Bowen Motors Coaches

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 17, 1943

51 N.L.R.B. 1375 (N.L.R.B. 1943)

In the Matter of BOWEN MOTORS COACHES and AMALGAMATED As-
SOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY & MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES
OF AMERICA, LOCAL # 1142.
Case No. C-2660.-Decided August 17, 1943
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On June 25, 1943, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Re-
port in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices,
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report
attached hereto. Thereafter, the respondent filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report and a ,brief in support of its exceptions, and
requested permission to present oral argument before the Board. On
August 3, 1943, pursuant to notice served upon all the parties, a hear-
ing for the purpose of oral argument was held before the Board at
Washington, D. C. Only the respondent appeared.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the respondent's exceptions and brief, and the
entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the subsidiary findings
of fact made by the Trial Examiner. We do not, however, agree with
the Trial Examiner's conclusions from the evidence that the respond-
ent engaged in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section
8 (1) and (3) of the Act.
The Trial Examiner found a violation of Section 8 (3) on the
basis of:
(a) employee Burns' testimony that the clay after Rogers' dis-
charge Foreman Mason told him he "slipped up by the side of bus"
and heard Rogers talking about the Union with a "negro" em-
ployee ;
(b) the finding that although Rogers had long been an unsatis-
factory employee he was several times advanced to better positions
with more pay;
51 N. L R. B., No. 219.
1375
1376 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(c) the finding that Wesson. a colored employee with whom
Rogers had discussed the Union, was discharged the same day;
and
(d) the finding that the respondent- had a policy designed to
prevent the organization of its colored employees at Fort Worth.
The respondent contends that Rogers was discharged solely because
he was an unsatisfactory employee. The record is clear, as the Trial
Examiner found, that Rogers was an unsatisfactory employee. Thus,
the only issue is whether this was the actual motive for his discharge
or whether the motive was to prevent the organization of colored em-
ployees.
We are of the opinion that the support for the Trial Examiner's
inference that the discharge was discriminatory, which is drawn from
Burns' testimony above, is considerably weakened by Burns' further
testimony that Foreman Mason, at no time stated that Rogers was dis-
charged because he discussed unions with Wesson, whereas Mason did
state to him after the discharge that the cause was Rogers' unsatis-
factory work. Likewise, the inference of a discriminatory motive for
the discharge which is based on the fact that Rogers was not dis-
charged earlier, but was granted promotions despite his unsatisfactory
work, is entitled to little weight when considered in the light of Gen-
eral Manager Pinckard's testimony, which we credit, that the respond-
ent was simply trying to find a position where Rogers could "make
good," and that all wage increases received by Rogers were required
by the Union's wage scale for the different jobs held by him.
The inference of a discriminatory motive for the discharge which
is based on the finding that Wesson was discharged the same day as
Rogers appears at first to be justified. But General Manager Pinck-
ard, whose testimony we credit, testified without contradiction that
Wesson had been discharged once before because "he went stale on the
job," and was discharged this time because the head painter, who was
Wesson's father-in-law, reported he could get, no work out of him.
Wesson testified that no official or foreman of the respondent told him
he was discharged for talking about the Union. Wesson was later
reinstated.
The underlying basis for the Trial Examiner's finding that Rogers'
discharge was discriminatory, is his preliminary finding that the
respondent had a policy to prevent the organization of its colored
employees at Forth .Worth. We are convinced that the record does
not support such a finding. The record does not contain a single
statement by an official or supervisor of the respondent indicative of
such a policy, whereas it does reveal that at Houston the colored
employees of the respondent are organized. Furthermore, there is
no evidence that the respondent has an anti-union background.
BOWEN MOTORS COACHES 1377
There is nothing to indicate that the officials of the respondent or any
of its foremen, other than Gentry, have interfered with, restrained,
or coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act. On the contrary', the respondent has engaged in col-
lective bargaining with the Union and operates under a contract with
the Union. Upon the basis of the entire record, we find that Rogers
was not discharged because of his union activities. We shall, accord-
ingly, dismiss the allegations of the complaint that the respondent
engaged in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (3)
of the Act.
The Trial Examiner's finding that the respondent violated Section
8 (1) of the Act is based upon a statement made by Foreman Gentry
to employee McLain, 3 or 4 months before Rogers' discharge.
Gentry's remarks did not truly represent the respondent's actual policy
toward the concerted activities of its employees as shown by the con-
tractual relations existing between the Union and the respondent
and by the absence of attempts by the respondent's officers or other
supervisory employees to interfere with the employees' rights of self-
organization. We are of the opinion that, under all the circum-
stances, the remarks of Gentry, standing alone, did not interfere with,
restrain, or coerce the employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act. We shall, therefore, dismiss the allega-
tions of the complaint that the respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
ORDER 1
Upon the entire record in the case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the complaint against Bowen Motor
Coaches, Fort Worth, Texas, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
CHAIRMAN MILLIS took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Mr. Elmer Davis, for the Board.
Mr. Alfred Crager, of Ft. Worth, Texas, for the respondent.
Mr. B R Wayne, of Ft. Worth, Texas, for the Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge duly filed on February 16, 1943, by Amalgamated Association of
Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America , Local #1142,
herein called the Union , the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the
Board, by its Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region (Ft. Worth, Texas),
issued its complaint dated May 11, 1943 , against Bowen Motor Coaches, herein
called the respondent alleging that the respondent had engaged in and was
1378 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8 (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint and notice of
hearing were duly served upon the respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint alleged in substance
that the respondent: (1) on or about February 8, 1943, discharged L. J. Rogers,
and thereafter refused to reinstate said employee, because he joined or assisted
the Union and engaged in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ; and (2) by these acts, and from on
or about October 1, 1942, to May 11, 1943, through certain officers and supervisory
employees, by vilifying, discouraging and expressing disapproval of the Union, and
by urging, persuading, threatening and warning its employees to refrain from
assisting, becoming members of, or remaining members of the Union, had inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced and was interfering with, restraining, and
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act.
On or about May 20, 1943, the respondent filed an answer, admitting certain
allegations of the complaint as to the nature of its business but denying that it
had committed any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Ft Worth, Texas, on May 24 and 25,
1943, before the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly designated by the Chief Trial
Examiner. The Board and the respondent were represented by counsel and the
Union by its representative. All of the parties participated in the hearing. Full
opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties
At the close of the case, the Board's counsel moved to amend the complaint to
conform to the proof as to names and dates The motion was granted without
objection.
Although afforded an opportunity to do so, none of the parties argued orally
before the undersigned. Pursuant to permission granted at the hearing, the
respondent filed a brief.
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following:
FINDING OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The respondent is a Texas corporation, having its principal office and place of
business at Ft Worth, Texas, and is engaged in the transportation of passengers
and property by motor busses. In addition, the respondent manufactures bus
bodiesiat its Ft. Worth establishment.
Under a permit of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the respondent operates
250 busses daily within the State of Texas, serving all the principal cities thereof,
including Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Corpus Christi, Ft. Worth, Wichita Falls,
Amarillo, Tyler and Marshall. It employs approximately 1,000 employees. Dur-
ing the year 1942, in the operation of its business it received a gross income of
at least one million dollars, and from its operations in 1943 until the date of the
hearing, it has received a gross income in approximately the same ratio At least
10 percent of the respondent's gross income accrues from transporting passengers
and property in interstate commerce through its own and connecting lines. In
operating its business, the respondent regularly sells tickets to passengers destined
for points outside of the State of Texas, which tickets cover the entire trips of
the passengers so purchasing tickets from the respondent.
BOWS\y MOTORS COACHES 1379
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees
of America, Local #1142, is a labor organization which admits to membership
employees of the respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
On or about May 10. 1942, the respondent entered into a written contract with
the Union, in which the Union was recognized as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative for all persons employed by the respondent as operators, drivers,
mechanics, service employees and shop men. This contract contained a provision
for the arbitration of all questions, differences and disputes arising between the
parties. At the time of the hearing, negotiations were being conducted for a
new contract and, through extension, the old contract was still in effect.
At its Ft. Worth establishment, the respondent has a painting department or
shop. The record indicates that with one exception, colored persons were em-
ployed in the painting shop at all times mentioned herein. In addition, the record
discloses that the respondent at time employed colored persons as janitors and
on the wash rack As of February 8, 1943, none of these colored employees were
members of the Union
Although the contract specified the rates of pay for painters, none of the
employees in the painting department, including the head painter, received the
top rate of pay so specified. At sometime commencing in the latter part of
January, 1943, an attempt was made by the Union to organize the colored
employees.
B. Interference, restraint, and coercion
Robert McLain, who was employed by the respondent as a mechanic in the
machine shop, was a shop committeeman for the Union.' At sometime in October
or November, 1942, McLain had a conversation during working hours with Lloyd
Gentry, a general foreman with supervision over the entire shop including Mc-
Lain's department. With respect to this conversation, McLain testified as
follows :
. . . so I made the remark to Lloyd that I wished they would hurry and
start the reclassification or the Union would hurry and get me a raise, or
- something to that effect. . . . And Lloyd told me that the Union wouldn't
do me any good, wouldn't get me anywhere ; and he also said that the con-
tract we was working under wasn't worth the ink and paper it took to
write it; and I asked him why and he said there were a few things he couldn't
say but he happened to know what he was talking about, that the Union was
just pulling us fellows' legs for dues, that we were just paying our dues just
because we were'
r
The 'above is the only evidence in the case supporting the charge in the coin-
plaint to the effect that respondent's supervisors made remarks derogatory to the
Union and, in fact, employee witnesses both for the Board and the respondent
testified that they had not heard any of the respondent's officers or supervisors
' McLain left the employ of the respondent on May 17, 1943, for reasons not disclosed
by the record
2 McLain's testimony as to this conversation is uncontradicted and is credited by the
undersigned Gentry was not employed by the respondent at the time of the hearing.
540612-44-vol 51-88
1380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
disparage or express disapproval of the Union. Nevertheless, Gentry, by the above
remarks, clearly intended to disparage and discourage interest in the Union. Ac-
cordingly, in view of Gentry's supervisory position with the respondent, the
undersigned believes and finds that his remarks to McLain constituted interfer-
ence, restraint, and coercion within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
C. The discharge of L. J. Rogers
Rogers was first employed by the respondent on March 9, 1942, when he was 17
years of age. For about the first 3 months of his employment he washed busses
at a rate of pay of 40 cents per hour. At Roger's request, J. A. Pinckard, general
manager of respondent, then transferred him to the paint shop as a painter's helper
with an increase in his hourly rate. He remained in the paint shop for 5 or 6
days and, upon the head painter.'s request that Rogers be moved, Pinckard
transferred Rogers to the job of mechanic's helper, with an increase in pay to
65 cents per hour. In this position, Rogers was under the supervision of Bob
Malone, a body foreman. After some months at this position, Malone was trans-
ferred by the respondent to Brownwood, Texas. At Rogers' request, Pinckard
sent him to Brownwood with Malone. Malone returned with Rogers to Ft.
Worth about five days later and then went back to Brownwood. However, Malone
did not take Rogers back with him to Brownwood and it is the uncontradicted
testimony of Pinckard, which the undersigned credits, that Malone told him "You
can have Rogers, . . . He ain't worth a damn."'
Rogers was then placed under the supervision of L. S. Mason, foreman of the
body shop. In the first part of January, 1943, Mason assigned Rogers to Ralph
Burns, an electrician, as the latter's helper. Rogers stayed on this job until dis-
charged by Mason on February 8, 3-943 After his discharge, Rogers on at least
one occasion applied for reinstatement, which the respondent refused.
The respondent contends that Rogers was discharged for the reason that he
was an "unsatisfactory" employee, and does not claim that any one particular
incident caused the discharge' The testimony of both the Board's and the respond-
ent's witnesses clearly establishes that Rogers was often late for work ; that he
made a number of mistakes, some of which appear to have been caused by care-
lessness rather than inexperience ; that he failed to obey orders promptly ; and
that he spent considerable time during working hours talking to other employees,
and away from his job.` The undersigned does not believe any purpose would be
served by discussing herein,the particular incidents involving mistakes and other
charges of inefficiency attributed to Rogers, or by discussing the testimony in this
connection. The evidence conclusively proves that Rogers was, what might be
termed, an "unsatisfactory" employee for almost the entire period of his employ-
ment, and the undersigned so finds.
8 Malone was a witness for the Board but was not called upon to rebut the above testi-
mony of Pinckard. Malone testified that Rogers wanted to return to Brownwood but that
lie (Malone) needed a more experienced mechanic for the job. Malone was not employed
by the respondent at the time of the hearing I
4 On February 12, 1943, in response to a letter from Rogers asking for a letter stating
the reason for his discharge, the respondent wrote the following letter:
You are advised that you were released from this Company because the general
quality of the services performed by you was unsatisfactory to the management.
Numerous times you were told to perform certain tasks by the management which
you did not perform until being told again to do so. Also you spent too much time
talking to other employees during working hours.
6 Rogers, in effect admitted most of the above in his testimony. A number of the wit-
nesses who testified to these facts were members -h- Union.
BOWEN MOTORS COACHES 1381
From the above it would appear that the respondent was justified in discharg-
ing Rogers . However, the undersigned believes that the evidence shows that
other considerations entered into Mason's decision to discharge Rogers. Rogers
joined the Union on November 3, 1942. It does not appear from the record that
he was at all active in behalf of the Union until about two weeks before his dis-
charge, at which time he began to solicit respondent's colored employees to join
the Union. During this two-week period, Rogers talked to the colored employees
both during and after work, urged them to join the Union, and gave them appli-
cation cards for the Union. On February 6 or 7, Rogers talked to Robert Wesson,
a colored employee, about the Union while they both were working on the same
bus. Mason was in the vicinity of the bus while Rogers and Wesson were talking.
With respect to this incident, Rogers testified, "I was talking to Wesson about
the Union when the foreman (Mason) passed by. Of course I didn't want the
foreman to know I was talking about the union and I kept quiet until I saw he
was gone." Both Rogers and Wesson were discharged by Mason on February 8.
Wesson also was told by Mason that his discharge was for unsatisfactory work.'
On February 9, Mason had a conversation with Burns during which Mason stated
that he (Mason) had "slipped up by the side of a bus" and heard Rogers talking
about the Union with a "negro."' The undersigned finds that,, in this statement,
Mason referred to the above mentioned talk between Rogers and Wesson.
Mason testified that an incident occurring during the morning of February 7,
involving the failure of Rogers to install a "switch panel" in a school bus until
told by him (Mason) to do so on three occasions, brought him to the decision
to discharge Rogers.' However, the undersigned believes that Mason would not
have made the above statement to Burns if, in fact, he had not been motivated
in the discharge by reason of Rogers' union activity, and, therefore, does not
credit Mason's reason for discharging Rogers. As stated above, the evidence
discloses that Rogers' services to the respondent had been unsatisfactory over
a considerable period of his employment. The head painter requested his transfer
and Malone, in effect, made the same request. The evidence further discloses,
that his shortcomings were continuous, and were not confined to any one par-
ticular period of time. Rogers' attitude was known to the officials of the re-
spondent early in his employment and, instead of discharging him at the time,
he was advanced to positions of more importance and responsibility with in-
creases in pay8 Moreover, the fact that Wesson was also discharged on Feb-
ruary 8, one or two days after his conversation with Rogers, but was rein-
stated shortly thereafter while Rogers' request for reinstatement was denied,
Wesson was rehired by the respondent after about 11 days when he asked for rein-
statement, and was still employed by the respondent at the time of the hearing.
' Burns testified to the above conversation with Mason, and the undersigned credits his
testimony Burns was still employed by the respondent at the time of the hearing, and
was a member of the Union. Mason testified, that due to the noise in the shop it would
have been impossible to hear such a conversation as that between Rogers and Wesson, and
denied the statement attributed to him by Burns. Mason, before becoming a foreman,
had been a member and vice-president of the Union. B. R. Wayne, Secretary and Business
Agent of the Union, testified that Mason had been suspended from the Union for non-
payment of dues about one month before he (Mason) had become a foreman, whereas
Mason testified that his union dues were paid up when he became foreman. -
"Rogers admitted the incident, but testified that Mason told him only twice to put in
the panel. This was confirmed by T. L Warren, one of respondent's witnesses.
'Mason testified in substance , that at the time Rogers was transferred to electrician's
helper he talked to Rogers and warned him he would be dismissed if his work did not im-
prove. Rogers admitted having a conversation with Mason at the time, but denied that
Mason threatened to dismiss him or told him that his work was unsatisfactory. The
undersigned believes and finds that Rogers is the more credible witness in this respect.
1382 DECISION'S OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
is significant , in view of Mason's statement to Burns that be had -heard Rogers
talking about the Union. The undersigned believes , that the evidence, as, a
whole, shows a policy of the respondent to prevent organization of its colored
employees at Ft. Worth, and so finds. As pointed out above, none of these
colored employees belonged to the Union , and in the paint shop , not even the
head painter received the top rate of pay specified in the contract.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that although the respondent had for a
considerable period of time sufficient cause for discharging Rogers, it would
not have done so on February 8, 1943, in the absence of Rogers' activities in
behalf of the Union. Upon the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
respondent discharged Rogers because of his union activities and thereby dis-
criminated in regard to his hire and tenure of employment, discouraged mem-
bership in the Union, and interfered with, restrained, `arid coe`rcedi Its employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.'°
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR ,LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the respondent set forth in Section-III above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the respondent described in Section I above,
have a close , intimate , and substantial relation to trade , traffic, and commerce
among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Since it has been found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom, and that
it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The undersigned has found that the respondent discriminated in regard to
the hire and tenure of employment of L. J Rogers. The undersigned will
recommend therefore that the respondent offer immediate and full reinstate-
ment to Rogers to his former or substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and that the respondent
make him whole for any loss of pay he has suffered by reason of the respond-
ent's discrimination against him, by payment to him of a sum of money equal
10 In deciding this case on its merits, the undersigned is not unmindful of the principle
enunciated by the Board in the Matter of Consolidated Asrcraft Corporation, 47 N. L
R B 694 , where the Board, in its discretion , refused to pass upon the merits of two
alleged discriminatory discharges because the parties had not exhausted the remedy
under their existing collective bargaining contract which contained arbitration machinery
for the settlement of such disputes. In the instant case, a contract was in effect at the
time of the hearing containing an arbitration clause which might have been used for the
purpose of disposing of the dispute arising out of the discharge of Rogeis. The parties,
however, saw fit not to use such procedure under the contract The respondent , in addi-
tion to not having raised in its answer any issue as to the Union 's failure to avail itself
of the arbitration procedure in the contract, stated in the brief it submitted to the under-
signed, the follow ing :
It is respectfully submitted, in the light of the record made in this case [the com-
plaint ], ought not to be dismissed in such a manner as to now require an arbitration
and to compel the Respondent to again go through the matter The Union and the
complaining employee submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of this Board, and the
Respondent has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of this Board and a final deter-
mination should be made.
Therefore , in effect , the undersigned is confronted with a situation where both parties
request that the Board decide this case upon the merits , notwithstanding the existence
of arbitration machinery under an existing contract Under these circumstances, the
undersigned believes that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to accede to the request
of the parties and decide this case upon its merits.
BOWEN MOTORS COACHES 1383
to that which he normally would have earned as wages from the date of such
discrimination to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings,u
during said period.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS of LAW
1. Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Em-
ployees of'America, Local #1142, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of
L. Jr. Rogers and thereby discouraging membership in a labor organization, the
respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the
meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act.
3 By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (1)
of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair. labor practices affecting
commerce, within''the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the under-
signed recommends that the respondent, Bowen Motor Coaches and its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric
Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America, Local #1142, or any other labor
organization of its employees, by discharging or refusing to reinstate any of
its employees, or in any other manner discriminating in regard to their hire
or, tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment ;
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.
2. 'Take' the 'foll`owing affirmative action which the undersigned finds will ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to L. J. Rogers immediate and full reinstatement to his former or
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other
rights or privileges;
(b) Make whole L. J. Rogers for any loss of pay he has suffered by reason
of the respondent's discrimination against him, by payment to him of a sum
"By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses, such as for transportation, room,
and board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
where than for the respondent, which would not have been incurred but for his unlawful
discharge and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere. See Matter
of Crossett Lumber"Company and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Local 2590, 8 N. L. it. B. 440. Monies re-
ceived for work performed upon Federal, State, county, municipal, or other work-relief
projects shall be considered as earnings. See Republic Steel Corporation v. N. L. R. B.,
311 U.S.7. -
1384 DECISION'S OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of money equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages from
the date of the discrimination to the date of the respondent's offer of reinstate-
ment, less his net earnings'- during said period ;
(c) Immediately post in conspicuous places in and about its plant at Ft. Worth,
Texas, and maintain for a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days from
the date of posting, notices to its employees stating: (1) that the respondent
will not engage in the conduct from which it is recommended that it cease and
desist in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of these Recommendations; (2) that the
respondent will take the affirmative action set forth in paragraph 2 (a) and (b)
of these Recommendations; and (3 ) that the respondent's employees are free
to become or remain members of Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric
Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America, Local #1142, and that the
respondent will not discriminate against any employee because of membership
or activities in this organization ;
(d) File with the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region on or before
ten (10) days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report a report in writing
setting forth in detail the manner and form in which the respondent has com-
plied with the foregoing recommendations.
It is further recommended that unless on or before ten (10) days from the
receipt of this Intermediate Report, the respondent notify said Regional Director
in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the National
Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the respondent to take the action
aforesaid.
As provided in Section 33 of Article II of the Rules and Regulations of the
National Labor Relations Board, Series 2-as amended, effective October 28,
1942-any party may within fifteen (]5) days from.the date of the entry of the
order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to Section 32 of Article II of said
Rules and Regulations, file with the Board, Rochambeau Building, Washington,
D. C., an original and four copies of a statement in writing setting forth such
exceptions to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of the record or pro-
ceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he relies upon,
together with the original and four copies of a brief in support thereof As further
provided in said Section 33, should any party desire permission to argue orally
before the Board, request therefor must be made in writing to the Board within
ten (10) days from the date of an order transferring the case to the Board.
JOHN H. EADIE
Trial Examiner
Dated June 25, 1943.
12 See footnote 11, supra.