GOLDEN, Justice.

Don White sued HA Inc., dba Giovale's Bar (Giovale's), claiming it was responsible for injuries he received outside the bar on the night of October 19, 1984, when he was shot in the back while attempting to flee a fracas which arose between White and his assailant Hank Summers, both bar patrons. The district court granted summary judgment to Giovale's, finding it had no duty to protect White from harm. On appeal, White asks:

A. Whether or not the trial court erred in its finding that there were no genuine issues of fact and granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. More particularly, did the court err in finding:

1. That there was no altercation in the appellee's premises sufficient to put appellee on notice of danger to appellant;

2. That there was no relationship between the disturbance in the appellee's premises and the subsequent events which resulted in appellant's injuries;

3. That there was not sufficient opportunity for the appellee to take action to protect appellant.

B. Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that Mostert v. CBL Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987) was not applicable to the case at hand, and should only be given a limited application.

C. Whether or not the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment without giving consideration to appellant's cause of action based upon breach of the duty arising from the sale or furnishing of liquor.

Alternatively, Giovale's inquires:

1. Whether the trial court properly held that the fight which started outside was not reasonably foreseeable by Giovale's and there was no duty to protect Don White from the unexpected shooting.

2. Whether Don White failed to prove that a proximate cause of the shooting was any act or omission of Giovale's.

3. Whether Giovale's owed a duty to Don White to protect him from his own voluntary intoxication.

4. Whether punitive damages should be allowed.

5. Whether appellant's notice of appeal was timely.

We affirm. This decision renders unnecessary discussion of Giovale's fourth issue.

Don White began drinking at Giovale's Bar in the mid-afternoon of October 19, 1984, and continued to do so into the evening. Over the course of the afternoon and evening, White consumed six or seven mixed drinks and a pizza. In his deposition, White testified he "was getting a buzz on," but he was able to talk clearly, play pool and walk in a normal manner.

As the evening wore on, the bar became crowded with about forty to seventy bar patrons. One bartender was present and responsible for business activities in the bar, including serving patrons, selling alcohol through the drive-in, restocking the bar, removing trash, and cleaning the bar premises. Hank Summers walked into Giovale's carrying a bottle of beer; he was acting very angry and looking for a man who he said owed him money. Giovale's did not serve any alcohol to Summers the short time he was in the bar. After entering the bar, Summers approached White's friend, Steve DePaola, and without provocation, hit him in the back of the head, knocking him down. At this time Summers did not speak to or take any action toward White, and White did not speak to Summers or take any action toward him. During this assault, Giovale's bartender was taking out the garbage and did not see what happened. When she returned to the patron area, several bar patrons told her what happened, but she noted "everyone was quiet," and "nobody was yelling, screaming, everybody had calmed down * * *."

Shortly after hitting DePaola, Summers left the bar through a side entrance. White and DePaola waited in the bar for several minutes and then left through the front door. In his deposition, White stated it was his intention to walk to DePaola's house to smoke some marijuana, but that he delayed leaving the bar so they would avoid Summers. White stated that he thought the fighting was over, but upon walking out the door DePaola headed for the parking lot to look for Summers, and White followed. Summers was not there, so they started to leave. While crossing the street DePaola saw Summers nearby, standing behind his car with the trunk lid open. DePaola started for Summers and White followed, reaching him first. White approached Summers and exchanged a few words which resulted in an exchange of several punches. The punching ended when the two fell to the ground. Believing the fight was over, White started to get up. As he was doing so he noticed Summers had a gun. White jumped up and ran; Summers shot him in the back.

