OPINION AND ORDER

GERARD E. LYNCH, District Judge

This case presents a curious question of federal jurisdiction. Plaintiff Martin Trepel sued defendant Mourtala Diop for fraud in the sale of certain art works. Diop, who was also being prosecuted criminally by New York State authorities in connection with the same transactions, fled the jurisdiction, and Trepel was awarded a default judgment. In an effort to satisfy the judgment, Diop's cooperative apartment was attached, and sold at auction by the county sheriff. Trepel himself was the successful bidder at the sale. In anticipation of the sale, and in order expedite the transaction, Trepel agreed with the cooperative, Connaught Towers Corporation ("Connaught") that his acquisition ofthe rights to the apartment would "not constitute permission of approval to occupy, reside in, or utilize the Apartment under any circumstances or for any purpose except its re-sale." In exchange, Connaught agreed that it would not "require an interview or other personal information regarding Trepel" in order to issue Trepel stock in the cooperative and a proprietary lease to the apartment. (Olick Aff. Ex. A at ¶ 4.) Following the sale, shares in the cooperative corporation and a proprietary lease to the apartment were duly issued to Trepel.

A dispute has now arisen between Connaught and Trepel. Connaught has refused to issue Trepel a key to the apartment, and insists that he be escorted to and from the apartment, arguing that since Trepel is not entitled to reside in the building without approval by the coop board, it must maintain control over his access to the premises. Trepel maintains that Connaught's restriction on his access interferes with his ability to sell the apartment. The parties dispute a number of facts concerning the extent to which Trepel has actually taken steps to sell the apartment, the number of occasions on which his efforts to visit the apartment were frustrated by building personnel, and the circumstances surrounding such visits. One might think that since both parties profess a desire to see the apartment re-sold, and Trepel disavows any intention to do anything other than effectuate a sale, reasonable people in good faith could easily agree to provide Trepel and his realtor or prospective purchasers access to the apartment on reasonable terms, while guaranteeing to Connaught sufficient control over that access to protect its interests. But parties sometimes cannot reach such accommodations, and Trepel eventually brought an order to show cause in the above-captioned case, seeking an order compelling Connaught to provide him with a key to the apartment, and for related relief.

The dispute between Connaught and Trepel involves no federal claim; the division of incidents of ownership between a cooperative corporation as landlord and a shareholder-tenant is governed exclusively by New York State law. There has been no assertion that the amount in controversy is sufficient to support diversity jurisdiction. In any event, Trepel has not sought to bring a federal lawsuit against Connaught. Rather, he argues that this Court has ancillary jurisdiction over his dispute with Connaught in order to enforce its judgment in his favor in the underlying case.

Trepel is unquestionably correct that a federal court may assert authority over non-federal claims "when necessary to give effect to the court's judgment." Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 551 (1989). He cites authority as venerable as Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 23 (1825), for the proposition that a federal court's jurisdiction "is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but continues until that judgment shall be satisfied." Such jurisdiction may exist even as to third parties who are strangers to the underlying action, as where a defendant has engaged in a fraudulent conveyance of assets and the plaintiff seeks to recover the assets from the recipient of the conveyance.

The Second Circuit had occasion to apply this principle in Grimes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1977). There, a dispute had arisen among plaintiffs in a diversity case, counsel of record in the case, and trial counsel, over the distribution of settlement proceeds. Recognizing that the issues presented in the dispute involved only state-law contract issues, and that the district court would not have had diversity jurisdiction over an independent lawsuit among the parties, the Court of Appeals nevertheless sustained the District Court's exercise of federal jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. The Court found "ample authority that a distict court acquires jurisdiction of a case or controversy as an entirety, and may, as an incident to the disposition of a matter properly before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case of which it could not take cognizance were they independently presented." Id. at 844. More particularly, the Court noted that "the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction is appropriate where the subsidiary controversy `has direct relation to property or assets actually or constructively drawn into the court's possession or control by the principal suit.'" Id., quoting Fulton National Bank of Atlanta v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925).

Trepel argues that on these principles, ancillary jurisdiction over the present dispute exists, because the apartment is an "asset . . . drawn into the court's . . . control by the principal suit." This claim, however, is not without its problems. It is true that Diop's apartment was attached, and thus taken under the Court's power, in order to enforce TrepePs judgment against Diop. But the execution of the attachment, and the sale of the property at auction, was completed. Trepel now holds the property as the purchaser of the apartment at the auction. The judgment sale was completed, and a closing held at which Trepel took possession of the shares and lease formerly owned by Diop. Thus, the defendant's rights in the property have been extinguished and transferred to plaintiff. The Court's order has been satisfied. While Trepel contends that Connaught is effectively asserting an interest in the property that was the subject of this Court's attachment, Connaught argues, quite plausibly, that Trepel has gotten what he was entitled to, and that his dispute with Connaught amounts to nothing more than a claim that someone is interfering with his enjoyment of property. The ancillary jurisdiction of the federal court has to stop at some point. Surely, the federal court would not have jurisdiction over an action of replevin against someone alleged to have stolen another's property, simply because the owner purchased that property at a judgment sale that resulted from a federal court judgment.

While Connaught's argument is not without force, on the facts of this case I am satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction. The dispute essentially concerns the nature of the property that was the subject of the attachment, and the content of the rights that were transferred with the subsequent sale. Trepel contends that Connaught is not merely interfering with his physical enjoyment of property he acquired as a result of the judgment, but that it is in fact disputing his claim to ownership of that property. To this extent, Trepel is correct that the dispute centers on the substance of ownership of the asset that came under this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to its judgment in the underlying litigation. That is exactly the kind of dispute that the case law holds is within the jurisdiction of this Court.

That said, however, the Defendants are correct that the substantive rights of ownership conferred by the sale are limited in ways that affect Trepel's rights of access. The merits of the dispute are governed by New York property law. While in ordinary usage people speak of "owning" a cooperative apartment, under New York law, such an apartment (unlike a condominium) is not real property. The apartment is leased to its "owner" by the cooperative corporation; what the lessee owns is stock in that corporation. Thus, the transfer of the shares and of the proprietary lease effected the transfer of the property to Trepel. See University Mews Associates v. Jeanmarie, 471 N.Y.S.2d 457, 462 (1983).

Ordinarily, however, a cooperative will only permit transfer of ownership to a purchaser who has been approved by the cooperative. The acquisition of a cooperative apartment by a purchaser pursuant to a sheriff's auction thus creates an anomaly. A New York court confronted with this precise situation has held that under New York law, a cooperative has no right to block the transfer of shares and lease to a judgment creditor. However, "[e]ven though the transfer of the shares and the lease takes place pursuant to operation of law, the Co-op still has the right to approve before she takes occupancy. If she attempts to do so, or seeks to transfer her shares to another, either she or her transferee must obtain the approval of the Co-op's Board of Directors. . . . This is so because the Co-op is entitled to screen and approve persons who wish to become members of their community." House v. Lalor, 462 N.Y.S.2d 772, 776 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1983) (citations omitted). Thus, under New York law, as well as under the agreement between Trepel and Connaught, Trepel has an economic interest in the apartment, but he does not have the right to unfettered use of it.

Connaught thus may not unreasonably interfere with Trepel's right to access to the apartment for the purpose of sale. He, along with realtors or prospective purchasers, has the right to visit the apartment in connection with marketing his interest. At the same time, Connaught is entirely within its rights to impose reasonable restrictions on such access, in order to enforce its own interest in preventing a shareholder who has not been approved by the cooperative from occupying the apartment.

Though, as noted above, there are factual disputes between the parties, it is unnecessary to resolve them, because the resolution of the disputes is not material to the Court's conclusions of law. Even viewing the disputed facts in the light most favorable to Trepel, he is not entitled to an order directing Connaught to provide him with a key or enjoining Connaught from interfering with his access or collecting maintenance on the apartment. First, as a matter of law, Trepel is simply not entitled to keys, since to provide him with keys would grant him precisely the unfettered unilateral access to the apartment that New York law does riot provider such an order would effectively give Trepel the power to occupy the apartment. Second, as to injunctive relief, again accepting arguendo Trepel's version of the facts, all that has been established is that on a limited number of occasions, employees of the building have been unavailable or uncooperative with his efforts to secure access. That is unfortunate, but it does not warrant a conclusion that Connaught is deliberately preventing him from selling the apartment, nor does it persuade the Court that it is a necessary or appropriate exercise of its equitable discretion to issue an injunction to secure Trepel's rights.

At the same time, even accepting arguendo Connaught's version of the disputed facts, it is conceded that Connaught employees have on at least some occasions failed to provide Trepel with reasonable access to the apartment. Trepel thus has established his entitlement to a declaration that, under the attachment and sale directed by this Court, as well as under his agreement with Connaught, he has a right to access to the apartment, at reasonable times and on reasonable notice, for the purpose of showing the apartment to prospective purchasers. If Connaught chooses to provide such access by having an employee accompany Trepel or his agents on such visits, it may do so, but it must in that case take steps to assure that its employees are aware of Trepel's rights, and make employees available on reasonable notice to provide access and accompaniment.

It would be unfortunate if this Court's ancillary jurisdiction had to be further imposed upon to police this determination. However, on the principles discussed above, it is clear that if access is unreasonably denied in such a way as to interfere with the rights delineated above, an application for further equitable relief might at some point be warranted.

Accordingly, Trepel's motion for an order directing Connaugh to provide him with keys to the apartment in question, and for an injunctive relief, is denied. His motion for further relief is granted to the extent of the declaration set forth above.

SO ORDERED.