MEMORANDUM OPINION

KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice.

Following a remand to the trial court, this case returns to us for review of a summary judgment disposing of appellant Glenn Thomas's remaining claims. In the first appeal, we affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in part, reversed it in part, and severed and remanded claims under the Texas Insurance Code alleging Allstate misrepresented the terms and provisions of Thomas's insurance policy. See Thomas v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 14-03-00879-CV, 2004 WL 1574542, at *7B8 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 Dist.] July 15, 2004, no pet.) (mem op.). On remand, the trial court granted appellee Allstate Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment on Thomas's misrepresentation claims. We conclude that the summary-judgment evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding damages and that the trial court correctly granted Allstate's motion for summary judgment on Thomas's misrepresentation claims. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 1999, Glen Thomas purchased an automobile insurance policy from Allstate. On April 17, 2000, Thomas collided with an uninsured motorist. There is no dispute that the policy was in effect at this time. Thomas sought medical treatment, and he filed both personal-injury and property-damage claims with Allstate. Allstate presented Thomas with an "Allstate Quality Service Pledge" (hereinafter "Quality Service Pledge") and the "Consumer Bill of Rights for Personal Automobile Insurance" (hereinafter "Consumer Bill of Rights"). In filing his claims, Thomas demanded that Allstate pay for his past and future medical expenses, lost earnings, and pain and suffering in the amount of $52,996. Thomas submitted medical records and bills from his treating physicians.

Although Allstate paid Thomas's property-damage claim, it did not pay the personal-injury claim pending an investigation. Allstate advised Thomas that it would not pay the medical expenses until it concluded its investigation and determined liability. As part of its investigation, Allstate asked Thomas to sign a medical and wage authorization giving Allstate permission to order information it deemed necessary to evaluate Thomas's claim. On July 25, 2000, Thomas wrote Allstate, stating that he would provide information from his treating physicians, but that Allstate's medical authorization was "too broad and harassing" in nature. Allstate suspected that Thomas's injures might be pre-existing injuries, and it sent Thomas a reservation-of-rights letter on September 8, 2000. In this letter, Allstate directed Thomas to the policy language obligating Thomas to cooperate with Allstate and provide certain medical records and other documents.

A few months later, on January 17, 2001, Thomas sued Allstate for breach of contract, violation of Texas Insurance Code articles 21.21 and 21.55, violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and breach of the common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court severed all of Thomas's claims, except for his breach-of-contract and article 21.55 claims, into this case.

On September 3, 2002, Thomas's claims in the nonsevered case proceeded to trial. On October 4, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment on the jury's verdict and awarded Thomas $4,728.25 in past damages, $5,000 in future damages, and approximately $2,144.25 in costs. Although Thomas's article 21.55 claims were included in that case, the trial court did not grant Thomas any relief under article 21.55 in its final judgment. Allstate delivered checks in the amounts stated in the judgment to Thomas's attorney on the day the trial court rendered judgment.

Subsequently, in this severed case, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate on all of Thomas's claims. On July 15, 2004, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment as to Thomas's claims under the Texas Insurance Code and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act that relied on his bad faith claim, including the claims that were based on a theory of unreasonable delay. See Thomas, 2004 WL 1574542, at *7B8. On the other hand, this court reversed, severed, and remanded Thomas's claims under the Texas Insurance Code that Allstate allegedly misrepresented the terms and provisions of Thomas's insurance policy. See id.

On remand in the trial court, Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment as to Thomas's claims for misrepresentation, asserting both traditional and no-evidence grounds. Thomas amended his petition to add many new claims and allegations. In support of his amended claims, Thomas asserted that Allstate made misrepresentations to him in violation of the Texas Insurance Code, the Quality Service Pledge, and the Consumer Bill of Rights. In response, Allstate filed a supplement to its motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Allstate's motion. On appeal, Thomas challenges this summary judgment.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Thomas asserts the following issues on appeal:

(1)B(2) Allstate violated article 21.21, section 4 of the Texas Insurance Code by failing to adhere to the Quality Service Pledge and the Consumer Bill of Rights, given to Thomas at the time Thomas filed his claims with Allstate.

(3) Allstate's verbal misrepresentations, by and through its claims adjusters, constituted unfair settlement practices and/or misrepresentations in violation of article 21.21, section 4 of the Texas Insurance Code.

(4) Thomas is entitled to attorney's fees, eighteen percent penalty interest, and prejudgment interest under sections 38.001 and 42.003(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

(5) The insurance policy is ambiguous as to Thomas's contractual obligations, specifically whether Thomas was required to procure a judicial determination that he was legally entitled to under-insured motorist benefits under the policy.

(6) The trial court erred in granting Allstate's traditional motion for summary judgment because the testimony of Allstate's representatives and expert witness was not clear, direct, free from contradiction, and susceptible to being easily controverted.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Allstate asserted both traditional and no-evidence grounds for summary judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c), (i). The standard of review for a traditional motion for summary judgment is whether the successful movant at the trial level carried its burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment should be granted as a matter of law. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). A defendant must conclusively negate at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff's claims or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). Under this traditional standard, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we make all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Dolcefino v. Randolph, 19 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). If the movant's motion and summary-judgment evidence facially establish its right to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine, material fact issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id.

In reviewing a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, we ascertain whether the nonmovant pointed out summary-judgment evidence of probative force to raise a genuine issue of fact as to the essential elements attacked in the no-evidence motion. Johnson v. Brewer Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 206B08 (Tex. 2002). We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we make all reasonable inferences therefrom in the nonmovant's favor. Dolcefino, 19 S.W.3d at 916. A no-evidence motion for summary judgment must be granted if the party opposing the motion does not respond with competent summary-judgment evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 917. Because the trial court did not specify the grounds for its ruling, we will affirm if any of the grounds advanced in the motion has merit. See Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. What claims were within the scope of remand?

Both in his "Fourth Amended Petition" and in his various arguments, Thomas appears to be asserting that his claims for unreasonable delay, bad faith, unfair-settlement practices, and article 21.55 remedies, among others, are still pending following remand from this court in the first appeal. This assertion is not correct. The only claims that this court remanded to the trial court were Thomas's misrepresentation claims under the Texas Insurance Code, in which "Thomas alleged Allstate made a material untrue statement of fact or law and misrepresented terms and provisions of his policy." Thomas, 2004 WL 1574542, at *7. This court did not remand any other claims, including claims under article 21.55, article 21.21, section 4 (a)(10) (ii) and (iv), claims for unreasonable delay, and bad faith claims. See id. Therefore, to the extent Thomas asserted these claims on remand, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over them because they were outside the scope of this court's remand. See Harris County Children's Protective Servs. v. Oilvera, 77 S.W.3d 336, 342B43 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction over claim outside scope of remand).

B. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment based on the ground that there is no evidence of a misrepresentation by Allstate that Thomas would receive attorney's fees and eighteen percent interest if Allstate did not process and pay his insurance claim promptly?

Consistent with the scope of remand, Thomas did assert in his live pleading claims that Allstate misrepresented the terms and provisions of his insurance policy in violation of article 21.21, section 4(11). One of the summary-judgment grounds asserted in Allstate's motion was that there is no evidence of a misrepresentation by Allstate. In one of his allegations, Thomas asserts that Allstate made a material misrepresentation to him when it stated that, if Allstate did not process and pay his insurance claim in accordance with the applicable deadlines, then Thomas would receive eighteen percent interest and attorney's fees. Thomas asserts that (1) Allstate did not comply with these deadlines, (2) in the trial court's judgment in the nonsevered case, the trial court did not award Thomas eighteen percent interest and attorney's fees, and (3) Allstate refuses to pay Thomas eighteen percent interest and attorney's fees, as it allegedly represented if it failed to meet these deadlines.

The only evidence of Allstate's alleged misrepresentation in this regard is the part of the Consumer Bill of Rights stating that, if the insurance company fails to meet the claims processing and payment deadlines, Thomas has "the right to collect 18% annual interest and attorney's fees in addition to [Thomas's] claim amount." The Texas Department of Insurance adopted the Consumer Bill of Rights and requires insurance companies to provide policyholders with a copy upon issuance of an insurance policy. The Consumer Bill of Rights explains that Texas law gives policy holders certain rights regarding automobile insurance and identifies the most important of these rights as well as certain exceptions. Thomas has not cited, and we have not found, any Texas cases holding that the required Consumer Bill of Rights contains representations from the insurer. Presuming, without deciding, that the Consumer Bill of Rights contains representations by Allstate, this claim still fails for several reasons.

First, because this claim is based on a theory of unreasonable delay, it is not within the scope of remand. See Thomas, 2004 WL 1574542, at *7. Second, even if this claim were within the scope of remand, the Consumer Bill of Rights does not state that if Allstate fails to meet the claims-processing and payment deadlines, Allstate will voluntarily pay Thomas eighteen percent annual interest and attorney's fees; rather, the Consumer Bill of Rights states only that, in these circumstances, Thomas has the right to collect eighteen percent annual interest and attorney's fees. This statement is accurate and, as a matter of law, is not a misrepresentation. Thomas claimed that Allstate did not satisfy the deadlines in Article 21.55 and sought eighteen percent annual interest and attorney's fees under this statute. In a final judgment in the nonsevered case, the trial court denied Thomas recovery on this claim. Furthermore, to the extent Thomas asserts that Allstate represented that it would voluntarily pay him eighteen percent annual interest and attorney's fees if it failed to meet these deadlines, there is no evidence of such a misrepresentation. The only alleged evidence of this alleged misrepresentation is the Consumer Bill of Rights, which does not contain such a representation.

C. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment based on the ground that there is no evidence of damages?

To recover under the Texas Insurance Code claims that are within the scope of remand, Thomas must prove he sustained actual damages. Act of May 19, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 13, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2988, 3000 (stating "[a]ny person who has sustained actual damages caused by another's engaging in an act or practice declared in Section 4 of this Article to be unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance . . . may maintain an action against the person or persons engaging in such acts or practices") (repealed and recodified 2003) (current version at TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.151) (Vernon Supp. 2005). One of Allstate's summary-judgment grounds was that there is no evidence of damages caused by Allstate's alleged misrepresentations.

Although Thomas responded to Allstate's motion for summary judgment with voluminous summary-judgment proof, the only evidence that Thomas points to as allegedly raising a genuine issue of fact as to damages are his affidavit and an affidavit of his former counsel regarding Thomas's attorney's fees in asserting his claims. Thomas's affidavit contains conclusory statements that Thomas suffered damages; these statements do not raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. See McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 749B50 (Tex. 2003). The only nonconclusory statements in Thomas's affidavit relate to his alleged damages of $972.82 in interest as well as attorney's fees based on Allstate's delay in paying his insurance claims. As discussed above, claims based on unreasonable delay were not within the scope of remand, and even if this claim for interest and attorney's fees were within the scope of remand, there is no evidence of a misrepresentation for which these items would be the alleged damages. Likewise, the former attorney's affidavit relates only to Thomas's claim for attorney's fees in this regard. Presuming for the sake of argument that Thomas raised a fact issue regarding alleged misrepresentations about the terms and provisions of his insurance policy, these two affidavits do not raise a genuine fact issue as to damages for any such claims. Therefore, as to any such claims, the trial court did not err in granting Allstate's no-evidence summary judgment motion. See Franco v. Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 154 S.W.3d 777, 789 (Tex.App.-Hous. (14 Dist.) 2004, no pet.) (affirming no-evidence ground as to damages for article 21.21 claim).

V. CONCLUSION

The scope of remand following the first appeal in this case was much narrower than Thomas asserts. Thomas did not raise a genuine issue of fact as to an alleged misrepresentation within the scope of remand that would entitle him to recover interest and attorney's fees based on Allstate's alleged unreasonable delay in paying his insurance claim. Therefore, the trial court did not err in impliedly granting a no-evidence summary judgment in this regard. Presuming for the sake of argument that Thomas raised a fact issue regarding alleged misrepresentations about the terms and provisions of his insurance policy, the summary-judgment evidence does not raise a genuine fact issue as to damages for any such claims. Therefore, as to any such claims, the trial court did not err in granting Allstate's no-evidence summary judgment motion. Thomas has not cited any statute that would entitle him to attorney's fees even in the event he takes nothing as to his claims under the Texas Insurance Code. This analysis shows that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment as to all of Thomas's claims on remand, regardless of the other assertions and arguments made by Thomas on appeal. Therefore, we overrule all of Thomas's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.