MACY, Chief Justice.

Mack Wardell, as the conservator of Neal Wardell, a minor, filed medical malpractice suits against Jon M. McMillan, M.D. and Stan Peters, M.D. Wardell alleged that the doctors negligently treated his son, Neal, and proximately caused his quadriplegia. Following a lengthy trial, the jury returned a verdict favorable to the doctors, and the court entered a judgment. On appeal, Wardell asserts that the trial court denied him a fair trial by: (1) unduly restricting jury selection; (2) erroneously instructing the jury that medical professionals are presumed to have acted with due care; and (3) improvidently denying Wardell's motion in limine to exclude references at trial to prior settlements.

We reverse and remand.

Wardell raises the following issues on appeal:

I. Did the trial court erroneously restrict plaintiff's jury selection? Specifically:

A. Did the trial court err when, although it called two alternate jurors, it failed to afford each side an additional peremptory challenge, as required by Rule 47(b), W.R.C.P.?

B. Did the trial court err in giving the two defendants twice the number of peremptory challenges afforded plaintiff when defendants were allied and, in fact, presented a coordinated and mutually supportive defense?

C. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to excuse for cause two potential jurors who were biased against plaintiff and in favor of the defense?

D. Did the trial court err in failing to permit plaintiff to voir dire on the alleged "lawsuit crisis?"

II. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury that the defendants were presumed to have acted with due care, even though

A. Plaintiff presented a prima facie case of negligence; and

B. Plaintiff's preponderance burden of proof was properly set forth in other instructions?

III. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's motion in limine to exclude references to plaintiff's prior settlements with a non-party and a former party, where defendants did not contend that either of those entities had any proportionate fault with respect to plaintiff's injuries?[]

The doctors restated the issues in separate briefs. The issues as rephrased by McMillan are illustrative:

A. Was the jury selection fair?

1. Was the failure to grant an extra peremptory challenge for the alternate juror error and, if so, was it harmless error?

2. Did the trial court properly give each defendant three peremptory challenges?

3. Did the trial court properly refuse to excuse jurors Wasmuth and Brown for cause?

4. Did the trial court properly restrict voir dire concerning the alleged "lawsuit crisis"?

B. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that the defendant doctors were entitled to a presumption of reasonable care which could be overcome by expert testimony?

C. Did the trial court erroneously grant Plaintiff's request to inform the jury of settlements with others, or did the Plaintiff invite error?

In a separate cross-appeal, McMillan raises the following issue:

1. Did the trial court err in issuing its October 31, 1990 Protective Order denying Defendant/Appellant Jon M. McMillan the ability to fully discover the expert opinions and testimony of a treating physician?

Peters raises the following issue in another separate cross-appeal:

1. Did the trial court err in issuing its October 31, 1990 Protective Order denying Defendant/Appellant Stan Peters the ability to fully discover the expert opinions and testimony of a treating physician, Dr. E. Larry McCleary?

Background

On May 13, 1987, Neal Wardell fell on a rock while he was playing at school. After recess, Neal complained of pain between his shoulder blades and experienced difficulty holding a pencil. School authorities summoned an ambulance. The ambulance transported Neal to Cody's West Park Hospital. At the hospital, Peters, an emergency room physician, and McMillan, an orthopedic surgeon, examined Neal. While he was under the care of McMillan and Peters, Neal underwent numerous radiographic studies. The x-rays failed to demonstrate any apparent fractures, dislocations, or other abnormalities of the cervical spine. Despite the lack of radiographic evidence of an injury, Neal progressively lost neurological functioning. The doctors decided to transport Neal by helicopter to St. Vincent's Hospital in Billings, Montana. Neal arrived at St. Vincent's during the evening hours of May 13, 1987, and was placed into the care of James Johnson, M.D. Neal's condition continued to deteriorate at St. Vincent's, and Neal was transported to Children's Hospital in Denver, Colorado, on May 14, 1987. At Children's Hospital, Neal was treated by Robert Hendee, Jr., M.D. and by E.L. McCleary, M.D. Neal was released from Children's Hospital as a quadriplegic.

Wardell filed a negligence action against McMillan and West Park Hospital on May 12, 1989. He alleged that McMillan was negligent in failing to immobilize Neal's neck, in performing a range-of-motion test, and in permitting Neal to move about when he knew or should have known that Neal had suffered a spinal cord injury. On November 13, 1989, Wardell filed a separate action against Peters. He alleged that Peters was negligent for substantially the same reasons as he cited in the complaint against McMillan and the hospital. These cases were consolidated for trial by a court order filed on January 19, 1990.

In addition to filing civil actions, Wardell filed a claim with Big Horn County School District No. 1 pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Wardell alleged that the school district was negligent in failing to maintain a safe playground. The school district and the hospital settled the respective claims alleged against them prior to trial.

Jury selection began on November 13, 1990, and the trial began on November 15, 1990. Wardell presented expert testimony to support his theory that Neal's injuries were proximately caused by negligent medical treatment. The doctors, in turn, presented expert testimony to support their theory that "the die was cast" when Neal fell on the playground; i.e., the fall, and not the subsequent medical care, caused Neal's paralysis. On December 7, 1990, the jury returned a special verdict, finding no negligence by McMillan, Peters, the school district, the hospital, or Dr. Johnson. Wardell appeals.

Jury Selection W.R.C.P. 47(b)

Wardell claims that the trial judge committed reversible error by denying him his right to an additional peremptory challenge to be used against alternate jurors as was required by W.R.C.P. 47(b). Specifically, Wardell contends that his right to a fair trial was implicated when he was forced to use his statutory allotment of three peremptory challenges against a panel of fourteen prospective jurors. We agree.

The record discloses that the trial judge informed trial counsel prior to jury selection that fourteen prospective jurors would be seated in the jury box. Trial counsel were to proceed with voir dire as if they were qualifying fourteen jurors. Trial counsel, but not the jurors, knew in advance that those individuals seated in positions three and thirteen would be the alternate jurors. Upon being advised of the jury selection process, Wardell objected as follows:

[COUNSEL FOR WARDELL]: Well, I understand what the Court's doing. Let me say I have an objection insofar as I may be required to use both of my peremptory challenges on people who are going to be alternates, and all the more reason I need more.

THE COURT: That can be possibly true for any party to the case.

[COUNSEL FOR WARDELL]: I see that, Your Honor. But knowing in advance that three and thirteen will be alternates, I would much prefer to be able to exercise an extra challenge to the alternate because[,] as it is, I am being permitted to use my three statutory challenges on a panel of fourteen, when in fact only twelve will most likely try the case.

THE COURT: If I granted that, then I would have to grant each of the other parties the opportunity to do the same thing.

So the objection is noted on the record and overruled.

Wardell again objected to the procedure near the end of the jury selection process:

[COUNSEL FOR WARDELL]: I am now going to exercise my third peremptory challenge. I am being forced to use it on the alternate, therefore, not getting three peremptory challenges. I am going to exercise it on Mrs. Kaelberer. I also at this time, if I were afforded equal number of defense challenges, would strike Mr. Daniels, who has been treated by the doctors. I would strike Mrs. Miller, who has been reported to us to have a bias against Mormons, and the Wardells are obviously a Morm[o]n family, and Mr. Klentz, who expressed concern about whether he can be fair to our side.

The trial judge erred as a matter of law in overruling Wardell's objection and in denying his request for an additional peremptory challenge. Once the trial judge exercised his discretion to invoke W.R.C.P. 47(b) for the purpose of seating alternate jurors, the parties were entitled to an extra peremptory challenge as a matter of law. The trial judge was afforded no discretion. The plain language of W.R.C.P. 47(b) bore this out:

(b) Alternate juror. — Immediately prior to the selection of the jury, the court may direct that one (1) or two (2) jurors in addition to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. . . . If either one (1) or two (2) alternate jurors are called each party is entitled to one (1) peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed by law. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against an alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall not be used against the alternates.

(Emphasis added.) W.R.C.P. 47(b), by affording an extra peremptory challenge, was designed in part to protect from dilution the litigants' statutory right to have three peremptory challenges in the event the trial judge decided to seat alternate jurors.

The purpose of W.R.C.P. 47(b) was frustrated in this instance. The litigants were forced to make a "Hobson's Choice" not contemplated by W.R.C.P. 47(b): They could disregard W.R.C.P. 47(b) and exercise their statutory allotment of three peremptory challenges against both regular and alternate jurors, or they could use their statutory challenges against only the regular jurors and take the risk that an objectionable alternate would not be called upon to deliberate the case. Wardell chose the former alternative and struck an objectionable alternate juror with a statutorily allotted challenge. Under the circumstances, we do not fault him for that choice.

The doctors do not dispute the fact that the parties were not afforded an extra W.R.C.P. 47(b) challenge. Rather, they argue, among other things, that the objections Wardell made to the trial judge were insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal and that, in any event, a technical violation of W.R.C.P. 47(b) was harmless error absent a specific showing of prejudice.

