Vinyl Craft Fence Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 29, 1979

241 N.L.R.B. 607 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

VINYL CRAFT FENCE CO.
Andrew Craft, a sole proprietor d/b/a Vinyl Craft
Fence Co. and United Steelworkers of America.
Cases 25-CA-9588 and 25-CA-9588-2
March 29, 1979 NA
An Age
DECISION AND ORDER
After a hea
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS nity to pres
AND MURPHY ine witness,
the Nation
On November 21, 1978, Administrative Law Judge dered to po
George F. McInerny issued the attached Decision in I Wl
this proceeding. Thereafter. Respondent filed excep- or oth
tions. becaus
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the tion 7
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- give te
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- Board
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. I wI
The Board has considered the record and the at- restrai
tached Decision in light of the exceptions, and has of the
decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclu- Natiot
sions' of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt I wl
his recommended Order, as modified herein. reinsta
longer
ORDER tion,
otherr
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor make
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- have s
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or- terest.
der of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified be- I w
low, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Andrew crimin
Craft, a sole proprietor d/b/a Vinyl Craft Fence Co.,
Kokomo, Indiana, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said rec-
ommended Order as so modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a) and
reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
"(a) Offer George Pyke immediate and full rein-
statement to his former job or, if his job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without GEORGE
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privi- tteeesult of
leges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for alleging thaalleging tha
any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason discharged (
of Respondent's discrimination against him in the ruary 15. I
manner and to the extent set forth in the section here charge alleg
entitled "The Remedy." nated again:
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the gion 25 of t
Administrative Law Judge. complaint he
etor d/b/a
Respondent.
(3), and (4
amended, he
coercing his
'In his remedy the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently failed to cite by denying i
F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), for the forumla used in the
computation of a backpay award. We therefore modify his remedy to in- dent, in his
clude the citation. labor practii
607
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
,TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ency of the United States Government
tring in which all parties had the opportu-
ent evidence and examine and cross-exam-
es, it has been decided that I have violated
al Labor Relations Act. I have been or-
ost this notice and to comply with its terms.
ILL NOT discharge, deny wage increases to,
erwise discriminate against my employees
se they engage in activity protected by Sec-
of the National Labor Relations Act or
estimony to the National Labor Relations
LL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
n, or coerce my employees in the exercise
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
ial Labor Relations Act.
ILL offer George Pyke immediate and full
itement to his former job or, if his job no
exists, to a substantially equivalent posi-
vithout prejudice to his seniority or any
rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and
him whole for any loss of earnings he may
uffered by reason of his discharge, plus in-
ILL make Ralph Ryan whole for any dis-
ation suffered by him, plus interest.
NDREW C. CRAFT, A SOLE PROPRIETOR
/B/A VINYL CRAFT FENCE CO.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
F. MCINERNY, Administrative Law Judge: As
a charge filed on January 24. 1978, by United
s of America, herein referred to as the Union,
t Vinyl Craft Fence Co. had discriminatorily
3eorge Pyke: an amended charge filed on Feb-
978, by the Union: and a second amended
ling that Vinyl Craft Fence Co. had discrimi-
st Ralph Ryan; the Regional Director for Re-
he National Labor Relations Board issued the
rein, alleging that Andrew Craft, a sole propri-
Vinyl Craft Fence Co., herein referred to as
or the Company, had violated Section 8(a)(1),
) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
rein referred to as the Act, by threatening and
employees; by discharging George Pyke; and
Ralph Ryan increases in his wage rate. Respon-
answer, denied the commission of any unfair
ces.
241 NLRB No. 95
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on this complaint
in Kokomo, Indiana, on July 6, 7, and 31, 1978. All parties
were represented. presented evidence, examined, and cross-
examined witnesses. Following the hearing the General
Counsel and Respondent submitted briefs which have been
carefully examined.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, including my
observation of the witnesses, I hereby make the following:
FIND)IN(S OF FACT
1. ITHE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The Respondent, Andrew Craft, is a sole proprietor
doing business as Vinyl Craft Fence Co. At all times mate-
rial herein he has maintained his principal office and place
of business in Kokomo, Indiana, where he is engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of vinyl coated chain link
fencing. During the year prior to the issuance of the com-
plaint herein Respondent sold manufactured products val-
ued in excess of $50,000 to purchasers who themselves are
engaged in interstate commerce. The complaint alleges, Re-
spondent admits, and I find that he is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
II. HE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The United Steelworkers of America is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. IHE UNFAIR LABOR PRA(cTICES
A. Background
In December 1976, George Pyke. who had been em-
ployed by Respondent since March of that same year, en-
gaged in discussions with his fellow employees Ryan, Loy.
