SENTENCING ORDER

WOODCOCK, District Judge.

Having pleaded guilty to possession of stolen firearms and the manufacture of a sawed-off shotgun, Defendant Joshua L. Emerson challenges the Probation Office's calculation of his offense level under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. This Court concludes he is subject to a base offense level of eighteen under § 2K2.1(a)(5), because his juvenile conviction is not countable under § 2K2.1(a)(3) or (4), a two-level "destructive device" enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) because a short-barreled shotgun is a destructive device, and a four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) because he used a firearm in connection with another felony offense by cutting the barrel of a shotgun he had earlier stolen.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On January 6, 2006, Defendant Joshua L. Emerson pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) and one count of manufacturing an illegal firearm in violation 26 U.S.C. §§ 5822 and 5861(f). In its Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), the Probation Office (Probation) identified a prior juvenile conviction for Mr. Emerson. On April 10, 2001, when he was 17, the Bangor Juvenile Court adjudicated Mr. Emerson as having committed a juvenile crime, which if charged as an adult would have been Robbery, Class A. PSR ¶ 25. The Juvenile Court committed him to the Maine Youth Center until his 19th birthday. Id. Concluding that the juvenile conviction should count as a "felony conviction of . . . a crime of violence," Probation recommended a base offense level of twenty-two under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). PSR ¶ 13.

Probation also recommended upward adjustments to Mr. Emerson's offense level including: (1) a two-level adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) because the illegal firearm (a sawed-off shotgun) constitutes a "destructive device" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(2); and, (2) a four-level adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) because Mr. Emerson "possessed [a] Sears and Roebuck 12-Gauge . . . as it was made into an illegal . . . firearm." PSR ¶¶ 15-16.

Mr. Emerson objects. He contends that § 2K2.1(a)(3) is inapplicable because his April 10, 2001 juvenile adjudication does not constitute a "felony conviction" of a crime of violence under the Guidelines, that a sawed-off shotgun is not a "destructive device" under § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B), and that § 2K2.1(b)(5) does not apply since he possessed the firearm in connection with the illegal alteration of that same firearm. Def.'s Sent. Mem at 1-8 (Docket # 24).

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Meaning of a "Felony Conviction" 1. The Statutory Framework: U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3); U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 Application Note 1; and, 15 M.R.S.A. § 3310(6)

Section 2K2.1(a)(3) provides a base offense level of twenty-two, "if . . . the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. . . ." The commentary to § 2K2.1 sheds light on the meaning of a "felony conviction":

[A] prior adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether such offense is specifically designated as a felony and regardless of the actual sentence imposed. A conviction for an offense committed at age eighteen years or older is an adult conviction. A conviction for an offense committed prior to age eighteen years is an adult conviction if it is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted ( e.g., a federal conviction for an offense committed prior to the defendant's eighteenth birthday if the defendant was expressly proceeded against as an adult).

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 application note 1.

Under Maine law, "[a]n adjudication of the commission of a juvenile crime shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime." 15 M.R.S.A. § 3310(6). Maine law establishes a process by which a court may treat as an adult a juvenile who commits a crime, which "would be murder or a Class A, B or C crime if committed by an adult." 15 M.R.S.A. § 3101(4). Under this provision, Mr. Emerson could have been treated as an adult, but there is no evidence he was. To the contrary, Mr. Emerson was found to have committed a juvenile crime in Maine Juvenile Court, and was committed to the Maine Youth Center. See PSR ¶ 25. As Mr. Emerson's April 10, 2001 adjudication was not "classified as an adult conviction" under Maine law, § 2K2.1(a)(3) should not apply.

2. United States v. Unger 915 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1990) United States v. Unger, 915 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1990), may direct a different result. In Unger, the First Circuit addressed whether prior juvenile convictions should count in calculating criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d). Unger concluded that a prior juvenile conviction for receiving stolen property was countable:

The assessment was premised on U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A), which instructs the reader to "add 2 points under § 4A1.1(b) for each adult or juvenile sentence of confinement of at least sixty days if the defendant was released from such confinement with [sic] five years of his commencement of the instant offense." Because Unger's immurement at the Training School exceeded sixty days and occurred less than five years before the events underlying the crime charged in this case, section 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) applies on its face. See United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (commitment to juvenile hall is "confinement" for purposes of § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1037, 110 S.Ct. 1496, 108 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990).