This Court has often held that, absent plain error, it will not consider an alleged error which was not objected to at trial. See, e.g., Monn v. State, 811 P.2d 1004 (Wyo. 1991) (rule applied in criminal context); and Triton Coal Company, Inc. v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1990) (rule applied in civil context regarding jury instructions). W.R.C.P. 46 required a litigant to make known to the trial judge, in a timely fashion, the action he requested or his objection to the court's action and his grounds therefor. The purpose of this rule was to inform the trial judge of possible errors so that he could have an opportunity to consider his rulings and to correct them, if necessary. See 5A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 46.02 (2d ed. 1989).

Wardell's objections made to the trial court fulfilled the purpose underlying W.R.C.P. 46. Wardell objected immediately upon learning that the trial judge was going to invoke W.R.C.P. 47(b) for the purpose of seating alternate jurors without affording the litigants an extra peremptory challenge. He objected again just prior to exercising his third statutory peremptory challenge on an alternate juror. Wardell made it abundantly clear that he objected to using one or more of his statutory peremptory challenges on alternate jurors and that he thought he was entitled to have an additional peremptory challenge.

The doctors suggest that Wardell's objections were insufficient in that W.R.C.P. 47(b) was not specifically cited to the trial court. We disagree. Although we encourage counsel to be as specific as possible when they are making objections, we find it ill-advised to apply W.R.C.P. 46 in a ritualistic fashion. We would be exalting form over substance if we were to hold that Wardell's objections in this case were insufficient to preserve the alternate-peremptory-challenge issue for appeal. See 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2472 (1971).

Having decided that the trial court erred and that Wardell's objections were sufficient, we must now decide whether the court's failure to afford an extra peremptory challenge as was required by W.R.C.P. 47(b) warrants reversal under the circumstances of this case. According to W.R.C.P. 61, W.R.A.P. 7.04, and Wyoming case law, error is reversible only when substantial rights to a fair trial have been prejudiced. See Smith v. Kennedy, 798 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1990). The appellant is charged with the burden of demonstrating the existence of prejudice. Id. He can show prejudice by demonstrating that, absent the error, a reasonable possibility exists that the verdict might have been more favorable to him. Id.

In the instant case, Wardell argues that a substantial right — the right to a fair and impartial jury — was adversely affected by the error below. He contends that the trial judge's failure to allow an extra peremptory challenge affected the composition of the jury. Wardell claims that he would have used his third statutory peremptory challenge on one of three identified regular jurors, who were allegedly biased against his case, had he been afforded an extra W.R.C.P. 47(b) challenge to use on an alternate. Wardell argues that he should not be required to show how the improperly composed jury actually prejudiced his case because to do so would require conjecture and speculation. We agree and hold that the trial court's failure to afford the litigants with an extra peremptory challenge for alternate jurors under W.R.C.P. 47(b) constitutes reversible error when the error is properly preserved at trial and when the denial affects the composition of the jury actually called upon to deliberate the case.

Several considerations persuade us to apply the reversible-error rule. First, W.R.C.P. 47(b) afforded no discretion to the trial judge in granting an extra peremptory challenge to the litigants once he made the decision to seat alternate jurors. Cf. State v. Jones, 27 Wyo. 46, 191 P. 1075 (1920) (reversible error to allow prosecution an extra peremptory challenge beyond those mandated by statute). Second, it is axiomatic that all litigants are entitled to a fair trial. The touchstone of a fair trial is the right to have an impartial decision maker. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). When the decision maker is to be a jury, impartiality is achieved in Wyoming through the exercise of challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. See Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-11-202 to -203 (1988) and W.R.C.P. 47(b). A trial court's refusal to excuse a juror for cause upon a proper showing of bias or denial of a peremptory challenge afforded by law implicates a litigant's substantial interest in, and right to, impanel an impartial jury. Cf. Patterson v. State, 691 P.2d 253 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020, 105 S.Ct. 2048, 85 L.Ed.2d 311 (1985) (dilution of defendant's statutory allotment of peremptory challenges by trial court's failure to properly excuse juror for cause held to be reversible error). Third, requiring the complaining party to show the existence of actual prejudice would ask him "to discover the unknowable and to reconstruct what might have been and never was[; i.e.,] a jury properly constituted after running the gauntlet of challenge[s] performed in accordance with the prescribed rule[s] of the game." Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Cook, 590 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Ky. 1979). Finally, the law generally disfavors any attempt to invade the internal processes of a decision maker for the purpose of impeaching a verdict. See W.R.E. 606.

Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-202 (1988)

Wardell claims that the trial court committed reversible error by granting the allegedly nonantagonistic co-defendants, the doctors, three statutory peremptory challenges each, while affording Wardell only three challenges. Wardell urges that the error allowed the doctors an undue advantage in constructing the jury and denied him the right to a fair trial. While we find no error in the trial court's application of Wyoming law as it stood at the time of its ruling, we feel a more substantive inquiry into, or demonstration of, antagonism will be required in subsequent cases.

Section 1-11-202 provides: "In the trial of civil cases in the district courts of this state, each side is allowed three (3) peremptory challenges." In Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981), a case factually similar to this one, the Court was confronted with deciding the meaning of the word "side" for purposes of allocating peremptory challenges. The Court relied upon authority from Texas and Kentucky to hold: "[I]n determining whether multiple defendants constitute one side, consideration must be given the nature of the claim against them and whether the defendants' interests are or may be antagonistic." 633 P.2d at 171. The Distad Court found that it was very significant that distinct acts of negligence were alleged against the defendants and that they could each reduce their respective liability by emphasizing the fault of the other. Id. The Court went on to state in dicta that, by virtue of Wyoming's comparative negligence scheme, it would be rare that multiple defendants would not have antagonistic interests. Id.

In light of Distad, we cannot say that the trial court erred in affording three statutory peremptory challenges to each doctor. A separate complaint was filed against each doctor which, although very similar to the other, alleged distinct acts of negligence against each doctor. The trial judge was also aware that this case, like Distad, involved allegations of medical malpractice and that principles of comparative negligence would apply. Given this state of facts, Distad, in effect, dictated the trial judge's determination of the matter.

Although the factors identified in Distad are to be considered when determining antagonism in the multi-party context, we do not believe that they should necessarily be dispositive. Just because the acts of negligence alleged against multi-party defendants are in some manner distinct and because comparative negligence principles will apply does not ipso facto create antagonism between the parties sufficient to justify the allotment of extra peremptory challenges. Case law developed in Texas and Kentucky subsequent to the decisions relied upon by the Distad Court is in accord. See, e.g., Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Memorial Hospital, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 56 (Ky.Ct.App. 1988) (narrowly construing Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1960)); Patterson Dental Company v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1979) (expanding the scope of inquiry required under Tamburello v. Welch, 392 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1965)).

Anticipating that the question of antagonism will arise in the future, we take this opportunity to further define what constitutes antagonism under § 1-11-202 sufficient to warrant the allotment of extra peremptory challenges among multi-party defendants. Section 1-11-202 starts from the premise that each "side" to a controversy is entitled to an equal number of peremptory challenges. "Side," as that term is understood in the context of litigation, means "litigant or a group of litigants having essentially common interests." Patterson Dental Company, 592 S.W.2d at 917. Multi-party defendants constituting only one "side" to a controversy are thereby entitled to only three peremptory challenges under Wyoming law, unless their interests are antagonistic. Distad, 633 P.2d 167; Rivermeadows, Inc. v. Zwaanshoek Holding and Financiering, B.V., 761 P.2d 662 (Wyo. 1988). Multi-party defendants' interests are antagonistic when a good-faith controversy exists, vis-a-vis each other, over an issue of fact which the jury will decide. See Patterson Dental Company, 592 S.W.2d at 918. When such a controversy exists, the defendants constitute separate "sides" within the meaning of § 1-11-202 and are entitled to have additional peremptory challenges. This result is justified by the rationale that certain of the extra challenges will be used to select a jury for the case against the other defendant, rather than against the plaintiff. See Daniel J. Sheehan, Jr. Cynthia C. Hollingsworth, Allocation of Peremptory Challenges Among Multiple Parties, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 511, 530 (1979).

When, on the other hand, no good-faith controversy exists between multi-party defendants and they are yet awarded extra peremptory challenges, the single-party plaintiff is placed in a distinct tactical disadvantage. The multi-party defendants, having no motive to exercise their additional challenges against a co-defendant, are able to pool their challenges against the plaintiff. As we have previously recognized, peremptory challenges are of substantial importance in constructing a fair and impartial jury. Theoretically, peremptory challenges may be used in an arbitrary and capricious manner. In practice, however, a party exercises peremptory challenges to reject jurors perceived to be unsympathetic to his case. To allow nonantagonistic, multi-party defendants a two-, three- or four-to-one advantage in the exercise of peremptory challenges affords them undue influence over the composition of the jury and implicates the single-party plaintiff's right to a fair trial.

In light of the foregoing, we hold that, prior to allotting peremptory challenges under § 1-11-202, the trial judge should consider all relevant circumstances to determine whether a good-faith controversy exists among multi-party defendants regarding an issue of fact which the jury will decide. It would be incumbent upon multi-party defendants seeking additional peremptory challenges to assist the trial judge in making this determination. An illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of factors to be considered would include: (1) whether separate acts of misconduct were alleged against the defendants; (2) whether comparative negligence principles applied to the case; (3) the type of relationship among the defendants; (4) whether cross-claims or third party complaints had been filed and the positions taken therein; (5) information disclosed by pretrial discovery; and (6) representations made by the parties. See Davenport, 769 S.W.2d 56; Patterson Dental Co., 592 S.W.2d 914; Rivermeadows, Inc., 761 P.2d 662; and Distad, 633 P.2d 167.

Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-203 (1988)

Wardell contends that the trial court erred in failing to excuse jurors Wasmuth and Brown for cause under § 1-11-203. Wardell claims that the jurors were legally prejudiced against his case and argues that the trial court's refusal to excuse them implicated his right to a fair trial by forcing him to expend two peremptory challenges to remove them from the jury panel.

We perceive little need to address this issue on appeal in light of our decision to reverse this case on other grounds and the unlikely event that Wasmuth and Brown will again be called upon as potential jurors. We have also recently addressed the trial court's role in assessing challenges for cause under Wyo. Stat. § 7-11-105 (1987), which adopts by reference § 1-11-203. See, e.g., Schwenke v. State, 768 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1989); and Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033 (1986).

"Insurance Crisis"

Wardell's final contention regarding the jury selection process is that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his pretrial motion "to question potential jurors concerning advertising, newspaper articles, editorials, and the like with respect to the alleged `insurance crisis', the alleged `medical malpractice crisis', and alleged `lawsuit abuse.'" Wardell claims that the trial judge's undue restriction on the scope of voir dire adversely affected his right to select a fair and impartial jury. We disagree.

Trial judges are charged with the duty of seeing that a jury of competent, fair, and impartial persons is impaneled. Redwine v. Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407, 329 P.2d 257 (1958). To this end, the scope and extent of voir dire are generally within the discretion of the trial judge. See Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981). The object of voir dire is to afford litigants an opportunity to explore whether prospective jurors have such biases and prejudices as would interfere with their responsibility to fairly decide a case. Schwenke, 768 P.2d at 1033. A trial court abuses its discretion when it limits the scope of voir dire in a manner which is unreasonable under the circumstances. Smith v. State, 773 P.2d 139 (Wyo. 1989).

This Court has never addressed the issue of whether it is appropriate to question prospective jurors regarding the prejudicial effects of the alleged "insurance crisis" campaign. We have, however, addressed a somewhat analogous issue. In Eagan v. O'Malley, 45 Wyo. 505, 21 P.2d 821 (1933), the Court held that a plaintiff was entitled in good faith to voir dire prospective jurors regarding their interest in or connection with insurance carriers which might become secondarily liable for any judgment entered against the defendant. The Court recognized that ordinarily a trial judge should guard against counsel's attempts to inject the notion into the jury selection process that defendants carry liability insurance. 45 Wyo. at 510, 21 P.2d 821. The Court reasoned that such knowledge was generally irrelevant and that it could taint the jury's consideration of the merits of the case, both as to negligence and as to the amount of damage. Id. The Court, however, justified its holding by acknowledging that litigants should be given a reasonable opportunity to explore legitimate sources of juror bias for the purpose of selecting a fair and impartial jury. 45 Wyo. at 511, 21 P.2d 821. The Court concluded: "The rule should be, as we think, that when counsel's conduct and his questions in the case are fairly conducive to the accomplishment of a legitimate end in the proceedings, if, incidentally, prejudice results therefrom to the adverse party, it may not be avoided." 45 Wyo. at 510, 21 P.2d 821. The Court went on to note that the scope of inquiry should be narrowly drawn to protect the defendant's interest by not having the existence of insurance unduly emphasized. 45 Wyo. at 509-13, 21 P.2d 821. The Court indicated that only when the sanctioned inquiry was answered in the affirmative could further questions be asked of prospective jurors regarding their interest in or connection with a liability carrier. 45 Wyo. at 512, 21 P.2d 821.

Sister states which have considered the propriety of allowing a voir dire inquiry regarding "insurance crisis" propaganda have come to varying conclusions. Of them, we find the approach adopted in Borkoski v. Yost, 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979), to be persuasive and most in line with Eagan. In Borkoski, the Montana Supreme Court held that, upon a proper showing of possible prejudice, limited good-faith questioning regarding the prejudicial effect of "insurance crisis" propaganda should be allowed. 594 P.2d at 694. The Borkoski court found that the plaintiff's attorney made a proper showing of potential prejudice by demonstrating that the very insurance company involved in the case had been actively engaged in a national advertising campaign which was both designed to prejudice potential jurors against personal injury plaintiffs and contemporaneous in time to the drawing of the jury panel. Id. Under those circumstances, the Montana Supreme Court held that either of two preliminary questions would be appropriate: (1) whether the prospective jurors heard or read anything which might affect their ability to sit as impartial jurors; or (2) whether the prospective jurors regularly read any magazines or newspapers in which it had been demonstrated that the insurance advertisements or articles appeared. 594 P.2d at 695. The Montana Supreme Court cautioned that only in the event an affirmative response were received to one of the preliminary questions would counsel be entitled to ask limited follow-up questions to determine whether the juror believed the advertising and whether it would interfere with the juror's ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. 594 P.2d at 694.

We feel that the foundation prerequisites outlined in Borkoski strike an appropriate balance between plaintiff counsel's desire to discover legitimate sources of juror bias and defense counsel's interest in keeping the topic of insurance out of the courtroom. Applying Borkoski to the instant case, we conclude that Wardell's pretrial motion and supporting exhibits, although comprehensive, failed to demonstrate that the alleged "insurance crisis" campaign had been executed in such a pervasive and contemporaneous fashion as to create a significant source of prejudice in Park County jurors. We hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying Wardell's motion to voir dire prospective jurors regarding "insurance crisis" propaganda.

Due Care Instruction

Wardell contends that the trial court committed reversible error in giving the following instruction over his objection:

The defendants rendered medical services to the plaintiff, Neal Wardell. Each defendant is entitled to the benefit of certain presumptions, and in this connection you are instructed as follows:

1. The law presumes that each defendant possessed reasonable knowledge and skill according to medical standards and that in the service undertaken and rendered by him, he discharged his full legal duty to the patient and exercised reasonable care, prudence and foresight in applying his skill and learning.

2. However, this presumption is disputable and may be overcome only by expert testimony which, taken together with other evidence, reasonably justifies a contrary conclusion.

3. This presumption continues throughout the trial unless and until the presumption is overcome.

Wardell argues, among other things, that the trial court, by instructing the jury as to both Wardell's burden of proof and the physicians' presumption of due care, misled the jury into believing that Wardell had a double burden of proving his case. We agree that the trial court erred in giving the due-care instruction. We do not, however, reach the further issue of whether the error warrants reversal because of our decision to reverse this case on other grounds.

The doctors rely primarily upon a statement extracted from Harris v. Grizzle, 625 P.2d 747 (Wyo. 1981), to support their contention that the due-care instruction accurately reflects Wyoming law. In Harris, the Court stated: "A physician or surgeon is presumed to have carefully and skillfully treated or operated upon a patient." 625 P.2d at 753. Taken out of context, this statement, along with similar statements made in prior cases, would appear to support the instruction given in this case. See Smith v. Beard, 56 Wyo. 375, 110 P.2d 260 (1941); and Rosson v. Hylton, 45 Wyo. 540, 22 P.2d 195 (1933).

Harris, Smith, and Rosson were all medical malpractice cases wherein the plaintiffs were appealing either an adverse summary judgment or a directed verdict. The Court in each case affirmed the lower court's ruling on the basis of the plaintiff's failure to establish by competent evidence a prima facie case of professional negligence. A careful reading of the cases discloses that, in each instance when the alleged presumption of due care was mentioned, the Court was merely attempting to emphasize the burden of proof placed upon a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action. The real point the Court was making in each instance was that a presumption of negligence does not exist merely because unfavorable results follow medical treatment. The Court did not intimate in any of the cases that it intended to create an evidentiary presumption of due care for physicians upon which a jury should be instructed. Harris, 625 P.2d 747; Smith, 56 Wyo. 375, 110 P.2d 260; Rosson, 45 Wyo. 540, 22 P.2d 195.

