OPINION

Per Curiam:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in a personal injury action in favor of respondent, Nevada Power Company. The jury returned a special verdict finding appellant Bradney Ray Verner 53 percent negligent in an accident, thus barring him from any recovery. Appellant makes numerous assignments of error on appeal. Having determined that the lower court erred in matters dispositive of this appeal, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

On August 18, 1980, Bradney Ray Verner (Verner) was 29 years old and was employed as a lineman for Centel Telephone (Centel). He and his partner were lowering the Centel lines to make room for cable TV lines. The pole on which Verner suffered his injuries was owned by respondent Nevada Power Company (Nevada Power), but jointly used by both utilities, and had been installed in 1953.

The primary or main power line was supported at the top of this pole, but a vertical line connected it to the transformer located below the secondary power lines. (Modern practice, made possible by lighter transformers, is to locate transformers above the secondaries near the top of a pole.) The vertical line, also carrying 7200 volts, formed a drip loop before attaching to the transformer to allow water to drip off so it would not flow into the transformer. As a result of this configuration of the transformer and the vertical line from the primary, the drip loop was the lowest (in height) power bearing line on the pole. Normally, the primaries are the furthermost off the ground and the secondaries are the power bearing lines closest to the ground. The 7200 volt drip loop was also partially insulated, as secondaries are while primaries usually are not. Thus, the drip loop was similar to a secondary in its location on the pole and its appearance.

After making a visual inspection of the pole, Verner began climbing it. He climbed up to the telephone lines, then continued climbing up to the secondaries which carry 110 volts to individual houses. Verner then attached a handmade extension cord or "pigtail" to the secondary. Pigtails supply power to linemen to run their power tools while working on poles. Pigtails were not officially authorized by either Centel or Nevada Power; the evidence at trial was conflicting whether they are unofficially tolerated. Linemen were instructed to use approved extension cords running from a generator in the truck to the pole. When, as in this case, the pole is in a backyard easement and the extension cord on the truck is too short, it is more convenient to use a pigtail than to get a longer extension or to use hand tools.

Verner's accident happened as he was descending the pole back to the level of the phone lines. At trial, Verner testified that he remembered that he suffered a gaff "cutout" with his left leg in mid-stride and his arms around the pole. The gaff on Verner's right foot slipped, and he fell several feet as he fought to reestablish a position on the pole. In his struggle to regain his balance, his left foot swung out and touched a grounded communication line. At the same time, his left shoulder touched the drip loop of the primary power line carrying 7200 volts. Because Verner was touching both lines simultaneously the 7200 volts traveled through his body, shocking him severely. Verner was seriously burned on his left shoulder, arm and shoulder blade and the bottom of his left foot was burned off. The shock threw Verner off the pole, and he fell 17 feet to the ground severing his spine. As a result of his injuries, Verner is now a paraplegic, permanently paralyzed from the chest down, and confined to a wheelchair.

At trial, Nevada Power made a motion for separate trials on the issues of liability and damages on the basis that evidence of damages would prejudice the findings concerning liability. NRCP 42(b). The district court ordered separate trials as an economy of time. On appeal, Verner argues that the district court abused its discretion in bifurcating this trial because the issues of liability and damages were inextricably intertwined. We agree.

Verner asserts that medical testimony regarding his burn patterns was necessary to show how his accident occurred. He also claims that medical testimony concerning his temporary loss of memory following the accident and later recovery of it was necessary to preserve his credibility. Due to the bifurcation of trials, the trial court allowed only limited medical testimony. These limitations resulted in a cursory, almost cryptic, presentation of Verner's injuries. In its final argument, Nevada Power used this restricted review of Verner's injuries to challenge the limited medical testimony. Nevada Power argued that Verner did not recover from his amnesia, but had, instead, fabricated his testimony regarding how the accident took place.

To justify a separate trial on the issue of liability, the issue of liability must be separate and distinct from the issue of damages. State ex rel. Perry v. Sawyer, 500 P.2d 1052 (Or. 1972). Where the nature of the injuries has an important bearing on the issue of liability, a separate trial should not be ordered. Williams v. Adams, 362 N.Y.S.2d 68 (N.Y. 1974). Further, the movant must demonstrate that a bifurcated trial is clearly necessary to lessen costs and expedite the litigation. Perry, supra. The trial court bifurcated the trial as an "economy of time," although it was asserted that the damage portion would only have taken approximately two additional days of trial time. More significantly, the issues of liability and damages were inextricably interrelated. The bifurcation of trial prejudiced Verner's ability to present his case on the issue of liability. The district court abused its discretion in ordering separate trials. Perry, supra; Williams, supra. See also, Brown v. General Motors Corporation, 407 P.2d 461 (Wash. 1965). We reverse and remand for a nonbifurcated trial.

On appeal, Verner also asserts that the district court erred in its refusal to give Proposed Instruction I. This instruction is essentially the instruction a district court is required to give pursuant to NRS 41.141(2)(a), if requested. The district court recognized that NRS 41.141 (2)(a) was mandatory but considered the instruction unnecessary in a bifurcated trial. Nevada Power argues that this instruction is required where there is a general verdict, but cannot be given where, as in the instant case, a special verdict is used. We disagree.

The language in NRS 41.141(2) is plain and unambiguous. A reading of NRS 41.141 makes clear that no limitation is imposed upon this requirement either because of a bifurcated trial or a special verdict. The legislative directive is clear: the district court must, upon request, give such an instruction to the jury. City of Las Vegas v. Macchiaverna, 99 Nev. 256, 661 P.2d 879 (1983); Peair v. Home Ass'n of Enola Legion No. 751, 430 A.2d 665 (Pa. 1977). The district court's refusal to do so violated NRS 41.141(2)(a) and constitutes error. We decline to hold this error harmless, since any determination as to what the jury would have decided had it been properly instructed would be pure speculation. On remand, the district court is instructed to give to the jury, upon request, an instruction based upon NRS 41.141(2)(a).

Verner further contends that the district court erred when it admitted into evidence a copy of NRS 704.800 which makes it unlawful to tap into a power line with the intent to steal power. The district court correctly ruled that the statute did not create a standard of care relevant to the case at bar and refused to instruct the jury that a violation of NRS 704.800 was negligence per se. See Sagebrush Ltd. v. Carson City, 99 Nev. 204, 660 P.2d 1013 (1983). But the district court did allow a copy of the statute to be admitted into evidence as relevant to the issue of foreseeability. This was error. Any probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See, Allen v. Blanks, 384 So.2d 63 (Miss. 1980). On remand, the court is instructed to exclude the admission of NRS 704.800.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in ordering separate trials on the issues of liability and damages. We reverse and remand for a new, nonbifurcated trial consistent with this opinion.

SPRINGER, C.J., GUNDERSON, STEFFEN, and YOUNG, JJ., and GRIFFIN, D.J., concur.