Amalgamated Transit Union No. 825

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 8, 1979

240 N.L.R.B. 1267 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, NO. 825 1267
Amalgamated Transit Union, Division No. 825, AFL-
CIO and Robert Meier and Transport of New Jer-
sey, Party to the Contract. Case 22 CB-3678
March 8, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNIN(; AND MEMBERS PNEI.I.
AN[) TRt ISI)AI.
On December 12. 1978. Administrative Law Judge
Irwin Kaplan issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings.' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge. but
not to adopt his recommended Order.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Amalgamated Transit Union. Division No. 825.
AFL-CIO, Dumont, New Jersey, its officers, agents,
and representatives, shall:
I. C'ease and desist from:
(a) Charging, trying, finding, or otherwise disci-
plining Robert Meier, or any of its members, for pro-
viding a statement to the Employer in connection
with the grievance machinery under the collective-
bargaining agreement.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Rescind the fine assessed against Robert Meier
for providing a statement to the Employer in connec-
tion with the grievance machinery under the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, and expunge from its rec-
ords an)' reference to that fine.
(b) Refund to Robert Meier the full amount of the
fine assessed against him, with interest, as set forth in
the section of the Decision herein entitled "The
Remedy."
(c) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." Copies of
240 NLRB No. 166
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 22, after being duly signed by Re-
spondent'a authorized representative, shall be posted
by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Sign and return to said Regional Director suf-
ficient copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix" for posting by Transport of New Jersey, if will-
ing, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 22, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
t Respondent has excepted to certain credibilit findings made hb the
Administrative l.a% Judge It is he Board's established polic, not to oser-
rule an dministratie las judge's resolutions ith respect to credlbilitx
unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us
that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dr WUall Products. Inc. 91
NlRB 544 (1950). enfd. 188 E.2d 3t2 (3d (r. 1951). We have carefull'
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings
rWe shall issue an Order in lieu of that recommended hb the Administra-
live La. Judge. inasmuch as the recommended Order fails to include prosi-
sions requiring Respondent to cease and desist from restraining or c ercing
emploees "in ans hkle or related manner." to take certain affirmative ac-
tion to effectuate the policles of the Act and to rescind the fine assessed
aglnisl Robert Meier for pros.iding a statement t the Emplo)ser in connec-
tlion sith the eriesance machiner under the collectve-bargaining agree-
ment and to expunge from its records an) reference to the fine
In the ecent that this Order is enforced hb a Judgment of a t nited
States Court of Appeals. the 'words in the notice reading "Posted h Order
iof the Na.tiolnal Labor Relatuons Board" shall read Posted Pursuant to
Judgment of the Unted States Court of Appeals Fnforcing an Order of the
Nation.al I .ahr Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NoilwCE ro MEMBERS
PosIEr BY ORDER OF THE
NATIoNAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
Wi! Wilt. NI charge, try. fine, or otherwise
discipline Robert Meier, or any of our members,
for providing a statement to the Employer in
connection with the grievance machinery under
the collective-bargaining agreement.
WI. wILL NO in any like or related manner
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act.
WI wiiiL rescind the fine assessed against
Robert Meier for providing a statement to the
Employer in connection with the grievance ma-
1268 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
chinery under the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, and expunge from our records any refer-
ence to that fine.
WE WILL refund to Robert Meier the full
amount of the fine assessed against him, with
interest.
AMALGAMATED TRANSIt UNION DIVISION No
825. AFL-CIO
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IRWIN KAPLAN. Administrative Law Judge: This case was
heard before me in Newark, New Jersey, on July 6, 1978.
The charge in this proceeding was filed by Robert Meier
on October 25, 1977, against Amalgamated Transit Union,
Division No. 825, AFL-CIO (herein called Respondent or
Union). On February 16, 1978, a complaint issued thereon
alleging, principally, that Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended (herein called the Act), by imposing a fine on
Meier for providing information to Transport of New Jer-
sey (herein called the Employer), relative to a grievance
involving another employee and fellow union members.
Respondent filed an answer admitting, inter alia, jurisdic-
tion, labor organization, and imposing the fine on Robert
Meier, but denied that by doing so it violated the Act.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I
find as follows:
I JURISDIC11ON
Transport of New Jersey (herein also called the Em-
ployer) is a New Jersey corporation with its principal office
and place of business in Maplewood, New Jersey, and with
various other facilities in the State of New Jersey, is, and
has been at all times material herein, engaged in the busi-
ness of transporting passengers interstate and intrastate as
a bus company and related services. During the past 12
months the Employer, in connection with its aforenoted
business operations, has derived gross revenue in excess of
$250,000. The answer admits, and I find, that Transport of
New Jersey is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II1. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The answer admits, and I find that Respondent is a la-
bor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRA(TICE
A. Sequence of Events
Respondent has for many years represented the Employ-
er's drivers and mechanics at various facilities in the State
of New Jersey, including a garage located in Oradell, New
Jersey, the situs of an incident which culminated in the
instant proceeding. The aforenoted incident occurred on
July 22, 1975.' On that occasion, at approximately 8:15
a.m., Robert Meier, a mechanic, was cleaning the garage
floor with a sweeping machine when he noticed heavy
smoke emanating from the rear of a moving bus, which
was approaching the garage. Meier immediately looked to
alert others in the garage and came upon his immediate
supervisor, Herb Georges, and Superintendent Larry Gan-
gemi and told them about the "smoking" bus. Gangemi
and Georges sped to head off the bus from entering the
facility while Meier grabbed a fire hose and extinguished
the smoke from the bus' rear tires. Gangemi asked the
driver to identify himself, but the driver refused and
walked away.
On the day of the incident, James Beckwith, the driver of
the smoking bus, received a 2-day suspension for abusing
equipment. Under the collective-bargaining agreement in
effect between the Employer and Respondent, there is a
four-step grievance procedure with arbitration as the termi-
nal step.2 Beckwith immediately grieved the suspension,
and the first step of the grievance procedure was conduct-
ed on July 22, the date of the incident and suspension. The
grievance was not disposed of at the first step, and it pro-
ceeded to a second-step meeting a few days later. At this
second step, Beckwith was joined by Union Business Agent
Chester Polukord, and again the grievance was upheld.
On July 24, Meier was summoned to Gangemi's office
wherein Gangemi explained, "It is everybody's job to pro-
tect the equipment." He asked Meier to give a statement of
the bus incident and reminded him that he (Meier) knew
that the driver got nasty with him (Gangemi). Meier point-
ed out that he could not give a statement critical of a fellow
union member under the Union's constitution.3 Gangemi
then asked only for a statement of Meier's actions and
what he observed vis-a-vis the condition of the bus. Super-
visor Georges was also present in Gangemi's office at that
time, and he put in writing Meier's account of the incident,
which omitted any reference to the driver. The statement
was then signed by Meier.4
The third-step meeting was held on July 30. At this meet-
ing, the Employer's personnel director, George Carr, re-
vealed for the first time that he had a statement (G.C. Exh.
3) for an employee eyewitness who had observed the inci-
dent. Union Business Agent Polukord voiced displeasure
on being confronted with the statement at this stage (third
step) of the grievance The grievance was again upheld,
All dates hereinafter refer to 1975. unless otherwise indicated.
: The first step involves a meeting between the shop steward (a unit em-
ployee) and the garage supervisor: the second step is held 48 hours later and
involves he Employer's district manager and union business agent: the
third step is held within a few weeks of the second step at the Employer's
home office in Maplewood. New Jerse) the fourth and final step is arbitra-
tion
See fn. 7. nfra.
G.( Exh. 3.
Polukord and Beckwith dens that (;.('. Exh. 3 is the statement given to
them to peruse at the hird-step meeting According to hem, the original
statement indicated that Meier saw Beckwith operate the bus on two flat
tires. Beckwith asserts that this statement was false and. in fact, does not
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION. NO. 825 1269
and the Union decided to take the matter to arbitration.
Later that same day Polukord visited the Oradell garage
and confronted Meier as to why he gave the statement.
Meier told Polukord that he did so because Gangemi
called him into his office and asked him for it.6 Polukord
remarked to Meier, that "It [the statement] was detrimental
land] I just lost the case."
The arbitration was conducted on October 28. Meier did
not attend, nor waa he subpenaed, and his statement was
not received in evidence. The Union obtained a favorable
disposition of Beckwith's grievance at arbitration. On No-
vember 21, approximately 3 weeks later, the Union wrote
Meier specifying charges against him for his role in the
Beckwith case aa follows:
1. Willful violation of section 86 of the Internation-
al Constitution and General Laws which read (sic) as
follows:
"No member shall be allowed to injure the interest
of a fellow member, by undermining him in place,
wages, or in any other willful act by which the reputa-
tion or employment of any member may be injured."
2. Willful violation of the obligation as contained in
the International Constitution and General Laws of
the Amalgamated Transit Union, specifically in the
area of the obligation that reads as follows quote, "I
will not slander or abuse the officers and members of
the A.T.U.. and .... will not knowingly wrong a
member or see one wronged if it is in my power to
prevent it." 7
Meier appeared with counsel at a hearing before the
union trial board on December 5 in defense of the union
charges brought against him. He requested and was per-
mitted to read a prepared statement consisting of 11-1/2
typewritten pages.8 The aforenoted statement, inter alia,
makes reference to the previous union meeting wherein the
Union assertedly stated that it defended Beckwith because
he was doing his job as he was instructed to do. After
Meier's noting of the foregoing, he reasoned, "[u]sing the
Union's own logic I also was instructed by my supervisor
to perform an act concerning my employment." Meier as-
serted, "I signed a statement because I was told to by my
supervisor." Still further, he asserted in said statement that
"remember" seeing Meier that day. However. Beckwith was inconsistent
and unimpressive as a witness. Thus, he testified that he first told Polukord
that Meier's statement was incorrect after he and Polukord left Carr's office
Later, he asserted that he told Polukord that the statement was incorrect
during the third-step meeting. In an) event. it is noted that Polukord does
not assert. nor does the record reveal. that Meier was ever confronted rela-
tive to the contents of the statement. only (as will be further noted below)
why he gave it. In these circumstances, I am unpersuaded that G.C. Exh. 3
is not the statement that Polukord and Beckwith examined at the third-step
meeting. Further, on the basis of consistency plausibilit).and demeanor, I
credit Meier over Polukord and Beckwith in all material areas where their
testimony conflicts.
6 According to Polukord when he asked Meter why he gave the statement.
Meier responded. "I did it and I would do it again," and then he. Meier.
walked away. While Polukord could not recall Meier telling him that he
gave the statement because Gangemi asked him to. that is the reason Meter
gave him as stated in Polukord's affidavit. (See Ci C Exh. 4. par. 3.)
While the union constitution was not introduced as an exhibit. the rele-
vant provisions therein are substantially set forth in the union charges. See
G.C. Exh 2(al.
G.C Exh. 5
he reported the smoking-bus incident immediately because
of what he reasonably perceived to be a danger, to wit, a
garage fire, and not to report that the bus had two flat tires.
He also denied therein that he slandered a union member
(Beckwith), as charged, but maintained that he told the
"truth as [he] observed it." Meier completed reading his
prepared statement and was asked by members of the trial
board and Union Business Agent Polukord why he gave
his statement, to which Meier responded, "because I was
asked to by my supervisor." When the same question was
posed for the fourth or fifth time, Meier replied, "I made
my statement," and refused to further discuss the matter.9
The union local determined that Meier violated section
86 of the International constitution 10 and imposed a $100
fine. Thereafter, Meier pursued a series of unsuccessful in-
terim appeals to the International president, general ex-
ecutive board, and finally, by letter dated October 7, 1977,
he received notice that the appeals committee and dele-
gates of the 44th convention of the Amalgamated Transit
Union sustained the action against him.t' Meier had ex-
hausted all the avenues of appeal under the union's consti-
tution that were available and paid the fine. 3
B. Discussion and Conclusions
It is now well settled that unions may impose reasonable
fines on their members in order to secure compliance with
their constitutions, bylaws, or other properly adopted rules
under the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.'4 See
Scofield, et al. Wisconsin Motor Corp.] v N.L.R.B., 394
U.S. 423 (1969); N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co. et al., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). Local 5795. Communication
Respondent. on the other hand. asserts that Meier refused to answer an)
questions as to "whether he was asked or told by any company representa-
tive, to submit the statement . i. "In support thereof. Respondent prof-
fered it tape of Metier's speech and the trial board's questions and Meier's
responses thereto mmediately following said speech which was received
over General Counsel's objection. As Respondent represented that there
were different voices on the tape. it was listened to for purposes of identifi-
cation. I noted. nter a/ia, that several individuals spoke at the same time
and that neither I nor the court reported could discern what was said. Thus,
I reconsidered m previous ruling and rejected the tape as an exhibit. Re-
spondent elected not to place the tape in the rejected file and makes no
reference thereto n its bnef. Uinder all the circumstances. I reaffirm my
previous ruling rejecting Respondent's offer to prove by the tape that Meier
refused to answer any questions. In an5 event. I do not deem it material
whether Meter was "asked" oir "told" to give the statement. Rather. for
reasons discussed more fully. infra. I find material that Meier did not volun-
teer to ge the statement and that he gas.e t after the grievance procedure
had been activated.
See Respondent's letter dated November 21, set forth presiouslh. spec-
ifying the charges against Meier under sec. 86 (G.C. Exh. 2(a) )
G.C. Exh. 2(c) thru (p)
G.C. Eh. 2(q).
The General Counsel does not contend that Respondent failed to give
Meier adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, or otherwise denied him
due process with regard to the charges brought against him.
It is an unfair labor practice under Sec. 8(bXI)XA) for a union to "re-
strain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act." Sec. 7 of the Act states that employees have the nght to
self-organization. to form, join, or assist labor organizations. to bargain
collectivel' through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted aci ities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection and also have the right to refrain from any and all
such activities. A proviso to Sec. 8(bHI)(A). however. permits a union "to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of mem-
bership."
1270 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Workers of America, AFL-CIO ( Western Electric Co. Inc.),
192 NLRB 556 (1971).
The proviso, however, does not give a union an unquali-
fied license to expel or fine its members for every infraction
of intraunion rules.' 5 Thus, the Supreme Court in Allis-
Chalmers 16 recognized limitations on union rules insofar as
they affected a member's employment status. The Supreme
Court in Wisconsin Motor Corp. 17 subsequently noted fur-
ther limitations in that internal union rules must reflect a
legitimate union interest and not conflict with an overrid-
ing Federal labor policy.
In Cannery Warehousemen, supra, the Board had occa-
sion to consider the interplay of forces as represented by
the proviso and those of the Federal labor policy and
found, inter alia, that the Union violated Section 8(b)(l)(A)
of the Act by charging, trying, and fining a member for
testifying in an arbitration hearing adversely against anoth-
er member in violation of the Union's constitution. The
Union's actions therein gave way to an overriding national
labor policy, aa articulated in the Steelworkers Trilogyl, 8
which favors arbitration as a vehicle for promoting indus-
trial peace. It was reasoned that "[i]f either the employer or
the Union were permitted to take reprisal against witnesses
before the arbitrator, the integrity of the arbitration pro-
cess would be destroyed and the arbitration clause pervert-
ed." 19
The General Counsel asserts that the instant case pres-
ents a logical extension of the rationale expressed in Can-
nery Warehousemen.2° Thus, General Counsel argues that
"Respondent's fining of Meier because he complied with
his Employer's request for evidence in the preparation for a
grievance-arbitration proceeding is no less a subversion of
the arbitration process as is the fining of a witness who has
actually appeared before an arbitrator."
On the other hand, Respondent contends that there is no
basis in law or logic for extending the Cannery Warehouse-
men doctrine to the instant case. Respondent maintains
that "a statement given during the pendency of a grievance
. . . does not involve the same rights nor require the same
'protection' for the maker or witness as does live testimony
given at the arbitration hearing." Thus, Respondent argues
that in arbitration, unlike the stages prior thereto, both par-
ties may call or cross-examine witnesses, and may elect to
subpena witnesses. In such circumstances, the Respondent
characterizes the rationale protecting the testimony of wit-
U I'nited Seelccorkers of America, A.L (10 (L.( Local Union 555(i
(Redfield (Companv a Division of Outdoor Sports Industries), 223 Nl.RB 854,
855 (1976). Freight Drivers and Htelpers local nion No. 55
7
affiliated ilth
International Brotherhood of 7leanrters, Chauffeurs. Wiarehousemen and
Helpers of America (I.iberv Traun.fr (ompuny, Inc.), 218 NLRB 1117
(1975): Cannerv Walrehousemen Food Processors, Drivers and Helpers ,local
Union 788 e al. (Marston Ball). 190 NLRB 24, 26 (1971)
i~ See N .. R B. v. .41is-( halmers Manufacturing CoI., supra at 195.
Sofield v. N .R B., upra at 430.
I See. United Steelworkers ofA mricla .A4 nerican Manufacturing c(o., 363
U.S. 564 (1960): United Steelworkers of 4America s. Warrior & Gulf Nccig-
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960): U'nited Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
'19 anners Warehousemen Food Processors Drivers and lpers Lo,,l
Union 788. supra at 27.
2n See, e.g., United Mine Workerrs of 4mernca, Local 1859 (American (al
(ompanvL, 235 NLRB 867. 68 (1978); United Steelworkerr of 4merica,
AFlI. (10 L(C. ocal U'nion 5550, vlpra at 855.
nesses as "understandable."
In Local 5795 Communication Workers of America, supra,
relied on by Respondent, the Board dismissed a complaint
alleging that the union had fined a member (Coogle) be-
cause she reported to her employer the breach by a fellow-
employee of the company rule against alcoholic beverages
on the job and that said fine had a restraining and coercing
effect upon her and other employees and served no legiti-
mate purpose in violation of Section 8(b)( )(A). According
to Respondent, Local 5795 is more analogous to the instant
case than Cannery Warehousemen. I disagree.
In Local 5795. unlike the case at hand, the informant
(Coogle), not only reported that she discovered an alcohol-
ic beverage at her machine but volunteered the identity of
the employee she presumed responsible and suggested that
still another employee be questioned about it. As a result of
the leads volunteered by Coogle, the company disciplined
the employee named by her as responsible for having the
alcoholic bottle on company property. The information
supplied by Coogle (unlike Meier's statement herein), was
not given during the pendency of a grievance. In further
contract, the union charges against Meier were not predi-
cated on his alerting management initially of what he per-
ceived to be a hazard but, rather, for the subsequent state-
ment he provided after the grievance machinery under the
collective-bargaining agreement had been formally activat-
ed. Significantly, Meier's statement (G.C. Exh. 3) reads in
pertinent part, "The reason for my concern was the excess
smoke from the left rear tires and I was afraid the bus
would go on fire," and does not name Beckwith as the
alleged wrongdoer. In fact, Meier made it clear that he
would not provide material he believed to be critical of a
fellow union member. Thus, Meier's actions in spirit, if not
in letter, comported favorably with the Union's constitu-
tion.
While Local 5795 is not without relevance, 2' on balance
and for reasons noted above, I find that case factually dis-
tinguishable. Of overriding significance is that arbitration
and the grievance machinery otherwise were not in issue in
Local 5775, thereby setting it apart from Cannery Ware-
housemen and the instant case. As previously noted in Can-
ner), Warehousemen, the union fine and the proviso to Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) gave way to an overriding labor policy of
promoting industrial peace through arbitration. This was
deemed necessary in order to preserve the "integrity" of
the arbitral process. In agreement with the General Coun-
sel, I am persuaded that the rationale in Cannery Ware-
housemen is equally applicable herein and the doctrine
should be so extended. I can discern no justifiable basis for
protecting employees in arbitration on one hand, but, on
2 Thus. for reaaons stated therein. I find General Counsel's further asser-
tion that Respondent's conduct in fining Metier does not reflect a legitimate
union interest is without merit. As noted. inter alto, "lassuming the Union's
rule simply prohibited a member from informing upon another member. it
would appear that such a rule would represent a legitimate union interest in
promoting harmony within the ranks." Local 5795 Communication Workers
of A.4erica. supra at 557. Cf. SteelWorkers Local Union 5550. supra at 855
(repression of testimony). Further in Local 5795, and as I find herein. the
record failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the impo-
sition of the union fine affected Meier's employment status. Meier testified,
iter cali. that his duties did not extend to maintaining the bus involved in
the incident.
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION. NO. 825 1271
the other, denying such protection to employees because
their activities involved steps in the grievance procedure
preliminary to arbitration. Each step of the grievance
procedure, including arbitration, represents an important
part of the same continuous process. The grievance-arbi-
tration process was described by Justice Douglas as fol-
lows:
23
[Tlhe grievance machinery under a collective-bargaining
agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial
self-government. Arbitration is the means of solving the
unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for
all the problems which may arise and to provide for
their solution in a way which will generally accord
with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The
processing of disputes through the grievance machin-
ery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content
are given to the collective bargaining agreement.
Apart from matters that the parties specifically ex-
clude, all of the questions on which the parties disagree
must therefore come within the scope of the grievance and
arbitration provisions of the collective agreement. The
grievance procedure s, in other words, a part of the con-
tinuous bargaining process. It. rather than a strike, is
the terminal point of a disagreement. [Emphasis sup-
plied.]
Having previously determined that the Cannery Ware-
housemen rationale applies to the case at hand, I find that
the Union, by charging, trying, and fining Meier for giving
a statement to the Employer during the pendency of a
grievance, in the circumstances herein, violated Section
8(b) (I)(A) of the Act.
IV THE FFFECI OF I E UINFAIR IABOR PRA(TICFS UPON
COMMER(CE
The activities of Respondent, as set forth in section III.
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the
Employer described in section 1, above, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tends to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
22 It has been noted that information prosided durin the earlk sages. of
a grievance may actuall contribute toward the settlement of grievances
without arbitration and therebh present oerburdening the arbitral process
Fauwcell Printing (orportirln. 201 NI.RB 964. 972 (1973) See also R.A I,rd
Newipaper.. In,. 229 NIRB 429. 433 (197
7
)
Sleltorkerv v Warrior & Gulf ( p. i rln al t 58
Upon the basis of the foregoing facts and the entire rec-
ord, I make the following:
CONt t ISIONS () .&A9
I. Transport of New Jersey is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and 7) of
the Act.
2. Amalgamated Transit Union, Division No. 825.
AFL C10, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. B charging, trying, and fining Robert Meier. an em-
ploy ee-member. because he provided a statement to the
Employer about another emplovee-member's grievance in
connection with the grievance machinery under the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, Respondent restrained and
coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act, in violation of the provisions
of Section 8(b)( I)(A) of the Act.
4. By engaging in the aforesaid conduct. Respondent
has engaged in, and is engaging in. unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
Ti REMF.DI
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in, and
is engaging in, unfair labor practicea within the meaning of
Section 8(b)( )(A) of the Act, I shall recommend that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac-
tion designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. To rem-
edv the coercive and restraining effect upon all employee-
members, by the intraunion trial procedure and the result-
ing fine against Robert Meier. it is recommended that
Respondent be required to refund the full amount of the
fine 4 against Robert Meier.with interest assessed in ac-
cordance with Florida Steel Corporation. 231 NLRB 651
(1977). and to rescind and expunge from its records any
documents or entries purporting to show that the fine or
disciplinary action was otherwise taken against Robert
Meier because of the statement he provided the Employer
in connection with the grievance machinery under the col-
lective-bargaining agreement.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
In 11 the c. rumstances of this case. noting partlcularl that the Board ha
not preiloru,ls determined the precise issue insolked herein. I relect the
(entral ('oilnsel' request that Respondent be ordered to reimburse Robert
Meier foor rael and other expenses incurred bx him in challenging Respon-
dent's halree ai.lllqt hinl See, e g. /I oSit,n it il,,rin. ., 224 NIRB
722, 781 1976)