ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH VANCE, District Judge

Before the Court is defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation's ("Lockheed") Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss.

I. Background and Procedural History

Defendant Lockheed Martin and its predecessor, Martin Marietta, employed plaintiff Patricia Wilson between 1981 and December 2002.

During her employment at Lockheed, plaintiff was covered by a collective bargaining agreement between Lockheed and the United Auto Workers and its Local 1921. As the collective bargaining agreement called for, Lockheed used Reclassification Consideration Review Cards to determine an employee's interest in being considered for a promotion. The Review Cards gave the employee three options. The employee could: (1) indicate an interest in consideration for a promotion; (2) decline consideration with the understanding that the employee would not be eligible for reconsideration until the employee submitted a new Review Card; or (3) request reconsideration.

On October 3, 1996, Wilson submitted a Review Card and requested consideration for promotion from Assembler "A" to Mechanic Assembler. Lockheed promoted plaintiff on December 2, 1996. One year later, Wilson submitted a Review Card in which she declined consideration for promotion to Senior Mechanic Assembly. On July 24, 2000, Wilson submitted another Review Card in which she again declined consideration for promotion to Senior Mechanic Assembly. Wilson never submitted another Review Card.

On July 30, 2002, Wilson filed EEOC Charge No. 270A201661 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In the charge, Wilson alleged that she

was hired in 1981 as Assembler "B" in the mechanical assembly department. I have been subjected to harassment from 1981 to the present in that I have been threatened with discipline several times, moved to small parts, tanks Barrels department for three months and not allowed to work overtime on Bryan Pearson's crew since April 2002. I am currently on medical leave. No reason has been given for the unfair treatment.

On September 24, 2002, the EEOC mailed a dismissal and notice of right to sue letter to Wilson. On August 13, 2003, plaintiff filed suit in this Court against Lockheed, asserting that defendant subjected her to a continuing pattern of harassment, which included the failure to promote her on the basis of sex, retaliation, and acts of sexual harassment.

Defendant first argues that plaintiff's complaint is time-barred because she did not file suit in federal court within 90 days of when she received the dismissal and right-to-sue letter. Defendant also argues that plaintiff's claims are time-barred because she did not file the EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Lastly, defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because her claims exceed the scope of those submitted to the EEOC. In response, plaintiff relies on the Supreme Court's recent decision in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), which Wilson argues saves her claim from dismissal.

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). The Court must resolve doubts as to the sufficiency of the claim in plaintiff's favor. Vulcan Materials Company v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. Id.; Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).

The Court may take judicial notice of EEOC documents as a matter of public record when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Cinel v Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1994). Any reference to EEOC documents, therefore, does not convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. See Chadwick v. Layrisson, No. 98-3518, 1999 WL 717628, *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 1999).

III. LAW AND ARGUMENT

Defendant first argues that plaintiff's complaint is time-barred because she did not file suit within 90 days of when she received her right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Because the Court finds this issue controlling, it does not consider defendant's other arguments.

Plaintiffs in employment discrimination actions must exhaust administrative remedies before they file suit in federal court. see Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2002). Exhaustion occurs when a plaintiff files a timely charge with the EEOC and thereafter receives a right-to-sue letter. See id. at 379. Claimants have 90 days after receipt of the right-to-sue letter within which to file suit in state or federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1); Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Miss., 674 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1982). This 90-day limitation period is strictly construed. See Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379 (citing Ringgold v. Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 796 F.2d 769, 770 (5th Cir. 1986); Espinoza v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th Cir. 1985)). Federal courts in this Circuit have consistently dismissed Title VII claims when the plaintiff did not file suit within the 90-day limitation period. See Butler v. Orleans Parish School Board, No. CIV. A. 00-0845, 2001 WL 1135616, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2001) (dismissing plaintiff's complaint when the plaintiff filed 91 days after she received her right-to-sue letter).

Here, the EEOC mailed the right-to-sue letter to Wilson on September 24, 2002. Although plaintiff does not state when she received the letter, the Court may presume that she received it at most seven days after the date of mailing. See Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379. At the latest, plaintiff received the letter on October 1, 2002. Wilson did not file suit in this Court until August 13, 2003. This, is well beyond the 90-day limitation period. Wilson's suit is therefore barred as untimely.

The Court recognizes that it may equitably toll the 90-day limitation period. See Espinoza, 754 F.2d at 1251. Plaintiff, however, has made no showing that the period should be equitably tolled. Plaintiff has made no showing that she was misled by the Court, by the EEOC, or by the defendant, or that she took any action within the 90-day period to commence the lawsuit. See id. Wilson is not entitled to equitable tolling.

Wilson relies on the recent Supreme Court decision National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Wilson, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). Wilson argues that Morgan allows a plaintiff to recover under Title VII for discrete acts that occurred outside of the 180 — or 300-day limitation period within which a complainant must file a charge with the EEOC. Id. at 117. Although the Court recognizes the holding of Morgan, Morgan did not involve the 90-day period within which plaintiff must file suit after she receives a right-to-sue letter. Morgan involved the proper scope of a claim once a plaintiff timely files a claim with the EEOC. Morgan did not deal with the situation present here in which plaintiff filed no claim in federal court within 90 days of her receipt of a right-to-sue letter. Accordingly, Morgan does not salvage plaintiff's claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims as untimely.