CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.

This is the second time this case has been before this Court. In August 1979, a divided panel of this Court upheld the district court's summary judgment for defendant. 604 F.2d 1022. On November 1, 1979, we granted plaintiff's petition for rehearing en banc and the case was subsequently reargued before all active judges. We now vacate the district court's judgment and remand the cause for trial.

In this action under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. § 20(11), plaintiff seeks $13,092,66 in damages arising from the U.S. Navy's rejection of approximately 33,465 pounds of frozen meat shipped by plaintiff via defendant carrier from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to the Naval Supply Center in Norfolk, Virginia. With the allegations in plaintiff's affidavits taken as true for purposes of reviewing defendant's summary judgment motion, the record in this case discloses the following: On July 29, 1974, plaintiff shipper transferred the goods to defendant for delivery at Norfolk on July 31. The plaintiff had previously had the meat tested for compliance with Navy temperature regulations and had specified that the carrier was to maintain the meat en route in a refrigerated trailer at zero degrees Fahrenheit (Plaintiff's Supp. App. 18). When the goods arrived at Norfolk on the appointed day, the Naval Supply Center refused delivery because the Cargo temperature was 1.2 degrees over tolerances (Plaintiff's Supp. App. 19). Defendant immediately notified plaintiff of the rejection and subsequently brought the shipment back to Milwaukee, stopping in Pittsburgh so that the refrigeration unit on the trailer could be tested.

Defendant carrier retained exclusive possession of the meat during this period. Thus one of its representatives was present when the seals were broken and the trailer opened in Norfolk and he observed the tests that indicated the meat was not within acceptable military standards. A carrier representative was also present when the meat was returned to the shipper's Wisconsin premises on August 2. He remained there while the meat was again tested and found to be 1.2 degrees over the required tolerances. Recognizing that the temperature of the meat represented a fatal deviation from the shipper's specifications, the carrier's agent chose not to investigate any further the circumstances surrounding the damage to the cargo. The shipper then refused the carrier's tender of the returned meat, and the carrier removed the trailer and its cargo from plaintiff's premises with the intention of attempting to resell the meat. Carrier representatives also rechecked the refrigeration unit on the trailer and continued to perform tests on the unit for three days. On August 5, the carrier's Milwaukee terminal manager advised the shipper he had been unable to dispose of the meat and the shipper agreed to take back the meat to dispose of on the carrier's behalf. Thereafter plaintiff kept the meat in cold storage, eventually selling it at a loss in two separate lots on September 30, 1974, and April 3, 1975, respectively.

During the August 2 examination of the trailer in Milwaukee, Karl Brown, one of plaintiff's local officers, orally informed James Stevenson, defendant's Milwaukee terminal manager, that the shipper would look to the carrier for reimbursement for the damage to the meat. Stevenson thereupon told Brown to prepare a letter "summarizing the situation." Accordingly, at the same meeting Brown handed Stevenson the following notice:

"Wisconsin Packing Company refused to accept meat on trailer no. 4013 because of Army [Navy] rejection of temperatures averaging 1.2 degrees over acceptable allowance temperatures. Return temperatures checked out and ranged from nine to twenty-five degrees."

Stevenson accepted this letter which he apparently forwarded to defendant's headquarters in Muncie, Indians, without comment. Neither he nor any other carrier representative ever sought additional information from plaintiff about the damage. The record also indicates that on April 10, 1975, shortly after the second lot of damaged meat was sold, Brown prepared on a formal claim notice an itemized list of plaintiff's losses (Attachment to Record Items 4 and 5). It was stipulated below, however, that plaintiff and defendant exchanged no written notice other than the August 2 letter during the nine-month period after the refusal of the meat by the Navy.

Defendant's refusal to honor plaintiff's claim for its losses from the Navy's rejection of the meat led plaintiff to file this action in the district court. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff had failed to file a written claim for damage within nine months, as required by the standard bill of lading. Finding that a notice of loss is not equivalent to a claim for damage, the district court held that the August 2 letter was insufficient to meet the writing requirement of the bill of lading. The court also concluded "as a matter of law" that defendant lacked the actual knowledge of loss a written notice would have provided and that absent some further writing, plaintiff could not recover from defendant. Accordingly, Judge Reynolds entered summary judgment for defendant.

Congress adopted the Carmack Amendment to prevent carriers from insulating themselves from damage actions filed by shippers. Consequently, the Amendment requires carriers to issue a receipt or bill of lading for property received for transportation and makes the carrier liable to the lawful owner of the bill of lading for any damage caused by the carrier. The Amendment also makes it unlawful for the carrier to provide "a shorter period for the filing of claims than nine months [formerly four months] and for the institution of suits than two years" from the date the carrier disallows the claim. 49 U.S.C. § 20(11). In the case at bar, the carrier's bill of lading provided this minimum period for filing claims and instituting suits, adding that "in case of failure to make delivery, then [a claim must be made] within nine months after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed." The bill of lading also specified that the claim must be "in writing," although the Carmack Amendment neither requires written claims nor imposes any other restrictions on the form of notice.

The Supreme Court has indicated that a bill of lading requirement that claims be made "in writing" within a specified period of time will be enforced ( St. Louis, Iron Mountain Southern Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U.S. 592, 604-605, 37 S.Ct. 462, 467, 61 L.Ed. 917), but the Court has also expressed a willingness to construe such writings liberally. Thus in Georgia, Florida Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 36 S.Ct. 541, 60 L.Ed. 948, the Court stated that a bill of lading requiring written claims for losses within four months after the delivery of the property was intended simply "to secure reasonable notice" and "to facilitate prompt investigation." Accordingly, it held that a written notice that "sufficiently apprised the carrier of the character of the claim * * *" was adequate. The Court noted that compliance with the written notice provision of a bill of lading "does not require documents in a particular form," and that "It is addressed to a practical exigency and it is to be construed in a practical way." 241 U.S. at 198, 36 S.Ct. at 545. Therefore it permitted the shipper in that case to recover even though its communications with the carrier consisted of a series of telegrams about the damage to the cargo, one of which stated a mere intention to file a claim at some later date.

The principle that emerges from Blish should dispose of this case. Although lacking in formality, plaintiff's August 2 letter gave defendant "reasonable notice." When "construed in a practical way," it clearly represented an attempt to formalize the claim inherent in plaintiff's refusal to take back the meat and its oral assertions that defendant was at fault. It thus sufficed to advise the carrier that the shipper was seeking reimbursement for the loss. It is incontrovertible that the notice identified the goods by reference and set forth a formal statement of the damage. It is also apparent that the carrier not only was aware of the need to investigate, but actually conducted a thorough inquiry. Moreover, since the carrier had itself spent three days unsuccessfully endeavoring to dispose of the meat, it knew at least as well as the shipper what the maximum loss could be. Thus within a few days of the damage defendant had all the information necessary to protect its interests in the fact of plaintiff's claim. Accordingly, the August 2 letter was "an adequate statement * * * deemed to satisfy this [written claim] requirement" of the bill of lading. 241 U.S. at 198, 36 S.Ct. at 545.

The carrier insists, however, that a prevailing Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulation requires more formal notice than was available here. The section of the regulation relied on by the court below provides:

"Bad order reports, appraisal reports of damage, notations of shortage or damage, or both on freight bills, delivery, receipts, or other documents, * * * shall, standing alone, not be considered by carriers as sufficient to comply with the minimum claim filing requirements [of this regulation]." 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(c) reproduced in Ex Parte No. 263, 340 I.C.C. 515, 719 (1972).

That this provision is inapplicable to the case at bar becomes obvious when the regulation is viewed in its entirety. The central provision of the regulation states:

" A claim for * * * damage to * * cargo shall not be voluntarily paid by a carrier unless filed in writing * * * with the receiving or delivering carrier * * * within the specified time limits * * * required by law, [or by] the terms of the bill of lading * * *." 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(a) reproduced in 340 I.C.C. at 718 (emphasis supplied).

The regulation also states that its provisions "shall govern the processing of claims for loss * * *." 49 C.F.R. 1005.1 reproduced in 340 I.C.C. at 718 (emphasis supplied). See also 340 I.C.C. at 553. Given the contrasting references in the accompanying legislative proposals to "disputed claims" and "claims determinations," see e. g., 340 I.C.C. at 587, 588, 595, 596, it is apparent that the purpose of the regulation was to make claim settlement more expeditious by providing procedures for the voluntary disposition of claims by carriers. The formalities the regulation mandates serve the purpose of preventing carriers from discriminating among shipper customers by settling spurious or frivolous claims of certain shippers while rejecting bona fide claims of others. See 340 I.C.C. at 524, 529, 530, 544, 547-548, 553, 605, 606.

Thus far from controlling the form a notice must take here, the regulation does not even apply to a contested case such as this. Instead of attempting to regulate the process of judicial determination of claims, the ICC indicated that its intention was to encourage parties to follow formal procedures that would make it unnecessary for them to face the unattractive prospect of time-consuming, expensive and potentially unavailing litigation in the district courts. 340 I.C.C. at 553, 570, 613. Indeed, by submitting various legislative proposals to increase its role in claims determination, the Commission expressed its doubts about its authority to erect substantive barriers to legal claims recovery. The regulation therefore presents no obstacle to plaintiff's case.

Even if the regulation were to apply, plaintiff could demonstrate its compliance. First, because careless wording in Section 1005.2(c) of the regulation renders precise interpretation impossible, it is not clear that the provision precludes a claim based on the notice available here. The sufficiency of the plaintiff's August 2 letter under the regulation gains force from the ICC's own recognition that, as here, a shipper often does not know the extent of the damage until long after delivery and must therefore have the opportunity to file a supplemental notice. 340 I.C.C. at 555. The ICC thus seems to have anticipated that an initial claim notice may provide no more than was available to defendant in this case.

In Gay v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 1 Kan. App. 2d 704, 573 P.2d 632 (1977), the court held the regulation did not bar a consignee from recovering, although the only written communication between the parties during the nine-month period was an inspection report sent by the carrier to the consignee regarding the damage. The court noted that plaintiff filed a supplemental claim ten months later when the actual damages became precisely known. Similarly here, plaintiff supplemented its original letter with the formal claim dated April 10, 1975, a claim notice that unquestionably met the requirement of the regulation. This notice apprised the carrier of the actual losses shortly after they became known. The maximum sixty days between the time plaintiff learned of the actual damages and the receipt of that claim by the carrier (see note 2 supra) was only slightly longer than the comparable period in Gay and, more importantly, the actual time between the loss and full notice was about the same. It is significant, moreover, that as noted the bill of lading here stated that the time for filing a claim would be nine months from the date of delivery but "in case of failure to make delivery, then within nine months after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed." The Navy's refusal of the meat might well be viewed as within the kind of "failure to make delivery" contemplated by that provision (compare Georgia, Florida Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. at 196, 36 S.Ct. at 544) and the shipper's difficulty in finding a substitute market for the meant could affect the calculation of a "reasonable time" so as to make the delay here immaterial.

The case law does not demonstrate the insufficiency of the plaintiff's notice. In fact, a number of the cases cited by defendant support the proposition that the form of the written notice is less important than its adequacy in affording the carrier an opportunity to inspect the damaged goods. For example, in Miller v. Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.Fla. 1978), the court held that informal letters from the shipper to the carrier were sufficient notice. It concluded:

"The purpose of the written claim requirement is not to avoid the payment of just claims, but to facilitate prompt investigation of claims and insure equality of treatment among shippers.

* * * * * *

"[T]he requirement is satisfied if the written instruments supply `sufficient information upon which a prompt and complete investigation may be based.'" 447 F. Supp. at 1204 (citations omitted).

Accord, American Synthetic Rubber Corp. v. Louisville Nashville R. Co., 422 F.2d 462, 468-469 (6th Cir. 1970); Loveless v. Universal Carloading Distributing Co., 225 F.2d 637, 639 (10th Cir. 1955); Thompson v. James G. McCarrick Co., 205 F.2d 897, 900, 901 (5th Cir. 1953); Rollei of America, Inc. v. T.I.M.E. — DC, Inc., 140 N.J.Super. 560, 357 A.2d 33, 35 (1976); see also Atchison, T. S.F. Ry. Co. v. Littleton Leasing and Investment Co., 582 F.2d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 1978).

Perhaps for this reason courts have been more liberal in finding compliance with a claim procedure as the carrier's actual knowledge of the facts surrounding the claim increases. See Conagra, Inc. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 (D.Neb. 1977). Such an approach not only reflects a practical understanding of how a prudent carrier should and would construe a written notice when it is fully aware of the circumstances and extent of loss, but also comports with the equities of the situation. A carrier is surely less entitled to block recovery when its own acts or omissions have created a situation in which processing a claim is more difficult. Indeed, such considerations have given rise under other circumstances to an estoppel defense for shippers when carriers assert failure to comply with time limitations. Perini-North River Assocs. v. Chesapeake Ohio Ry. Co., 562 F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Hopper Paper Co. v. Baltimore O.R. Co., 178 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1949), certiorari denied, 339 U.S. 943, 70 S.Ct. 797, 94 L.Ed. 1359.

If under the policies behind the notice requirement, actual knowledge or a full inquiry on the part of the carrier may buttress a shipper's claim when the written notice is informal or perhaps even nonexistent, the obverse is also true: the complete absence of such actual knowledge of the damage or its extent will vitiate a claim unless the writing gives a precise basis for investigation. Not surprisingly, then, the absence of any reason for the carrier to know of the damage or its extent has been a salient characteristic of many of the cases (including those cited by the defendant) in which claims have been denied. East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. United States, 239 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1956); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mackie, 195 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1952); Delphi Frosted Foods Corp. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 188 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1951), certiorari denied, 342 U.S. 833, 72 S.Ct. 53, 96 L.Ed. 630; Insurance Co. of North America v. Newtowne Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1951); MGD Graphics Systems Americas Co. v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., No. 76 C 1605 (N.D.Ill. decided by unreported opinion on May 16, 1977); Henry Pratt Co. v. Stor Dor Freight Systems, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 714 (N.D.Ill. 1975). Under these circumstances, the dissent's reliance on Atchison, T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Littleton Leasing and Investment Co., 582 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1978), is misplaced. First, although a majority of the Tenth Circuit panel held the shipper's notice in Littleton Leasing was deficient, it acknowledged the general principles we have set forward as applicable to such cases, stating

"Generally any written document, however informal, which indicates a claim for damages is asserted, and identifies the shipment, will be adequate. Georgia, Florida Alabama Ry. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 36 S.Ct. 541, 60 L.Ed. 948; American Synthetic Rubber Corp. v. Louisville N. R. R., 422 F.2d 462 (6th Cir.). In accordance with this liberal attitude, we have held the requirement of a claim in writing has been satisfied where the carrier had inspected the damaged property nothing the apparent damage, had acknowledged in writing that damages were sustained by carelessness in transit, and had agreed that a formal claim could be filed when itemized damages were ascertained. Loveless v. Universal Carloading Distributing Co., 225 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.)." 582 F.2d at 1240.

Second, and more important, unlike the case at bar, Littleton Leasing involved a situation in which the notice involved was sketchy and the carrier lacked any independent means of gaining information about the damage. Indeed, the damage to the goods in that case was not discovered until after delivery. Thus the meager communications from the shipper in Littleton Leasing were insufficient to provide the carrier with the additional information it needed to protect its interests.

We are not postulating a general rule that some actual knowledge must exist for an informal notice to be effective any more than we wish to decide whether some writing is always required. We find only that the combination of actual and written notice in this case is sufficient. Accordingly we need not reconsider the specific holding of Hopper Paper Co. v. Baltimore O. R. Co., 178 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1949), certiorari denied, 339 U.S. 943, 70 S.Ct. 797, 94 L.Ed. 1359. Since there was more than mere actual notice in this case, to overrule Hopper would be inappropriate, particularly insofar as that case helps illuminate the role actual notice can play in an evaluation of the overall situation.

To sum up, the bill of lading merely required written claim of damage without any further specificity (Defendant's Supp. App. 112). Since under the plaintiff's version of the facts the carrier received oral notice of the claim and had actual knowledge of the fact of the damage, the extent of the damage and the reasons for the rejection by both the consignee and the shipper, a more complete written notice than was contained in the August 2, 1974, letter was unnecessary. That notice was delivered to the carrier well within the nine months specified by the bill of lading. Allowing the shipper an opportunity to recover is consistent with the prevailing case law and does not run afoul of the ICC regulation which, with its concern about the improper preferences or discrimination that can occur in voluntary settlements, has no application to this case. Under these circumstances, summary judgment for the carrier gave it an improper windfall.

This conclusion does not mean that a notice such as the August 2 letter would be appropriate under other circumstances. Although the requirements of the standard bill of lading do not include the use of any particular words for claiming damage (see note 3 supra), it is ordinarily essential for the shipper to indicate to the carrier that it will be looked to for reimbursement. In this case, however, plaintiff has alleged defendant's actual knowledge and an oral assertion of liability, and assuming the plaintiff can prove the facts supporting these allegations, these circumstances, along with the language of refusal in the August 2 letter, would warrant a finding that the shipper has fulfilled the notice requirement. Accordingly, the cause should be remanded for trial on this issue and the merits of the claim. Circuit Rule 18 shall apply.

Judgment vacated; cause remanded for trial.