01985919
04-12-2000
Janette J. Wells v. United States Postal Service
01985919
April 12, 2000
Janette J. Wells, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01985919
) Agency No. 1H-337-0033-97
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
On July 27, 1998, Janette J. Wells (the complainant) timely filed an
appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission)
from a final agency decision (FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The Commission
hereby accepts the appeal in accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659
(1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly determined that
complainant had failed to prove that the agency discriminated against her
based on race, color, sex and reprisal when her request for a temporary
change of schedule was not approved and her request for annual leave
was denied.
BACKGROUND
Complainant was employed by the agency as a Distribution Clerk at the
agency's Processing and Distribution Center in St. Petersburg, Florida.
She initiated EEO Counseling on August 25, 1997. She filed a formal
complaint on September 29, 1997, alleging discrimination on the bases
of race (African American), color (black), sex (female) and reprisal
(prior EEO activity) when, on July 23,1997, her request for a change in
schedule was not approved and her request for annual leave was denied.
The agency accepted the complaint for investigation and processing.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the agency issued a copy of its
investigative report and notified complainant of her right to request
an administrative hearing. After complainant requested a final agency
decision on the record, the agency issued its FAD on June 24, 1998.
In its FAD, the agency found that the complainant had failed to establish
a prima facie case of race, color and sex discrimination because she was
unable to demonstrate that similarly situated employees were not subjected
to the same treatment or were treated more favorably than her. It also
found that she had failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
discrimination because the management officials involved in this complaint
were not aware of or involved in her previous EEO complaints, and because
she had not shown a causal connection between her protected activity and
the adverse action. The FAD further stated that complainant had failed
to establish that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason articulated
by the agency for its decision was a pretext for discrimination.
Complainant timely appeals, without comment.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis
first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a
prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency
has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility
to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that
the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the
first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima
facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel
action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the
third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of
whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);
Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159
(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,
EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In response to complainant's claims of discrimination, the agency claimed
that complainant's requests were both denied because she had placed her
requests two days before the date when she desired to change her schedule
(July 24, 1997) and when she wished to take annual leave (July 25, 1997).
Due to the lateness of her requests, the schedule could not be changed to
accommodate complainant because the agency would have been short-staffed
for those dates and times. The agency officials explained that the
requests were made after the weekly schedule had been drawn up and due
to the volume of mail the agency was experiencing, management determined
that to allow complainant to take the time she was requesting would
impact the ability of the agency to function. We find that the agency
has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.
Since the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its action, the burden returns to the complainant to demonstrate
that the agency's articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination.
We find that complainant has failed to do so. She claimed that various
other employees had their requests for time off granted on the same dates
she was requesting. A review of the record, however, reveals that those
other employees had placed their requests significantly in advance of the
dates for which they requested annual leave. Only one employee (CO1)
(white, male, no prior EEO activity) had his request for annual leave
granted when he had requested it close in time to the date desired.
CO1 had also requested July 25,1997, and placed his request on July 21,
1997. Complainant did not show that management's articulated reason for
granting CO1's request and denying hers, that by granting her request
they would have been short-staffed due to having granted the other
employees' requests, was a pretext for discrimination. Therefore,
the agency's determination that complainant failed to establish that
she was discriminated against was correct.<2>
Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0300)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must
also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS
THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
April 12, 2000
______________ __________________________________
Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that
the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
_______________ __________________________
Date
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the
EEOC's federal sector complaint process went into effect. These
regulations apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any
stage in the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission
will apply the revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999),
where applicable, in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as
amended, may also be found at the Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.
2 We find that the agency erred to the extent that it found that
complainant had not established a prima facie case of race, color or
sex discrimination because she was unable to demonstrate that she was
treated less favorably than any similarly situated employee. We note
that to establish a prima facie case, complainant must only present
evidence which, if unrebutted, would support an inference that the
agency's actions resulted from discrimination. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 576.
It is not necessary for the complainant to rely strictly on comparative
evidence in order to establish an inference of discriminatory motivation
necessary to support a prima facie case. O'Connor v. Consolidated
Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S.Ct. 1307 (1996); Enforcement Guidance on
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., EEOC Notice No. 915.002,
n.4 (September 18, 1996); Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157
(7th Cir. 1996).