Summary
In Vulcan Materials Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 31, 33, 25 OBR 26, 27, 494 N.E.2d 1125, 1127, this court held that "in the consideration of the permanency of a disability, the commission need not determine whether the claimant could return to his former position of employment.
Summary of this case from State ex Rel. Pepsi-Cola General v. Indus. CommOpinion
Nos. 85-938, 85-1008, 85-1160, 85-1199, 85-1200, 85-1234 and 85-1318
Decided July 9, 1986.
Workers' compensation — R.C. 4123.56 — Authority of commission to reclassify injury from temporary to permanent — Commission need not wait until claimant has received two hundred weeks of temporary total disability benefits.
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
This opinion consolidates seven appeals taken from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County. At issue in each of these actions is the authority of the Industrial Commission to reclassify a disability from temporary to permanent. In case Nos. 85-1008, 85-1160, 85-1199, 85-1200, 85-1234 and 85-1318, the commission terminated the claimants' temporary total disability benefits for the reason that their respective disabilities had become a permanent condition. The claimants thereafter instituted mandamus actions seeking the reinstatement of temporary total disability compensation on the grounds that R.C. 4123.56 mandates a minimum of two hundred weeks' payment of temporary total disability benefits before the commission may find a temporary disability to have become a permanent condition. In each case, the court of appeals granted the requested writs.
In case No. 85-938, the employer sought to terminate the claimant's receipt of temporary total disability compensation on the grounds that several of the examining physicians concluded that the claimant's injury had become a permanent condition. The commission denied the employer's motion based on the finding that the claimant could not return to his former employment as a diesel mechanic. The employer instituted a mandamus action alleging that the commission's continuation of temporary total disability compensation was improper. The court of appeals denied the requested writ on the basis that R.C. 4123.56 entitled the claimant to receive a minimum of two hundred weeks of temporary total disability compensation before the commission may consider the injury to have become a permanent condition.
The cause as consolidated is now before this court upon appeals as a matter of right.
Mitchell, Allen, Catalano, Boda Clark Co., L.P.A., Daniel K. Boda and William A. Catalano, for claimants in case Nos. 85-938 and 85-1008.
Michael J. Muldoon, for claimants in case Nos. 85-1160, 85-1199, 85-1200 and 85-1234.
Thompson, Meier Dersom and Thomas D. Thompson, for claimant in case No. 85-1318.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour Pease, Thomas M. Taggart and Bruce L. Ingram, for appellant Vulcan Materials Co. in case No. 85-938, and for Buckeye Metal Refining in case No. 85-1199.
Stanley R. Stein and Donald A. Mullin, for appellant J.C. Penney Co. in case No. 85-1008. Smith Schnacke Co., L.P.A., Gary W. Auman and Geraldine M. Johnson, urging reversal for amicus curiae, American Freight System, Inc. et al. in case No. 85-1008.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, Janet E. Jackson and Michael L. Squillace, for appellee Industrial Commission in case No. 85-938.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, and Merl H. Wayman, for appellant Industrial Commission in case Nos. 85-1008, 85-1160, 85-1199, 85-1200, 85-1234 and 85-1318.
The common gravamen of each of these consolidated actions concerns the authority of the Industrial Commission to reclassify a disability from temporary to permanent prior to the claimant's receipt of two hundred weeks of temporary total disability benefits.
This court recently addressed this identical issue in State, ex rel. Bryant, v. Pinkerton's, Inc. (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 79. Therein, this court specifically rejected the argument that R.C. 4123.56 mandates two hundred weeks of temporary total compensation before the commission may find an injury to have become permanent. Rather, this court interpreted the two hundred weeks' provision of R.C. 4123.56 as manifesting "`a safety valve on the indefinite payment of temporary benefits.'" Id. at 83.
Accordingly, the judgments of the court of appeals in contravention of this court's finding in Bryant, supra, are hereby reversed.
A second issue raised in these appeals brings into question whether, in the commission's consideration of the permanency of a disability, the commission must determine whether the claimant could return to his former position of employment.
We hold that in the consideration of the permanency of a disability, the commission need not determine whether the claimant could return to his former position of employment. The commission's designation of a disability as permanent relates solely to the perceived longevity of the condition at issue. It has absolutely no bearing upon the claimant's ability to perform the tasks involved in his former position of employment. Further, in Logsdon v. Indus. Comm. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 508 [28 O.O. 429], at paragraph two of the syllabus, this court defined the term "permanent" as applied to disability under the workmen's compensation law as a condition which will, "* * * with reasonable probability, continue for an indefinite period of time without any present indication of recovery therefrom."
For the reason set forth in this opinion, we hereby reverse the court of appeals' issuance of writs of mandamus in case Nos. 85-1008, 85-1160, 85-1199, 85-1200, 85-1234 and 85-1318. In regard to the appellate court's denial of a writ of mandamus in case No. 85-938, we reverse that court's judgment as to its interpretation of R.C. 4123.56 and remand the cause to the appellate court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgments reversed in case Nos. 85-1008, 85-1160, 85-1199, 85-1200, 85-1234 and 85-1318.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded in case No. 85-938.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN, DOUGLAS and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.