Zwickey, and Tate concerning a union. At a result. Pyke
contacted one Breedon. a representative of the Steelwork-
ers, and was referred, in turn, to the Union International
Field Staff Representative Carl N. Morris. A meeting was
set up on December 31, at which Pyke, Ryan, Tate, Loy,
and an employee named Trotti signed union cards.
On receiving the signed cards, the Union filed a petition,
in Case 25-RC-6517. on January 10, 1977, for a unit of
production and maintenance employees of Respondent.
Following a stipulated election on June 9, 1977, at which
Pyke served as the observer for the Union, challenges to a
number of ballots were heard on September 6, 1977, and
resolved by the Board in an unpublished decision dated
April 19, 1978. The Union was certified as the exclusive
representative of certain of Respondent's employees on
May 16, 1978.'
While the representation case was making its way
through the processes of the Board, unfair labor practice
charges were filed against Respondent2 which resulted in
' There are no questions as to the appropriateness of the unit, or of any
refusal to bargain in good faith. The documents concerning the representa-
tion case were received to assist the trier of fact in plotting the courses of two
concurrent streams of events.
2 This case is identified in the General Counsel's brief as Case 25-CA-
8579 but in the record as Cases 25 CA 8578 and 25 CA-8578-2.
the issuance of a complaint, and the scheduling of a hearing
some time in May 1977, where a settlement was reached.
Certain employees of Respondent, including Pyke and
Ryan appeared at the hearing, but the record does not re-
veal whether they in fact testified or whether the settlement
was reached prior to their taking the witness stand. The
record in this case is clear, however, that Ryan and Pyke
did testify at the hearing on challenged ballots on Septem-
ber 6, 1977.
B. The Alleged 8(a)(1) Conduct
The General Counsel introduced evidence of Respon-
dent's activities in the period between the filing of the peti-
tion in Case 25-RC-6517 on January 10, 1977, and the
settlement agreement in May of that year. Respondent ob-
jected to the admission of this evidence on the grounds that
its receipt was foreclosed by Respondent's execution of, and
compliance with, the settlement agreement: and, further,
that all of the evidence proffered concerned events which
had occurred more than six months before the filing of the
charges in this case.
At the hearing I indicated my views to Respondent's
Counsel on this matter and urged him to furnish me with
citations to authorities supportive of his position. This he
has done, and, in fairness, I have carefully studied the au-
thorities he has cited. However, I am of the opinion that the
law on events occurring prior to the 6-month statute of
limitations contained in Section 10(b) of the Act has been
definitively settled by the Brian case,3 which itself is cited in
Respondent's brief.
In arguing that Section 10(b) prohibits consideration of
Respondent's conduct occurring more than 6 months prior
to the charge, Respondent cites Knickerbocker Manufactur-
ing Company, Inc., 109 NLRB 1195 (1954); Indiana Metal
Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 202 F.2d 613 (1953); and Olin
Industries, Inc., 97 NLRB 130 (1951). Aside from the fact
that all of these cases were decided before Bryan, it is clear
that the proposition they stand for is that Section 10(b) bars
use by the General Counsel or the Board of events which
occurred prior to the 6-month period as the basisforfindings
of unfair labor practices. In the instant case, the evidence
was offered by the General Counsel and received by me not
for the purpose of establishing violations of law, but to es-
tablish an attitude or character in order to illuminate and to
furnish a background for later events. The findings I make
must be based on those later events. Thus my ruling is not
inconsistent with the authorities cited by Respondent.
With respect to the effect of the prior settlement agree-
ment on the receipt of evidence as to events which were a
part of prior charges, complaints, and settlements, Respon-
dent has cited two categories of authorities. The first series
of cases stands for the proposition that the Board cannot, or
will not, make findings concerning independent allegations
of violations occurring prior to the settlement agreement:
Independent Life and Accident Co. d/bla Herald Life Insur-
ance Comrpany, 227 NLRB 1546 (1977); Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Helpers and Taxicab Drivers, Local 32 7, affiliated with
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
Local Lodge No. 1424. International Association of Machinists, A FL-CIO,
et al. v. V.LR B. 362 U. S. 411 (1960). reversing 264 F.2d 574 (1959).
608
VINYL CRAFT FENCE CO.
housemen and Helpers of America (Greer Stop Nut Co., a
Division of Kaynar Mfg. Co., Inc.), 160 NLRB 1919 (1966);
and Eveready Garage, Inc., 126 NLRB 13 (1960).
Here again, I must emphasize that the evidence in ques-
tion was not received by me for purpose of making findings
based thereon, nor do I make such findings. Respondent's
reliance on these authorities is thus misplaced.
The second group of cases dealing with settlements holds
that a settlement agreement, in and of itself, is not evidence
of hostility of antiunion animus and may not be used as the
basis for such a finding. Poray, Inc., 143 NLRB 617 (1963),
enfd. 337 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir., 1964); Southwest Chevrolet
Corp., 194 NLRB 975 (1972); Local No. 92, International
Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron
Workers, AFL-CIO (R. W. Hughes Construction Co., Inc.)
138 NLRB 428 (1962); Raymond Buick, Inc., 173 NLRB
1292 (1967); Lincoln Bearing Co.,' 133 NLRB 1069 (1961),
vacated 311 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1962); Bangor Plastics, 156
NLRB 1165 (1966), enforcement denied 392 F.2d 772 (6th
Cir., 1967).
In the instant case, of course, there has been no attempt
by the General Counsel to use the fact of the settlement
agreement as evidence of antiunion animus, and these cases
are inapposite to the issue here.5
Accordingly, in reliance upon Bryan, supra, I find that
evidence of animus and hostility occurring more than 6
months prior to the filing of the instant charges in January
1978 may be used to establish that such attitudes existed.
Further, in reliance on Northern California District Coun-
cil of Hodcarriers and Common Laborers of America, A FL-
CIO, et al., 154 NLRB 1384 (1965), affd. 389 F.2d 721 (9th
Cir. 1968), 1 find that the Board's policy with respect to
presettlement activities is that such conduct may be consid-
ered in assessing post-settlement actions of a Respondent.
Accordingly, the credible and undenied testimony of Ste-
ven E. Tate, James Loy, Jr., George Pyke, and Ralph Ryan
concerning the activities of John Craft, Respondent's son
and plant manager, is accepted as an accurate representa-
tion of events which took place in January 1977, and shows
that, at that time, by interrogating employees about their
union activities; by threatening employees with reprisals for
their union activity; by laying off Ralph Ryan: and by dis-
charging George Pyke, Respondent demonstrated anti-
union animus and hostility toward his employees' attempt
to organize.
In addition to these events, Ralph Ryan testified that
sometime between July 10 and 20, 1977, John Craft told
him that "the Union is not going to get in," and that Re-
spondent was going to get rid of "every one of you that
signed a union card" as soon as he had a chance.' This
conversation is also outside the 6-month period prior to the
instant charge, but it is an indication that, despite the settle-
'This case really concerned the issue of the Board's right to set aside a
settlement agreement in the absence of post-settlement violations.
5 Fanr Milling Co., 360 U. S. 301 (1959), was cited by Respondent, but that
case has nothing to do with the issues herein.
6 This conversation was not specifically denied by John Craft, although he
did deny that he had spoken to any employees about "union activities of any
sort." I do not credit Crafi's testimony on material issues. His memory was
inaccurate, and his denials of threats or other coercive conduct were made in
response to leading questions by Respondent's counsel in a conclusionary
and unconvincing fashion. Ryan, on the other hand, impressed me as a
credible, candid witness.
ment of the prior charges, Respondent's hostility and ani-
mus remained.
Following the hearing on challenged ballots on Septem-
ber 6, 1977, George Pyke was at work at the plant on Sun-
day, September 11. At this time John Craft came up to him
and with an obscenity, told Pyke he would like to bust his
head open "with a steel pipe." Craft went on to say that
Pyke was in the wrong crowd, that he should run around
with a better crowd, and that he was just going along with
the crowd to "get the union," adding that the reason Pyke
had not received a raise was "because of the union."'
C. The Discharge of George Pke
Pyke was hired by Respondent in March 1976. He
worked as a truck loader and as a fence-weaving machine
operator. He started at the rate of $2.50 per hour. After 8 or
9 weeks he was raised to $3 and to $3.50, a month or two
later. This last was his rate when he was discharged. As
noted above, Pyke was active in bringing the employees
into contact with the Union in December 1976, which fact
was known by Respondent in January 1977, and testified
credibly about interrogation by John Craft and his later
discharge by Croft in a conversation marred with antiunion
threats. Pyke was reinstated and awarded back pay as a
result of the settlement agreement in May 1977, and he
acted as the Union's observer at the representation election
on June 9.
The results of the election were not determined at that
time, due to a number of challenges which were yet to be
ruled upon, but on June 13 Respondent called the employ-
ees together and announced that they were going to "stop
playing games in this plant." He further stated that thence-
forth a doctor's excuse would be required for all absences
due to illness. Respondent did not stipulate what, if any,
discipline would be imposed for transgressions of this rule.
Pyke was admittedly not an exemplary employees. He
had trouble keeping up production, although the Company
kept no production records, and was absent frequently due
to illness. However, from June, when Respondent instituted
the new policy on illnesses, until October, nothing was said
or done about these absences. There is no evidence that
Pyke did not conform to this new policy.
Some time in October Pyke was called in to the office
where Respondent told him that if he did not keep up with
the other employees he was going to be terminated. Re-
spondent also mentioned Pyke's absentee record. but did
not indicate that poor attendance was going to furnish
grounds for discharge. Pyke was admonished to bring up
his productivity and was given 2 weeks to do it. The 2
weeks passed and nothing further was said to him about
either productivity or absenteeism.
On December 15 Pyke became ill after lunch, and, not
finding anyone in the office, asked several fellow employees
to tell Respondent that he was not feeling well and was
going to see a doctor. He visited a Dr. Bennett and was told
I credit Pyke's version of this story. Pyke is a person of limited education.
but I found him to be forthright and candid in his testimony despite ex-
tended and vigorous cross-examination. This testimony was not specifically
denied by John Craft. and, as noted above. I do not credit his general deni-
als.
609
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that he had high blood pressure. An appointment for x-rays
was set up for December 20 at St. Joseph Memorial Hospi-
tal in Kokomo. On the next day, December 16, Pyke called
John Craft and told him about the high blood pressure.
Craft was sympathetic and told Pyke to let him know as
soon as he had a more definite prognosis. Pyke called in
again on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, on each occa-
sion speaking to John Craft, who said it was "all right" that
he could not come in. About 2 weeks later, Pyke testified
that he came in to work, worked about 2 hours, but devel-
oped a headache and became dizzy, so he left after notify-
ing Ann Craft, Respondent's daughter and a secretary in
his office. 8 The following Monday, January 16, Pyke came
in to pick up his check and encountered John Craft. Ac-
cording to Pyke, Craft told him not to come to work unless
he had a doctor's excuse saying he could return to work.9
Later that week Pyke obtained a certificate from Dr.
Bennett that he could return to work on January 20. On
that date he presented himself ready for work at 8 a.m.
John Craft took the doctor's certificate and instructed Pyke
to return at 5 p.m. Pyke did as he was told, and, sometime
after 5 o'clock that evening spoke to Andrew Craft, Re-
spondent. Craft told Pyke "I thought you quit," and stated
that Pyke had never showed up for work. Pyke told him
about John Craft's request that he obtain a release from his
doctor and Andrew Craft replied that Pyke should find a
light job, that he might fall into one of the machines and get
hurt or killed.'0
Pyke's story of his illness is credible, undenied, and, in-
deed, corroborated at critical points by the testimony of
Respondent, his son, and daughter. Moreover, Respondent
gave no account of his action in discharging Pyke, other
than to state the fact that he was discharged. Respondent's
version of the events must then be constructed from the
evidentiary materials at hand. Since I am urged by Respon-
dent's brief to defer to the decision of the Indiana Employ-
ment Security Division, which "says it all concerning Mr.
Pyke." I have reviewed that decision. It is true that the
determination of eligibility issued by the Division sustains
the position of the employer. That determination was up-
held by an appeals referee. But aside from the fact that I
am not bound by a decision of the Indiana Employment
Security Division," I find that these decisions support the
General Counsel's contention that Respondent proffered
shifting and conflicting reasons for its actions toward Pyke.
Thus Respondent at one point said to Pyke that he thought
he had quit. This position was carried over into the answer
of Respondent to the complaint. Then Respondent stated
that Pyke had been replaced, but no evidence was pre-
sented as to who the replacement was, and Pyke's undenied
testimony about his conversation with John Craft, on Janu-
0 Respondent's records show that this was on January 9, 1978. Ann Craft
admitted that Pyke had told her he was dizzy, had high blood pressure, and
went home on that day.
I This conversation is corroborated by John Craft.
10This conversation was not denied by Andrew Craft. However, he did
state at one point in the record that Pyke was fired for absenteeism, and at
another point averred that he had been replaced. Respondent's answer to the
complaint alleged as an affirmative defense that Pyke had quit. This was
amended during the hearing when Andrew Craft testified that Pyke had been
discharged for absenteeism.
I mean no disrespect by this, but their standards and laws may be some-
what different from those I must observe.
ary 16, carries no hint of replacement. Quite the contrary,
John Craft told Pyke to be sure to have a doctor's excuse
that he was able to return to work. Finally, at this hearing
Respondent himself stated that Pyke was fired for absentee-
ism.
In the light of all the evidence before me, based on the
shifting reasons advanced by Respondent for his treatment
of Pyke, and on the fact that at no time was Pyke warned
that he would be discharged if the absenteeism continued,
the open and evident animus and hostility shown by John
Craft toward Pyke and the Union shortly after Pyke had
testified in favor of the Union at the challenged ballots
hearing in September 1977, 1 find that Pyke would not,
despite his poor attendance record, have been discharged
on January 20, 1978, if it were not for the fact that he had
engaged in union activity and had given testimony before
the National Labor Relations Board. Signal Delivery Ser-
vice, Inc., 226 NLRB 843 (1976); Branthaven, Inc., d/b/a
Hospitality Home, 192 NLRB 1062 (1971).
D. The Failure To Increase Ryan's Wages
Ralph Ryan began work at the Company on December
28, 1975. He also started out as a truck loader, but after
only one day he was assigned to work on the weaving ma-
chines where he remained until he resigned around May 12,
1978. When he started, Ryan was paid at the rate of $3.50
per hour. After a month, and after he had begun working
on the weaving machines, his rate was increased to $4. In
September 1976 he received another 50 cents, bringing the
rate to $4.50. Ryan testified that he asked for another raise
between January I and 10, 1977 and was granted a 25-cent
increase. He remained at this same rate, $4.75, until he re-
signed.
Ryan was identified as participating, with Pyke and oth-
ers, in signing a union card and participating in union meet-
ings.
Ryan was a good worker, was praised by John Craft, and
was told by John after he had been on the weaving machine
for less than a month that he would be "up with the other
guys" within a year. The "other guys" are identified by
Ryan as James Pearson and Michael Zwickey, who worked
full-time on weaving machines at a rate of $6 per hour.
Respondent's reasons for not granting any further raises,
as in the case of Pyke's discharge, suffer from a lack of
consistency as well as candor. Andrew Craft testified that
Ryan was not doing a good enough job. However, he was
never reprimanded for not doing good work, not offered
training in the more technical intricacies of the weaving
machine, and, indeed, John Craft testified that Ryan was
progressing satisfactorily at the time of his resignation.
As another reason why Ryan did not receive a raise, Re-
spondent stated that no one received a raise. This defense is
contradicted by evidence that a number of employees,' in-
cluding Carl Justice, James Stine, Myron Roberts, and Don
Ely, were granted raises unconnected, as claimed by Re-
spondent, with a new job assignment. What is clear is that
none of the employees who were employed at the time of
" All of whom were hired after the date of the election, June 9, 1977, in
Case 25-RC-6517.
610
VINYL CRAFT FENCE CO.
the filing of the petition in Case 25-RC-6517 received a
raise thereafter. No economic or other reasons were ad-
vanced by Respondent for this." This explanation, like the I. Respon
first, is unconvincing. within the rr
Finally, Respondent advanced as a reason why Ryan was 2. United
not awarded a raise was the asserted fact that Ryan, unlike tion within t
more experienced employees, Pearson and Zwickey, and 3. By thr
later Justice and Williamson," could not perform the tech- Pyke, Respo
nical maintenance and adjustment functions required be- 4. By disc
cause of the small size of Respondent's operation. behalf of the
There was a great deal of testimony of Respondent and National La
Union Representative Carl N. Morris concerning the rela- violated Secl
tive requirements for reaching journeyman status as a 5. By reft
weaving machine operator. In view of my findings and con- because of h
clusions hereinafter stated, I do not find it necessary to at- has violated
tempt to resolve the merits, or relative merits, of this con- 6. The aft
troversy. practices affe
In reviewing Ralph Ryan's record, I find that Respon- 2(6) and (7)
dent's wage policy was, at least up to the advent of the Upon the
Union, based on Respondent's subjective evaluation of the the entire re
work of employees. This system rewarded those who per- sions of Sect
formed to Respondent's satisfaction, and since Ryan's work recommend(
admittedly satisfied Respondent, he received three increases
in a relatively short time.
With the coming of the Union, in January 1977, this pol-
icy changed to a policy of granting no wage increases. The Resp,
Based in part on the background evidence submitted by the Vinyl Craft
General Counsel showing Respondent's hostility and ani- shall:
mus toward the Union early in 1977, but more importantly 1. Cease
on the statement by John Craft to Pyke in September 1977 (a) Threa
to the effect that he was not granted an increase because of increases be,
the Union, I infer and find that Respondent denied an in- (b) Threa
crease to Ryan for the same reason, the union activity of testimony be
Ryan and the other employees. (c) Disch;
Respondent's defenses are, as noted above, inconsistent employees t
and shifting, leading to the inference, which I draw in this cause they g
instance, that the real reason for denying Ryan a wage in- tions Board.
crease was his union activity. Shattuck-Denn Mining Corp. (d) In anl
v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466 (C.A. 9, 1967). coercing em
teed them b
IV. THE REMEDY 2. Take ti
to be necess
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain (a) Offer
unfair labor practices I shall recommend that he be ordered former or st
to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative whole in the
action including the reinstatement of George Pyke together "The Remec
with back pay and the payment to Ralph Ryan of a sum of (b) Make
money equivalent to the sum of the raises he was not fered by hit
granted in the period from January 1977 to May 1978, to- section entit
gether with interest thereon computed in the manner pre- (c) Post a
scribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977) attached no
(see also Isis Plumbing and Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716). tices, on for
'1 In the light of Pyke's statement that John Craft told him he had not
received a raise if it were not for the Union, this situation is certainly suspi- 1S In the evet
cious. But there is no allegation in the complaint that other employees were Rules and Reg
denied raises because of union activity, so there is no issue for me to con- conclusions, ani
sider. of the Rules a:
14 Pearson and Zwickey had resigned at some time prior to the hearing. findings, conclu
Williamson and Justice were recruited by Respondent from Florida in Octo- waived for all
ber 1977 because of an unspecified "need" for expenenced weaving machime "In the ever
operators. Williamson resigned in March 1978. Both he and Justice were States Court of
hired at the rate of S6 per hour. After Williamson resigned Justice was given the National La
raises of SI per hour in May1978 and another 50 cents in June, bringing his ment of the Un
current rate to $7.50 per hour. tional Labor R,
611
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
dent is an employer engaged in commerce
ieaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Steelworkers of America is a labor organiza-
he meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
eatening and coercing its employee, George
mndent has violated Section 8(aXl) of the Act.
:harging George Pyke because of his activity on
e Union, and because he gave testimony in a
bor Relations Board hearing, Respondent has
tion 8(a)( I), (3)., and (4) of the Act.
ising to grant wage increases to Ralph Ryan
is activities on behalf of the Union Respondent
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
oresaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
cting commerce within the meaning of Section
of the Act.
foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
cord in this matter, and pursuant to the provi-
ion 10(c) of the Act I hereby issue the following
ed:
ORDERs
ondent, Andrew Craft, a sole proprietor d/b/a
Fence Co., his agents, successors, and assigns,
and desist from:
tening or coercing employees with loss of pay
cause they engage in union activity.
tening or coercing employees because they give
fore the National Labor Relations Board.
arging or refusing to grant wage increases to
because they engage in union activity, or be-
give testimony before the National Labor Rela-
y other manner interfering with, restraining or
nployees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
y Section 7 of the Act.
he following affirmative action which is deemed
ary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
George Pyke immediate reinstatement to his
ibstantially equivalent position, and make him
manner described above in the section entitled
dy."
Ralph Ryan whole for the discrimination suf-
n, also in the manner described above in the
led "The Remedy."
it his Kokomo, Indiana, facility, copies of the
tice marked "Appendix." '6 Copies of said no-
ms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
nt no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
ulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings,
d recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
nd Regulations. be adopted by the Board and become its
sions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
purposes.
at that this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of
abor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
nited States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na-
elations Board."
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
gion 25, after being duly signed by Respondent, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof
and be maintained by him for 60 consecutive days there-
after, in conspicuous places, including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that such notices
are not altered, defaced. or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
have been taken by Respondent to comply herewith.
612