OPINION ORDER

HAROLD BAER, JR., District Judge[fn1] [fn1] Allison Ridder, an intern in my Chambers during the summer of 2003 and a second-year law student at Duke Law School, provided substantial assistance in the research and drafting of this opinion.

Plaintiff Flora Newkirk Wood alleges that defendants Sophie Davis School, and City University of New York Medical School of Biomedical Education (collectively "Medical School") discriminated against her on the basis of race. She brings suit for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Defendants move, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") to dismiss Wood's complaint in its entirety. For the following reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted-in-part and denied-in-part.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

A motion to dismiss should be granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton College, 128 F.3d 59, 63 (2d. Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted). In particular, "an employment discrimination complaint . . . must contain only a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998 (2002) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court "must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1996).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Wood is a 59 year old African-American woman. Am. Compl. ¶ 7. Defendants hired her on or about October 1993 as a personnel and payroll officer. Id. ¶ 9. Throughout the term of her employment, Wood consistently fulfilled the requirements of her position. Id. ¶ 10. Wood alleges that she was paid the lowest of all comparable employees and she initially was hired at 60% of her Caucasian predecessor's salary. Id. ¶¶ 12, 9. In addition, Wood alleges that defendants applied a union pay scale to her salary, see id. ¶ 18, and implies that such pay scale should not have been applied to her, id. ¶ 19. Wood further claims that defendants repeatedly passed her over for salary increases, id, ¶ 20, and rejected her requests for promotions and reclassification, while granting such requests to Caucasians with less experience than her, id. ¶¶ 11, 15. Furthermore, Wood alleges that while other Caucasian employees with less work had full time assistants, defendants gave her only part time help, and on occasion used her for clerical purposes. NYSDHR Compl. ¶ 3(d); Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16.

On April 16, 1999, Wood filed a complaint with the New York State Department of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") alleging race discrimination. The NYSDHR dismissed Wood's complaint on May 28, 2002, finding no probable cause. On June 27, 2002, just before Wood was to receive her Certificate of Continuous Education ("CCE"), John Snyder, Dean of the Medical School, informed Wood that she was not entitled to a CCE because, as a member of management, she was not under the union contract that provided for such entitlement. Wood alleges that defendants denied her the CCE in retaliation for filing the NYSDHR complaint.

The EEOC sent plaintiff a right to sue letter on July 3, 2002, when it accepted the NYSDHR decision of no probable cause for discrimination. Am Compl. Exh. E. Plaintiff filed a complaint in her lawsuit here on September 27, 2002, alleging discrimination on the basis of race and retaliation for filing a complaint with the NYSDHR. Wood later filed an amended complaint as of right, adding a claim for hostile work environment.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Before June 20, 1998

Defendants contend any conduct that allegedly took place before June 20, 1998 is time-barred. Wood filed her complaint with the NYSDHR on April 16, 1999, and thus, any alleged discriminatory conduct under Title VII that occurred before June 20, 1998 is not actionable unless Wood can demonstrate that the conduct formed part of a "continuing violation." National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111-12 (2002) (providing that discrete discriminatory conduct generally is actionable only if plaintiff files an administrative complaint within 300 days of the conduct). "The continuing violation doctrine allows a plaintiff in certain circumstances to recover on the basis of an ongoing policy or practice of illegal activity initiated prior to the limitations period." Pollis v. New School for Social Research, 132 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1997).

In the period before June 20, 1998, Wood alleges that defendants paid her "a lower salary than all of the employees in the Higher Education Officer series of the Medical School" in comparable positions, Am. Compl. ¶ 12, refused to promote her, id. ¶ 15, and denied her access to use of a full time assistant, while Caucasians with comparable duties were granted such access, id. ¶ 14. Wood contends that the discriminatory pay and refusal to promote are "continuing violations" that are actionable beyond the 300 day limitations period. Wood is incorrect. The United States Supreme Court in National R.R Passenger Corp. v. Morgan specifically reversed the Ninth Circuit's "holding that so long as one [discrete] act falls within the charge filing period, discriminatory and retaliatory acts that are plausibly or sufficiently related to that act may also be considered for the purposes of liability." 536 U.S. at 114. The Supreme Court specifically acknowledged that allegations of related discrete acts, such as compensation to a plaintiff and failure to promote, do not alone constitute a continuing violation. 536 U.S. at 111-12 (there is "simply no indication" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) that related discrete acts, such as compensation to a plaintiff, is a "single unlawful practice for purposes of timely filing"). Because a plaintiff "can only file a charge to cover discrete acts that 'occurred' within the [relevant limitations] period," id at 114, "[a]ll prior discrete discriminatory acts are untimely filed and no longer actionable." Id. Here, the alleged discriminatory salary paid to Wood before June 20, 1998 lies outside the 300 day limitations period and must therefore be dismissed. See Quarless v. Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr. 228 F. Supp.2d 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113). Furthermore, for the same reasons, Wood's claims for damages from defendants' failure to promote or reclassify her before June 20, 1998 must be dismissed. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111, 114 (categorizing failure to promote as a discrete act that is generally actionable only if it occurred within 300 days before the filing date of the administrative charge). Although Wood also attempts to characterize these actions as part of a hostile work environment, which, if I accepted as true, could supply the basis for a continuing violation claim that would encompass conduct beyond the 300-day limitation period, these actions cannot be considered to create an "objectively hostile or abusive work environment." Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373-74 (2d Cir. 2001). These actions are "episodic" in nature, and objectively are not sufficiently continuous and concerted enough that they so severely permeate the work environment with "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult" so as to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Alfano, 294 F.3d at 373.

Wood further alleges that defendants failed to provide her a full-time assistant starting from 1995, and in fact, used her on occasion for clerical help. The Second Circuit has yet to decide "whether other patterns of discrimination besides the hostile environment claim can create a single unlawful employment practice." Burrowes v. Brookdale Hosp. and Med Ctr., 2003 WL 1240609, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2003). It is unclear from Wood's amended complaint whether defendants' alleged denial of a full-time assistant was the result of a one-time decision that is now time-barred, or was part of an ongoing decision, which was revisited at least once during the applicable limitations period. In light of Wood's allegation that this decision amounted to a continuing violation, it would be premature at this stage to conclude she could not prove any facts which would entitle her to relief. See Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 250 (1999) ("dismissal is appropriate only if a complaint clearly shows the claim is out of time . . . [I]t is possible that [plaintiff] could demonstrate some discriminatory act that did occur within the statute of limitations, so that his claim would not be time-barred."); Bloom v. New York City Bd. of Educ. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 2003 WL 1740528, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003). Defendants' motion to dismiss as time-barred Wood's claims in regard to their failure to provide her a full-time assistant and their use of her as clerical help on account of her race is denied.

B. Title VII Retaliation Claim

Wood alleges that defendants retaliated against her for filing the NYSDHR complaint by denying her a CCE on the pretext that she was in management, despite being paid on a union pay scale for eight years. See Am. Compl. ¶ 25. Wood had filed her NYSDHR complaint a little over three years before the alleged denial. Defendants contend that the temporal proximity between the filing of the NYSDHR complaint and the alleged retaliation is too great to permit an inference of causation. Defendants overlook the fact, however, that the denial took place a mere month after the NYSDHR complaint was dismissed. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Wood, Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 673 (2d Cir. 1995), one can infer that defendants, after the NYSDHR's scrutiny was lifted, took the opportunity to retaliate by denying her the CCE. The month difference between the two events is sufficiently close in time that one could reasonably infer defendant's denial was retaliatory in nature. Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op Extension of Schenectady County, 252 F.3d 545, 554-55 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing numerous cases finding causal connection between alleged retaliation and pretext after several months elapsed). Defendants' motion to dismiss Wood's retaliation claim is denied.

C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants contend that Wood's claims of hostile work environment and denial of a CCE must be dismissed because she failed to administratively exhaust her remedies. I disagree. In her federal complaint, Wood alleges that defendants subjected her to a hostile work environment by, inter alia, compelling her to perform clerical duties while Caucasians of similar rank were not made to do the same. In her NYSDHR complaint, although Wood does not specifically mention hostile work environment, she does allege that her supervisor relegated her to the status of a clerk, treating her less favorably than compared to her other peers who are Caucasian and younger than her. In view of the similarity of the underlying conduct alleged in the two complaints, I am satisfied that an investigation into the hostile work environment could reasonably be expected to grow of out of the NYSDHR discrimination charge. See Butts v. City of New York Dep't of Hous. Preservation and Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1402 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 107 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1978)).

As to the denial of the CCE, it is well settled that a retaliation claim after an administrative complaint has been filed may be treated as "reasonably related" to the administrative complaint. Id. at 1402 (relaxing "the exhaustion requirement based on the close connection of the retaliatory act to both the initial discriminatory conduct and the filing of the charge itself."). Although the alleged retaliation took place slightly over three years after the charge was filed, the close temporal proximity between the alleged retaliation and when the NYSDHR dropped its investigation is sufficient to create the inference that they are causally connected. Under this circumstance, the failure to plead the retaliation claim before the NYSDHR or EEOC is not a bar to Wood's assertion of this claim in her federal action. See id. (noting that "requiring a plaintiff to file a second EEOC charge . . . could have the perverse result of promoting employer retaliation in order to impose further costs on plaintiffs and delay the filing of civil actions relating to the underlying acts of discrimination."). Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss the hostile work environment and retaliation claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is denied.

D. Adequacy of Hostile Work Environment Claim

Defendants contend that the acts alleged by Wood do not rise to a level sufficient to demonstrate a hostile work environment. While I agree that the failure to promote and discriminatory pay may not stand as grounds for a hostile work environment, Wood's allegations concerning her treatment as a clerical worker on account of her race despite purportedly occupying a "management" level position is sufficient, at this stage, to withstand a motion to dismiss. Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's hostile work environment claim is denied.

E. Title VII Punitive Damages Claim

Wood does not dispute that her punitive damages claim should be dismissed because, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), the Medical School, as an academic unit of the City University of New York and an arm of the state, is immune from punitive damages. Roddini v. City Univ of New York, 2003 WL 435981 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2003). Accordingly, Wood's punitive damages claim must be dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion is denied-in-part and granted-in-part. Wood's claims for (1) damages arising before June 20, 1998 for defendants' alleged discriminatory pay and failure to promote or reclassify and (2) punitive damages are dismissed. In a June 19, 2003 letter, the parties sought a stay of the pre-trial scheduling order and consent to have ninety days to complete discovery from the date of the Opinion and Order deciding the motion to dismiss. The parties' request to extend discovery is granted, but all other deadlines

SO ORDERED