Todd Davis et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 4, 2021

2020000177 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 4, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/087,579 04/15/2011 Todd A. Davis 67097-1428PUS1;
58123US01
6533
54549 7590 10/04/2021
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS/PRATT & WHITNEY
400 West Maple Road
Suite 350
Birmingham, MI 48009
EXAMINER
FORD, RENE D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3741
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/04/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TODD A. DAVIS and BRIAN P. CIGAL
Appeal 2020-000177
Application 13/087,579
Technology Center 3700

Before ANNETTE R. REIMERS, SUSAN L. C. MITCHELL, and
ERIC C. JESCHKE Administrative Patent Judges.

REIMERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–7, 30–34, and 36–43. Claims 8–29
have been withdrawn from consideration. Claims 2 and 35 has been
cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 The subject application was previously before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board in Appeal No. 2016-001615. See Decision dated July 5, 2017. In that
Decision, the adverse decision of claims 1 and 3–7 of the Examiner was
AFFIRMED. Following that Decision, Appellant reopened prosecution,
added new claims, and submitted record evidence to support its positions.
2 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as United Technologies
Corporation. Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) 1, filed Apr. 2, 2019.
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We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject matter “relates to a gas turbine engine, and in
particular, to a case structure therefor.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claims 1, 30, and 36 are
independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter and recites:
1. A front center body support for a gas turbine engine
comprising:
a front center body section defined about an axis;
a bearing section defined about said axis; and
a frustoconical interface section defined about said axis,
said frustoconical interface section between said front center
body section and said bearing section,
wherein said front center body section is welded to said
bearing section at a weld within said frustoconical interface
section.
REJECTIONS3
I. Claims 41 and 42 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
II. Claims 41 and 42 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as indefinite.

3 The Examiner has withdrawn the 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
rejection of claims 36–40 and 43 as failing to comply with the written
description requirement. See Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) 3, dated Aug. 8,
2019; see also Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) 6–7, dated Oct. 17, 2018.
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III. Claims 1, 3–7, 41, and 42 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Sheridan (US 2010/0105516 A1, published Apr. 29, 2010)
and Thebert (US 4,683,714, issued Aug. 4, 1987).4
IV. Claim 30–32 and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Allen (US 6,109,022, issued Aug. 29, 2000) and Thebert.
V. Claims 36, 37, 39, 40, and 43 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Allen, Thebert, and Newland (US 5,161,940, issued
Nov. 10, 1992).
VI. Claim 33 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Allen, Thebert, and Ashley (US 2007/0104574 A1, published May 10,
2007).
VII. Claim 38 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Allen, Thebert, Newland, and Ashley.
ANALYSIS
Written Description
Claim 41
Claim 1 recites “said frustoconical interface section between said
front center body section and said bearing section, wherein said front center
body section is welded to said bearing section at a weld within said
frustoconical interface section.” Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.). Claim 41,
which depends from claim 1, recites “wherein the front center body section
has a first thickness at the weld, and the bearing section has a second
thickness at the weld.” Id. at 13 (Claims App.). The Examiner determines

4 Claims 41 and 42 are not listed in the heading of the rejection but are
discussed in the body of the rejection. Final Act. 9–12.
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that “[t]here is no mention of any thickness within the original disclosure”
and that the only mention of a weld is found as paragraph 20 of the
Specification, which states that “[t]he [frustroconical] interface section 76
may include a weld W.” Final Act. 6–7.5 The Examiner reasons that “[a]s
the weld is described as [being] included in the frustro-conical section 76 as
well as [being] shown in [Figure 4 of the drawings] as placed in the middle
of the frusto-conical section 76, the bearing section and the front center body
section both are not positioned at the weld and therefore do not have the
claimed thicknesses at the weld.” Id. at 7. Additionally, the Examiner takes
the position that “claim 1 clearly defines three separate and distinct sections
where the frustoconical interface section, as claimed, is a separate and
distinct section from the front center body section and bearing section.”
Ans. 11.
Appellant contends that “[t]he Figures depict the frustro-conical
interface section 76 containing the weld W as being two portions that meet
at the weld, one of those portions being a contiguous extension of the front
center body section 72 and the other being a contiguous extension of the
bearing section 74.” Appeal Br. 9 (citing Figs. 2, 3).
Appellant has the better position. The Specification describes that
“[t]he frustoconical interface section 76 combines the front center body
section 72 and the bearing section 74 to form a unified load path.” Spec.

