Murphy, J.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Murphy, J.

BACKGROUND

This case is a wrongful death action against the defendants, Yale New Haven Health Services Corporation and Lawrence and Memorial Hospital, Inc., brought by the plaintiffs, Joshua Vincent and Erin Vincent, co-executors of the estate of their son, Lucas Vincent (Lucas). The plaintiffs allege that Lucas, the decedent, was born prematurely at Lawrence and Memorial Hospital on March 15, 2017. The plaintiffs further allege that Lucas was transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit at Yale New Haven Hospital within hours of his birth, where he was treated with respiratory support and tube feedings. Lucas improved and was transferred back to the Lawrence and Memorial Hospital neonatal intensive care unit on April 5, 2017. Lucas subsequently demonstrated increasing clinical instability, including a large emesis, prolonged apnea, and desaturation of his hemoglobin and was pronounced dead on April 8, 2017. The operative amended complaint is set forth in three counts as to both the defendants. Count one alleges statutory wrongful death pursuant to General Statutes § 52-555, count two claims loss of filial consortium on behalf of the plaintiffs in relation to the death of their son Lucas, and count three claims negligent infliction of emotional distress as to Erin Vincent, the mother of the decedent, Lucas. The present motion before this court is the defendants’ motion to strike count two, the plaintiffs’ claim for loss of filial consortium. For the following reasons, the defendants’ motion to strike is granted.

STANDARD

A motion to strike attacks the legal sufficiency of the allegations of a pleading. See Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270, 709 A.2d 558 (1998). The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to construe the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff and determine if the plaintiff has set forth a legally sufficient cause of action. See Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).

DISCUSSION

The defendants argue that count two should be stricken because claims for loss of filial consortium do not state a legally cognizable cause of action under Connecticut law. In response, the plaintiffs argue that the parent-child relationship is recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a legal right, and that the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 10, provides the plaintiffs the right to seek a remedy in Connecticut courts for interference with that relationship.

"The unavailability of a common-law right of recovery based on wrongful death is well-established Connecticut law." Belliveau v. Stevenson, 123 F.3d 107, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1997). "[D]eath and its direct consequences can constitute recoverable elements of damages only if, and to the extent that, they are made so by statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ladd v. Douglas Trucking Co., 203 Conn. 187, 196, 523 A.2d 1301 (1987). Section 52-555, commonly referred to as Connecticut’s wrongful death statute, permits a recovery of damages by the decedent’s estate. Our Supreme Court, in Ladd v. Douglas Trucking Co., supra, 195, stated in April of 1987 that "[s]ince its enactment, our wrongful death statute has been regarded as the exclusive means by which damages resulting from death are recoverable." Further, the court in Ladd held that a spouse may recover on a claim for antemortem loss of consortium joined with the estate’s wrongful death action, but that a surviving spouse has no statutory or common-law right to recover for postmortem loss of consortium. Id. The legislature, subsequent to the Ladd decision, enacted General Statutes § 52-555a, which allows for postmortem loss of spousal consortium claims. There has been no similar enactment for postmortem loss of parental or filial consortium claims, despite the recent recognition of a common-law loss of parental consortium claim by our Supreme Court in Campos v. Coleman, 319 Conn. 36, 123 A.3d 854 (2015). In Campos, the court kept in line with prior rulings, holding that injuries are recoverable elements of death only as created by statute. Id., 59. The Campos court also limited loss of parental consortium claims to those "resulting from a parent’s injury during the parent’s life." (Emphasis added.) Id., 60.

In the present case, the plaintiffs are asking this court to recognize a postmortem filial loss of consortium claim. This court finds Ladd and Campos dispositive of this issue. Even if this court were to find that an action for loss of filial consortium might be found to give rise to a cause of action in certain cases, any such doctrine would not cover a claim for postmortem loss of filial consortium because there is no statutory authority for such an action. The plaintiffs’ claims are foreclosed by the holdings in Ladd and Campos, which clearly state that Connecticut does not recognize postmortem claims absent statutory authority. Our legislature has not yet extended claims in wrongful death cases to damages for postmortem loss of filial consortium. Section 52-555a is limited to postmortem loss of spousal consortium. The statute is clear and unambiguous and this court cannot add to the statute. "It is axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to accomplish a particular result. That is the function of the legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent v. New Haven, 285 Conn. 778, 792, 941 A.2d 932 (2008). "[U]nder Connecticut law, when a statute is in derogation of common law ... it should receive a strict construction and is not to be extended, modified, repealed or enlarged in its scope by the mechanics of statutory construction ... Section 52-555a, which is in derogation of the common-law rule prohibiting actions based on death and its direct consequences ... speaks exclusively in terms of loss of spousal consortium ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Belliveau v. Stevenson, supra, 123 F.3d 111.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to strike count two of the amended complaint is granted.