Relying on U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2), which directs that previous sentences for juvenile "status offenses" cannot be counted for purposes of a defendant's criminal history score, the defendant next contended that his juvenile convictions for waywardness should be characterized as "status offenses" within the meaning of the guideline. Id. at 762. In response, Unger wrote that "the guidelines themselves strongly suggest that a state's taxonomy should not be given controlling effect." Id. at 763. It explained that if state law controlled, the "primary purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act, namely, to `provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records,' 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988), would be severely undermined." Id. at 762-63. Instead, the First Circuit looked to the substance of the underlying state offenses to determine whether they were "status offenses" within the meaning of § 4A1.2(c)(2). Id. at 763. Because the conduct underlying the three juvenile adjudications consisted of "(1) breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, (2) receiving stolen goods, and (3) assault and battery," Unger determined that the wrongful acts were not "status offenses" and were countable. Id.

The narrow issue is whether the Unger analysis of § 4A1.2 applies to § 2K2.1(a)(3). This Court concludes it does not, because the language of § 2K2.1(a)(3) dictates a different result. Unlike § 4A1.2, § 2K2.1(a)(3) defines a "felony conviction" as "a prior adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. . . ." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 application note 1 (emphasis supplied). Under § 2K2.1(a)(3), a conviction for an offense committed prior to age eighteen is "an adult conviction if it is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted." Id. The example in the application note is where "the defendant was expressly proceeded against as an adult." Id. As opposed to § 4A1.2(d), § 2K2.1 incorporates the state classification of the juvenile offense into the determination as to whether to count the offense under § 2K2.1(a)(3). As Mr. Emerson's juvenile adjudication was not classified as an adult conviction under Maine law and Maine did not proceed against him as an adult, Unger does not apply. B. The Applicable Base Offense Level

As § 2K2.1(a)(3) does not apply, the next question is whether Mr. Emerson's base offense level should be calculated under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B):

(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the Greatest):

(4) 20, if — (B) the offense involved a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) . . .; and the defendant (i) was a prohibited person at the time the defendant committed the instant offense; or (ii) is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d). . . .

The commentary to § 2K2.1 defines "prohibited person" as "any person described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or § 922(n)." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 application note 3. The only potentially applicable statutory provision is § 922(g)(1), which prohibits anyone "who has been convicted in any court of . . . a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis supplied).

Mr. Emerson argues that Maine law determines whether a Maine juvenile adjudication constitutes a "conviction" as required by § 922(g)(1). This Court agrees. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) ("What constitutes a conviction of [a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year] shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held."); Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 313 (1998); United States v. Walters, 359 F.3d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1997). Accordingly, this Court must determine whether a juvenile adjudication is a § 922(g)(1) "conviction" under Maine law.

Under 15 M.R.S.A. § 3310(6), "[a]n adjudication of the commission of a juvenile crime shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime." 15 M.R.S.A. § 3310(6) (emphasis supplied); see also Maine v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 581 (Me. 1979) ("Under the Maine Juvenile Code, an adjudication of the commission of a juvenile crime is not deemed a conviction of a crime, and it does not lead to the civil disabilities which conviction of an adult crime may entail." (citing 15 M.R.S.A. § 3310(6))). As a juvenile adjudication does not constitute conviction of a crime under Maine law, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) does not apply and Mr. Emerson's base offense level is eighteen pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(5).

C. Destructive Device Enhancement

Mr. Emerson objects to the imposition of a two-level upward adjustment to his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) for possession of a "destructive device." He posits that a sawed-off shotgun is not a "destructive device" and argues: (1) the definition of "destructive device" as set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(2) is unconstitutionally vague; (2) application of the adjustment would amount to improper double counting; (3) the 2004 amendment of § 2K2.1 eliminated sawed-off shotguns from the definition of "destructive device"; and, (4) a sawed-off shotgun cannot be a "destructive device" because 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) distinguishes between sawed-off shotguns and destructive devices by listing them separately. Def.'s Sent. Mem. at 4-7 (Docket # 24).

