Ex Parte McDaniel

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 5, 2012

11603462 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 5, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/603,462 11/21/2006 Richard Gary McDaniel 2006P14068US01 9584
28524 7590 12/05/2012
SIEMENS CORPORATION
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPARTMENT
170 WOOD AVENUE SOUTH
ISELIN, NJ 08830
EXAMINER
ROSWELL, MICHAEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2141
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/05/2012 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RICHARD GARY MCDANIEL
____________

Appeal 2010-007672
Application 11/603,462
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before KARL D. EASTHOM, STEPHEN C. SIU, and JENNIFER S. BISK,
Administrative Patent Judges.

SIU, Administrative Patent Judge

DECISION ON APPEAL

This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 1-4, 6-14, 21-24, 26-34, 36, 40, and 41. Claims 5, 15-20, 25, 35,
and 37-39 were cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The disclosed invention relates generally 3D graphical editors and
physical simulation (Spec. 2).
Independent claim 1 is illustrative:
Appeal 2010-007672
Application 11/603,462

2
1. A graphical simulation system for physical simulation of 3D (three-
dimensional) objects, comprising:
a display;
a memory containing a graphical simulation program with program
code for physical simulation of 3D objects; and
a processor operatively connected to the memory and the display and
adapted to execute the graphical simulation program with the program code
adapted to cause the processor to:
instantiate a 3D graphical editor;
assemble a physical simulation via the 3D graphical editor, including
by
creating a 3D graphical representation of the physical simulation,
wherein the physical simulation comprises a plurality of 3D objects, wherein
the plurality of 3D objects comprises 3D physical objects and 3D widget
objects, wherein the 3D widget objects are oriented with respect to the
plurality of 3D physical objects, and wherein the orientation of the plurality
of 3D widget objects with respect to the plurality of 3D physical objects
defines a semantic relationship between one or more of the plurality of 3D
physical objects, and
providing one or more markers to indicate a type of material
associated with at least one of the plurality of 3D physical objects, indicate
groupings and attachment associated with one or more of the plurality of 3D
physical objects, or indicate connections of joints associated with one or
more of the plurality of 3D physical objects; and
initiate a physical simulation session to manipulate properties
associated with one or more of the plurality of 3D physical objects and one
or more of the plurality of 3D widget objects.

The Examiner rejects claims 1-4, 6-14, 21-24, 26-34, 36, 40, and 41
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hughes1 and Feld.2

1 U.S. Patent No. 7,058,896 B2; Jun. 6, 2006 (“Hughes”).
2 U.S. Patent No. 7,149,665 B2; Dec. 12, 2006 (“Feld”).
Appeal 2010-007672
Application 11/603,462

3
Issue
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1-4, 6-14, 21-24, 26-34, 36,
40, and 41?
Principles of Law
The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art,
(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, and
(3) the level of skill in the art. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-
18 (1966).
“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods
is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
Analysis
Appellant argues that the combination of Hughes and Feld fails to
disclose or suggest “3D physical objects” (App. Br. 5). However, as the
Examiner points out, Hughes discloses modeling 3D objects (see, e.g., col.
6, ll. 47-49) in a “physical element window” (see, e.g., col. 7, l. 58)
containing “physical elements” (see, e.g., col. 7, l. 59), some of which
comprise “a mass” (col. 8, l. 31). Appellant does not demonstrate a
difference between the 3D “physical elements” of Hughes and the claimed
3D “physical objects.”
Appeal 2010-007672
Application 11/603,462

4
Appellant cites a dictionary definition of the term “physical”3 in
support of the contention that the “physical elements” of Hughes are not
“physical” as claimed (see, e.g., App. Br. 5). However, Appellant does not
indicate how the “physical element” of Hughes differs from the “physical
object” recited in claim 1 or how the “physical element” of Hughes is
somehow not “physical” despite the fact that Hughes explicitly discloses the
“physical” elements as such.
Appellant also argues that Hughes discloses that “physical elements”
may include any of “elements that define active forces . . . elements that
generate a force only when acted upon . . . elements which resist one or
more degrees of freedom . . . elements which act to resist motion . . . and
elements used to define local environmental constraints” (App. Br. 5). First,
the elements cited by Appellant from the Hughes references are merely
examples. Appellant has not indicated that Hughes limits the “physical
elements” as only the elements explicitly stated in Hughes.
Even assuming that the “physical elements” were limited to only those
classes of elements explicitly enumerated in the Hughes reference, Appellant
does not indicate how the “physical object” recited in claim 1 is limited to
physical objects that do not define active forces, do not generate a force
when acted upon, do not resist one or more degrees of freedom, do not act to

3 Appellant cites a definition from Webster’s unabridged Dictionary, p. 1461
to argue that an object that is “physical” must be “of or pertaining to that
which is material” (App. Br. 5).
Appeal 2010-007672
Application 11/603,462

5
resist motion, and do not define local environmental constraints. Therefore,
Appellant’s argument fails to demonstrate a difference between Hughes’
“physical elements” and the “physical objects” as claimed.
Claim 21 recites similar features as claim 1. Appellant does not
provide additional arguments in support of claims 2-4, 6-14, 22-24, 26-34,
36, 40, or 41 or additional arguments with respect to Feld.
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-4, 6-14, 21-24, 26-34,
36, 40, and 41 as obvious over Hughes and Feld.

SUMMARY
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of
claims 1-4, 6-14, 21-24, 26-34, 36, 40, and 41 as unpatentable over Hughes
and Feld.

AFFIRMED

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