ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION, WITH ADMONITION [Dkt No. 196]

LARRY BURNS, District Judge

By Order entered July 16, 2007 in this Fair Debt Collection Practices Act putative class action, this court granted defendant GC Services Limited Partnership's ("GC Services") Motion For Summary Judgment and denied as moot both defendant's Motion For Limitation On Communications With Putative Class and plaintiffs' Motion To Certify Class. Dkt No. 192. A Clerk's Judgment was entered in GC Services' favor the same day. Dkt No. 193. On July 30, 2007, plaintiffs filed this Ex Parte Application For Leave To File After Judgment And Pursuant To FRCP 59(e) A Motion To Reconsider Orders: (1) Denying Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Complaint; (2) Granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment; and (3) Denying As Moot Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class ("Application"). Dkt No. 196. The Application seeks reconsideration of the enumerated Orders on purported grounds of "newly discovered evidence" or alternatively "facts and circumstances not previously shown," clear error committed by the court, "manifest injustice" to Plaintiffs and others, and "unusual circumstances discernable from the record. . . ." Appl. 3:16-21.

The Application summarizes plaintiffs' arguments for reconsideration with the aim of setting aside the Judgement pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. ("Rule") 59(e): (1) discovery disputes prevented the timely presentation of certain deposition testimony from two managers of GC Services' credit collection departments and constitutes "newly discovered" evidence; (2) the court committed "clear error" in denying on November 2, 2006 leave to add two additional putative class representative plaintiffs in a Second Amended Complaint who, the two named plaintiffs contend, could have saved the case from dismissal on standing grounds; (3) if the court determines upon reconsideration it clearly erred in denying the Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Complaint, "then it necessarily was also error for the Court to deny as moot Plaintiffs' Motion For Class Certification;" (4) Mr. Thomasson's deposition testimony that "`Ashley' admitted to him during a telephone conversation that said conversation was being monitored by an unknown third auditor" created a triable issue of material fact adequate to prevent summary judgment; and (5) "The proceedings were so infected with irregularity reconsideration is warranted on that basis alone." Appl. pp. 3-5.

GC Services filed procedural Opposition to the Ex Parte Application, urging the court to deny the Application on untimeliness grounds. Defendant argues any Rule 59(e) motion would be untimely, as the Ex Parte Application required under this court's Standing Order to obtain prior authorization to file a motion for reconsideration is the only filing that technically can meet the 10-day deadline prescribed by Rule 59(e) under which plaintiffs seek to proceed. The court OVERRULES the untimeliness argument and construes the Application, filed within 10 days of the entry of Judgment, as a timely preservation of a Rule 59(e) motion with respect to the summary judgment ruling. See Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1989). GC Services also objected plaintiffs' Application violates the Standing Order's restrictions as to the maximum length of requests for leave to file for reconsideration. The 5-page Application was accompanied by an 8-page Declaration Of Robert E. Schroth, Jr., Esq. and the 14-page Arleo Declaration. GC Services asks the court to strike the 14-page Arleo Declaration on that basis. The court DENIES GC Services request to strike the Arleo Declaration because its oratorical excess informs the disposition of the Application.

As a threshold matter, the court denied plaintiffs Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Complaint by Order entered November 2, 2006. Dkt No. 154. To be timely, any request for reconsideration of that Order had to be filed no later than 30-days after it was entered. See Civ. L. R. 7.1(i)(2) (imposing time limits for reconsideration of pre judgment motions). The court declines to entertain so belated a request, and DENIES reconsideration.

Similarly, the court finds the dismissal of plaintiffs' Motion To Certify Class on March 16, 2007 in connection with the resetting of case management dates to be untimely challenged at this late date, and in consideration of the summary judgment ruling disposing of the putative class action in its entirety, any class certification motion has been mooted. In addition, the March 16, 2007 Order dismissing the class certification motion was particularly appropriate as that motion was predicated on class definitions from the rejected Second Amended Complaint, and the denial was without prejudice. Finally, the court also declines to "reconsider" the rejection of class certification within the scope of the First Amended Complaint's surviving definitions because one basis for the granting of summary judgment was the court's finding these named plaintiffs lack standing to pursue the claims presented, on their on behalf or on behalf of anyone else. The court accordingly evaluates plaintiffs' Application under Rule 59(e) only as it pertains to the summary judgment ruling, even though the court need not have reached issues other than the standing issue.

"A district court may reconsider its grant of summary judgment under [Rule 59(e)], (motion to alter or amend ajudgment). . . ."School Dist. No. 1J, Multonomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1266 (9th Cir. 1993).

While Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order, the rule offers an "extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources." [Citation.]. . . . Indeed, "a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law." [Citation].

Plaintiffs' Application identifies no change in controlling law. They do not convince the court they can demonstrate "manifest injustice" occurred in the granting of summary judgment, despite the invective in counsel Robert L.Arleo's supporting Declaration. The only remaining ground that could support granting these plaintiffs leave to set aside or modify the Judgment is "clear error." However, rather than succinctly identify any discrete mistakes, plaintiffs' arguments instead advance vague contentions of sweeping, wholesale, and generalized error. The Application foreshadows that were leave granted to file motions to reconsider, plaintiffs would reargue the entire breadth of their previously rejected contentions based solely on their disagreement with outcome. The Schroth Declaration identifies ten general areas and theories he states plaintiffs "will discuss" in their post-judgment reconsideration motions if the Application were granted:

(1) Upon review in a "fully briefed motion for reconsideration" of plaintiffs' facts and analysis, plaintiffs argue "the Court would be compelled to reach a different conclusion in ruling upon the Defendant's motion for summary judgment." Schroth Decl. ¶ 9. However, their proposed "facts and analysis" would take the court beyond "reconsideration" of its summary judgment ruling to admit different evidence and argument than was before the court in reaching the challenged result, a proposition the court REJECTS . If the court erred, it must be demonstrated based on the matters properly presented in reaching the result, not on a modified set of facts.

(2) Plaintiffs propose to demonstrate on reconsideration of the denial of their motion to file a Second Amended Complaint that the proposed new plaintiffs "undeniably had standing" to pursue this putative class action. As noted above, the court REJECTS as untimely any attempt now to revisit that nine-month-old ruling and to retroactively alter the posture of the case from its circumstances when defendant was granted summary judgment.

(3) "If leave to file a motion to reconsider [the summary judgment ruling] is granted, Plaintiffs will also discuss whether the Court's rulings on standing were correct. Plaintiffs aver they were not and clear error is present." Schroth Decl. ¶ 11. Such a bare assertion of "clear error" does not inform the court of the nature of its purported error on what authority. A party's mere disagreement is insufficient to convince the court it would probably reach a different result on reconsideration.

(4) Similarly, the bootstrapped argument that "[b]ecause the Court's rulings on standing were [purportedly] incorrect, it was clear error to use those rulings as a basis to deny as moot Plaintiffs' motion for class certification" (Schroth Decl. ¶ 10) merely begs the question. Even had the court not rejected reconsideration of denial of the class certification motion for the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs offer no insight into the manner in which they would demonstrate how the court may have erred in the standing rulings, and the court finds they simply disagree with the result.

(5) Plaintiffs want to re-argue their position disputed material facts purportedly should have precluded summary judgment in a reconsideration motion "discuss [ing] whether the Court incorrectly ruled there existed no genuine disputes of material fact. . . ." Schroth Decl. ¶ 13. If plaintiffs believe they are entitled to a de novo review of the summary judgment motion in its entirety, as their unfocused criticism of the result suggests, they may present their contentions to a higher court. Moreover, the time for plaintiffs to have isolate and directed the court's attention to discrete material facts in dispute supported by the evidence was in their initial opposition to summary judgment, not on reconsideration. Plaintiffs are mistaken to suggest the mere volume of material somehow establishes the existence of triable issues of discrete material fact. The court declines to revisit every ground and page of the parties' voluminous filings. De novo review of district court rulings are reserved for courts of appeals.

(6) Plaintiffs also seek to "present argument that the Court committed clear error by refusing to suspend the proceedings until after the assigned Magistrate Judge resolved discovery issues put before the Court by Plaintiffs." Schroth Decl. ¶ 14. However, motions for summary judgment may be filed and granted at any time in the litigation after a reasonable period for discovery. GC Services filed its Motion For Summary Judgment on October 26, 2006, nearly 18 months after plaintiffs initiated this litigation. The court acknowledges from the case docket much time was expended in acrimonious disputes and motions to compel, and case management deadlines were modified accordingly. Nevertheless, the contentiousness of the discovery process does not foreclose any party from attempting a Rule 56 showing this far into the litigation. Plaintiffs sought not to stay the proceedings, but rather to augment the briefing incrementally with respect to their own positions alone.