1. Void for Vagueness

Section 5845(f)(2) defines the term "destructive device":

[A]ny type of weapon by whatever name known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, the barrel or barrels of which have a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter, except a shotgun or shotgun shell which the Secretary finds is generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes. . . .

In general, "the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); see also United States v. Campbell, 61 F.3d 976, 980 n. 4 (1st Cir. 1995); Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1991). "The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices." Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951). A statute need only provide fair warning, and it is not rendered unconstitutionally vague where "Congress might, without difficulty, have chosen `clearer and more precise language' equally capable of achieving the end which it sought. . . ." United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 L.Ed. 1877 (1947)).

Mr. Emerson has not cited, and this Court has not discovered, any case law discussing whether 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(2) is void for vagueness. However, the First Circuit addressed a similar argument regarding 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(1) — an explosive, bomb or similar device — in United States v. Markley, 567 F.2d 523 (1st Cir. 1977), and concluded it passed constitutional muster. Rejecting a vagueness argument, Markley concluded "that the defendants dealing in the devices here involved were well aware of their destructive propensities and that these devices had no legitimate social purpose. Section 5845(f)(1) provides adequate notice that the devices would be included within the term `explosive, . . . (A) bomb, . . . or (F) similar device,' and a person of ordinary intelligence would be so aware in the circumstances of this case." Id. at 528.

This Court concludes that § 5845(f)(2) provides adequate warning to a person of ordinary intelligence that sawed-off twelve gauge shotguns fall within the definition of "destructive device." The definition explicitly encompasses all weapons "by whatever name known which will . . . expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, the barrel or barrels of which have a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter," except sporting shotguns excluded by the Secretary. Moreover, like the defendants in Markley, Mr. Emerson knew or should have known that sawed-off shotguns "are inherently dangerous, lack usefulness except for violent and criminal purposes and their possession involves the substantial risk of improper physical force." United States v. Fortes, 141 F.3d 1, 8 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Hayes, 7 F.3d 144, 145 (9th Cir. 1993)). Section 5845(f)(2)'s definition of a "destructive device" as applied to short-barreled shotguns is not unconstitutionally vague.

2. Double Counting

Mr. Emerson contends that double counting would result "if the Court were to conclude that the sawed-off shotgun, which increases [his] Base Offense Level under [U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(5)], is also [a] destructive device subject to a 2 level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B)." Def.'s Sent. Mem. at 5 (Docket # 24). This Court addressed the double counting argument in United States v. McCarty, No. CR-05-09-B-W, 2006 WL 760323 (D. Me. Mar. 22, 2006). For the reasons expressed in that opinion, this Court rejects Mr. Emerson's double counting argument.

3. 2004 Amendment of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1

Mr. Emerson contends that the November 1, 2004 amendment of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 eliminated sawed-off shotguns from the definition of "destructive device." His argument is grounded on the fact that pre-2004 versions of the Guidelines defined "destructive device" to include a type of firearm listed in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), which explicitly includes short-barreled shotguns. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 application note 4 (2003); 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(1), (2). By contrast, the 2004 and 2005 versions of the Guidelines do not define "destructive device" by reference to § 5845(a); rather, they define "destructive device" as having "the meaning given that term in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 application note 1. The Commission adopted the statutory definition provided in § 5845(f) "in response to concerns that it [was] unclear whether certain types of firearms qualif[ied] as `destructive devices'" under pre-2004 versions of the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. Supp. to Appx. C, Am. 669.

