Summary
theorizing that rigorous statements of the fraud/deceit quantum of proof are merely "expressions of opinion as to `what constitutes a preponderance of evidence'"
Summary of this case from Putnam Resources v. PatemanOpinion
July 5, 1961
In an action to recover damages for fraud in inducing the purchase of real property and to reform a purchase-money mortgage, the plaintiffs appeal: (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated March 30, 1960, dismissing the complaint upon the decision of the court after a nonjury trial; and (2) from an order of said court, dated May 23, 1960, denying their motion for a new trial, pursuant to section 549 of the Civil Practice Act. Judgment and order appealed from reversed, with costs to abide the event, and a new trial ordered. In our opinion, the learned trial court was in error in holding, as he did here, that in order to prevail plaintiffs' proof in support of the alleged fraud "must go beyond the presentation of a preponderance of evidence" and "must nearly approach the standard of proof required in a criminal action" (cf. Kurz v. Doerr, 180 N.Y. 88; Chemical Corn Exch. Bank v. Wassung, 7 N.Y.2d 337). It has been held that "intent to defraud is never presumed, but must be established by proof" ( Karpas v. Brussel, 217 App. Div. 550, 554); that fraud "is of the nature of a crime, and cannot be presumed" ( Morris v. Talcott, 96 N.Y. 100, 107); and that an inference of fraud must be unequivocal ( Manchel v. Kasdan, 286 App. Div. 483, affd. 1 N.Y.2d 734). These, and similar decisions, are expressions of opinion as to "what constitutes a preponderance of evidence rather than a disagreement with the general rule that a preponderance of evidence is sufficient to establish fraud in a civil case" (24 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, § 278, p. 122). Nolan, P.J., Beldock, Ughetta, Kleinfeld and Christ, JJ., concur.