Michael F. Longo, Complainant,v.Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 23, 2003
01A24811 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 23, 2003)

01A24811

12-23-2003

Michael F. Longo, Complainant, v. Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Michael F. Longo v. Department of the Air Force

01A24811

December 23, 2003

.

Michael F. Longo,

Complainant,

v.

Dr. James G. Roche,

Secretary,

Department of the Air Force,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A24811

Agency No. 00DCMW41001

Hearing No. 360-AO-8514X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal

is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons,

the Commission affirms the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Store Worker, WG-04, at Laughlin

Air Force Base (AFB) Commissary, in Del Rio, Texas, filed a formal EEO

complaint on December 12, 1999, alleging that the agency had discriminated

against him in reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

(1) his voluntary reassignment from the Kingsville Naval Air Station

(NAS) Commissary to the Laughlin AFB Commissary resulted in less pay

even though he was told that his pay would not change;

on October 24, 1999 his first-level supervisor (S1) at the Laughlin

AFB Commissary, threatened to take personnel action against him;

he was subjected to negative comments from management regarding his

previous EEO complaint activity;

on June 8, 1999 he received a Letter of Requirement;

he was told not to return to work unless medical documentation was

provided;

he was charged Absent Without Leave (AWOL) for the week of October 24

through October 28, 1999; and

he was given a Notice of Proposed 14 Calendar Day Suspension.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,

finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant established a prima facie case

of reprisal discrimination that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The AJ found that complainant

did not establish that more likely than not, the agency's articulated

reasons were pretexts to mask unlawful discrimination/retaliation.

The AJ found that complainant requested a reassignment from the

Kingsville NAS Commissary to the Laughlin AFB Commissary, and that the

transfer was arranged and complainant was reassigned in the same grade

and step. The AJ further found that after complainant reported to AFB,

it was discovered that his hourly rate of pay would decrease because

of the applicability of a different locality pay rate for Del Rio,

Texas area. The AJ concluded that management reassigned complainant as

complainant requested and that management was not aware that the pay rate

would change or they deliberately withheld such information; therefore,

there was no evidence to indicate that there was a discriminatory intent

in reassigning complainant at his own request.

With respect to issues number two through six, the AJ noted that

management became aware of complainant's prior EEO activity sometime

in October of 1999. The AJ found that from April 13, 1999 until

June 8, 1999 complainant requested and received approval for leave on

eighteen separate occasions. The AJ also found that on June 8, 1999,

complainant was issued a Letter of Requirement due to excessive use of

sick and annual leave. The AJ further found that the letter stated that

complainant was advised that effective immediately, he needed to furnish

medical certification for any sick leave requested. The AJ noted that

in October, 1999 complainant again did not furnish medical certification

for his absence on October 15 and October 18 through 21, 1999. The AJ

found that on October 24, 1999, S1 advised complainant that he would not

be allowed to return work until he furnished a medical certificate. The

AJ also found that S1 misunderstood the advice she received from the

Personnel Management Specialist and erroneously charged complainant

AWOL for October 24 through the 28. However, the AJ found that once

the mistake was discovered complainant was reimbursed for the erroneous

AWOL charge.

Regarding the final issue, the AJ found that management issued the Notice

of Proposed Suspension because of complainant's excessive use of annual

and sick leave. Finally, the AJ found that the Notice was based entirely

on complainant's failure to come to work and failure to provide sufficient

medical documentation.

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision. On appeal,

complainant restates arguments previously.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We begin by noting that we are reviewing the AJ's decision without

a hearing, and the final agency decision adopting them, under a de

novo standard of review. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405 (a) (stating that

a �decision on an appeal from an agency's final action shall be based

on a de novo review...�); see also EEOC Management Directive for 29

C.F.R. Part 1614 (rev. Nov.9, 1999) (�EEO MD-110"), at 9-16 (providing

that an administrative judge's �decision to issue a decision without a

hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)] will be reviewed de novo�).

This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes.

In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if

erroneous) the AJ's, and agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis-

including on the ultimate of whether intentional discrimination occurred,

and on the legal issue of whether any federal discrimination employment

statute was violated. See id. at 9-15.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact . 29 C.F.R. � 1614. 109 (g). This regulation is patterned after

the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is only appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exist

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id at 255. An issue of fact is �genuine� if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F. 2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is �material�

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, the issuance of

a decision without a hearing is not appropriate. Similarly, and AJ may

not issue a decision without a hearing if he or she actually has to find

facts first to do so. After a careful review of the record, the Commission

finds that the issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate,

as no genuine dispute of material fact exists. Specifically, we note

that assuming arguendo that complainant established a prima facie

case of reprisal discrimination, the agency established legitimate

non-discriminatory reasons for its actions which complainant did not

rebut with sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could

conclude that unlawful retaliatory animus motivated the agency's actions.

We conclude that complainant has not �set forth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.� Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (e).

We further find that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant

facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws.

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the agency's final order

adopting the AJ's decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 23, 2003

__________________

Date