ORDER AND REASONS ORDER AND REASONS ON RECONSIDERATION

HELEN G. BERRIGAN, Chief U.S. District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Having considered the record, the memoranda of counsel and the law, the Court has determined that this matter should be stayed pending arbitration for the following reasons.

After the Court had previously determined that arbitration was appropriate, the plaintiff presented new arguments on motion for reconsideration. She argued for the first time that the arbitration clause is unenforceable under Arizona and Ninth Circuit law because it is a contract of adhesion "with the additional characteristics that it is beyond the reasonable expectation of the consumer" and is "procedurally and substantively unconscionable." (Rec. Doc. 23, p. 2). She argues that no consumer would have reason to expect an arbitration clause and that the arbitration clause is unconscionable because it eliminates plaintiff's right to a jury trial and the right to bring a class action. (Rec. Doc. 23, p. 8). Sears argues that both federal and Arizona law mandate the enforcement of the arbitration clause.

The arbitration clause in the cardholder agreement provides that "[t]he arbitration section of this Agreement is made pursuant to a transaction involving interstate commerce and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq." ("FAA"). The general "Governing Law" provision reads:

This Agreement and your Account will be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the United States and, to the extent governed by state law, the laws of the State of Arizona, regardless of where you live or where you use the Account.

Under 9 U.S.C. § 2, an arbitration clause such as the one under examination "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." This language mirrors the language of the Arizona arbitration statute underlying the plaintiff's primary support, Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Az. 1992).

In Broemmer, supra, the Arizona Supreme Court declared patient's arbitration agreement with a physician unenforceable based on uncontradicted facts presented by the plaintiff. "It would be unreasonable to enforce such a critical term against plaintiff when it is not a negotiated term and defendant failed to explain it to her or call her attention to it" and when the "[p]laintiff was under a great deal of emotional stress, had only a high school education, and was not experienced in commercial matters, and is still not sure `what arbitration is.'" Id., 840 P.2d at 1017. The Broemmer court did not reach the issue of unconscionability. "Because of this holding [on reasonable expectation], it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the contract is also unconscionable." Id.

The plaintiff's argument presents a number of problems for the Court. First, in calling for a broad rule declaring all arbitration clauses unreasonable if they waive the right to jury trial or proceeding as a class action, the plaintiff overlooks the specific limitations put onBroemmer by the court:

We also restate that we decline the invitation to write a sweeping, legislative rule concerning all agreements to arbitrate. Instead, we decide this case. In this case, the facts concerning the signing of the document have all come from the plaintiff and all are uncontradicted. Under the undisputed facts in this case, the document involved is a contract of adhesion. Our enthusiasm for arbitration in general does not permit us to ignore the realities present in this case.

The dissent is concerned that our decision today sends a "mixed message." It is, however, our intent to send a clear message. That message is: Contracts of adhesion will not be enforced unless they are conscionable and within the reasonable expectations of the parties. This is a well-established principle of contract law; today we merely apply it to the undisputed facts of the case before us.

Further, in finding that the arbitration clause was outside of the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff under Arizona law, the Arizona Supreme Court found that "[c]learly, the issues of knowing consent and reasonable expectations are closely related and intertwined." It also affirmed the validity of standardized agreements, the terms of which are binding on customers, but "they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation." Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1017,quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 682 P.2d 388, 396 (Az. 1984), quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Standardized Agreements) § 211.

The Darner court specifically approved the enforceability of standard form contract provisions:

The rule which we adopt today for interpretation of standardized contracts . . . recognizes that most provisions of standardized agreements are not the result of negotiation; often, neither the customer nor salesperson are aware of the contract provisions. The rule . . . charges the customer with knowledge that the contract being "purchased" is or contains a form applied to a vast number of transactions and includes terms which are unknown . . .; it binds the customer to such terms.

In addition, the Broemmer court focus on the specific medical context at hand was apparent. It repeatedly relied on a law review article by Stanley Henderson, Contractual Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 Va. L. Rev. 947 (1972). In discussing "The Integrity of the Arbitration Bargaining Process — Special Problems of Standardized Contracts of Adhesion," Professor Henderson wrote:

Unless unknown terms exceed the range or reasonable expectation, the rule is that an adherent to a standard form contract binds himself in detail by blanket assent. Nevertheless, the application of these ordinary contract principles to arbitration clauses, and particularly to medical arbitration agreements, raises some troublesome issues not found in other classes of transactions or types of contracts.

