SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Nick Mends appeals from a December 15, 2009 amended judgment of conviction entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Gershon, J.). On January 7, 2008, Mends was convicted, following his guilty plea, of one count of using a passport secured by a false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542 ("Count One") and one count of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) ("Count Two"). He was sentenced principally to one month's imprisonment for Count One and a mandatory consecutive term of two years' imprisonment for Count Two. Mends appealed from this judgment, and in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009), this court vacated Mends's guilty plea to Count Two and remanded the case for further proceedings. United States v. Mends, 331 Fed.Appx. 895 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order). On remand, the government moved to dismiss Count Two, and the district court then resentenced Mends on Count One to a term of imprisonment of "time served" and to a two-year term of supervised release. We presume the parties' familiarity with the facts and remaining procedural history of this case.

On this appeal, Mends challenges both the sentence of time served and the validity of his plea of guilty to Count One. We turn first to Mends's arguments directed toward the guilty plea.

Rule 11(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea." The court must also "inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, . . . the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1)(G). We have observed that the "overarching requirement" imposed by Rule 11 "is that the court `assure itself simply that the conduct to which the defendant admits is in fact an offense under the statutory provision under which he is pleading guilty.'" United States v. Garcia, 587 F.3d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1524 (2d Cir. 1997)).

As a preliminary matter, we note that the law of the case doctrine limits our consideration of this challenge. This doctrine generally obligates us to adhere to our own rulings made in earlier stages of the same litigation, and applies in particular when "a decision made at a previous stage of litigation . . . could have been challenged in the ensuing appeal but was not." United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Cnty. of Suffolk v. Stone Webster Eng'g Corp., 106 F.3d 1112, 1117 (2d Cir. 1997)). Here, the validity of Mends's guilty plea to Count One was ripe for review at the time of his first appeal, but the brief filed by Mends's prior appointed counsel addressed only the Count Two conviction. We have stated, however, that this doctrine may be relaxed if there are "cogent or compelling reasons to deviate, such as an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." United States v. Uccio, 940 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For the following reasons, we conclude that none of these extraordinary circumstances is present, in that there was no plain error or manifest injustice in the district court's acceptance of Mends's plea of guilty to Count One. Mends's claim of error in this regard is twofold, and requires consideration of the text of the statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1542. Mends was charged with violating the second paragraph quoted in the margin, which we have referred to as the "use" prong, as opposed to the first paragraph, which we have dubbed the "securing" prong. See United States v. Jean-Baptiste, 166 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 1999). In challenging his guilty plea, Mends first contends that the entry of the plea was plainly erroneous because there was no factual basis to conclude that he himself made the false statement by reason of which his passport was secured, which, he asserts, is a necessary element of the "use" prong.

We assume arguendo that the factual basis of Mends's plea was insufficient to conclude that he personally made the false statements resulting in the issuance of his passport, but we see no plain error in the district court's failure to adopt the interpretation of the "use" prong urged by Mends for the first time on this appeal. "Statutory construction begins with the plain text, and, where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well." Raila v. United States, 355 F.3d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there are significant textual differences between the "securing" and "use" prongs with respect to their treatment of who must make the false statement. Whereas the former prong makes clear that the person charged with the "securing" offense must make the false statement, the latter is phrased expansively and in the passive voice ("was secured in any way by reason of any false statement"), thus suggesting that Congress did not intend for any such limitation on who must make the statement to apply to the "use" prong. Nor is there any Supreme Court or circuit precedent compelling Mends's construction. Rather, the Supreme Court, in construing a similar predecessor statute, has noted that "[t]he [statute's] balanced form . . . shows that the Congress viewed with concern and punished with equal, severity the securing of passports by false statements and their use," and held without further limitation that "[t]he crime of `use' is complete when the passport . . . obtained [by a false statement] is used willfully and knowingly." Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 337, 341, 61 S.Ct. 599, 85 L.Ed. 862 (1941). While these statements in Browder do not squarely foreclose Mends's argument, and although this circuit has never directly spoken on the validity of the interpretation that Mends is advancing, we have in other respects "decline[d] to add an element to the § 1542 offense that is not reflected in the language of the statute." Jean-Baptiste, 166 F.3d at 111; see also United States v. Hasan, 586 F.3d 161, 167 (2d Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the district court plainly erred by accepting Mends's plea despite the lack of evidence that Mends personally made the false statements on the passport application.

