holding that expert's testimony based on experience rather than existing data was sufficiently reliable where he had "worked for several different financial institutions, conducted more than fifty due diligence reviews of hedge funds"

holding that "expert witnesses are generally not permitted to address issues of fact that a jury is capable of understanding without the aid of expert testimony"

finding a hedge fund auditing expert qualified even though he had performed only one hedge fund audit because he had "substantial auditing experience" and had "remained familiar with the practice of auditing and auditing standards through his role as a litigation consultant"

finding an expert's opinions with regard to industry standards unreliable when not "ground[ed] in his knowledge of the custom and practice of the industry"

finding an expert's opinions with regard to industry standards unreliable when not "ground[ed] in his knowledge of the custom and practice of the industry"

finding that while the expert “may not be the world's leading expert” in the relevant field, plaintiffs' arguments regarding his qualifications went to the weight and credibility of the testimony

finding an expert's opinions with regard to industry standards unreliable when not "ground[ed] in his knowledge of the custom and practice of the industry"

finding an expert's opinions with regard to industry standards unreliable when not "ground[ed] in his knowledge of the custom and practice of the industry"

finding an expert's opinions with regard to industry standards unreliable when not "ground[ed] in his knowledge of the custom and practice of the industry"

finding an expert's opinions with regard to industry standards unreliable when not "ground[ed] in his knowledge of the custom and practice of the industry"

finding an expert's opinions with regard to industry standards unreliable when not "ground[ed] in his knowledge of the custom and practice of the industry"

finding that while the expert “may not be the world's leading expert” in the relevant field, plaintiffs' arguments regarding his qualifications went to the weight and credibility of the testimony

finding that professional experience provided a reliable basis for expert testimony

admitting expert testimony on industry standards

permitting some factual description but noting that "expert testimony should focus on the expert's opinions and factual analysis rather than on a recitation of facts"

noting that expert's description of his job experience and communications with others as part of his job "provides a sufficient link between his experience and his opinions to satisfy the reliability requirement of Rule 702"

permitting experts to opine on industry due diligence practices

permitting testimony "about the standard practices employed by industry participants in calculating the NAV," but excluding a "legal interpretation of the term as found in the . . . documents"

noting that the Second Circuit has "allowed an expert to testify as to matters within his general expertise even though he lacked qualifications as to certain technical matters within that field."

In Pension Comm. Of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Secs., LLC, 691 F. Supp. 2d 448, 477-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), plaintiffs challenged the expert's valuation and discount rate opinions by asserting, among other things, that the expert's use of a 20% discount rate was unreliable because he could not confirm the rate reflected overall industry practice.

allowing hedge fund administrator to testify about the customs and practices of that industry