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Given the distinctive nature of the medical services transaction, the use of a standardized form runs the risk of failing to satisfy the policy of awareness. The arbitration provision, viewed from the perspective of the patient, is indeed subsidiary to the primary exchange of medical services for an undertaking of payment. After consenting to medical procedures, the contract purchaser of medical services may fairly assume that no obligation other than that of payment are imposed. Absent some guidance by the medical entity, the patient has little reason to know anything at all about arbitration, let alone that the tendered document requires it. Nor should the medical entity ordinarily expect a patient to read or even to understand a broad arbitration clause. In these circumstances a court is faced with the question of whether the patient is nevertheless bound by the term since he knew that the writing was used to embody contract terms. In resolving the question, a consideration peculiar to all executory arbitration agreements may well be weighty heavily in the medical context. Not only is the resisting party (presumably the patient) claiming lack of knowledge of the arbitration term, but he asks not to be prevented from litigating a consequential loss controversy that was also unknown and non-existent at the time of contracting. Viewed in this light, the knowledge factor is doubled in its impact.

The Court further notes that Broemmer was determined before the Supreme Court pronouncements in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc., 513 U.S. 265 (1995). The Supreme Court found that there was nothing inherently anti-consumer about the Section 2 of the FAA: "[w]e agree that Congress, when enacting [the FAA], had the needs of consumers as well as others, in mind." Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 180.

In any event, § 2 gives States a method for protecting consumers against unfair pressure to agree to a contract with an unwanted arbitration provision. States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." . . . What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal "footing," directly contrary to the Act's language and Congress' intent.

In any event, and assuming that Arizona law applies, the Court finds that the arbitration clause at issue is neither outside the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff nor unconscionable. As implicitly acknowledged by both parties, such clauses were routinely included in consumer contracts prior to the relevant time here. See Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. Corp. L 331 (1996). Unlike the plaintiff in Broemmer, supra, there is no evidence to support the finding that the arbitration clause was outside this plaintiff's reasonable expectation.

The issue of unconscionability is one of law for the court to decide.Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 907 P.2d 51 (Az. 1995). "Procedural or process unconscionability is concerned with unfair surprise." Southwest Pet Products, Inc. v. Koch Industries, Inc., 107 F. Supp.2d 1108, 1113 (D. Az. 2000). Procedural unconscionability focuses on "`those factors bearing upon . . . the real and voluntary meeting of the minds of the contracting party . . .'" Maxwell, 907 P.2d at 58, quoting Johnson v. Mobil Oil Co., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E. D. Mich. 1976). It bears a strong resemblance to fraud and duress. Id. Substantive unconscionability "concerns the actual terms of the contract and examines the relative fairness of the obligations assumed." Id. "Indicative of substantive unconscionability are contract terms so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party, an overall imbalance, in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain, and significant cost-price disparity." Id. "It concerns the actual terms of the contract and examines the relative fairness of the obligations assumed." Southwest Pet Products. Inc. v. Koch Industries. Inc., 107 F. Supp.2d 1108, 1113 (D. Az. 2000).

The Court can not find that the arbitration clause is unconscionable as claimed by the plaintiff. The Court previously found that the plaintiff was given adequate notice of the term. In addition, other courts have found that the fact that the clause implicitly waives the "right" to a jury trial or the "right" to proceed by class action does not, in itself, render the clause unconscionable. A thorough discussion of the non-unconscionability of the jury waiver in an arbitration clause is contained in Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp.2d 909 (N.D. Tex. 2000). Similarly, a recent and thorough discussion of validity of the arbitration clause class action waiver can be found in Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp. — Alabama, 244 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2001). It should be noted that the plaintiff can cite to no court decision that has found such clauses to be unconscionable for the argued reasons under Arizona or any other law.

The Court is mindful of the fact that the contract at issue here is unquestionably one of adhesion. The Court also recognizes that the arbitration clause precludes jury trial and class actions, the latter a particularly valued vehicle of litigation to vindicate consumer claims that are small on an individual basis but enormous in overall volume. While the Court is sympathetic to the plaintiff's desire to pursue her claim as a class, the Court is bound by the strong presumption in favor of affirming arbitration clauses. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Bhatia v. Johnson, 818 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir. 1987), citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth. Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1986). "[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626 — 627. The concerns of those consumers seeking to void such-arbitration clauses need to be addressed to Congress.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED and PARTIALLY DENIED, and the defendant's motion to stay plaintiff's action in favor of arbitration is GRANTED.