Although short-barreled shotguns are not explicitly included in the definition of "destructive device" in § 5845(f), they fall within the definition. See Henry, 417 F.3d at 494; Hardy, 393 F.3d at 748 ("[Section 5845(f)'s] definition of `destructive device' includes most shotguns not found particularly suitable for sporting purposes."); Wynn, 365 F.3d at 551; Lee, 351 F.3d at 351 n. 1. As Wynn demonstrates, the legislative history of the Gun Control Act makes clear that Congress intended to include sawed-off shotguns within the § 5845(f)(2) definition of "destructive device." 365 F.3d at 551-52. The 2004 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 did not remove sawed-off shotguns from the scope of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3).

4. The Distinction Between Short-Barreled Shotguns and Destructive Devices in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)

Mr. Emerson asserts that a sawed-off shotgun cannot be a "destructive device" because 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) distinguishes the two by listing them separately. The same argument was rejected by the Eighth Circuit in Hardy and the Sixth Circuit in Wynn. This Court agrees with the Sixth and Eighth Circuits. Notwithstanding § 5845(a), § 5845(f) clearly encompasses most shotguns. Moreover, the commentary to the current version of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 directs courts to § 5845(f), not (a), to determine whether the device is a "destructive device" within the meaning of § 2K2.1(b)(3); thus, any distinction made between a "destructive device" and a sawed-off shotgun in § 5845(a) is not dispositive. This Court concludes that a twelve gauge sawed-off shotgun is a destructive device within the meaning of § 2K2.1(b)(3).

D. Possession of a Firearm in Connection with Another Felony Offense

Section 2K2.1(b)(5) provides for a four-level increase to a defendant's base offense level "[i]f [he] used or possessed any firearm . . . in connection with another felony offense. . . ." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). This enhancement "was created in response to a concern about the increased risk of violence when firearms are used or possessed during the commission of another felony." United States v. McDonald, 165 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Armstead, 114 F.3d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1997) (section 2K2.1(b)(5) "reflects the concern for public safety which the Guidelines sought to achieve"). To determine whether § 2K2.1(b)(5) applies, this Court is required to undertake a two-step inquiry. It must consider whether the underlying offense constitutes "another felony offense" and, if so, whether the firearm was possessed "in connection with" the underlying offense. United States v. Blount, 337 F.3d 404, 406-07 (4th Cir. 2003).

1. "Another Felony Offense"

The commentary to § 2K2.1 defines "another felony offense" for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(5) as "offenses other than explosives or firearms possession or trafficking offenses." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 application note 15. Because Probation calculated Mr. Emerson's offense level on the basis of his 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) violation, he contends that his manufacture of a sawed-off shotgun constitutes the predicate felony offense for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(5). Thus, Mr. Emerson argues, the four-level enhancement does not apply because possession of stolen firearms is not "another felony offense" within the meaning of Note 15. The Government responds that possession of stolen firearms constitutes the predicate felony, and that Mr. Emerson committed "another felony offense" by later altering one of the stolen firearms. The chronology advanced by the Government is consistent with the Prosecution Version the Defendant has admitted. The question, therefore, is whether the act of manufacturing an illegal shotgun constitutes "another felony offense" beyond possession of the stolen firearms.

This Court has not unearthed any case law addressing whether § 2K2.1(b)(5) is applicable where, as here, the "other felony offense" is sawing off the barrel of the same shotgun the defendant had stolen. To manufacture an illegal firearm, a defendant necessarily must possess the firearm. At least two circuit courts have employed the Blockburger element-based analysis in the context of § 2K2.1(b)(5) to determine when a second crime constitutes "another felony offense." See United States v. Lloyd, 361 F.3d 197, 200-01 (3d Cir. 2004); Blount, 337 F.3d at 409 (noting that Blockburger is easier to apply than any "vague iterations of the `closely related to' or `inextricably intertwined with' test"). Under Blockburger, two crimes are considered separate offenses where "each [statute] requires proof of an additional fact the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)). Other circuits have stressed the need for "a separation of time between the offense of conviction and the other felony offense, or a distinction of conduct between that occurring in the offense of conviction and the other felony offense." United States v. Sanders, 162 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Szakacs, 212 F.3d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 2000) ("All six published [Sixth Circuit] cases applying the phrase `another felony offense' have involved crimes separated in time or by a `distinction of conduct.'").

Even where two crimes require proof of different elements, are separated in time, or require different conduct, Note 15 may preclude application of § 2K2.1(b)(5). See Lloyd, 361 F.3d at 201 ("[R]egardless of the interpretation given to the word `another' in 2K2.1(b)(5), `firearms possession or trafficking offenses' are categorically removed from the set of crimes that may constitute `another felony offense.'"). In United States v. Boumelhem, 339 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2003), for example, the Sixth Circuit held that the offense level of a defendant convicted of felony firearms possession could not be enhanced under § 2K2.1(b)(5) on the basis of a conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(e). Section 922(e) prohibits delivery of a firearm or ammunition to a common carrier for shipment without written notice to the carrier. 18 U.S.C. § 922(e). The defendant argued that this amounted to a "firearms trafficking offense" within the meaning of former Note 18 (now Note 15). Boumelhem, 361 F.3d at 427. The Sixth Circuit agreed, even though 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and (e) constitute different felonies under the Blockburger test. Similarly, in United States v. English, 329 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 2003), a defendant's sentence for felony firearm possession had been enhanced because he had sold the guns associated with the possession offense. The Eighth Circuit noted that the sale of firearms was "trafficking" under former Note 18 (now Note 15), and could not be counted as "another felony offense." Id. at 617; see also Lloyd, 361 F.3d at 202 (where a defendant is convicted of possession of stolen firearms, acquired during the commission of a burglary, the burglary is a "firearms possession offense" and therefore not "another felony offense" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5)); United States v. Fenton, 309 F.3d 825, 827 (3d Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Szakacs, 212 F.3d 344, 350 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Sanders, 162 F.3d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); but see United States v. Kenney, 283 F.3d 934, 937-38 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[B]ecause [the defendant's] burglary offense is not specifically excluded from consideration [under Note 15], it constitutes `another felony offense' in addition to the firearms possession offense.").

Here, Mr. Emerson's manufacture of a sawed-off shotgun constitutes "another felony offense" for three reasons. First, "possession of stolen firearms" and "manufacture of an illegal firearm" are separate offenses under Blockburger, since each crime requires proof of at least one element the other does not. Second, the two crimes constitute separate offenses under the "distinction in time or conduct" test, since Mr. Emerson came into possession of the Sears and Roebuck twelve gauge shotgun on April 21, 2005, but did not modify it until April 26, 2005. Third, whatever the exact scope of a "firearms possession offense" in Note 15, it does not include the manufacture of a sawed-off shotgun, which requires affirmative action synonymous with "use" of the firearm as opposed to mere "possession." See United States v. King, 341 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement where defendant "first possessed the gun (offense of conviction) and then used the gun (enhancement conduct)" (emphasis in original)). This Court concludes that the crime of manufacturing an illegal firearm constitutes "another felony offense" within the meaning of § 2K2.1(b)(5). 2. "In Connection With" The First Circuit construes the phrase "in connection with" broadly, United States v. Peterson, 233 F.3d 101, 111 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Thompson, 32 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1994)), and requires only "causal or logical sequence between possession and the related offense." United States v. Ellis, 168 F.3d 558, 563 (1st Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Olivera, 145 Fed. Appx. 686, 687 (1st Cir. 2005) (per curiam). While mere coincidental possession does not establish the requisite connection, it is sufficient "if the possession has `the potential to aid or facilitate' the other crime." Ellis, 168 F.3d at 563 (quoting Thompson, 32 F.3d at 6). Here, Mr. Emerson's possession of the stolen firearms facilitated the manufacture of the sawed-off shotgun. Indeed, absent the firearms, he could not have committed a violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5822 and 5861(f). Accordingly, this Court concludes that Mr. Emerson is subject to a four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5).

III. CONCLUSION

This Court concludes:

1. Mr. Emerson's base offense level is eighteen pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(5);

2. Mr. Emerson is subject to a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) as his offense involved a "destructive device" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f); and,

3. Mr. Emerson is subject to a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) because he possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense.

SO ORDERED.