Ex Parte De Leij et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 15, 201714045347 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 15, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/045,347 10/03/2013 Franciscus Antonius Anna Maria De Leij 95095-000400US-889800 9769 20350 7590 03/17/2017 KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22 1100 Peachtree Street Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309 EXAMINER FAN, LYNN Y ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1651 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/17/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com jlhice@kilpatrick.foundationip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte FRANCISCUS ANTONIUS ANNA MARIA DE LEIJ, JAMES STRATFORD, and TONY HUTCHINGS Appeal 2016-003728 Application 14/045,347 Technology Center 1600 Before DONALD E. ADAMS, MELANIE L. McCOLLUM, and JOHN E. SCHNEIDER, Administrative Patent Judges. ADAMS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 This appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) involves claims 1—9, 11, and 13—15 (App. Br. 5).2 Examiner entered rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellants identify the real parties in interest as “The Forestry Commission and The University of Surrey” (App. Br. 3). 2 Pending claims 16—23 stand withdrawn from consideration (App. Br. 5). Appeal 2016-003728 Application 14/045,347 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants disclosure “relates to oil absorbent compositions, such as charcoal-based compositions, and to methods of making such oil absorbent materials” (Spec. 1: 2—3). Claim 1 is representative and reproduced below: 1. A method of preparing an oil absorbent composition, the method comprising: heating a precursor plant material under substantially anaerobic conditions to a temperature between about 280°C and about 600°C to produce a charcoal, and then de-mineralising the resulting charcoal by contacting said charcoal with an acid or buffered solution having a neutral or acidic pH and then, after the demineralization step, separating the demineralized charcoal from the acid or buffered solution to produce an oil absorbent composition. (App. Br. 17.) The claims stand rejected as follows: Claims 1, 5—9, 11, and 13—15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by De Leij.3 Claims 1, 2—9, 11, and 13—15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of De Leij and Akiyama.4 Anticipation'. ISSUE Does the preponderance of evidence on this record support Examiner’s finding that De Leij teaches Appellants’ claimed invention? 3 De Leij et al., WO 2009/016381 A2, published Feb. 5, 2009. 4 Akiyama, US 4,172,039, Oct. 23, 1979. 2 Appeal 2016-003728 Application 14/045,347 FACTUAL FINDINGS (FF) FF 1. De Leij discloses that “[t]he charring process is well known to those skilled in the art. Essentially, it involves heating [a plant material] to temperatures considerably above boiling (for instance between 400°C and 700°C), under oxygen starved conditions” (De Leij 13: 26—28; see id. 17: 5— 12 (providing examples of plant materials useful in De Leij’s method); Ans. 4-5). FF 2. De Leij discloses that: [AJcidified charred material is preferably obtained by grinding charred material, most preferably from nettles or other materials described here, and treating this with an acid. The acid can be a weak acid or a strong acid, such as hydrochloric or nitric acid, provided that the acid is at least pH 3 or 4 or lower. The acid is preferably at least 0.5 molar and more preferably at least 1 M or more. Preferably, the mixture is left until at least 70% and more preferably at least 90% of the acid was removed from solution by the charcoal, such that the pH of the solution has a pH of 3 or less, more preferably pH 2 or less and most preferably pH 1 or less. The resulting acidified charred material is drained and subsequently dried and has a pH of around 4 when added to water. (De Leij 21: 12—21; Ans. 4—5.) FF 3. De Leij discloses that “[i]n general charcoals are porous and their adsorbing properties are often related to the large specific surface area within the charcoal” (De Leij 1: 29—30). ANALYSIS Appellants claim 1 requires: (1) the production of a charcoal by heating a precursor plant material under substantially anaerobic conditions to a temperature between about 280°C and about 600°C, (2) de-mineralising the resulting charcoal by contacting the charcoal with an acid solution 3 Appeal 2016-003728 Application 14/045,347 having an acidic pH, and then, after the demineralization step, (3) separating the demineralized charcoal from the acid solution to produce an oil absorbent composition (see App. Br. 17; see also Reply Br. 5). De Leij teaches: (1) the production of a charcoal by heating a precursor plant material under substantially anaerobic conditions to a temperature between 400°C and 700°C, (2) treating ground charcoal with an acid solution, and (3) separating the resulting charcoal from the acid solution by draining and subsequently drying the charcoal (FF 1—2). We agree with Examiner finding that De Leij anticipates Appellants’ claim 1. (Ans. 6; FF 1—2; cf. App. Br. 17; Reply Br. 5). Appellants’ claim 1 does not require a washing step (see App. Br. 17). Therefore, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ contention that “the present claims (directed to an oil adsorbent charcoal) contemplate that acid is therefore removed by washing” (App. Br. 11; see also id. at 14). For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ contention that there are “differences between the present invention and De Leij,” that “De Leij does not teach a de-mineralisation step followed by a subsequent step of separating the acid from the demineralized charcoal, as required by [Appellants’] claim 1,” or that De Leij’s separation step differs from the separation step required by Appellants’ claim 1 (App. Br. 11—13; see App. Br. 13 (“Contrary to [] Examiner’s assertion, [De Leij at page 21, paragraph 3,] actually teaches how the charcoal can be acidified to produce an acidified charcoal—which, while it may be a useful product for the reasons explained above, is not a de-mineralisation step as required by [Appellants’] claim[] [1]”); Reply Br. 5—8; cf. FF 1—2). 4 Appeal 2016-003728 Application 14/045,347 Appellants fail to provide persuasive evidence or argument to support a finding that De Leij fails to teach a method that comprises every step, in order, as is required by Appellants’ claim 1 or that De Leij’s method, which utilized the same steps in the same order as is required by Appellants’ claim 1, results in a different product than is produced by the method set forth in Appellants’ claim 1 (see FF 1—2; cf App. Br. 17). In this regard, Appellants fail to provide persuasive evidence or argument to support a finding that the charcoal produced by the method of claim 1 will not exhibit the same properties as that produced by De Leij’s method or “that at least some of the acid” will remain in Appellants’ charcoal when produced by the method of Appellants’ claim 1 (see App. Br. 13—15; Reply Br. 6; cf. FF 1—2). In this regard, we note that Appellants’ claim 1 does not require a washing or neutralizing step (see App. Br. 17; cf. App. Br. 11 and 14; Reply Br. 6 (“De Leij [] does not teach or suggest separating the charred material from the acid and adjusting the pH of the material, thereby neutralizing the acid”); see also Reply Br. 7 and 8).5 De Leij discloses that “[i]n general charcoals are porous and their adsorbing properties are often related to the large specific surface area within the charcoal” (FF 3). Therefore, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ 5 We recognize Appellants’ contentions regarding Appellants’ claim 15, which depends ultimately from and further limits Appellants’ claim 1 to “further comprise^ adjusting the pH of the composition until the pH indicates that the majority of the acid has been substantially neutralized” (see App. Br. 18; Reply Br. 6). To the extent that Appellants consider their contentions with regard to claim 15 a separate argument of claim 15, we find Appellants’ new argument belated and decline to treat claim 15 separately. See Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1474 (BPAI 2010) (informative) (Appellants fail to “explain what ‘good cause’ there might be to consider the new argument. On this record, Appellant’s new argument is belated”). 5 Appeal 2016-003728 Application 14/045,347 contention that their invention differs from De Leij because “charcoals obtained using the method defined by claim 1 are surprisingly effective at absorbing oil” (Reply Br. 8). Even if, De Leij had not disclosed that charcoals have adsorbing properties “often related to the large specific surface area within the charcoal,” De Leij teaches the same method as is required by Appellants’ claim 1 (see LL 1—3; cf App. Br. 17). It is a general rule that merely discovering and claiming a new benefit of an old process cannot render the process again patentable. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Calif, 814 L.2d 628, 633 (Led. Cir.), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987) (“Even assuming Stoller did not recognize that the heel of his process functioned as a heat sink, that property was inherently possessed by the heel in his disclosed process, and, thus, his process anticipates the claimed invention”). CONCLUSION OL LAW The preponderance of evidence on this record supports Examiner’s finding that De Leij teaches Appellants’ claimed invention. The rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by De Leij is affirmed. Claims 5—9, 11, and 13—15 are not separately argued and fall with claim 1. Obviousness: ISSUE Does the preponderance of evidence relied upon by Examiner support a conclusion of obviousness? 6 Appeal 2016-003728 Application 14/045,347 FACTUAL FINDINGS (FF) FF 4. Examiner relies on De Leij as set forth above (FF 1—3; see Ans. 7— 8). FF 5. Examiner finds that “De Leij does not teach the method wherein the oil absorbent composition is contacted with a water repellant substance,” and relies on Akiyama to make up for this deficiency in De Leij (Ans. 8). FF 6. Akiyama “relates to an improved oleospecific absorber, comprising a body of porous substance obtained from a vegetable body, and disposed in an upper part of a container,” wherein the “oleospecific absorber ha[s] an excellent absorptivity for collecting oily substance[s], in particular for mineral oil” (Akiyama 1: 34—39; Ans. 9). FF 7. Akiyama discloses that “the porous material mentioned hereinbefore, is provided with a water repellent property by impregnating it with a suitable hydrophobic material in an appropriate quantity,” wherein “as a result of the impregnation process, the porous material can further be improved with respect to its absorbing an oily substance co-existent with water” (Akiyama 3: 11-17; Ans. 8). ANALYSIS Based on the combination of De Leij and Akiyama, Examiner concludes that, at the time Appellants’ invention was made, it would have been prima facie obvious: [T]o contact the charcoals (a porous material) of De Leij with a hydrophobic material (a water repellent substance)[, because] Akiyama discloses that by impregnating a porous material with a hydrophobic material (a water repellent substance), the porous material possesses a water repellant property and an excellent absorptivity for collecting oily substance[s] (Ans. 8-9). 7 Appeal 2016-003728 Application 14/045,347 As discussed above De Leij anticipates Appellants’ claim 1. Therefore, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ contentions that Akiyama fails to make up for Appellants’ alleged deficiency in De Leij (App. Br. 15 (“Akiyama is unable to cure the deficiencies of [De Leij]”); Reply Br. 9 (“Akiyama is unable to cure the deficiencies of [De Leij]”)). For the reasons set forth above, and notwithstanding Appellants’ contention to the contrary, De Leij teaches the de-mineralisation step required by Appellants’ claim 1 (see App. Br. 15—16; Reply Br. 9). CONCLUSION OF LAW The preponderance of evidence relied upon by Examiner supports a conclusion of obviousness. The rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of De Leij and Akiyama is affirmed. Claims 2—9, 11, and 13—15 are not separately argued and fall with claim 1. TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation