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holding that the ALJ properly relied in part on the claimant's "inconsistent and suspiciously-timed complaints of depression" to find that he did not have a severe mental impairment for a consecutive period of 12 months
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No. SA-03-CV-1303-RF.
November 9, 2004
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
BEFORE THE COURT is the Memorandum and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge John W. Primomo, filed September 7, 2004. The Magistrate Judge recommends affirming the decision of the Social Security Commissioner ("Commissioner"). Plaintiff filed objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation on September 14, 2004. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff's objections should be REJECTED and that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation should be ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Timoteo Trejo, filed an application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits on March 8, 2001, alleging disability beginning May 1, 1999. Plaintiff alleges he is disabled due both to the recurrence of cysts or boils and depression. Plaintiff's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Subsequently, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing to determine Plaintiff's eligibility for Social Security benefits. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at this hearing. On August 29, 2003, the ALJ issued a written decision in which she concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council subsequently denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision, thus making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review from this unfavorable decision in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Transcript at 94-96, 483-86.
Id. at 17-26.
See Plf.'s Brief (Docket No. 11).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The Court reviews de novo a Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Recommendation if a party files specific objections within ten days of service. The Local Court Rules for the Western District of Texas require that the "written objections . . . specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections." Thus, the Court need not consider objections that are frivolous, conclusive, or general in nature. If there are no specific objections to a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the District Court is to review it for findings and conclusions that are either clearly erroneous or contrary to law. In the instant case, Plaintiff filed specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, thus warranting consideration by the Court.
W.D.TEX. R. 4(b) at App. C ("Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges").
Battle v. United States Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989).
See Plf.'s Objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation (Docket No. 19).
The Court's review of the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits is limited to determining whether (1) the decision is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence. The Commissioner's final decision must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and such that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings exist to support the Commissioner's decision. The Court may not re-weigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Conflicts in evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve, not the courts.
Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002); See also Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001).
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272.
Boyd, 239 F.3d at 704.
Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir. 2000); Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993).
Carey, 230 F.3d at 135; Patton v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1983).
Despite this limited function, the Court must scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached and whether substantial evidence exists. Four elements are weighed to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's determination: (1) objective medical facts, (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians, (3) the claimant's subjective evidence of pain and disability, and (4) the claimant's age, education and work experience.
Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990).
Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174.
B. Analysis
To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a plaintiff must initially establish that he is disabled by showing that: (1) he lacks that ability to engage in a substantial gainful activity, and (2) his disability has lasted or may be expected to last at least twelve months. If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that the plaintiff is capable of performing some type of alternate work.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505 416.905; see also Taylor v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 1294, 1298 (5th Cir. 1986).
Taylor, 782 F.2d at 1298. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant qualifies as disabled under the Act, the Commissioner uses the following sequential, five-step inquiry: (1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?; (2) Does the claimant have a severe impairment?; (3) Does the impairment meet or equal a listed impairment?; (4) Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work?; and (5) Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing other work? Claimant bears the burden of proof under the first four parts of the inquiry. If at any step the Commissioner finds that the claimant is or is not disabled, the inquiry ends.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 416.920.
Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled due to cysts and depression. The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff was thirty-nine years old, had a tenth grade education, and had worked as a laborer and caterer. The ALJ conducting the hearing on behalf of the Commissioner found that Plaintiff had engaged in substantial gainful activity until at least February 2001. After reviewing the objective medical evidence, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's recurrent cysts or abscesses are a severe impairment, but that the impairment is not considered a listed impairment. The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff does not have a severe mental impairment, completing the second and third stages of evaluation set out in the regulations. At the fourth stage of the evaluation, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity and the demands of his previous work. The ALJ discounted Plaintiff's subjective complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations. As a result, she determined that Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of medium work and thus he is not disabled.
Plaintiff appealed the decision of the ALJ on one ground, alleging that the ALJ erred in her credibility determination. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give sufficient weight to a consultative physician's opinion regarding his mental impairment.
The Magistrate Judge found that despite these concerns, the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence and comported with proper legal standards. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that the medial and treatment records before the ALJ support the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff suffers no significant ongoing limitations due to a mental or physical impairment. As a result, the Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ had properly concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled and recommended that the decision of the Commissioner denying Plaintiff's applications for disability and supplemental security income benefits be affirmed.
Plaintiff now asks this Court to review his claims on essentially the same grounds, objecting to the Magistrate Judge's finding that the fact that Plaintiff did not previously complain of depression is relevant to the ALJ's determination regarding the existence and severity of such an impairment. However, Plaintiff fails to cite any authority for his argument that the ALJ should not have considered this fact. In fact, Plaintiff fails to cite any authority whatsoever in support of his objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings. Further, the Magistrate Judge points to persuasive authority holding that an ALJ could properly consider whether the plaintiff's had complained of depression previously in his determination of whether the plaintiff was really impaired.
See, e.g., Ford v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1342 (8th Cir. 2000); Morris v. Callahan, 989 F.Supp. 1364, 1372 (D.Kan. 1997).
Plaintiff argues both in his initial briefing and in his objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the ALJ inaccurately found that he was not disabled due to a severe mental impairment. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that his depression constituted a severe mental impairment which lasted at least from 2001 until the hearing before the ALJ in 2003. Plaintiff alludes to diagnoses of major depression disorder, schizophrenia, and antisocial personality disorder, "which were not contradicted by any evidence offered by the ALJ and Defendant or found by the [Magistrate Judge]." Plaintiff thus argues that both the ALJ's finding that his ability to work was not affected for a consecutive period of twelve months and the Magistrate Judge's similar conclusion were without merit.
Plf.'s Reply Brief (Docket No. 16); Plf.'s Objections at 2.
Plf.'s Objections at 2 (citing Tr. pp. 344-45, 356, 421, 423, 425, 429, 434, 439, 444, 447, 452, 457, and 466).
Plaintiff further disputes the Magistrate Judge's findings that his inconsistent reports and suspicious timing as to complaints regarding his mental state supported the ALJ's determination of Plaintiff's credibility. However, in addition to Plaintiff's inconsistent and suspiciously-timed complaints of depression, the Magistrate Judge also pointed to several other parts of the record which weigh in favor of the ALJ's credibility determination. For example, the Magistrate Judge noted that Plaintiff had reported to the consultative physician, Dr. A. Camis Milam, that his most significant problem was his boils and that if these could be cured, he felt he would be fine. The ALJ had also observed that Plaintiff's report to Dr. Milam of being hospitalized at the San Antonio State Hospital was not supported by hospital records. In January 2002, Plaintiff reported worsening depression, but the psychiatrist diagnosed only mild depression. Finally, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist from the Center for Health Care Services (CHCS) had noted Plaintiff's inconsistent reports and questioned whether Plaintiff was motivated by secondary gain. Weighing these facts, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's mental impairment is not severe was supported by substantial evidence.
Magistrate Judge's Memorandum Recommendation at 11.
Tr. pp. 22, 169.
Memorandum Recommendation at 11.
Plaintiff's argument that he has been disabled due to depression since late 2001 is not supported by the weight of the evidence in the record. Plaintiff's examiners reports from late 2001 reveal Plaintiff's complaints as to depression, but found no impairment of thought process, communication, or normal activities of daily living. In January 2002, Plaintiff's examiner observed mild depression but noted lucid thought and goal-oriented behavior. At some point in this time period, Plaintiff was prescribed medication to address his depression, which examiners found began to achieve real results as early as February 2002. In March, Plaintiff's depression was still under control and by April 2002 he was reporting no depression at all. In June 2002, Plaintiff's treating physician at CHCS reported that Plaintiff presented differing stories at his appointments and surmised that Plaintiff may be motivated by secondary gain. Indeed, if nothing else were to support the ALJ's findings that Plaintiff was not disabled due to his depression from 2001 through 2003, the apparent improvements and success of his medication seems to belie this argument. Thus, the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff was not disabled to his ongoing battles with depression was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Tr. p. 175.
Id. at 439-43.
Id. at 434-38, 429-33.
Id. at 428.
Plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the ALJ was justified in finding that the evaluations by Plaintiff's treating physicians at the CHCS were inconsistent with the conclusion of the consultative examiner and that she appropriately gave more weight to the CHCS records. However, Plaintiff fails to develop this argument in any coherent manner. The Magistrate Judge, upon an extensive review of the Plaintiff's treatment records, found that the ALJ's belief that Plaintiff's testimony concerning his mental symptoms was motivated by his application for benefits was well-supported by evidence in the record and affirmed the ALJ's findings on this point as well. The Magistrate Judge also pointed out several specific ways in which the consultative physician's report differed from the CHCS psychiatrist's evaluation, which concluded that Plaintiff suffers no significant ongoing limitations due to mental impairment.
Tr. p. 22.
In summary, the Court finds no basis on which to overturn the ALJ's determinations and ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled due to the existence of a severe mental impairment that prevents him from working. A review of the CHCS medical files shows that Plaintiff, while initially depressed, responded well to medication. Indeed, his depression appears to have been effectively controlled by the medication, and only recurred when Plaintiff stopped taking his medication. Of course, a medical condition that can be remedied is not disabling. These records support the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff is not disabled and suffers no real, functional limitations as a result of his depression. Based upon the foregoing, the Court will not disturb the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled under the Social Security Act.
Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 11-18.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that the Report and Recommendation be ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
It is further ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.
FINAL JUDGMENT
On this day, the Court entered an Order adopting the report of the United States Magistrate Judge recommending to affirm the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying disability benefits. The Court now enters its Final Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge be ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
It is further ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration be AFFIRMED.
It is further ORDERED that all pending motions be DENIED AS MOOT and that the parties bear their own costs.