FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 27, 2021

2020006353 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 27, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/271,850 09/21/2016 Brunilda Bleta CAUSHI 83679981 1975
28395 7590 12/27/2021
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
WU, JUNCHUN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2191
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/27/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_____________

Ex parte BRUNILDA BLETA CAUSHI and
JOHN NAUM VANGELOV1
_____________

Appeal 2020-006353
Application 15/271,850
Technology Center 2100
______________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges.

NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1 through 16 and 20.
We AFFIRM.

INVENTION
The invention is directed to a system to schedule software updates to a
vehicle. Spec. ¶ 4. Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and is reproduced
below:
1. A system comprising:

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42.
According to Appellant, Ford Global Technologies, LLC is the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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a server configured to:
access stored priority data to determine a priority of a software
update specific to a vehicle to be updated,
responsive to the priority indicating that the software update is
a new feature authorized for use by the vehicle, schedule the software
update for immediate push, and
otherwise, schedule the software update to the vehicle at a time
according to the priority and a geographic region of the vehicle.

REJECTIONS AT ISSUE
The Examiner rejected claims 1 through 16, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 for being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 4–8.2
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 6, 7, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Haubold (US 2011/0289499 Al, pub. Nov. 24,
2011), Hoefler (US 2007/0157192 Al), pub. July 5, 2007, and Dickerson
(US 2015/0169311 Al, pub. June 18, 2015). Final Act. 8–12.
The Examiner rejected claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Haubold, Hoefler, Dickerson, and Pandya (US
2015/0193219 Al, pub. July 9, 2015). Final Act. 12–13.
The Examiner rejected claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Haubold, Hoefler, Dickerson, and Breed (US
2008/0140278 Al, pub. June 12, 2008). Final Act. 13–14.
The Examiner rejected claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Haubold, Hoefler, Dickerson, Breed, and Pandya. Final
Act. 14–15.

2 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to the Appeal Brief, filed April 16,
2020 (“Appeal Br.”), the Reply Brief, filed September 10, 2020 (“Reply
Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer, mailed July 10, 2020 (“Answer”), and the
Final Office Action, mailed October 16, 2019 (“Final Act.”).
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The Examiner rejected claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Haubold, Hoefler, Dickerson, and Opitz (US 8,090,388
B1, iss. Jan. 3, 2012). Final Act. 15–16.
The Examiner rejected claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Haubold and Dickerson. Final Act. 16–19.
The Examiner rejected claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Haubold, Dickerson, and Breed. Final Act. 19–20.
The Examiner rejected claims 11 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Haubold, Dickerson, and Hoefler. Final Act. 20–
21.
The Examiner rejected claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Haubold, Dickerson, and Anderson (US 2005/0028153
Al, pub. Feb. 3, 2005). Final Act. 21–22.
The Examiner rejected claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Haubold, Dickerson, and Vangelov (US 2017/0315797
A1, pub. Nov. 2, 2017). Final Act. 22–23.
The Examiner rejected claims 15, 16, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Dickerson, Breed, Pandya, and Opitz. Final Act.
23–27.
The Examiner rejected claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Dickerson, Breed, Pandya, Opitz, and Haubold. Final
Act. 27–28.

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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101.3 The USPTO’s
current eligibility guidance is found in the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019
(revised June 2020) of the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure
(MPEP), and particularly within Sections 2103 through 2106.07(c).
“Because the MPEP now incorporates the 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance (2019 PEG), October 2019 Patent Eligibility
Guidance Update (October 2019 Update), and the Berkheimer Memo,4 all
references to those materials should now be directed to the MPEP.” See
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-
policy/subject-matter-eligibility (emphasis added). All references to the
MPEP throughout this Decision are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019
(Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated.
Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental

3 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). In response to received public
comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019,
clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”). “All USPTO
personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to
follow the guidance.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at
1.
4 Referring to Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

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processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5

Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are
not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See MPEP § 2106.05(d)).

ANALYSIS
Patent eligibility under § 101 is a question of law that may contain
underlying issues of fact. “We review the [Examiner’s] ultimate conclusion
on patent eligibility de novo.” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896
F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1365); see
also SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an
issue of law that we review de novo.”). We have reviewed Appellant’s
arguments in the Briefs, the Examiner’s rejection, and the Examiner’s

5 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by: (1)
identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception(s); and (2) evaluating those additional
elements individually and in combination to determine whether they
integrate the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)(II).
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response to Appellant’s arguments. We concur with the Examiner’s findings
and conclusions in the Final Rejection and the Answer. Appellant’s
arguments have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of all
the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and we address them as they apply to the
2019 Revised Guidance. Appellant’s arguments have persuaded us of error
in the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 1 through 8 but have not
persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 9
through 16 and 20.

35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection
Abstract Idea
The Examiner concludes that the claims are not patent eligible as they
are directed to a judicial exception without reciting significantly more. Final
Act. 4–7. Specifically, the Examiner determines that the steps of scheduling
software updates can be performed in the human mind. Final Act. 4.
Further, the Examiner concludes the recitation of a server, in the claim, that
performs the steps “amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the
judicial exception using generic computer components.” Final Act. 4–5.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection is in error as the “claims
relate to specific operations that are performed with respect to software
updates” and recites several patent classification system classes. Appeal Br.
5. Further, Appellant argues, “the installation of software updates cannot, as
a practical matter, be performed mentally.” Appeal Br. 5.
We concur with the Examiner that the claims recite an abstract
concept, a mental process, of scheduling a software upgrade. The concept of
scheduling actions is a function routinely performed by a person, e.g., a
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doctor’s office scheduling a procedure based upon the severity of the
patient’s condition. More specifically, representative claim 16 recites
accessing stored priority data (collecting information), responsive to the
priority indicating that the software update is a new feature, scheduling the
software update for an immediate push7 or otherwise scheduling the
software update for a time based upon priority and a geographic region (a
basic analysis). Thus, the claims recite a concept of gathering data, and
analyzing it, which is similar to the idea held to be abstract in Electric Power
Group. The claims at issue in Electric Power Group recited several steps of
receiving data from various sources, detecting and analyzing the data, and
displaying the data. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The court stated “we have treated collecting
information, including when limited to particular content (which does not
change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas.”
Id. at 1353; see also Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659
F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding claims to collecting and
comparing known information determined to be steps that can be practically
performed in the human mind); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823
F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding the claims to classifying and storing
digital images as reciting an abstract idea) Content Extraction &
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The concept of data collection, recognition, and storage is

6 Appellant’s arguments group all of the claims rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 together. Appeal Br. 6. We select claim 1 as representative of the
claims rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
7 We note the claim recites scheduling a push but does not recite actually
performing a step of pushing the update.
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undisputedly well-known. Indeed, humans have always performed these
functions.”); October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 7 (discussing
Electric Power Group and mental processes), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df.
Further, Appellant’s argument that the installation of software updates
cannot be performed in the mind is not persuasive of error because the
claims do not recite installation of software updates, but rather just the
scheduling of updates. Additionally, the use of a server to schedule the
update does not preclude the claim from reciting a mental process. Courts
frequently do not distinguish between claims that recite mental processes
performed by humans and claims that recite mental processes performed on
a computer. As the Federal Circuit has explained, “[c]ourts have examined
claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the
underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper
or in a person’s mind.” Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d
1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the
exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the
claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human,
mentally or with pen and paper.”); MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III).

Practical Application
The Examiner determines that the claims do not include additional
elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception. Final Act. 5.
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Appellant argues that the Examiner’s analysis of whether the claims
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application is in error, as the
Examiner did not consider both the practical application and whether the
claims recite significantly more than the abstract idea. Appeal Br. 5.
Appellant argues:
claim 1 as an example, at least “responsive to the priority
indicating that the software update is a new feature add-on
authorized for use by the vehicle, schedule the software update
for immediate push,” and “otherwise, schedule the software
update to the vehicle at a time according to the priority and a
geographic region of the vehicle” in the context of the claim
provides a practical application that is beyond a mere abstract
idea. For instance, and as noted in the Specification, in many
software update systems a push of a new software update may
occur as a bundle in a FIFO (first in, first out) manner.
However, this manner of software updates does not provide for
control regarding the type of the updates to push.
Advantageously, a scheduler may perform immediate updates
of high priority or preferred priority updates and perform later
scheduled updates of lower priority updates.
Appeal Br. 5–6.
Under MPEP § 2106.04(d)(1), an improvement in the functioning of a
computer or other technology is an example of integrating the abstract
concept into a practical application. As discussed above, considering
priority of a software update in scheduling the software update is reciting a
metal process. Further, in as much as Appellant is arguing that the use of a
priority is an improvement in a FIFO manner, this is an improvement to the
abstract idea of scheduling, as FIFO is a process that also can be
implemented mentally (e.g., taking a number at the deli). We consider the
recitation of a server performing the process as merely reciting use of a
computer as a tool to implement the abstract concept. See, e.g.,
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RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“Unlike Enfish, [the claim] does not claim a software method that improves
the functioning of a computer . . . [but] claims a ‘process that qualifies as an
“abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.’”)
(Citation omitted). Our reviewing court said “‘[the] mere automation of
manual processes using generic computers’ . . . ‘does not constitute a
patentable improvement in computer technology.’” Trading Techs. Int’l Inc.
v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Credit
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
USPTO examination procedure also requires that “the claim must include
more than mere instructions to perform the method on a generic component
or machinery to qualify as an improvement to an existing technology.”
MPEP § 2106.05(a). Thus, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us
the Examiner erred in finding the claims do not recite a practical application
of the abstract concept.