Addressing a similar instruction, an Arizona court captured the irony of literally interpreting language similar to that found in Harris:

If the quoted language is intended to create a presumption in favor of a defendant physician, it is a strange species of presumption indeed. It does not fit the typical description of a presumption in a civil case — that is, a rule that shifts the burden of producing evidence to the party against whom the presumption operates. Rather, "this presumption" appears to do no more than merely restate the familiar rule that the plaintiff has the burden of proving the defendant negligent.

Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326, 348 (Ct.App. 1978) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we view this alleged due-care presumption as being merely the flip side of the plaintiff's burden of proof in a medical malpractice case. As stated by McMillan: "The burden of proving `that the non-existence of the presumed fact [i.e., due care] is more probable than its existence,' is the same as the burden of proving defendants' negligence `by a preponderance of the evidence.'" Consequently, once the jury has been adequately instructed on the plaintiff's burden of proof in a case, it is of no avail to further instruct the jury as to the alleged presumption of due care. To do so would serve only to confuse the jury. See id.; Richmond v. A.F. of L. Medical Service Plan of Phil., 421 Pa. 269, 218 A.2d 303 (1966); and Peacock v. Piper, 81 Wn.2d 731, 504 P.2d 1124 (1973); but see Crumbley v. Wyant, 188 Ga. App. 227, 372 S.E.2d 497 (Ct.App. 1988).

A review of the jury instructions given in this case discloses that the jury was adequately instructed regarding the plaintiff's burden of proof. That being the case, we perceive no reason why physicians, to the exclusion of everyone else, are entitled to a due-care instruction in a negligence case. Cf. Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988) (Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds). The trial court erred by so instructing the jury.

Disclosure of Settlements

Wardell finally contends that the trial court erred by ruling that Wyoming's comparative negligence law required the pretrial settlements with the hospital and the school district to be disclosed to the jury. The doctors counter that Wardell should not be heard to complain because he invited the alleged error; i.e., Wardell insisted that the jury be informed of either nothing or everything about the settlements. We agree with Wardell and disagree with the doctors.

We do not believe that the disclosure of settlements is required under Wyoming's comparative negligence law. The relevant statutory section provides in pertinent part:

(b) The court may, and when requested by any party shall:

(i) . . . .

(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of fault.

Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(b)(i)(B) (1988). This language has been interpreted in practice to require that the jury be informed (1) that a plaintiff will not recover any damages if he is found to be more than fifty percent at fault, and (2) that each defendant is liable for only that portion of the total damage award which corresponds to his percentage of fault. See Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instructions 10.01A and 10.03A (1988). We believe that § 1-1-109(b)(i)(B) is satisfied once a jury receives instruction on the points outlined above. The jury should then understand the consequences of attributing fault under Wyoming's comparative negligence law. The admission of settlement evidence is not necessary to this understanding. Therefore, whether or not settlement evidence is to be admitted in a particular case must be determined under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. We hold that the trial court erred in ruling that disclosure of settlements is required by Wyoming's comparative negligence law.

We have previously recognized that, under the doctrine of invited error, a party may not complain of action which he induced the trial court to take. Thatcher Sons, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Casper, N.A., 750 P.2d 1324 (Wyo. 1988). The key to determining whether this rule of law applies is identifying the party who "induced" the allegedly erroneous action. The record discloses that Peters requested that the settlements be disclosed to the jury. Wardell's pretrial posture was that no mention should be made of the settlements. It was only after the trial court ruled to allow disclosure of the settlements that Wardell insisted that, to prevent juror speculation, the jury also be informed regarding the settlement amounts. The doctrine of invited error does not apply to Wardell under these circumstances.

Discovery

The doctors claim on cross-appeals that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing a protective order which prevented them from deposing one of Neal's treating physicians, Dr. McCleary, regarding his expert opinion on the issues of standard of care and causation. The protective order limited the scope of inquiry to the factual circumstances relating to Neal's condition and treatment at Children's Hospital. The doctors assert, however, that they had reason to believe Dr. McCleary's expert opinions would be favorable to their cases. They argue that his opinions should be discoverable because Wardell waived the patient-client privilege by filing suit. The trial court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this case.

W.R.E. 501 provides in pertinent part: "Except as otherwise required by constitution or statute or by these or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law." The physician-patient privilege is not recognized in the common law of Wyoming. See CP v. Laramie County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (Parental Rights of PP), 648 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1982). Rather, the privilege is established and defined by Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-101 (Supp. 1992), which provides in pertinent part:

(a) The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:

(i) . . . [A] physician concerning a communication made to him by his . . . patient in that relation, or his advice to his . . . patient. The . . . physician may testify by express consent of the . . . patient, and if the . . . patient voluntarily testifies the . . . physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject.

Section 1-12-101 by its express terms protects only confidential communications made by a patient to his physician and advice given by a physician to his patient. Similar privilege statutes are generally interpreted as extending the privilege to all information secured by a doctor through observation, examination, or conversation with the patient, so far as it is relevant. EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 100 (3d ed. 1984). The policy underlying such a statutory privilege is to encourage full and frank disclosure between a patient and his doctor for the purpose of effective diagnosis and treatment. See 61 AM.JUR.2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 169 (1981). When a patient places his physical or mental condition into contest, the physician-patient privilege is waived to the extent that it is relevant to the controversy. See Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1986). Under such circumstances, the patient can no longer expect to silence his physician relating to the subject matter of the litigation. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra at § 103. The waiver, however, is not without boundaries. The physician may not discuss the patient's condition and treatment with the world at large, but he is bound to disclose the relevant circumstances only within the confines of the adversarial process. See 61 AM.JUR.2D, supra.

Wardell concedes that he waived the physician-patient privilege by filing suit. He contends, however, that the waiver extended to only factual information relating to Neal's condition and treatment. Wardell apparently interprets the statutory language, "[t]he . . . physician may testify by express consent of the . . . patient," to mean that a physician may not offer anything but factual testimony absent the express consent of the patient. We do not read the statute so broadly. The language, when read with the rest of the statute, refers only to the circumstances under which a physician may disclose patient confidences when a waiver of the privilege has not been implied by law. The plain language of the statute does not prohibit a treating physician from expressing his expert opinion regarding issues placed into contest by his patient.

Wardell argues alternatively that as a matter of public policy this Court should protect the "special relationship" which exists between a patient and his physician by prohibiting the physician from expressing an expert opinion adverse to the patient's interests. Wardell claims that a physician has a fiduciary duty not to act contrary to his patient's best interests.

W.R.C.P. 26(b) governed the scope of discovery in civil litigation and provided: "Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, . . . [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant . . . [or which] appears reasonably calculated to lead to . . . admissible evidence." As is evident, few restrictions are placed upon the scope of civil discovery. Only privileged or completely irrelevant information is off limits, unless the court orders otherwise. In the instant case, we have already determined that Dr. McCleary's expert opinions were not privileged, and it was conceded that they were potentially relevant. Our question then becomes whether the protective order issued by the trial court constituted an abuse of discretion under the rules governing discovery. See Cubin v. Cubin, 685 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1984).

W.R.C.P. 26(c) provided that, upon a motion for good cause shown, a trial judge could issue any order required by justice "to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." The record reveals that Wardell moved the trial court to issue a protective order forbidding the doctors from deposing Dr. McCleary regarding, among other things, his expert opinions on the applicable standard of care and the issue of causation. The trial court issued the requested order on the grounds that it furthered the ends of justice and that the information sought was privileged.

Although Dr. McCleary's testimony was not privileged, we do believe that the protective order was issued in the interest of justice. Our reasons are several. First, Dr. McCleary was not designated as a trial expert by Wardell at the time the protective order was sought, and, therefore, it was unnecessary to depose him regarding his expert opinions for purposes of cross-examination. See W.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A). Second, Dr. McCleary was never "retained or specially employed" by Wardell in anticipation of trial, so his expert opinions were not discoverable pursuant to W.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B). Third, as a general proposition, we do not believe that a treating physician, who may feel that it is ethically inappropriate to testify as an expert witness against a patient, should be unnecessarily forced to do so. A contrary position would needlessly pit physician against patient, potentially destroying a mutually beneficial relationship. Finally, the doctors had numerous expert witnesses to support their theory of the case. The apparent and primary reason they sought Dr. McCleary's testimony was in the hopes that they could argue before the jury that Wardell's own physician said no one was at fault. The prejudicial effect of such testimony or argument may well outweigh its need in this case. We hold that, under the circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by issuing the protective order.

Conclusion

The trial court committed reversible error by failing to afford the parties an extra peremptory challenge as was required by W.R.C.P. 47(b).

Reversed and remanded for a retrial consistent with this opinion.

CARDINE, J., files a specially concurring opinion.

URBIGKIT, J., files an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, and GOLDEN, J., generally concurs and joins in that portion of Justice Urbigkit's opinion dealing with the discovery issue on cross-appeal.