White filed a complaint against Giovale's on February 24, 1986, alleging two counts: (1) Giovale's failure to exercise reasonable care to provide safe premises for its customers; and (2) Giovale's negligent sale or furnishing of liquor to an intoxicated person, White. On July 25, 1988, Giovale's filed a motion for summary judgment. In its September 12, 1988 decision letter, the trial court granted Giovale's motion, finding in pertinent part:

In the present case, the only disturbance which occurred in the bar was not between White and Summers so the defendant [Giovale's] had no reason to give White any protection, nor was there any relationship between the disturbance in the bar between Summers and DePaola and the disturbance outside the bar between Summers and Richmond [murdered by Summers that night] that would put the defendant on notice. It all happened so fast that no one could have averted the result. Calling the police would have been a waste of time, even if the defendant could have anticipated what was going to happen. I find nothing in this record which showed "a relationship between the particular disturbance which was relied upon as warning defendant of the impendence of danger to his invitees and the subsequent violence which caused plaintiff's injury."

This appeal followed.

In this case, we are asked to extend the established scope of tavern keeper liability to encompass injuries received by a bar patron off bar premises resulting from another bar patron's criminal acts. Earlier cases have suggested liability will lie in two instances: (1) when a tavern keeper serves intoxicating liquor to a minor or a person obviously intoxicated who later injures a third party either on or off the tavern premises, McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983); and (2) when a third party is injured in the tavern by other patrons of the tavern who have exhibited behavior such as to alert the tavern keeper that danger or injury to the third party is imminent, Mayflower Restaurant Company v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1987). In each of these cases, liability attached because of the tavern keeper's breach of some responsibility owed to the public, the collective third party. See McClellan, 666 P.2d at 413 (discussing the legislative establishment of a duty owed to the general public through the enactment of W.S. 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a)). White's action against Giovale's cannot be squeezed into either of the two pigeonholes suggested by McClellan and Mayflower, and we decline the invitation to peck out yet another to accommodate this fact situation, for to do so would make all of us our brothers' keepers, a result the law of Wyoming does not support.

As a preliminary procedural matter, we disagree with Giovale's contention that White's notice of appeal was untimely filed; we agree with White's correct statement that pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b), the summary judgment order in this case could "only be deemed final upon an express determination that there was no just cause for delay." Only when the determination was made that there was no just cause for delay did the time for the filing of an appeal begin to run. See Olmstead v. Cattle, Inc., 541 P.2d 49 (Wyo. 1975). The 54(b) certification was entered in the form of a nunc pro tunc order on September 29, 1988. White filed his notice of appeal on October 6, 1988, well within the fifteen day time limit. Giovale's argues that as a nunc pro tunc order, the time for appeal began to run from the date of the original summary judgment, September 20, 1988, in that nunc pro tunc orders relate back to the date of the original order. That the order was entitled "Nunc Pro Tunc," does not alter our determination that the time for appeal began to run only upon its entry. The thrust of the order was a 54(b) certification that there was no just cause for delay. To dismiss this appeal based on the title of the order would be to assert form over substance. We find that White's notice of appeal was timely filed.

We analyze the substance of this appeal by noting our well-established standard of review for summary judgments which need not be reiterated. Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 110-11 (Wyo. 1989); Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188, 190 (Wyo. 1989); Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566, 568 (Wyo. 1988). See also W.R.C.P. 56.

As in all tort actions, negligence consists of a breach of a duty owed by the defendant that proximately causes injury to the plaintiff. McClellan, 666 P.2d at 411 (citing ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1981)). Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. McClellan, 666 P.2d at 411. This court has held a liquor vendor is bound to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of the circumstances. Id. at 412.

The paradigmatic Wyoming case addressing tavern keeper liability is Fisher v. Robbins, 78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116 (1957). There, a bar patron was injured as a result of an altercation between two or three other patrons. A fifteen to twenty minute argument occurred in the bar between the other patrons culminating in one patron breaking a beer bottle over another's head. A particle of broken glass from the bottle flew into the plaintiff's eye; the plaintiff's eye later had to be removed. The plaintiff successfully brought a negligence action against the bar. In overturning the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff, this court articulated the rule to be applied here:

[I]n order to recover from the * * * defendant, the burden [is] upon the plaintiff to prove: (1) a disturbance occurred which either did or should have attracted defendant's attention; (2) defendant had an opportunity to act; (3) defendant permitted the disturbance to continue without reasonable effort to quell the same; (4) defendant failed to give plaintiff reasonable protection; (5) there was some relationship between the disturbance and the subsequent violence; and (6) plaintiff was injured as a result of the violence.

Fisher, 78 Wyo. at 57, 319 P.2d at 118. Under Fisher, the duty to protect a third party from danger, above and beyond the general landowner duty to provide reasonably safe premises to all invitees, arises when the disturbance in the bar is sufficient to alert the tavern keeper that there is imminent danger of injury to a third party. If the disturbance is of such a dangerous nature to create the duty of protection, the tavern keeper breaches that duty if he permits the disturbance to continue.

The evidence presented at the Fisher trial about the disturbance indicated an argument developed between two bar patrons; a police officer entered the bar and was talking to the two patrons when a third patron approached the talking group, yelled a "cuss" word at one of the other patrons, and almost immediately, broke a beer bottle over the head of one of the other patrons. The plaintiff testified that the argument, occurring before the glass breaking incident, attracted his attention but that he did not continually direct his attention toward the two. Id. 78 Wyo. at 59, 319 P.2d at 118. Other witnesses testified they did not notice that two patrons were quarreling or anything else out of the ordinary. Id. 78 Wyo. at 63, 319 P.2d at 120. Characterizing the activities in the bar before the glass breaking incident as a battle of words, this court found the evidence insufficient upon which to attach liability to the bar, stating:

[W]e do not consider it is a reasonable inference that when people become angry and argue violently with each other that such disagreement portends they will break bottles over each other's heads or otherwise resort to unlawful assaults and batteries. A mere battle of words, no matter how violent, unaccompanied by action, threat of action or some type of demonstration which gives warning that violence is impending, usually causes no concern of those present, any more than it seemed to have alarmed the plaintiff.

Id. 78 Wyo. at 64, 319 P.2d 120.

In two later cases involving tavern keeper liability, McClellan and Mayflower, this court assigned liability to the tavern keepers in two very limited circumstances. In McClellan a tavern keeper sold liquor to a minor who later became intoxicated on the liquor and killed a third person in an automobile accident. The district court entered an order dismissing the plaintiff's complaint against the tavern keeper for failure to state a claim, based on this court's holding in Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396 (Wyo. 1971), that there was no established common law cause of action in Wyoming against a vendor who unlawfully sells liquor to a minor who becomes intoxicated and injures a third party. When the Parsons case was decided, there was also no Wyoming dramshop statute changing the common law rule of nonliability. In the absence of such legislation the Parsons court was unwilling to create such a cause of action on its own, despite the emerging trend among other jurisdictions. In accordance with this court's long-standing deference to the legislature,

[t]he legislature of Wyoming has not seen fit to change the common law rule as it applies in this case. Whether legislation in the nature of a dramshop act or civil damage statute should be included as a part of our liquor control code is within the province of the legislature.

Parsons, 480 P.2d at 397-98.

In overturning the district court's order dismissing the decedent's complaint and overruling Parsons in McClellan, this court no longer felt constrained to await the legislature's abrogation of the common law rule of nonliability. It further acknowledged the enactment of W.S. 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a), which established a duty on the part of tavern keepers toward the general public to protect them from intoxicated persons and minors who have consumed alcohol, recognizing "that these people are more likely to be unable to handle alcohol, that they need protection from themselves, and that society needs protection from them." McClellan, 666 P.2d at 413. Liability was premised on the illegal sale of alcohol to a minor in violation of the above statutes, which was some evidence of negligence to be considered in the determination of liability. The court found it was the sale of the liquor to the minor or intoxicated person and not its consumption, as in Parsons, that was the proximate cause of the injury. McClellan, 666 P.2d at 409-10.

Perhaps the facts in Mayflower present a situation more analogous to this one, although detailing a much more egregious factual scenario in the bar. In Mayflower, a bar patron approached the plaintiff, threatened him in a loud and vulgar manner, and although unclear from the factual description, proceeded to physically attack him. Bouncers broke up the affray, but not before plaintiff's jaw was broken. Testimony at trial by other patrons in the bar and the assailant himself indicated the argument was of such a nature as to attract the attention of those in the bar, including the bar employees. Mayflower, 741 P.2d at 1114. The trial court determined, under a sufficiency of the evidence analysis, that the actions exhibited by the assailant were sufficient to provide the bar with notice the plaintiff was in imminent danger. This court affirmed the trial court's determination that the bar has a duty to protect a plaintiff in light of the known dangerous nature of an assailant's actions. In doing so, it factually distinguished Fisher where the altercation was characterized as "[a] mere battle of words, * * * unaccompanied by action, threat of action or some type of demonstration which gives warning that violence is impending * * *." Id. 1113-14. The court concluded the altercation failed to put the bar on notice of any danger to the plaintiff. In comparison, the physical actions in Mayflower, following a conversation containing threats of physical violence between the plaintiff and his assailant, were held sufficient notice to the bar.

In both McClellan and Mayflower, the court recognized a duty to protect the respective plaintiffs. In McClellan, that duty arose by virtue of the existence of W.S. 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a), creating a duty to protect the general public against intoxicated persons and minors who consumed alcohol illegally sold to them. In Mayflower, the duty arose because the nature of the disturbance occurring in the bar placed the bar on notice that danger to the plaintiff was imminent. In Fisher, however, the nature of the disturbance was not such as to place the bar on notice that plaintiff was in danger of being injured; the evidence presented did not prove that the violence resulting in plaintiff's injury was caused or inspired by the argument between the other patrons. Accordingly, no duty on the part of the bar to protect the plaintiff arose on the part of the bar. The same is true here.

In Fisher, this court held it is "not enough merely to prove there was a disturbance and that the plaintiff was injured." Fisher, 78 Wyo. at 58, 319 P.2d at 118. Rather, "[P]roof of defendant's actual or implied knowledge of impending danger to his invitees and that he had reasonable opportunity to avert it [is] indispensable to entitle plaintiff to recovery." Id. Here, White failed to make even the threshold showing that Giovale's was placed on notice of impending danger to him. Such a showing is necessary to create a duty in Giovale's to protect him from harm. Absent this duty to protect there can be no breach by failing to avert the disturbance.

White relied upon the altercation in the bar between Summers and DePaola as the disturbance that should have warned Giovale's of impending danger to White. Evidence presented by White demonstrates that a brief altercation occurred between two bar patrons, Summers and DePaola; any disturbance in the bar created by the altercation ended when the assailant, Summers, voluntarily left the bar; DePaola remained in the bar with a third party, White, for several minutes after Summers left; at no time while in the bar did White and Summers talk to each other, or exhibit any aggressive behavior against one another. It was after leaving the bar to go to DePaola's house that White encountered Summers some distance away from the bar. White approached Summers and engaged in fisticuffs with him; immediately following the fight, White was shot in the back by Summers. This evidence, even taken in the light most favorable to White, is not sufficient to give rise to a duty on the part of Giovale's to protect White from danger. Without sufficient notice of impending danger, no duty arose on the part of Giovale's to protect White.

White next asserts that the rule established in Mostert v. CBL and Associates, 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987), is applicable here to create Giovale's liability. We disagree. This case is distinguished from Mostert because no duty exists here. In Mostert, a child died in the 1985 flash flood in Cheyenne. Just before her death, the child and her parents were watching a movie at the defendant's movie theatre. Outside the theatre a severe thunderstorm developed causing the National Weather Service, civil defense authorities and local law enforcement officials to issue severe thunderstorm, flash flood and tornado warnings. As the storm progressed, the authorities ordered that Cheyenne citizens stay indoors and off city streets in order to avoid injury or death. Id. at 1091. Despite its actual knowledge of the storm and the warnings, the defendant movie theatre failed to warn its business invitees, including the child, of the storm. As a result, the child left the theatre with her parents, traveled into the streets of Cheyenne and drowned. In this limited circumstance this court departed from the traditional rule that a business owner has no duty to warn an invitee of risks off the business owner's premises, and concluded that the movie theatre had a duty to advise its patrons of off-premises danger that might reasonably be foreseeable. Id. at 1096. This holding was premised on the foreseeability of harm to the child, due to the severe nature of the storm and the several public warnings. Here, however, we do not have such a case. The facts surrounding the disturbance in Giovale's were not sufficient to place the bar on notice that White was in imminent danger of being shot by Summers outside the bar. Consequently, no duty to warn or protect White arose.