Significantly More than Abstract Idea
If a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate
that exception into a practical application, we then look to whether the claim
adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or,
simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.
Appellant argues that the claim “is also significantly more than mere
recitation of what is routine and conventional in the field.” Appeal Br. 6.
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The Examiner has found the recitation of a server is at a high-level of
generality. Ans. 5.
Appellant’s Specification describes the method as being implemented
on “any existing programmable electronic control unit or dedicated
electronic control unit.” Spec. ¶ 94. Thus, Appellant’s Specification does
not demonstrate that the additional limitation of a server is for anything
other than using a conventional computer. As such, we do not find that the
Examiner erred in finding the additional limitations include anything other
than a routine and conventional activity and Appellant’s arguments have not
persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
In summary, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner’s determination that the claims recite an abstract idea,
scheduling software updates based upon priority (a mental process).
Further, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us that the Examiner
erred in finding that the claims are not integrated into a practical application
of that abstract idea, because the claims are not: directed to an improvement
in the functioning of the computer or to other technology or other technical
field; directed to a particular machine; directed to performing or affecting a
transformation of an article to a different state or thing; directed to using a
judicial exception in some meaningful way beyond linking the exception to a
particular technological environment such that the claim as a whole is more
than a drafting effort to monopolize the judicial exception. Nor have
Appellant’s arguments persuaded us the Examiner erred in finding the
additional limitations of the claims simply append well-understood and
conventional activities such that the claim as a whole does not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Accordingly, we sustain the
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Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 through 16, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejections
Independent claim 1 and the claims dependent thereupon.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 is error, as
the combination of the references do not teach the claim limitation directed
to scheduling the software update for immediate push responsive to the
priority indicating that the software update is a new feature authorized for
use by the vehicle. Appeal Br. 7–8.
The Examiner finds that Haubold teaches accessing priority data to
determine a priority of a software update. Final Act. 8; Ans. 6 (citing
Haubold ¶¶ 36, 53). Further, the Examiner finds that Hoefler teaches a
priority indicating a software update is a new feature authorized for use by a
client and scheduling a software update for immediate push. Final Act 9;
Ans. 6 (citing Hoefler ¶¶ 23, 33). Finally, the Examiner finds that Dickerson
teaches scheduling a software to a vehicle according to priority and
geographic region. Final Act 10–11 (citing Dickerson ¶¶ 34, 50, 51). Based
upon these findings the Examiner concludes that claim 1 is obvious.
Appellant’s arguments have persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
rejection. We have reviewed the teachings in Haubold, Hoefler, and
Dickerson cited by the Examiner and disagree with the Examiner that the
combination teaches the disputed limitation. While Haubold, in paragraphs
53 and 57, teaches that software updates may be assigned priorities, we do
not find that the cited portions discuss that a priority is used to schedule an
immediate push of a software update for a new feature authorized for use by
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the vehicle, as claimed. Further, Hoefler in paragraph 23, and Dickerson in
paragraph 34, both discuss software updates as including a new feature,
however, we find no teaching of associating a new feature with a priority to
schedule the software for an immediate push. Accordingly, we do not find
that the Examiner as identified sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
disputed limitation of claim 1 is obvious. Accordingly, we do not sustain
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 1 and dependent claims 6
through 8 over Haubold, Hoefler, and Dickerson.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 2
through 5 are in error for the same reasons as claim 1. Appeal Br. 8–10. We
concur with the Appellant. The Examiner’s rejection of these claims relies
upon the combination of Haubold, Hoefler, and Dickerson to teach the
limitations of independent claim 1. Final Act. 12–16. Thus, the rejections
of claims 2 through 5 suffer from the same deficiency as the rejection of
claim 1. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejections of claims 2 through 5 for the same reasons as claim 1.

Independent claim 9 and the claims dependent thereupon.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9 is in error as the
combination of Haubold and Dickerson does not teach the claim 9 limitation
of “responsive to receiving an indication of a vehicle-specific priority
override for the software update for the vehicle, updating the priority data
with the vehicle-specific priority override; and scheduling the software
update to the vehicle at a time according to the vehicle-specific priority
override and a geographic region of the vehicle.” Appeal Br. 10; Reply Br.
2. Appellant argues that portions of Haubold cited by the Examiner discuss
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ensuring consistent application of software updates but do not discuss
priority overrides that are vehicle specific as claimed. Appeal Br. 10–11
(citing Haubold ¶¶ 56, 57). Further, Appellant argues that the portions of
Dickerson cited by the Examiner do not discuss priority overrides that are
vehicle-specific as claimed. Appeal Br. 11–13 (citing Dickerson ¶¶ 50, 51).
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error, as they are not
commensurate with the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 9. Claim
9 is a method claim and recites a step of updating a priority and scheduling
which is performed “responsive to receiving an indication of a vehicle-
specific priority override.” Thus, the claim is reciting a conditional step,
which is performed in response to receiving an override. As such, the
broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim is that the steps of updating a
priority and scheduling using the updated priority would not be invoked
necessarily and, as such, it is not incumbent upon the Examiner to show that
the art performs those steps. See Ex parte Schulhauser, No. 2013-007847,
2016 WL 6277792, at *3–4 (PTAB Apr. 28, 2016) (precedential) (holding
that in a method claim, a step reciting a condition precedent does not need to
be performed if the condition precedent is not met). See also Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2111.04(II) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017,
Jan. 2018) (citing Schulhauser) and In re Johnston, 435 F.3d 1381, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[O]ptional elements do not narrow the claim because they
can always be omitted.”). Ex parte Gary M. Katz, Appeal No. 2010-006083,
2011 WL 1211248, at *2 (BPAI Mar. 25, 2011) (citing In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Accordingly,
Appellant’s arguments directed to claim 9 are not commensurate with the
broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 9, and as such we are not
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persuaded of error in rejecting claim 9. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of this claim.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 10
through 14 are in error for the same reasons as claim 9. Appeal Br. 13. As
we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9, we
similarly sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 10 through 14.

Independent claim 15 and the claims dependent thereupon.
Appellant argues:
At least for reasons similar to those give above for the
patentability of independent claim 1, independent claim 15 is
also patentable. For example, the alleged combination does not
disclose or suggest “a message indicating a geographic region
in which the vehicle is located responsive to vehicle presence in
the geographic region,” let alone to “receive, from a vehicle, a
message indicating a geographic region in which the vehicle is
located responsive to vehicle presence in the geographic region
corresponding to a political boundary for a predefined period.”
Appeal Br. 14.
We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection by this
argument. Claim 1 and claim 15 are of different scope, and Appellant’s
arguments directed to claim 1 are inapplicable to claim 15. As discussed
above, Appellant’s arguments directed to claim 1 addressed the limitations
directed to scheduling the software update for immediate push responsive to
the priority indicating that the software update is a new feature authorized
for use by the vehicle, which are not present in claim 15. Further, the
rejection of claim 1 is based upon Haubold, Hoefler, and Dickerson, whereas
the rejection of claim 15 is based upon Dickerson, Breed, Pandya, and Opitz.
Appellant’s arguments directed to claim 15 in the Appeal Brief do not
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address the Examiner’s findings concerning Breed, Pandya, and Opitz as
applied to claim 15. We recognize that Appellant, in the Reply Brief, did
address the Examiner’s findings concerning these references. Reply Br. 2–3.
However, we have not considered these arguments, as they are new
arguments, which could have been presented in the Appeal Brief, are not
prompted by the Examiner’s Answer, and are not based on any new
arguments or grounds of rejection in the Examiner’s Answer. As a result,
we will not consider these untimely arguments because Appellant has not
shown good cause for belatedly raising the new arguments. See 37 C.F.R. §
41.41(b)(2) (2019). Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 15 and sustain the rejection of
claims 15, 16, and 20 based upon Dickerson, Breed, Pandya, and Opitz.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s separate obviousness rejection of
claim 20 over the combination of Dickerson, Breed, Pandya, Opitz, and
Haubold is in error for the same reason as claim 15. Appeal Br. 15. As we
are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 15, we
similarly sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20.

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DECISION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–16, 20 101 Eligibility 1–16, 20
1, 6, 7, 8 103 Haubold, Hoefler,
Dickerson,
1, 6, 7, 8
2 103 Haubold, Hoefler,
Dickerson, Pandya
2
3 103 Haubold, Hoefler,
Dickerson, Breed
3
4 103 Haubold, Hoefler,
Dickerson, Breed, Pandya
4
5 103 Haubold, Hoefler,
Dickerson, Opitz
5
9 103 Haubold, Dickerson, 9
10 103 Haubold, Dickerson, Breed 10
11, 12 103 Haubold, Dickerson,
Hoefler,
11, 12
13 103 Haubold, Dickerson,
Anderson
13
14 103 Haubold, Dickerson,
Vangelov
14
15, 16, 20 103 Dickerson, Breed, Pandya,
Opitz
15, 16, 20
20 103 Dickerson, Breed, Pandya,
Opitz, Haubold
20
Overall
Outcome
1–16, 20

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED