Mark Pittman, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, TX, Charles W. Fillmore, The Fillmore Law Firm LLP, Fort Worth, TX, David Lee Spiller, Mason Spiller, Reid Spiller, Spiller & Spiller, Jacksboro, TX, H. Dustin Fillmore, III, The Fillmore Law Firm LLP, Fort Worth, TX, Michael Dan Berry, Jeremiah Grant Dys, First Liberty Institute, Plano, TX, for Plaintiff.

John J. McKetta, III, Graves Dougherty Hearon & Moody, Austin, TX, David R. Schleicher, Schleicher Law Firm PLLC, Waco, TX, Roland K. Johnson, Harris Finley & Bogle, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendants.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Mark Pittman, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Beginning with Chief Justice Roberts's dissent and Justice Thomas's dissent to Obergefell , jurists have recognized that the fundamental rights of religious freedom and marriage (now including same-sex marriage) are on an inevitable collision course. See Davis v. Ermold, et al. , 592 U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 3, 208 L.Ed.2d 137 (2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (recognizing that "[d]ue to Obergefell , those with sincerely held religious beliefs concerning marriage will find it increasingly difficult to participate in society without running afoul of Obergefell and its effect on other antidiscrimination laws"). The undersigned fully agrees that, at some point, a federal court will be called upon to resolve an actual controversy in which these rights are in direct conflict. This case is not that point.

First , Plaintiff Brian Keith Umphress, currently the County Judge of Jack County, Texas, simply has not alleged (and cannot allege) facts to demonstrate that he has standing to challenge Defendants David C. Hall, in his official capacity as Chair of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct; Ronald E. Bunch, in his official capacity as Vice-Chair of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct; David M. Patronella; Darrick L. McGill; Sujeeth B. Draksharam; Ruben G. Reyes; Valerie Ertz; Frederick C. Tate; Steve Fischer; Janis Holt; M. Patrick Maguire; and David Schenck, each in their official capacities as Members of the State Commission's ("Commission") application of Judicial Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus, the Constitution mandates that the Court dismiss this action as failing Article III's case or controversy requirement. Second , there is currently a Texas state-court case pending involving another Texas judge who was allegedly harmed by the Commission's application of Canon 4A(1) in the way that Judge Umphress complains of here. Because that case provides the most appropriate vehicle for the challenged state action to reach Texas's highest court, federalism compels the Court to abstain from considering the constitutionality of a state rule when the state's highest court has not yet had an opportunity review the matter.

Thus, as more fully explained below, the Court GRANTS the Commission's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

A few months before filing his complaint, Judge Umphress heard that the Commission had issued a "public warning" to Judge Diane Hensley, a Justice of the Peace in McClennan County, Texas, because she had a policy of recusing herself from officiating at same-sex marriage ceremonies on account of her Christian faith. First Amended Complaint ("FAC") at ¶ 22, ECF No. 9. The Commission found that this particular policy violated Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, which holds that "[a] judge shall conduct all of the judge's extra-judicial activities so that they do not cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge ...." Id. at ¶ 23. In their warning, the Commission stated that Judge Hensley "should be publicly warned for casting doubt on her capacity to act impartially to persons appearing before her as a judge due to the person's sexual orientation in violation of Canon 4A(l) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct." Id.

In response, Judge Hensley filed a class action lawsuit against the Commission asking for declaratory relief to the effect that justices of the peace do not violate Canon 4A(1) by (1) performing traditional weddings, but not same-sex weddings; (2) expressing public disapproval of homosexual activity; or (3) affiliating with a church that opposes same-sex marriages. Judge Hensley's lawsuit is currently pending in Travis County. See Hensley v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct et al. , No. D-1-GN-20-003926 in the 459th District Court of Travis County, Texas, Petition ¶¶ 80–81.

Judge Umphress asserts that he engages in numerous extrajudicial activities—namely, being a member and supporter of a church that "adheres to longstanding Christian teaching that marriage exists only between one man and one woman, and that homosexual conduct of any sort is immoral and contrary to Holy Scripture"—that expose him to discipline under the Commission's interpretation of Canon 4A(1) as expressed in Hensley's case. FAC at 2. Moreover, he alleges that although he officiates traditional weddings, he refuses to officiate same-sex weddings on the basis of his Christian faith and his contention that same-sex marriage remains illegal under Texas law. Id. Judge Umphress contends that because he plans to run for reelection in 2022 on the platform that Obergefell was wrongly decided, and because he intends to continue officiating traditional but not same-sex weddings, he is susceptible to discipline from the Commission. Id. at ¶ 26. Thus, Judge Umphress seeks declaratory and equitable relief against the Commission's possible future enforcement of Judicial Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, claiming that the Commission's actions against a different judge located in a different county chilled his First Amendment rights. Id. at ¶¶ 37, 44, 54, 63, 74, 77.

In a Joint Status Report filed by the parties in this case, the Commission asserted, inter alia , that Judge Umphress

is not, and has not been, the subject of any investigation or disciplinary proceeding ... [and] that neither the Commission [on Judicial Conduct] nor any Texas court has—to date—expressed the view that Canon 4A(1) would be violated by a judge's choice of church for worship, nor (without more), a judge's choice to decline to perform same-sex marriages, nor a judge's choice to campaign on a platform that opposes same-sex marriage and Obergefell .

Joint Status Report at 2–3; see also Habersham Declaration in Support of Defendants’ Mt. to Dismiss or Transfer at ¶ 7, ECF No. 7-1. The parties later appeared for a hearing at which the Commission's counsel unequivocally confirmed that based on Judge Umphress's pleaded activities: (1) he faced no disciplinary action from the Commission; (2) the Commission does not plan to take any disciplinary action against him; (3), his choice to decline to perform same-sex marriages and to campaign on a platform that opposes same-sex marriage and Obergefell is not violative of the Commission's interpretation of Canon 4A(1); and (4) there is no allegation of facts that the Commission would take action against him. ECF No. 20. Importantly, Judge Umphress does not dispute the Commission's assertions. See generally , Joint Status Report; FAC; ECF No. 20.

Now before the Court are two motions filed by Commission. The first is a Motion to Abstain and the second is a Motion to Dismiss Based on Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction ("Motion to Dismiss"), Abstention, and Lack of Standing. ECF Nos. 23, 25. The motions were fully briefed and are now ripe for review.

ANALYSIS

Here, there is simply no case or controversy between the parties and, indeed, no credible indication that there will be a future case or controversy between the parties presenting the Court with a dispute to adjudicate. Judge Umphress is not running for office until 2022, he continues to engage in his allegedly chilled behavior, the Commission expressly stated that it has not and will not prosecute him for his allegedly chilled behavior, and there is a currently pending state court case involving another judge on precisely the same state-law issues at bar that would render a decision on the federal constitutional questions presented unnecessary. For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that Judge Umphress lacks standing and that his claims are unripe. Alternatively, even if the Court had jurisdiction over this action, it would abstain under R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co. , 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941).

A. Judge Umphress lacks standing because the alleged injury lacks imminence and there is no credible threat of prosecution.

Standing, at its "irreducible constitutional minimum," requires plaintiffs "to demonstrate [that]: they have suffered an ‘injury in fact’; the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant's actions; and the injury will likely ... be redressed by a favorable decision." Henderson v. Stalder , 287 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up) (citing Public Citizen, Inc. v. Bomer , 274 F.3d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 2001) and quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). "The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing ... each element ... in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (collecting cases).

Significantly, an allegedly forthcoming injury must be "certainly impending." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA , 568 U.S. 398, 409, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) ("[W]e have repeatedly reiterated that threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and that allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.") (Alito, J.) (emphasis in original) (cleaned up). "Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose , which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes[.]" Id. (emphasis added). Further, standing requires more than a "speculative" fear of prosecution. Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 42, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) (denying standing where plaintiffs claimed that they "feel inhibited" by the challenged law but as to whom no prosecution was threatened). Rather, there must be "a credible threat of prosecution." Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union , 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (citing Doe v. Bolton , 410 U.S. 179, 188, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) ). "When plaintiffs do not claim that they have ever been threatened with prosecution [or] that a prosecution is likely ... they do not allege a dispute susceptible to resolution by a federal court." Id. at 298–99, 99 S.Ct. 2301. Mere "[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm." Laird v. Tatum , 408 U.S. 1, 13–14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972).

Simply put, "[t]o invoke a federal trial court's jurisdiction, a litigant ‘must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement.’ " KVUE, Inc. v. Moore , 709 F.2d 922, 927 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Texas v. KVUE-TV, Inc. , 465 U.S. 1092, 104 S.Ct. 1580, 80 L.Ed.2d 114 (1984) (quoting Babbitt , 442 U.S. at 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301 ). "The case or controversy requirement ... forecloses our consideration ... of abstract, hypothetical, and conjectural questions, and, indeed, of all matters save those involving parties who have a real dispute about a matter in which their interests are genuinely adverse." Id. at 927.

Here, Judge Umphress's complaint mentions neither a currently nor imminently pending judicial disciplinary proceeding or investigation against him. Instead, his alleged injury is a "chilling effect" on his First Amendment rights stemming from the Commission's decision to issue a Public Warning to a different judge in a different county. FAC at ¶¶ 22–24, 31. Specifically, Judge Umphress fears that he will risk disciplinary action if he continues to refuse to officiate at same-sex marriage ceremonies or when he announces his opposition to same-sex marriage when he seeks reelection in 2022. Id. at ¶ 29.

However, the Commission asserts not only that there are no plans to investigate or discipline Judge Umphress but that they will neither investigate nor discipline him if he acts in the very way that he claims to be chilled against. Joint Report at 2–3; ECF No. 20; see also Habersham Declaration in Support of Defendants’ Mt. to Dismiss or Transfer at ¶ 7, ECF No. 7-1. See Christian Coal. of Alabama v. Cole , 355 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court's dismissal because "we would be overstepping our judicial authority if we were to rule on the constitutionality of the [Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission’] supposed ‘enforcement policy’ that is evidenced only by a withdrawn Advisory Opinion that was an interpretation of Canons that are currently being reconsidered" and because there are "still unsettled questions of state law").

Judge Umphress also does not appear to be chilled in his current actions. He continues to (1) attend the same church that he attended before he knew of the public warning to Judge Hensley and (2) engage in the same practice that he engaged in before concerning the performance of traditional wedding ceremonies but not same-sex ceremonies. FAC at ¶¶ 27, 28. Thus, a mere bare assertion of subjectively "chilled" activity to take place over a year and a half in the future falls outside the realm of "imminent" injury and remains well within that of the "speculative." See Clapper , 568 U.S. at 409, 133 S.Ct. 1138 ; Laird , 408 U.S. at 13–14, 92 S.Ct. 2318 ; Younger , 401 U.S. at 42, 91 S.Ct. 746. This applies especially in cases where, not only is there no "credible threat of prosecution," but the prosecuting entity expressly and exhaustively states that it has no plans to act against Judge Umphress for partaking in the allegedly chilled activity. See Babbitt , 442 U.S. at 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301 ; Joint Status Report at 2–3; ECF No. 20. Thus, given that Judge Umphress's alleged injury is far from imminent and that the Commission has expressly disclaimed any intention of investigating or disciplining him for engaging in his desired activity, the Court finds that Judge Umphress's claims must be DISMISSED for lack of standing.

B. Judge Umphress's claims are unripe for judicial consideration.

"Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed ‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements ... [until a] decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’ " Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior , 538 U.S. 803, 807–08, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 148–49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) ). Determining whether an issue is ripe for judicial review requires considering "[t]he fitness of the issues for judicial decision and ... the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Id. at 809, 123 S.Ct. 2026 ; see Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prod. Co. , 473 U.S. 568, 580–81, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) ("A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’ ") (quoting 13A C. WRIGHT , A. MILLER , & E. COOPER , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532 (1984) ).