(7) Plaintiffs aver they would use an opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration to "discuss whether the Court's rulings so misconstrued the law that they amount to clear error." Schroth Decl. ¶ 15. They sweepingly identify as the alleged errors of law "the California Invasion of Privacy Act and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act," purportedly causing "in turn, misappli[cation of] the law to the facts in this case."Id. No such generality offers the court any principled basis to entertain yet more imprecise argument in a second-bite-at-the-apple attempt to oppose summary judgment in the guise of reconsideration briefing with a goal to have the Judgment set aside.

(8) Plaintiffs contend they would "discuss whether the Court's ruling on evidence and evidentiary objections were correct," averring "that many of the [unspecified] rulings contain clear error and therefore rise to the level of an abuse of discretion." Schroth Decl. ¶ 16 (emphasis added). Considering over eleven pages of the 52-page Order at issue addresses each of the multitude of evidentiary objections presented by the parties before reaching the merits of the summary judgment motion, so vague and vast a challenge again suggests no principled basis on which to reopen consideration of any discrete portion of the record on grounds supportive of Rule 59 relief.

(9) Plaintiffs want the opportunity to argue open-endedly that "manifest injustice to Plaintiffs" resulted from the "irregularities" of the "proceedings conducted before this Court." Schroth Decl. ¶ 17. The intemperate content of the Arleo Declaration foreshadows and provides the court with considerable insight into the likely content of the filings it might expect were leave to file Motions For Reconsideration granted. He expounds at length, among other things, his opinion of this court's purported incompetence, further obfuscating any argument on the merits. For example, Mr. Arleo disrespectfully excoriates the court's reasoning, results, and process. He repeatedly, most vehemently, and quite mistakenly accuses this court of bias and prejudice against his clients, as well as judicial misconduct in the manner of its rulings, blatant and intentional misapplication of legal standards, and the like. Mr. Arleo summarizes:

[T]he Friday the 13th Order is patently baseless, unjust and without any merit in fact or law. As set forth above, it is my contention that the Court herein is absolutely and undeniably biased against the Plaintiffs and views each as debtors who should simply shut up and pay up.

. . .

Unfortunately, the degree of bias and prejudice evidenced in the Friday the 13th Order has compelled me to advise this Court that the Plaintiffs herein have authorized me to request that: (a) the Court herein sua sponte vacate its Friday the 13th Order; and (b) Your Honor recuse himself from the herein action and direct the Clerk of Court herein to randomly assign this case to another district judge.

Arleo Decl. ¶¶ 35, 36.

The court denies both of Mr. Arleo's requests as wholly improper and unwarranted.

(10) Plaintiffs finally assert they would also discuss in a motion for reconsideration "whether the proceedings conducted before this Court were so irregular and filled with error as to constitute cumulative error requiring that the disputed orders be vacated as they comprise in aggregate a manifest injustice to Plaintiffs." Schroth Decl. ¶ 18. The court disagrees and finds allegations of that nature must be addressed to and assessed by a reviewing court. If reversible error occurred, this court respectfully awaits corrective instructions from that court.

For the reasons set forth above, and in consideration of plaintiffs' extravagant attack on this court's integrity, misstatements of portions of the court's rulings, and misrepresentations of the record advanced in support of their Ex Parte Application, the Application for leave to move for reconsideration in the hope of vacating the Judgment is DENIED . In particular, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application for reconsideration of the November 2, 2006 Order denying Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Complaint is DENIED AS UNTIMELY .

2. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the motion for class certification without prejudice is DENIED AS UNTIMELY, MOOT, AND UNMERITORIOUS because predicated on an amended pleading never authorized for filing, with any renewed Motion To Certify Class necessarily foreclosed by the summary judgment result.

3. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application for reconsideration of the Order Granting Summary Judgment is DENIED .

4. The "requests" in the Arleo Declaration are DENIED . The undersigned District Judge need not "recuse" himself. Judgment has been entered, the case is closed, no further proceedings are contemplated here, and accusations this court is biased or harbors prejudice against these plaintiffs or any others similarly situated is wholly unfounded.

5. Robert L. Arleo, Esq., a New York attorney, was granted pro hac vice status to represent plaintiffs in this action. He has exhibited extraordinary disrespect to the undersigned District Judge as well as to the Magistrate Judge assigned to this case during the conduct of this litigation. Mr. Arleo is hereby admonished, should he make any future application to appear pro hac vice in any matter which may be assigned to the undersigned District Judge, he shall accompany the application with a copy of this Order and shall inform the Clerk of Court prior authorization of this court is required before Mr. Arleo will be granted any future pro hac vice privileges.

IT IS SO ORDERED.