ORDER AND REASONS

EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, United States District Judge

Before the Court is defendant Byron Duffaut's Motion to Suppress Confession. The Court does not find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. For the following reasons, the defendant's motion is DENIED.

A. BACKGROUND

On January 3, 2001, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent Darrell Lyons received information from a confidential informant that defendant Kevin Huff intended to transport a large quantity of cocaine from New Orleans, Louisiana to Slidell, Louisiana. The informant told Special Agent Lyons that Huff would use a black Lincoln Continental as the delivery vehicle and a green Chevrolet Camaro as back-up. The informant also provided Lyons with the Continental's license plate number.

On January 4, 2001, Huff met defendant Byron Duffaut in New Orleans; and the two drove east on Interstate-10. Huff was driving the Camaro, and Duffaut was driving the Continental. When the defendants reached St. Tammany Parish, DEA agents and St. Tammany Parish police officers stopped both Duffaut and Huff for traffic violations. Duffaut consented to a search of the Continental, and the deputies found approximately 500 grams of crack cocaine and 250 grams of powder cocaine hidden in the passenger side air bag compartment. Both Huff and Duffaut were arrested and given their Miranda warnings.

Huff told the officers he did not knew Duffaut. Duffaut, however, stated that Huff paid him to transport the cocaine to "the casino." Govt.'s Mem. at 2. After his arrest, Duffaut was taken to DEA headquarters, where, according to Duffaut, "he stayed for an unknown length of time." Duffaut's Mem. at 2. Later, while in transit to the Orleans Parish Prison, Duffaut told DEA Task Force Agent Eric Covell that Huff had paid him to drive drugs from Houston, Texas to New Orleans, Louisiana on at least four previous occasions.

Duffaut now moves to suppress the statement made to Covell while en route to Orleans Parish Prison on the grounds that it was not voluntary.

B. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether the defendant's motion requires an evidentiary hearing. The Court concludes that it does not. For a court to grant an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress, "factual allegations set forth in the defendant's motion, including any accompanying affidavits, must be "sufficiently definite, specific, detailed and nonconjectural, to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim has been presented." United States v. Harrelson, 705 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir. 1983). General or conclusional assertions will not suffice. See id accord United States v. Mergist, 738 F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 1984).

The defendant's motion sets forth no specific facts that would enable the Court to conclude that a substantial claim is presented. Duffaut only states (1) that the Government has produced no evidence that his statement was made after a voluntary waiver of his rights, (2) that his "statement must be suppressed because it was not given in a free and voluntary manner," and (3) that the statement "was the direct result of the intimidating atmosphere that he was placed in at DEA headquarters." Duffaut's Mem. at 2-3.

The Court does not find that these allegations are sufficiently "definite, specific, detailed and nonconjectural" to entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing. Duffaut does not describe any facts or circumstances explaining why his confession was not free and voluntary, nor does he present any evidence regarding either his treatment at DEA headquarters or his state of mind. There are no grounds for the Court to conclude that a substantial claim is presented, let alone that the defendant should prevail on the motion. Accordingly, the defendant's request for a hearing is DENIED.

C. MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONFESSION

When a defendant claims that a confession was not voluntarily made, the Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant waived his Miranda rights and that the confession was voluntary. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1986). However, "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary'. . . ." Id. at 522, cited in United States v. Gordon, 812 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1987) (denying defendant's motion to suppress because FBI agent's behavior "was not coercive in any legally prohibited or morally reprehensible manner").

In the instant case, defendant Duffaut claims that his confession was involuntary because he had been at DEA headquarters before he was transported to the Orleans Parish Prison. However, he does not allege how or why his detention at DEA headquarters was coercive. In the absence of any evidence of coercive police activity, this Court cannot conclude that Duffaut's confession was involuntary.

In addition, Duffaut does not claim that his statement to Covell was the product of police interrogation. It is well settled law that spontaneous admissions are not the product of interrogation and thatMiranda rights do not attach to such statements. In Miranda the Supreme Court held that "when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). However, "volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by [Miranda]." Id. In the instant case, although Duffaut was in custody when he confessed to Agent Covell, he does not allege that he was under interrogation at the time he made the admission.

Accordingly, because Duffaut has provided no evidence of police coercion and because he does not allege that his statement was a product of police interrogation, his motion to suppress the confession made to Agent Covell is DENIED.