Ex Parte Moroney et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 21, 201713754287 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 21, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/754,287 01/30/2013 Nathan Moroney 83138499 1052 22879 HP Tnr 7590 03/23/2017 EXAMINER 3390 E. Harmony Road Mail Stop 35 PHAM, MICHAEL FORT COLLINS, CO 80528-9544 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2167 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/23/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipa.mail@hp.com barbl@hp.com y vonne.bailey @ hp. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte NATHAN MORONEY and EHUD CHATOW1 Appeal 2016-008110 Application 13/754,287 Technology Center 2100 Before JEAN R. HOMERE, DAVID J. CUTITTAII, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges. CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—19, which constitute all of the pending claims in the application on appeal. App. Br. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part. We also enter a new ground of rejection for claims 1—9 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Hewlett-Packard Development Company, LP. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2016-008110 Application 13/754,287 STATEMENT OF THE CASE According to Appellants, the application relates to determining a corrected optical property value of an optical property of interest (e.g., a particular color) captured within a digital image. Spec. 1 8.2 Claims 1, 10, and 17 are independent. Claims 1,10, and 17, which are illustrative of the issues under appeal, are reproduced below with disputed limitations italicized: 1. A system comprising: networking hardware to receive from a device to which the networking hardware is communicatively connected one or more of: a digital image of a physical scene including an optical property of interest and a physical optical property calibration chart; a corrected optical property value of the optical property of interest determined based on the physical optical property calibration chart and the optical property of interest within the digital image; a processor; and a non-transitory computer-readable data storage medium storing computer-readable code executable by the processor to: determine a search query based on the corrected optical property value; search a database using the search query to determine search results for the search query that have appearance attributes with optical properties at least similar to the corrected optical value; and 2 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to: (1) Appellants’ Specification filed January 30, 2013 (Spec.); (2) the Final Office Action (Final Act.) mailed June 9, 2015; (3) the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br.) filed November 30, 2015; (4) the Examiner’s Answer (Ans.) mailed June 16, 2016; and (5) the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed August 16, 2016. 2 Appeal 2016-008110 Application 13/754,287 return the search results to the device via the networking hardware. 10. A non-transitory computer-readable data storage medium executable by a mobile device having image-capturing capability to perform a method comprising: capturing a digital image of a physical scene including an optical property of interest and a physical optical property calibration chart; determining a corrected optical property value of the optical property of interest based on the physical optical property calibration chart and the optical property of interest as captured within the digital image; determining search results obtained by a database being searched using a search query based on the corrected optical property value, the search results having appearance attributes with optical properties at least similar to the corrected optical property value; and outputting the search results. 17. A method comprising: determining, by a computing system, a corrected optical property value of an optical property of interest captured within a digital image; determining, by the computing system, a search query based on the corrected optical property value; searching, by the computing system, a database using the search query to determine search results for the search query that have appearance attributes with optical properties at least similar to the corrected optical property value; and outputting, by the computing system, the search results for the search query. Appeal Br. 7, 9—10 (Claims App’x). 3 Appeal 2016-008110 Application 13/754,287 REJECTION Claims 1—19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Wang et al. (“Wang”) (US 2012/0269432 Al; Oct. 25, 2012). Final Act. 2- 13. NEW GROUND OF REJECTION Pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we enter a new ground of rejection for claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for indefiniteness. The essence of the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph is that the language of the claims must make it clear what subject matter the claims encompass — i.e., “whether those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification.” Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Claim 1 recites: networking hardware to receive . . . one or more of: a digital image . . .; a corrected optical property value . . .; However, it is not reasonably clear whether “a digital image” and “a corrected optical property value” should be separated by a disjunctive “or” or instead a conjunctive “and.” The Examiner and Appellants appear to read in a disjunctive “or.” Ans. 5—6 (finding claim 1 “indicates ‘a digital image’ and ‘a physical optical property calibration chart’; or ‘a corrected optical property value’) (emphasis added); Appeal Br. 4 (“Claim 1 recites that either a digital image of a physical scene including a physical optical property calibration chart or a corrected optical property value determined based on 4 Appeal 2016-008110 Application 13/754,287 the physical optical property calibration chart is received.”) (emphasis added, original emphasis omitted). However, claim 1 does not expressly recite an “or” between these limitations, and neither the Examiner nor Appellants explain why they assume an “or” rather than “and.” Being separated by “or” rather than “and” would make a substantive difference in the claim. For example, where “[t]he phrase ‘at least one of precedes a series of categories . . . and the patentee used the term ‘and’ to separate the categories,” the Federal Circuit has held “the phrase ‘at least one of modifies each member of the list.” SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 886 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain meaning of the limitation “at least one of A and B” is “at least one of A and at least one of B,” whereas the plain meaning of “at least one of A or B” is “at least one of A or at least one of B.” Because the claim as presently written does not specify whether the list is separated by “and” or “or,” the language “is ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention,” In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014), and “fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). Therefore, claim 1 is indefinite. Claims 2—9 depend from claim 1 and are indefinite for the same reason. We note that dependent claim 2 recites “the networking hardware is to receive from the device just the digital image and not the corrected optical property value” and dependent claim 3 recites “the networking hardware is to receive from the device just the corrected optical value . . . and not the 5 Appeal 2016-008110 Application 13/754,287 digital image.” These limitations would be impossible to meet if claim 1 recited a conjunctive “and.” Accordingly, we enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION against claims 1—9 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which Appellants regard as the invention. DISCUSSION We review the appealed rejection for error based upon the issues identified by Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2014). Claims 19 With regard to the anticipation rejection of claim 1, for the reasons expressed above, claim 1 is indefinite. A prior art rejection cannot be sustained if the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have to make speculative assumptions concerning the meaning of claim language. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962). Hence, claim 1 on appeal must be reasonably understood without resorting to speculation. Here, we would require such speculation to construe the claims. Therefore, the prior art rejection must fall pro forma because it is necessarily based on speculative assumption as to the meaning of the claim. It should be understood, however, that our decision in this regard is based solely on the indefmiteness of the claimed subject matter and does not reflect on the adequacy of the prior art evidence applied in support of the rejection. We do not reach the merits of the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claim 1. 6 Appeal 2016-008110 Application 13/754,287 Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 pro forma. Dependent claims 2-9 depend from claim 1 and are reversed for the same reason. Claims 10—16 Wang relates to “large-scale image retrieval.” Wang 11. “Based on web searching techniques, example large-scale image retrieval can implement the use of images based on ‘bag-of-features’ or BOF models. Furthermore, such models can include index histograms that represent features of the images.” Id. The Examiner finds “the histogram of Wang are a physical optical property chart. They are physical optical property as they represent spatial features of portions of the image.” Ans. 5; see also Final Act. 10; Ans. 2—3 (citing Wang H 35, 36, Fig. 3). Appellants argue the Examiner has “confuse[d] a histogram that is constructed from an image with a physical chart that is tangible, concrete, having material existence, and present in the scene of which an image has been captured.” Appeal Br. 6 (emphasis added). We agree with Appellants the Examiner has not demonstrated Wang discloses “capturing a digital image of a physical scene including an optical property of interest and a physical optical property calibration chart,” as recited in independent claim 10. In the rejection, the Examiner’s rationale appears to alternate between a finding that the term “physical” modifies “optical property” and “physical” modifies “chart.”3 For example, referring to optical properties, 3 In the event of further prosecution, Appellants are encouraged to amend the independent claims to clarify the term that the adjective “physical” is 7 Appeal 2016-008110 Application 13/754,287 the Examiner states “[t]hey are physical optical property as they represent spatial features of portions of the image.” Ans. 5. Yet in the same paragraph, the Examiner also states “it is noted the histograms are physical as they have architecture.” Id. In either case, however, the Examiner fails to establish that Wang’s histogram is included in a captured digital image. During prosecution before the PTO, words of the claim are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. ofSci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In describing image capture, Appellants’ Specification states that [i]n some implementations, a user thus just has to bring along a small chart when out and about to accurately identify colors or other optical properties of interest that the user sees. The user can use his or her smartphone to capture an image of a discovered color or other optical property of interest with the chart placed alongside. . . . Besides the color of interest, the digital image includes the physical color calibration chart. Spec. 1111, 16. We find there are no implementations described in the Specification in which the user does not capture an image of the calibration chart. We, therefore, agree with Appellants’ argument that Wang fails to disclose a chart “present in the scene of which an image has been captured” (Appeal Br. 6) and are constrained to reverse the 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) rejection of independent claim 10 and of claims 11—16, which depend from claim 10. intended to modify. Otherwise, the Examiner should consider whether claim 10 should be rejected as being indefinite. 8 Appeal 2016-008110 Application 13/754,287 Claims 17—19 For independent claim 17, Appellants rely on the same arguments as independent claims 1 and 10. Appeal Br. 4. However, independent claim 17 fails to recite any limitation commensurate with the limitation disputed in claim 10. See Appeal Br. 10 (Claims App’x). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 17, as well as dependent claims 18 and 19, which are not argued separately. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). DECISION We sustain the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 17-19 under 35U.S.C. § 102(e). We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 10-16 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). We reverse pro forma the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-9 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we enter a new ground of rejection for claims 1-9 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides: When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the Appellants, within two months from the date of the Decision, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: 9 Appeal 2016-008110 Application 13/754,287 (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart. (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is sought. Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART: 37 C.F.R, § 41.500?) 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation