Diana L. Coy, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Northeast Area) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 26, 2002
01A13592 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 26, 2002)

01A13592

03-26-2002

Diana L. Coy, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Northeast Area) Agency.


Diana L. Coy v. United States Postal Service

01A13592

March 26, 2002

.

Diana L. Coy,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Northeast Area)

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A13592

Agency Nos. 4B-120-0062-99; 4B-120-0079-99

Hearing No. 160-A0-8190X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency order

concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission reverses

and remands the agency's final order.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a Window/Distribution Clerk at the agency's Binghamton,

New York, facility. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently

filed formal complaints alleging that she was discriminated against on

the bases of sex (female) and reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

she became aware on April 7, 1999, that management intentionally

abolished a Window Clerk position knowing that she would be the senior

bidder for the position; and

during the period of 1994 to June 11, 1999, she was not placed on an

Officer-In-Charge (OIC) assignment.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a

copy of the investigative file and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing

finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination, noting that, with regard to the elimination

of the Window Clerk position, complainant failed to prove that she

applied for and was denied the position. The AJ also concluded that

complainant could not demonstrate that the person who vacated the Window

Clerk position did so because of complainant's protected activity,

and neither did the agency decide to eliminate the position because of

complainant's prior protected activity. The AJ then concluded that

complainant failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence

that she was discriminated against under any of her alleged bases.

The agency's final action implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant contends, among other things, that the AJ

erred in granting summary judgment as several material facts remain

in dispute. The complainant also argues that the AJ misapplied the

law and misconstrued the facts surrounding the Window Clerk position.

The AJ opined that complainant's argument regarding not applying for

the position because it was never posted so she could apply �calls for

hindsight speculation. . . .� Complainant argues this is incorrect

at the very least, and legal error at the very most. The complainant

further argues that the AJ did not view her position in the most favorable

light, as required on summary judgment. Finally, the complainant argues

that the AJ improperly did not address the issue of denial of training,

which complainant raised with the EEO counselor. The agency stands on

the record and requests that we affirm its final action implementing

the AJ's decision.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without

a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of

material fact. This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment

procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where

a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary

standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment a court does not

sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non moving party must

be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences

must be drawn in the non moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of

fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder

could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103,

105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to

affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by

weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate.

In the context of an administrative proceeding under Title VII, an AJ

may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that

the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

The courts have been clear that summary judgment is not to be used as

a "trial by affidavit." Redmand v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st

Cir. 1975). The Commission has noted that when a party submits an

affidavit and credibility is at issue, "there is a need for strident

cross-examination and summary judgment on such evidence is improper."

Pedersen v. Department of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05940339 (February

24, 1995).

After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ erred when she

concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact in this case.

The AJ further erred in not believing the evidence of the non-moving

party, complainant, or drawing all justifiable inferences in complainant's

favor, as required on summary judgment. In finding no discrimination,

the AJ relied on the representations of management officials as provided

in their affidavit testimony over that of complainant's allegations.

This is particularly noteworthy, given that management officials

changed their position as to why the position was eliminated. Further,

a reasonable fact finder, when viewing the record in the light most

favorable to complainant, could find that the Window Clerk position was

abolished in an effort to prevent complainant from occupying the position.

Further, we find that the exclusion of the issue of denied training

was foreseeable as complainant did not include this issue in her formal

complaint. The record indicates, however, that this issue was counseled,

so complainant may amend her complaint to include this issue and the AJ

will thus address it.

We note that the hearing process is intended to be an extension of the

investigative process, designed to �ensure that the parties have a fair

and reasonable opportunity to explain and supplement the record and to

examine and cross-examine witnesses.� See EEOC Management Directive

(MD) 110, as revised, November 9, 1999, Chapter 6, page 6-1; see also

29 C.F.R. �� 1614.109(d) and (e). �Truncation of this process, while

material facts are still in dispute and the credibility of witnesses

is still ripe for challenge, improperly deprives complainant of a full

and fair investigation of her claims.� Mi S. Bang v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (March 26, 1998). See also

Peavley v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950628

(October 31, 1996); Chronister v. United States Postal Service, EEOC

Request No. 05940578 (April 23, 1995). In summary, we find that there

are simply too many unresolved issues which require an assessment as

to the credibility of the various management officials, co-workers,

and complainant, herself.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

arguments on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission reverses the

agency's final action and remands the matter to the agency in accordance

with this decision and the Order below.

ORDER

The agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the New York EEOC field

office the request for a hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days of

the date this decision becomes final. The agency is directed to submit

a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit within fifteen

(15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency

shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the

address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted to

the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall issue a

decision on the complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 and the

agency shall issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 26, 2002

__________________

Date