5 We reference amended paragraph 20 of the Specification, dated October 2,
2014.
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¶ 20 (emphases added); see also Fig. 4;6 Appeal Br. 9. Stated differently, as
frustoconical interface section 76 connects/unites front center body
section 72 and bearing section 74 to form a unified load path, frustoconical
interface section 76 is not “a separate and distinct section” from front center
body section 72 and bearing section 74, as alleged by the Examiner. See
Ans. 11. Further, although the Specification does not disclose that front
body section 72 and bearing section 74 have a thickness at weld W, a
thickness is an inherent property of a structure at a point. See Fig. 4; see
also Davis Declaration ¶ 10 (“The weld W joins walls. There is no question
these walls have a thickness.”).7,8
For the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claim 41 for lack of written description.
Claim 42
Claim 42, which depends from claim 41, recites “wherein the first and
second thicknesses are the same as one another.” Appeal Br. 13 (Claims
App.). The Examiner notes that Appellant “is reminded that it is improper to
rely on drawings for dimensions when the drawings are not disclosed as
made to scale (see MPEP 2125)” and that “[t]he instant application does not
disclose that [Figure] 4, the only drawing showing the weld W, or any other
drawings are to scale.” Final Act. 7; see also Ans. 12.

6 We reference replacement sheet for Figure 4 of the subject application,
filed October 2, 2014.
7 Declaration of Todd Davis (“Davis Declaration”), one of the above-named
inventors, filed June 28, 2018.
8 We note the Examiner acknowledges that Figure 4 of the subject
application “does show thicknesses at the weld.” Ans. 11; see also Final
Act. 3.
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Appellant contends that the Davis Declaration constitutes “submitted
record evidence that the features of claim 42 are supported at least in
Figure 4.” Appeal Br. 9 (citing Davis Declaration ¶ 10, annotated Figure 4
provided in the Davis Declaration). Appellant further contends that MPEP
§ 2125 relates to “Drawings as Prior Art” and that “[t]he Examiner has not
provided any authority to support the assertion that drawings must be
designated as to scale for the purpose of the written description
requirement.” Id.
Paragraph 10 of the Davis Declaration states that “[t]he thicknesses
are shown as being the same in [annotated Figure 4], although the
thicknesses may also be different for tuning purposes, if desired.” Davis
Declaration ¶ 10. Although Appellant is correct that MPEP § 2125 is
directed to “Drawings as Prior Art,” MPEP § 2125 II cites to the authority
relevant in this circumstance. See Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia
Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is well
established that patent drawings do not define the precise proportions of the
elements and may not be relied on to show particular sizes if the
specification is completely silent on the issue.”); see also In re Olson, 212
F.2d 590, 592 (CCPA 1954) (affirming new matter rejection, stating
“[o]rdinarily drawings which accompany an application for a patent are
merely illustrative of the principles embodied in the alleged invention
claimed therein and do not define the precise proportions of elements relied
upon to endow the claims with patentability” and, quoting the affirmed
Board decision, “‘[i]t is well known that Patent Office drawings are not
normally drawn to scale, with the dimensions and sizes of parts shown to
exact measurements as are shop drawings’”); MPEP § 2125 II (“When the
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reference does not disclose that the drawings are to scale and is silent as to
dimensions, arguments based on measurement of the drawing features are of
little value.”).
In this case, the Specification is silent on the thicknesses of front
center body section 72 and bearing section 74 at the weld. See Spec.,
passim; see also Final Act. 6–7 (“There is no mention of any thickness
within the original disclosure.”). Because there is no indication that the
drawings are to scale and the Specification is silent as to any dimensions, in
this case thicknesses, Figure 4 of the subject application may not be relied
upon to disclose the comparative thicknesses of the front center body section
and the bearing section at the weld.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 42 for lack of written description.
Indefiniteness
Claim 41
The Examiner rejects claim 41 under 35 U.S.C. §112, second
paragraph, for indefiniteness on the same basis as discussed above for the
rejection of claim 41 under 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, for lack of
written description. Final Act. 8; see also Ans. 12. As discussed above,
although the Specification does not disclose that front body section 72 and
bearing section 74 have a thickness at weld W, a thickness is an inherent
property of a structure at a point. See Fig. 4; see also Davis Declaration ¶ 10
(“The weld W joins walls. There is no question these walls have a
thickness.”).9

9 See fn. 8 above.
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For these reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 41 for indefiniteness.
Claim 42
The Examiner rejects claim 42 for indefiniteness under the same basis
as the rejection of claim 41. Final Act. 8; see also Ans. 12. The Examiner
does not present additional reasons for why claim 42 is considered
indefinite. For the same reasons discussed above for claim 41, we likewise
do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 42 for indefiniteness.
Obviousness over Sheridan and Thebert
Claims 1, 3–7, 41, and 42
Appellant does not offer arguments in favor of dependent claims 3–7,
41, and 42 separate from those presented for independent claim 1. Appeal
Br. 3–6. We select claim 1 as the representative claim, and claims 3–7, 41,
and 42 stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner finds that Sheridan discloses all the limitations of
claim 1 except for “said front center body section is welded to said bearing
section at a weld within said frustoconical interface section.” See Final Act.
10–11; see also Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.). The Examiner reasons that
“[a] weld would only be necessary in the case where the frustoconical
section is composed of two frustoconical subsections that would then be fit
together to form the frustoconical section as shown” and that it would have
been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan “to separate the frustoconical
section into two subsections, since it has been held that constructing a
formerly integral structure in various elements involves only routine skill in
the art.” Final Act. 11 (citing In re Dulberg, 289 F.2d 522, 523 (CCPA
1961)).
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The Examiner also finds Thebert discloses that “welding is a
known/conventional means of attachment for gas turbine engine support
structures.” Id. (citing Thebert 6:1–4).10 The Examiner further reasons that
it would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan “to combine the
teachings of a weld as a means of rigid attachment, as taught by Thebert, to
the device of Sheridan (with the frustoconical section being comprised of
two subsections), as part of an obvious combination of known prior art
structures,” in this case being “the use of welds in gas turbine support
structure, to achieve the predictable result of a rigid attachment of two
components (in the instant case the two frustoconical subsections).” Id.
(citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007); MPEP
§ 2141 III A).
As an initial matter, Appellant contends that “the Board’s previous
decision was based on a perceived lack of record evidence to support
Appellant’s position[s], which [have] been corrected by the [Davis]
Declaration” and that “[t]he Examiner has not properly considered the
[D]eclaration because the Examiner believes the Board has already decided
against Appellant’s positions.” Appeal Br. 3–4; see also id. at 5–6
(Appellant arguing that the Examiner has dismissed Appellant’s arguments
based on res judicata); Reply Br. 1–2;11 Final Act. 3–4; Ans. 12–13.

10 We note Newland discloses that “the means for securing the inner and
outer rings 24, 26 to the supported or supporting structures may include the
bolted connections 28 as shown in FIG. 1 as well as any of a variety of
known means for securing annular structures, such as mating threads,
welding, splining, etc.” Newland 4:15–20 (emphases added).
11 Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”), filed Oct. 7, 2019.
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First, res judicata is not applicable when new evidence directed
towards patentability has been provided. See In re Herr, 377 F.2d 610,
(CCPA 1967) (res judicata not applicable despite similarities between
previously adjudicated and current claims because applicant provided new
evidence of patentability). Here, Appellant submitted the Davis Declaration
as new evidence regarding patentability. See Davis Declaration; see also
Appeal Br. 3–6; Reply Br. 1–2. Therefore, res judicata is not applicable in
this case. Second, contrary to Appellant’s contention, the Examiner has
given the Davis Declaration “appropriate weight” by adequately explaining
on the record why the relied-upon aspects of the Davis Declaration were not
persuasive. See Final Act. 4–5, Ans. 13–14; see also Appeal Br. 3–6; Reply
Br. 1–2.
Appellant contends that “the Examiner mischaracterizes Dulberg,” in
that “[t]he [Dulberg] court did not state that it is per se obvious to separate
an explicitly unitary feature in the prior art into multiple subsections.”
Appeal Br. 4–5. As such, Appellant concludes “the assertion that it would
have been obvious to separate the feature of Sheridan that the Examiner
considers to be a frustoconical section into two subsections has no basis in
the art.” Id. at 5.
We disagree with Appellant’s contention for the following reasons.
First, the Examiner points out that “Sheridan discloses the claimed invention
with the exception of the weld.” Final Act. 11. The Examiner reasons that
separating Sheridan’s frustoconical section into two subsections, i.e.,
constructing a formerly integral structure in various elements, involves only
routine skill in the art. Final Act. 11. We agree with the Examiner’s
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assessment of what is routine skill in the art here. See Thebert 6:1–4;
Newland 4:15–20.
Appellant does not apprise us how such a proposed separation would
be outside of the knowledge within the level of ordinary skill in the art. See
Appeal Br. 3–6; see also Reply Br. 1–2. Moreover, in response to
Appellant’s argument about applying the Dulberg decision to the facts here,
the Examiner refers to a discussion from the Response to Argument section
in the Final Action that identifies a reason to provide the frustoconical
section in two subsections, i.e., easier and cheaper production. Ans. 13
(¶ 12) (discussing Final Act. 4 (¶ 10)). Appellant does not address in the
briefing on appeal this additional reason (aside from Dulberg) to separate
Sheridan’s frustoconical section into two subsections. We view this
additional reasoning as supported by rational underpinnings.
Second, the Examiner points out, and Appellant does not dispute, that
“Thebert teaches that welding is a known/conventional means of attachment
for gas turbine engine support structures.” Final Act. 11; see also Appeal
Br. 3–6; Reply Br. 1–2. Third, the Examiner reasons that further modifying
Sheridan’s frustoconical section with the teachings of Thebert, i.e., the use
of welds in gas turbine support structure, achieves the predictable result of a
rigid attachment of two components, i.e., the two frustoconical subsections.
Final Act. 11. As discussed below, Appellant’s contention regarding the
weld yielding unexpected results is unpersuasive. See Appeal Br. 5; see also
Davis Declaration ¶ 7.
Appellant contends that “there is record evidence that a skilled person
would have expected the Examiner’s proposed modification of Sheridan to
be time consuming and expensive without any apparent benefit.” Appeal
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Br. 5; see also Davis Declaration ¶ 5. According to Appellant, “the
proposed change to Sheridan ha[s] disadvantages, but no benefits that a
person of ordinary skill would have expected at the time the application was
filed. As such, a skilled person would necessarily have expected the benefits
lost to outweigh the benefits gained.” Appeal Br. 5; see also Davis
Declaration ¶ 5 (“[A] welded two-piece arrangement would add cost and
time over Sheridan’s disclosed center body support with no identified need
or benefit.”).
In response to Appellant’s contention, the Examiner reasons that “[a]
weld is taught as a conventional attachment means within the art by
secondary reference Thebert. A conventional technique such as welding
would not be expected to add substantial burden to production,” noting (as
discussed above) that “smaller pieces or subsections, as opposed to the
larger section, can be easier to produce.” Ans. 13; see also Final Act. 4 (the
Examiner explaining that “[it] can be cheaper to produce two
subcomponents than the fully formed component. For example, if the
owned production equipment is not large enough to produce the full
component but can produce the subcomponent then the production facility
avoids [the] cost of new equipment.”). Appellant does not apprise us of
error in the Examiner’s findings. Appeal Br. 3–6; see also Reply Br. 1–2.
Appellant also contends that “the claimed features are critical because
they enable the overall stiffness of the structure to be tuned, and this result is
unexpected because it is not found in the art.” Appeal Br. 5; see also Davis
Declaration ¶ 7 (explaining that paragraph 20 of the Specification describes
that “the overall stiffness of the structure can be tuned” and that “[t]his may
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be achieved by using different wall thicknesses or materials for the bearing
section and the frustoconical interface section”).
As an initial matter, the Examiner correctly points out that
paragraph 20 of the Specification “explicitly states that the integral section,
as opposed to the welded section, has the increased ability to tune the
stiffness. Thus[,] the weld is not critical for the alleged unexpected result.”
Ans. 14 (emphasis added); see also Spec. ¶ 20 (“The integral, flange-less
arrangement of the frustroconical interface section 76 facilitates a light
weight, reduced part count arrangement with an increased ability to tune the
overall stiffness to achieve rotor dynamic requirements.”) (emphases added).
Further, in response to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner reasons
that “the alleged unexpected result is a result of different wall thicknesses or
materials and not dependent on the weld.” Ans. 13. The Examiner also
reasons that “[o]ne could tune the overall stiffness of a one-piece
frustoconical interface section, i.e. a frustoconical interface section that does
not include a weld, by employing different wall thicknesses (of the
frustoconical interface section)” or by “using different materials (a weld is
not necessary to use different materials, sub-sections of the one-piece
frustoconical interface section could be bonded without a weld such as by
production via 3-D printing).” Id. at 13–14. Appellant does not apprise us
of error of these findings from the Examiner in the Reply Brief or address
these findings at all. Reply Br. 1–2.
Although not addressed by Appellant in the briefing on appeal, we
note that paragraph 6 of the Davis Declaration states “[Appellant] has argued
that joining a two-piece structure with a weld does not make the structure
more rigid compared to the same structure as if it were one piece. This is
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true” and that “[o]ne would . . . expect a welded structure to be ‘as stiff’ as—
not stiffer than—an equivalent non-welded structure.” Davis Declaration
¶ 6.
In response, the Examiner clarifies that this comparative argument
“[w]as never presented” by the Examiner, and that the Examiner has in fact
agreed with Mr. Davis and “stated that a weld is a known structure used to
rigidly attach two components.” Final Act. 4. Appellant is incorrect that the
Examiner disagrees with Mr. Davis on this point. See Davis Declaration ¶ 6.
In summary, and based on the record presented, we are not persuaded
the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 as unpatentable over
Sheridan and Thebert. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 1 as unpatentable over Sheridan and Thebert. We further sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 3–7, 41, and 42, which fall with claim 1.
Obviousness over Allen and Thebert
Claims 30–32 and 34
Appellants do not offer arguments in favor of dependent claims 31,
32, and 34 separate from those presented for independent claim 30. Appeal
Br. 6–7. We select claim 30 as the representative claim, and claims 31, 32,
and 34 stand or fall with claim 30. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant contends that “[o]ne would not modify Allen as proposed,
as the modification would render it unsatisfactory for its intended purpose of
providing a frangible support.” Reply Br. 2. In particular, Appellant
contends that “a skilled person would not have found it obvious to join
Allen’s elements 27 and 28 with a weld,” in that “[a] skilled person would
be discouraged from welding Allen’s frangible support member 27 to
element 28 because Allen’s intended operation would require the weld to be
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stronger than the frangible support member 27 itself,” and that “such a weld
would add considerable difficulty to replacing the frangible support
member 27 every time the member 27 breaks compared to any reversible
joining method.” Appeal Br. 6.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive of error by the Examiner for
the following reasons. First, Appellant has not provided sufficient evidence
to support the contention that “Allen’s intended operation would require the
weld to be stronger than the frangible support member 27 itself.” Id.; see
also Reply Br. 2. Second, Allen is silent regarding the joining method for
attaching fixed structure 26, which includes annular panel 28, to frangible
support member 27(see Allen 2:61–3:3, Fig. 2), and Appellant has not
identified any “reversible joining method” suitable for attaching gas turbine
engine components (Appeal Br. 6). See Ans. 15 (the Examiner explaining
that “[a] ‘reversible joining method’ is not an ordinary or conventional term
within the art, so it is unclear how this method is performed, what structure
is associated, and whether this method would be appropriate for use in
joining elements 27 and 28 of the frustoconical section of Allen” and
referencing “the undefined reversible joining method mentioned in
Appellant’s argument”) (emphasis added). As such, Appellant has not
provided sufficient evidence to support the contention of a comparable, more
suitable reversible joining method over the conventional welding method
proposed by the Examiner.
Appellant further contends that “the claimed weld is critical because it
enables the overall stiffness of the claimed structure to be tuned, and this
result is unexpected because it is not found in the art.” Appeal Br. 6–7; see
also Davis Declaration ¶ 7. However, as correctly noted by the Examiner,
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this conclusion that the weld enables tuning of the overall stiffness is simply
not supported by the evidence in paragraph 20 of the Specification cited by
Mr. Davis in support of this conclusion. Ans. 15; see also id. (the Examiner
explaining that “the increased ability to tune stiffness is . . . taught as a
property of an integral member [in the subject application]. Thus, the
enabling of stiffness tuning is not an unexpected result of the weld.”); see
also Spec. ¶ 20 (discussing integral frustoconical interface section 76 as
having “an increased ability to tune the overall stiffness”); Davis Declaration
¶ 7 (discussing paragraph 20 of the Specification in support); In re Geisler,
116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that unsupported attorney
argument as to unexpected results is entitled to little weight); In re De
Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“It is well settled that
unexpected results must be established by factual evidence.”).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claim 30 as unpatentable over Allen and Thebert.
We further sustain the rejection of claims 31, 32, and 34, which fall with
claim 30.
Obviousness over Allen, Thebert, and any of Newland, Ashley,
or Newland and Ashley
Claims 33, 36–40, and 43
Appellant does not present arguments for independent claim 36 or
dependent claims 33, 37–40, and 43 separate from those presented for claim
30. See Appeal Br. 6–7. As we find no deficiencies in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 30 as unpatentable over Allen and Thebert for the reasons
discussed above, we likewise sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 33,
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36–40, and 43 as unpatentable over the variously indicated combinations of
cited prior art.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
41, 42 112 Written
Description
42 41
41, 42 112 Indefiniteness 41, 42
1, 3–7, 41,
42
103(a) Sheridan, Thebert 1, 3–7, 41,
42

30–32, 34 103(a) Allen, Thebert 30–32, 34
36, 37, 39,
40, 43
103(a) Allen, Thebert,
Newland
36, 37, 39,
40, 43

33 103(a) Allen, Thebert,
Ashley
33
38 103(a) Allen, Thebert,
Newland, Ashley
38
Overall
Outcome
1, 3–7, 30–
34, 36–43

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED