Summary
In Zangerle, the court of common pleas issued an ex parte directive to a county auditor to vacate certain rooms in the courthouse because the court needed more space in which to conduct its business.
Summary of this case from State ex Rel. Wolff v. DonnellyOpinion
No. 29341
Decided February 10, 1943.
Courthouses — Primary and paramount purpose to furnish rooms and facilities for court functions — Other branches of government cannot direct or impede exercise of judicial functions — Court may exercise control over courthouse, when.
1. The primary and paramount purpose of a courthouse, as its name implies, is to furnish the rooms and facilities essential for the proper and efficient performance of the functions of the court.
2. Courts of general jurisdiction, whether named in the Constitution or established pursuant to the provisions thereof, possess all powers necessary to secure and safeguard the free and untrammeled exercise of their judicial functions and cannot be directed, controlled or impeded therein by other branches of the government.
3. Such courts may pass upon the suitability and sufficiency of quarters and facilities for their occupation and use, and may exercise control over the courthouse to the extent required to assure the provision, equipment and maintenance in the courthouse of rooms and facilities essential for their proper and efficient operation.
IN PROHIBITION.
This is an action in prohibition instituted in this court by John A. Zangerle as auditor of Cuyahoga county against the Court of Common Pleas of the same county and the judges composing that court.
Issue is made by demurrer to the petition, which is as follows:
"Plaintiff alleges that as such auditor of said county he is now and for many years past has been continuously in occupation of rooms in a county building of said county, known as rooms Nos. 139, 139A and 141, on the first floor of the said building and that such rooms are occupied by him for the purpose of performing his duties as such auditor with respect to the administration of his functions in the matter of personal property tax assessments, inheritance tax assessments, corporation tax assessments and various other duties with respect to taxation, and that for said purposes said premises are used and occupied by twenty-three deputies and clerks, together with a large amount of office furniture and equipment and a great volume of tax records and tax returns.
"Plaintiff further says that the said rooms so occupied by him in said building are close to other space on the same floor occupied by him for the performance of other duties imposed upon him by law in his capacity as county auditor, and are close to other space in the said building occupied by the county treasurer of said county.
"Plaintiff further says that the public county building housing the said offices was planned and constructed under the authority and direction of a building commission appointed in pursuance and under the authority of the provisions of General Code Section 2333 and with moneys derived from the sale of bonds issued by said county in pursuance of the authority vested in them so to do by the electors of said county at an election duly called and held on the 5th day of November, 1901, which election was held in pursuance of a resolution duly adopted by the Board of County Commissioners of Cuyahoga county requesting the approval of the electors of said county of the issuance of bonds in a sum not in excess of $10,000,000, the proceeds of which were to be expended for the purpose of purchasing sites for county public buildings and to erect county public buildings.
"Plaintiff further says that the said building commission so provided by law and in accordance with the authority vested in it so to do, caused plans to be prepared for said building and contracts to be let for its construction and in said plans and by resolution of its members of said board allocated, set apart and designated the space in said county public building for the use of the respective public authorities to be therein housed and specifically set forth and provided space therein for the several courts, including the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Appeals and the Probate Court, and specifically designated and set apart space therein for the use of the several county offices of said county.
"Plaintiff alleges that the space presently occupied and used by him, including the rooms so above designated by number, in said public county building was by said commission designated and set apart for the use of county offices of said county and was thereafter duly assigned to the use of said auditor by the said board of county commissioners of said county and has ever since the construction of said building been used exclusively for the purposes of housing and accommodating public offices of said county other than the courts in accordance with the order and designation of the board of county commissioners, and that no other designation or order assigning the use of said premises has been made by said board of county commissioners.
"Plaintiff further alleges that on October 6, 1942, the sheriff of Cuyahoga county, by the direction of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga county, locked the doors of the above numbered rooms and forcibly prevented the county auditor, his deputies and employees and the public from entering into said rooms and from having access to the said rooms and the records and papers therein contained, thereby preventing the county auditor from performing the duties imposed upon him by law with respect to matters involving the rights, interests and liabilities of the taxpayers and in respect to matters that required his immediate and prompt action in order that the rights of the said taxpayers and the public may be preserved.
"Plaintiff further avers that he is by law shortly required to make a tax settlement with the respective political subdivisions of the county and that in respect of such tax settlement he will be unable to make a settlement to determine the amount of taxes becoming due them respectively until and unless such records and the premises aforesaid are accessible to and available for the use of the plaintiff, his deputies and employees.
"Plaintiff further avers that said order and direction by the Court of Common Pleas to the sheriff of said county to bar the said auditor from the said premises and evict him from possession thereof was made by the said court and thereafter entered upon its special docket and designated No. 53,709 on said docket, and entitled: 'In the Matter of the Use of Certain Rooms in the Cuyahoga County Courthouse,' a copy of which order is marked 'Exhibit A,' annexed hereto and made a part hereof.
"Plaintiff avers that the said order was made without notice to the county auditor, that he was not a party to any proceeding before the Court of Common Pleas with respect to the subject matter therein contained, that no summons was issued to him nor did he receive any, that he made no appearance in any proceeding, that no hearing or trial was had and, except for the receipt of a copy of such order after it had been made by the said court, plaintiff knew nothing of any matter before the said court with respect to the subject matter contained in such order.
"Plaintiff further avers that on October 7, 1942, he was requested by the Honorable Judge Frank J. Merrick, judge of said court, to come to his room and upon complying with such request was ordered and directed by the said court to remove all of the furniture, equipment, files, reports and records from the said rooms, by Friday noon, October 9, 1942.
"Plaintiff further alleges that the Board of County Commissioners of Cuyahoga county have made no provision for other space for the county auditor to which such furniture, equipment, files, records and reports may be moved and that he has no place in which to house such furniture, equipment, files and records or to carry on his duties and functions in respect to the matters and things contained in said records; and that without such order of the Board of County Commissioners of Cuyahoga county, Ohio, plaintiff is wholly without authority or power in law to comply with the said order of the said court.
"Plaintiff further says that because of the facts and matters hereinabove set forth, he has been prevented from performing his functions, the functions enforced upon him by law as county auditor, that he is without authority or means of making provision for the exercise of said functions, and that he has no adequate remedy at law.
"The plaintiff has been informed, believes and therefore alleges that prior to the making of such order hereinabove complained of, the said judges of the Court of Common Pleas of said county represented to the board of county commissioners of said county that the space theretofore assigned by said board in the said building for the use and occupancy of the Bureau of Domestic Relations of said county, set up and established by rule of the Court of Common Pleas, was insufficient in size for the uses and purposes of said court in the matter of the affairs of said Bureau of Domestic Relations, and that said court requested of said commissioners that additional space adjoining the premises occupied by the said Bureau of Domestic Relations, and then and now occupied by the state examiner of the Bureau of Inspection and Supervision of Public Offices, be assigned to and made available to the said court for the purposes of said Bureau of Domestic Relations in addition to that already occupied by it; that thereupon the said board of county commissioners undertook and agreed to make the said space available to the said court for said use and to remove and order the state examiner to find premises elsewhere than in said county building.
"Plaintiff is further informed, believes and alleges the fact to be that thereafter the said judges of the Court of Common Pleas declared that said premises so to be made available to them as hereinbefore set forth were not satisfactory for such purposes and in their judgment not suitable for such use and thereupon made demand of said commissioners that the county auditor be removed from the rooms in this petition designated and that said space be assigned to the use of the Court of Common Pleas for such Bureau of Domestic Relations.
"Plaintiff is further informed, believes and alleges the fact to be that the said board of county commissioners informed the judges of the Court of Common Pleas that there was no other space available in the said public county building to which the said auditor could be removed; that the said county of Cuyahoga had been obliged to rent a very large amount of space at a very considerable expense outside the county building for the purpose of housing county offices, and that the said board was able and willing to provide space outside said county building for the use of said Bureau of Domestic Relations or to make available to it the additional space presently occupied by the state examiner, which space is immediately adjacent to that occupied by the said bureau and is suitable and convenient for its use and is greater in extent than that now occupied by said bureau.
"Plaintiff further said that the said order was made by the said judges and entered upon the said docket as aforesaid without the knowledge of plaintiff.
"Plaintiff avers that defendants, unless prevented by issuance of the writ herein prayed for, will continue to assume and exercise without authority in law and without jurisdiction of the person of this plaintiff or the subject matter, the power and authority to bar the said county auditor and his employees from access to said records and will continue to assume and exercise authority and power to require the said sheriff as an officer of said court under its direction and control to evict the said county anditor from the said premises."
The prayer is for a writ prohibiting the respondents from further proceeding with the execution of such order.
The journal entry, complained of, a copy of which is annexed to and made a part of the petition, may be stated in substance as follows:
After reciting that by an order entered June 2, 1942, the court had adjudged and determined that the proper administration of justice required the use of rooms 139, 139A and 141 on the first floor of the Cuyahoga county courthouse, together with its finding that without such rooms being available for the use stated the court could not properly function and administer in an efficient manner, it had ordered and adjudged that the county commissioners make such rooms available for use and occupancy by the court on or before September 1, 1942, the court proceeded to further adjudge and decree that the space occupied by the court in the basement of the courthouse known as Room 45 be vacated by the court upon compliance by the Board of County Commissioners with its order, and Room 45 would then be made available for any use determined by the board, and further recited that on June 19, 1942, the Board of County Commissioners replied thereto and thereafter, on August 28, 1942, informed the court in writing that Rooms 139, 139A and 141 on the first floor of the courthouse were then occupied by the county auditor and were essential to carrying forward the work of his office and offered to make available for the use of the court certain additional space in the basement of the courthouse.
The court, upon consideration thereof, concluded as. follows:
That the space in the basement of the courthouse referred to as Room 45 was unfit and wholly inadequate for the performance of the duties and functions of the court; that the additional basement space adjacent to Room 45 mentioned in the letter of the commissioners was also unfit and inadequate for the use of the court; and that, so long as the court must house its so-called Department of Domestic Relations in the. basement of the courthouse, it could not properly perform its duties and functions.
The court further found that matters coming before the Department of Domestic Relations "cannot be properly handled in the basement of the county courthouse in the depressing and unfit surroundings created by the cramped and crowded quarters, paper-thin partitions, inadequate lighting, poor ventilation and want of that privacy essential in the consideration of intimate problems of litigants involved in domestic controversies, and of rights and interest of wards of the court who are victims of such litigation"; that the problem created by such inadequacy of quarters was becoming increasingly acute by reason of the increasingly important and growing volume of duties devolving upon the court, which increases from year to year are therein recited; that facilities for dealing with such matters in the basement of the county courthouse, "either in the present quarters, or in any other or additional space in the basement, are not fit or adequate for the performance of the duties and functions of the court, and to attempt to continue to do so will impede and imperil the due administration of justice in this county, particularly as it relates to domestic relations causes."
The court further found that "An emergency exists, which imperils the due and orderly administration of justice in this county, and requires that rooms 139, 139A and 141, on the first floor of the county court-house, be made available for the use of the court, for the performance of its duties and functions"; and also that "In order to permit the necessary arrangements to be made for transfer of the offices presently housed in said rooms 139, 139A and 141, on the first floor of the county courthouse, with a minimum of inconvenience, the order of June 2, 1942, requiring said space to be made available for the court on September 1, 1942, should be amended to provide that said rooms be made available to the court on or before October 5, 1942."
The court thereupon ordered that the county commissioners cause rooms 139, 139A and 141 to be vacated and made available for the use of the court on or before October 5, 1942, and likewise directed the county auditor to vacate the same, and further that the court vacate room 45 in the basement upon notifications that rooms 139, 139A and 141 are ready and available for the use of the court, and directed the sheriff to make its order effective if the rooms specified were not vacated in accordance with its order.
Mr. Frank T. Cullitan, prosecuting attorney, Mr. Ralph W. Edwards and Mr. Saul S. Danaceau, for relator. Mr. P.J. Mulligan, Mr. J.M. Ulmer, Mr. John Ladd Dean and Mr. Thomas V. Koykka, for respondents.
It is contended by the respondents in support of the demurrer that the petition for a writ of prohibition cannot be entertained or considered by this court for the reason that other adequate remedies are available to the relator, particularly the remedy of injunction.
The relator in this action challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas to make the finding and order in question in an ex parte proceeding or to proceed further with the execution of such order. The respondents urge that an action in injunction to restrain the sheriff from carrying such order into effect would be an appropriate and adequate remedy, and therefore an action in prohibition may not be maintained.
In our opinion, a sufficient answer to this contention of the respondents is found in the fact that neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in injunction, and such action would necessarily be brought in the Court of Common Pleas and would be either against the Court of Common Pleas and the judges thereof as defendants or against the sheriff seeking to prevent his doing the very thing that court had ordered to be done, which would constitute a collateral attack.
However, the theory and claim of the relator is that the order of the court challenged was wholly void. The original proceeding which is brought into question by this suit is a very unusual one and in our opinion an action in prohibition is the appropriate method of presenting for determination the substantive question involved, which is: Has the Court of Common Pleas the authority to require surrender of the rooms designated for the use of the court and to accomplish such purpose in an ex parte proceeding and by the issuance of the order herein challenged?
The facts before us upon which the question of law is based are those set forth in the petition and also the order of the Court of Common Pleas, for it is expressly made a part of the petition. Therefore, the situation presented by the petition is one in which the Court of Common Pleas found that the due and orderly administration of justice requires room in the courthouse in addition to that heretofore provided and that the space now occupied by the Department of Domestic Relations, which is in the basement of the courthouse, for the reasons set forth in its finding and order, is not only unfit as a location for the proper functioning of the court but, even with the additional space there available, is wholly inadequate for such purpose.
It is disclosed that the work of the court has gradually and constantly increased and that by reason thereof it has become essential that not only additional space be provided, but that the court shall be removed from the basement to a location fit and appropriate for the various uses and purposes required for the Department of Domestic Relations.
It may be well to concisely state the conflicting claims of the contending parties to this unusual and regrettable controversy. The relator contends that the building housing the courtrooms and county offices, having been constructed under the authority and direction of a building commission appointed for such purpose pursuant to statutory provisions, which board allocated and set apart and designated rooms in such building for the use and occupancy of the various courts and the several county offices, and the rooms involved in this controversy having been so designated and subsequently assigned by the board of county commissioners for the use of the county auditor and ever since so used and occupied, and no other designation or order having been made by the board of county commissioners, the courts have no power to alter or interfere with such allocation or assignment, but that such power and authority reside only in the board of commissioners of the county.
The respondents contend that the structure having been erected under and pursuant to the provisions of the statute as found in 97 Ohio Laws, 111, of which Section 2333, General Code, is the codified successor, receives its characterization from the language of the original enactment which directed the procedure to be followed "to erect a courthouse," and that the primary purpose of a courthouse is to provide a permanent seat of justice for such county, and therefore, in event of any controversy concerning space therein, the first and predominating right is that of the court. Respondents further contend that the building commission, being a creature of statute, has only such powers as are thereby conferred, and therefore its authority ended with the completion and acceptance of the building, and any indication or designation as to the purpose or use of any portion of the structure by such commission has no permanent binding effect.
The question presented by these conflicting contentions is substantially as follows: When, by reason of the constantly increasing volume of litigation and other resulting essential activities, the court is unable properly and adequately to function without additional space which is appropriate for the purpose of conducting the business of the court, and the county commissioners neglect or refuse to make such changes as are necessary to provide the additional space in the courthouse required for such purpose, has the court any authority in the matter, or is it altogether powerless?
The answer to this question will be determinative of the issue presented.
It is provided by Section 2418, General Code, that "Until proper buildings are erected for the permanent seat of justice in a county, the commissioners shall provide a suitable place for holding the court thereof."
From a consideration of all the statutory provisions relative to the subject under consideration, the conclusion is irresistible that the primary and predominant purpose of a courthouse is for the uses of the court and to provide the facilities essential for the proper and efficient discharge of the duties and functions thereof. It is true that the law (97 Ohio Laws, 111) under which the structure was erected contemplated the housing of county offices, and yet, in referring to the duties and tenure of the building commission, it is therein stated that the commission "shall serve until the completion of said courthouse as contemplated herein."
The opinion of this court in the case of Mackenzie v. State, ex rel. McMahon, Pros. Atty., 76 Ohio St. 369, 81 N.E. 638, which involved a controversy arising out of the proceedings for the construction of the very building in controversy in this case, supports the view that the statute authorizing the proceeding contemplates the erection of a "courthouse."
The only previous case reaching this court involving a controversy which is similar to this one is that of State, ex rel. Bittikofer, v. Babst, Judge, 97 Ohio St. 64, 119 N.E. 136. However, the order of the court there in question required the vacation of a room in the courthouse of Crawford county occupied by a county officer under the direction and with the approval of the county commissioners, which room, upon the rebuilding of the courthouse, had been designated as "chancery room" and occasionally, theretofore, had been used for some court purposes. Vacation thereof was ordered by the Common Pleas Court in an ex parte proceeding, and the jurisdiction of the court was challenged by an action in prohibition, just as in this case. Upon hearing upon its merits, a writ of prohibition was denied by the Court of Appeals, and that judgment was affirmed by this court. In the course of the per curiam opinion in this court, it was stated that "the primary purpose of the courthouse is to provide a permanent seat of justice."
In that case, after directing attention to Section 2418, General Code, hereinbefore cited, providing that it is within the discretion of the county commissioners to determine what is a suitable place for holding the courts of the county "until such permanent seat of justice is erected," the court further states: "After the building is erected, the county commissioners have no discretion or authority to deprive the courts of the use of any part of the building provided by this building commission for the administration of justice."
It seems significant that no authority, is vested by statute in the county commissioners to provide permanent quarters for court purposes outside the courthouse, but specific authority is conferred to provide for county offices elsewhere, if that should become necessary, which, however, does not appear to be the case here.
If we look elsewhere for authority upon the proposition that the judiciary has the prior right to be located in the courthouse and the subordination of other uses thereof to the requirements for court purposes, we find in 21 Corpus Juris Secundum, 255, Section 166, the following: "The term 'courthouse' is used to designate the building where courts are held, and where the people attending such courts are supposed to congregate."
The general principle is there stated that "While other bodies or officers are charged with the duty of providing suitable buildings or rooms for the holding of courts, the court or judge may pass on the suitability of the quarters furnished and exercise control over the courthouse to the extent necessary to secure suitable rooms for, and to prevent interference with, the discharge of public business."
In the case of Bd. of Commrs. of Vigo County v. Stout, 136 Ind. 53, 35 N.E. 683, it is said:
"The 'courthouse' as the term implies, is chiefly for the use of the court; the remaining uses being subordinate, and to a great extent incidental.
"Courts are an integral part of the government, and entirely independent; deriving their powers directly from the Constitution, in so far as such powers are not inherent in the very nature of the judiciary. A court of general jurisdiction, whether named in the Constitution or established in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution, cannot be directed, controlled, or impeded in its functions by any of the other departments of government. The security of human rights and the safety of free institutions require the absolute integrity and freedom of action of the courts. * * *
"Even without statutory enactment * * * the court * * * possesses all powers necessary for the free and untrammeled exercise of its functions."
That case involved the use and operation of an elevator which was the principal means of reaching the courtrooms, the use and operation of which was found to have been unduly limited by an order of the county commissioners. The Supreme Court of Indiana found that the order made by the court requiring the operation of the elevator in accordance with a prescribed schedule was a proper exercise of the inherent power of the court and announced specifically that the "court had undoubted jurisdiction of the subject-matter."
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in the case of In re Court Room and Offices of Fifth Branch of Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490, had before it the question of the validity of an ex parte order of the Circuit Court enjoining the proposed action of the county supervisors to move that court into inadequate and unsuitable quarters. The order was held to be valid and the action of the court sustained. The court announced that a county board has no power to even attempt to impede the functions of a court and that no such power could be conferred upon it, and specifically held that courts have incidental powers necessary to preserve the full and free exercise of their judicial functions and that they "may, in appropriate cases, make ex parte orders without formally instituting an action to secure the desired relief."
It has been suggested that the power of the court in the respect under discussion is limited and circumscribed by a provision in Section 2833, General Code, in which section the general powers and duties of the sheriff are prescribed. The particular provision referred to is as follows: "Under the direction and control of the county commissioners, he shall have charge of the courtheuse."
However, as stated by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill. 102, 48 N.E. 137, where a similar statutory provision was under consideration: " 'His [the sheriff's] custody and care cannot be construed to include the power of dictating to the courts what special courtrooms they shall occupy. This matter rests with the courts themselves, as a matter of inherent power, not with the sheriff even, and certainly not with the county board.' "
Similar in import and effect is the holding of the Supreme Court of Nevada in the case of State, ex rel. Kitzmeyer, v. Davis, Controller, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P. 689. The controversy in that case grew out of a challenge by the Board of Capitol Commissioners of the state of Nevada to an order issued by the Supreme Court of that state respecting the procurement of and payment for necessary courtroom furniture and equipment and resulted in a holding that the Supreme Court possesses the inherent power to procure at the expense of the state suitable furniture for its courtroom and did not depend upon the will of the Capitol Commissioners. In the opinion it is stated that:
"To assume that the Legislature did confer any such absolute power upon the board is to assume that the Legislature possesses unlimited power of legislation in that matter — that it could by hostile legislation destroy the judicial department of government of this state. In the absence of the statutory authority given to the court by Section 2418, supra, there exists, as we believe, the inherent power in the court, growing out of and necessary to the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, to make the order.
"This doctrine is not new, but has been recognized and acted upon by the courts of other states, and we have been unable to find any authority which holds to the contrary."
The demurrer to the petition is sustained and the writ of prohibition denied.
Writ denied.
WEYGANDT, C.J., HART, ZIMMERMAN and BELL, JJ., concur.
WILLIAMS and TURNER, JJ., dissent.