White also contends the trial court erred in failing to consider his cause of action based upon a breach of duty arising from Giovale's sale or furnishing of liquor to him; we shall style this as a "first party dramshop cause of action." White attempts to find foundation for this cause of action in the statement from dicta in McClellan, 666 P.2d at 413, that intoxicated persons need protection from themselves:

When alcoholic beverages are sold by a tavern keeper to a minor or to an intoxicated person, the unreasonable risk of harm not only to the minor or the intoxicated person but also the members of the traveling public may readily be recognized and foreseen * * *.

McClellan, 666 P.2d at 414-15 (quoting Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 6, 75 A.L.R.2d 821 (1959)). We disagree with White's contention that the language in McClellan creates a cause of action on the part of intoxicated persons against tavern keepers who sell or furnish alcohol to them. McClellan was concerned with a very specific fact situation, an injury occurring to a third person resulting from the sale of alcohol to a minor through a liquor drive-in business in violation of W.S. 12-5-301(a)(v). Its holding did not create a cause of action on behalf of intoxicated minors in general against a tavern keeper for its sale of alcohol to them. Nor did it create a cause of action for intoxicated persons in general against the tavern keeper. Instead, the holding in McClellan itself created a very limited cause of action for injured third parties against tavern keepers who negligently or illegally sell liquor to a minor or intoxicated person through a drive-in. "We hold that both § 12-5-301(a)(v), supra, and § 12-6-101(a), supra, establish a duty toward the general public." Id. at 413.

By this decision we join the majority of jurisdictions in holding that the tavern keeper has no duty to protect the intoxicated habitue from injuries he causes to himself, the rationale being that an individual should not be able to profit from injuries arising from his own voluntary intoxication. See Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Sup. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (1955); Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554 (Del.Supr. 1981); Bertelmann v. Taas Associates, 735 P.2d 930 (Hawaii 1987); Trujillo v. Trujillo, 104 N.M. 379, 721 P.2d 1310 (1986); Allen v. County of Westchester, 109 A.D.2d 475, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1985); Sager v. McClenden, 296 Or. 33, 672 P.2d 697 (1983). See also cases cited in Annotation, Liability of Persons Furnishing Intoxicating Liquor for Injury to or Death of Consumer, Outside Coverage of Civil Damage Act, 98 A.L.R.3d 1238-42. Cf. Porter v. Ortiz, 100 N.M. 58, 665 P.2d 1149 (N.M.App. 1983) (recognizing minor's cause of action against a tavern keeper who knowingly sells alcohol to the minor when the sale proximately results in injury or death of the minor. This case specifically notes, however, that no such cause of actions extends to intoxicated adults.). Dramshop statutes have not generally been perceived as extending to injuries to the intoxicated person himself. See Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383, 385 (1967). We quote from a case cited by Giovale's that captures our thinking on this issue:

A duty should not be imposed upon the tavern keeper, and protection should not be extended, because the adult voluntarily created the vulnerability that is the problem. See Allen v. County of Westchester, 109 A.D.2d 475, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1985). "To allow recovery in favor of one who has voluntarily procured a quantity of liquor for his or her own consumption with full knowledge of its possible or probable results `would savor too much of allowing * * * [said] person to benefit by his or her own wrongful act.'" Id. at 480, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (quoting from Buntin v. Hutton, 206 Ill. App. 194, 199).

Trujillo, 721 P.2d at 1313.

In summary, we conclude that Giovale's had no duty to protect White from being shot by Summers, as Giovale's had no notice that White was in imminent danger of injury. Summary judgment in favor of Giovale's was proper. There being no cause of action for an intoxicated consumer to recover from the tavern keeper who furnished the intoxicants, the trial court did not err in failing to consider White's second count premised on this theory.

Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting opinion.