As discussed above, Judge Umphress's alleged injury is speculative—he does not plan to run for reelection until 2022 and the Commission repeatedly disclaimed any plans to investigate or discipline him if he continues to act in the manner he deems chilled. See supra at 558-60. On these facts, any adjudication of Judge Umphress's claims against the Commission is premature and as such unsuited for judicial decision. Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n , 538 U.S. at 811–12, 123 S.Ct. 2026 ("[W]e ... believe that further factual development would significantly advance our ability to deal with the legal issues presented.") (cleaned up).

Stated again, Judge Umphress does not appear to be chilled in his current actions and the Commission repeatedly disclaimed any plans to investigate or discipline him if he chose to act in the manner he deems chilled. See supra at 559-60. These facts strongly support that the parties will not undergo any meaningful hardship if the Court withholds consideration. Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n , 538 U.S. at 803, 123 S.Ct. 2026 (finding claims unripe where "[the law in question] d[id] not affect [the plaintiff's] primary conduct").

Finally, because the Commission repeatedly disclaimed any plans to investigate or discipline Judge Umphress, the future event that he fears (being subject to investigation or discipline) "may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." Thomas , 473 U.S. at 580–81, 105 S.Ct. 3325. Thus, because consideration of this matter is premature, because the parties will not undergo any meaningful hardship if the Court withholds consideration, and because the future events Judge Umphress fears may very well never occur, the Court finds that Judge Umphress's claims are unripe. See Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Feldman , 504 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding challenge to judicial canon was not fit for review under ripeness doctrine because "[t]he fact that Alaska's high court has not yet had an opportunity to construe the canons at issue here ... further militates in favor of declining jurisdiction" and explaining that "[d]eclining jurisdiction ... gives the Alaska Supreme Court the first opportunity to construe the canons in the context of judicial campaign speech"); see also Poe v. Ullman , 367 U.S. 497, 508–09, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (dispute was not ripe because there was no real threat of criminal prosecution of plaintiffs under a Connecticut statute regulating contraceptives); Muskrat v. United States , 219 U.S. 346, 362–63, 31 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911) (a lawsuit between Native Americans and the federal government was not justiciable merely because Congress had passed legislation authorizing suit to resolve constitutional question when their interests were not adverse); cf. 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486-89 (H. Johnston ed., 1891) (the first justices of the Supreme Court refused to issue an opinion in response to President Washington's request for legal advice regarding a potential, future dispute).

Accordingly, Judge Umphress's claims must be DISMISSED. C. Even if Judge Umphress had standing and his claims were ripe, the Court would abstain under Pullman.

Alternatively, assuming arguendo that Judge Umphress had standing and that his claims were ripe, the Court would be compelled to abstain under Pullman doctrine and basic concepts of federalism. See R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co. , 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). In Moore v. Hosemann , the Fifth Circuit succinctly explained the dispute in Pullman as well as the Supreme Court's subsequent explication of the doctrine as follows:

In Pullman , plaintiffs challenged, on both federal constitutional and state law grounds, the authority of the Texas Railroad Commission to issue a racially discriminatory order. The Supreme Court abstained from deciding the case, because it found that if Texas courts were to strike down the Commission's action on state law grounds, it would be unnecessary to decide the federal constitutional question.

As the Court later explained, the moral of Pullman was that "federal courts should abstain from decision when difficult and unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before a substantial federal constitutional question can be decided. By abstaining in such cases, federal courts will avoid both unnecessary adjudication of federal questions and ‘needless friction with state policies.’ " Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff , 467 U.S. 229, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) (quoting Pullman , 312 U.S. at 500, 61 S. Ct. 643 ). "[F]or Pullman abstention to be appropriate ... it must involve (1) a federal constitutional challenge to state action and (2) an unclear issue of state law that, if resolved, would make it unnecessary for us to rule on the federal constitutional question." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee , 283 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2002). In other words, "[g]enerally, Pullman abstention is appropriate only when there is an issue of uncertain state law that is fairly subject to an interpretation [by a state court] which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question." Baran v. Port of Beaumont Nav. Dist. , 57 F.3d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1995).

591 F.3d 741, 745 (5th Cir. 2009).

In a recent decision from the Fifth Circuit that stayed a district court's preliminary injunction issued in regard to Texas state voting rules, Judge Costa concurred in judgment only because he believed it was a "textbook case" for Pullman abstention. Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott , 961 F.3d 389, 417 (5th Cir. 2020) (Costa, J., concurring in judgment). In his view, the case warranted abstention because it involved: (1) an unsettled question of state law and the answer to the question from the state court could have obviated the need for a federal constitutional ruling; (2) an already a pending state court proceeding that had reached the Texas Supreme Court; and (3) time for the federal court to rule, if necessary, after the state court decision. Id. at 418.

Here, Judge Umphress makes federal constitutional challenges to state action. FAC at ¶¶ 37–54. Judge Hensley's currently pending state court suit addresses the state law grounds on which Judge Umphress's claims would be decided. Hensley v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct et al. , No. D-1-GN-20-003926 in the 459th District Court of Travis County, Texas, Petition ¶¶ 80–81. Should the Texas district court decide the issues in Judge Hensley's favor, it would render any federal constitutional decision by this Court unnecessary.

While hallmarks of Pullman abstention are undoubtedly present, the Court is mindful that the doctrine is not an "automatic rule to be applied whenever a federal court is faced with a doubtful issue of state law; it rather involves a discretionary exercise of a court's equity powers." Baggett v. Bullitt , 377 U.S. 360, 375, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964). To that point, the Court believes that abstention in this case is not only available, it would be wholly appropriate. Indeed, a recent Supreme Court opinion affirmed that notion, albeit in a different context, when it stated that courts are "essentially passive instruments of government[,]" they "do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right." United States v. Sineneng-Smith , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579, 206 L.Ed.2d 866 (2020) (quoting United States v. Samuels , 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir. 1987) ). In the context of Pullman abstention, federal courts do not sally forth each day hunting for theoretical constitutional issues to opine on when there is a real possibility that a pending state court proceeding will take the constitutionality of the state action off of the table. Cf. Poe , 367 U.S. at 526, 81 S.Ct. 1752 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[N]ormally this Court ought not to consider the Constitutionality of a state statute in the absence of a controlling interpretation of its meaning and effect by the state courts.").

The one aspect of this case that the Court believes at first blush does not favor abstention is that Judge Hensley's lawsuit is still at the trial-court level. Abstention is "more appropriate when there is a direct route to obtaining an answer from the state's highest court rather than having to ‘litigate[ ] through the entire state hierarchy of courts.’ " Tex. Democratic Party , 961 F.3d at 418 (quoting 17A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4242 (3d ed. 2020) ). While this means that Judge Hensley's case may not reach the Texas Supreme Court in an expedient manner, the Court believes that it is still prudent to abstain given that Judge Umphress is seeking reelection in 2022, and he candidly states that he "intends to campaign for office as an opponent of same-sex marriage and the living constitution mindset that produced Obergefell v. Hodges [576 U.S. 644,] 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)." FAC at 3. In the Court's view, this reinforces that the focus of this lawsuit is an unsettled area of Texas law that may become a central issue in a Texas state election. Indeed, one of the important interests that Pullman abstention seeks to promote is "harmonious relation[s] between state and federal authority[.]" 312 U.S. at 501, 61 S.Ct. 643. Therefore, even this one aspect of the case that may not favor abstention does upon closer inspection.

Thus, the Court would invoke Pullman abstention and abate the case even if Judge Umphress had standing and ripe claims. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth. , 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton) (writing as "Publius") (explaining that under the Constitution, "the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice" would be left to the states); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 426 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden, eds., 2004 Modern Library Paperback ed.) (1944) (The federal "judiciary ... is a body, which, if rendered independent and kept strictly to their own department, merits great confidence for their learning and integrity.").

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Commission's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25), should be and is hereby GRANTED . Accordingly, Judge Umphress's claims against the Commission are DISMISSED with prejudice . Further, based on the Court's ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, the Commission's Motion to Abstain (ECF No. 23) is hereby DENIED as moot .

SO ORDERED on this 12th day of November, 2020.