Second, Mends argues that there was an insufficient factual basis to conclude that he used the passport within the meaning of the statute as opposed to merely possessing it. We detect no error, plain or otherwise, in this regard. See Browder, 312 U.S. at 339-40, 61 S.Ct. 599 (presentation of passport to facilitate reentry to the United States is sufficient to establish "use"). Mends was charged with "willfully and knowingly us[ing] and attempt[ing] to use "a passport obtained by false statements. App. 11 (emphasis added). During his plea allocution, Mends admitted that he flew from Ghana to the United States, had a passport containing his photograph and another person's identifying information in his possession, and was apprehended upon deplaning. The record was therefore sufficient to support the entry of a guilty plea for the attempt offense.

We next consider Mends's challenge to his resentencing on Count One. The government asserts that we cannot address this challenge because Mends has completed his terms of imprisonment and supervised release, thus rendering the sentencing appeal moot. Mends responds that the length of the sentence imposed could materially affect his prospects of obtaining a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(d)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3). Under the law of this circuit, this potentiality provides the defendant with a "personal stake" in the outcome of the litigation that is sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution. United States v. Hamdi, 432 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2005).

As to the merits, the government concedes that the district court committed procedural error by resentencing Mends to "time served," which amounted to approximately twenty-two months in custody. See United States v. D'Oliveira, 402 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2005). Yet, according to the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") calculations adopted by the district court, the Guidelines range for this offense was only eight to fourteen months. Thus, the district court in effect granted a substantial upward departure or variance, but with no explanation of its reasons for doing so. Indeed, given that the district court in its written statement of reasons erroneously indicated that the sentence it imposed was within the Guidelines range, it appears that the imposition of an above-Guidelines sentence may have been an oversight. For these reasons, we agree with the government that the sentence of time served was procedurally flawed and that we must vacate and remand for resentencing.

We conclude by addressing Mends's arguments regarding the scope of his resentencing on Count One. Mends contends that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the imposition of any sentence in excess of the one month's imprisonment that the district court initially imposed. As Mends acknowledges, while the Double Jeopardy Clause in certain circumstances prohibits the enhancement of a defendant's sentence, the defendant must have "a legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence" for the clause to apply. United States v. Bryce, 287 F.3d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have clarified that a defendant lacks any such expectation when he challenges on appeal the conviction underlying the sentence at issue, because succeeding on that appeal could result in a retrial, conviction, and resentencing, thus undermining any settled expectation in the original sentence's finality. Id. at 255. Here, even if there is some question as to whether Mends should be treated as having attacked the Count One conviction on his first appeal, he is certainly doing so in this appeal, and for that reason, he lacks a constitutionally significant expectation of finality in the one-month sentence. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a sentence of higher than one month on Count One in the event that the district court, in its sound discretion, decides that such a sentence is warranted.

Finally, Mends asserts that the scope of the mandate of the prior decision of this court did not permit his resentencing on Count One. This is incorrect. This circuit has adopted a "`default rule' that resentencing is required where part of a conviction is reversed on appeal." United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 117 (2d Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Quintieri 306 F.3d 1217, 1227-28 (2d Cir. 2002). Under this rule, following the prior panel's vacatur of the conviction on Count Two, the district court was required to resentence Mends de novo oh Count One. We now remand so that the district court may properly complete this task.

We have considered Mends's remaining arguments and find them to be either without merit or moot in light of our decision to remand for de novo resentencing. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the amended judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in all respects except that the sentence imposed on Count One is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for resentencing consistent with this order.