In People v. Smith, 37 Ill. 2d 622, 623-24 (1967), we held that a per se conflict of interest exists when one public defender must question the effectiveness of another public defender in the same office. Twenty years later, we overruled Smith in Banks, 121 Ill. 2d 36. There, we stated that "it is not clear * * * that where an assistant public defender asserts the incompetency of another assistant, the reputation of the whole office is negatively impacted."

In People v. Smith (1967), 37 Ill.2d 622, the defendant filed a pro se petition for a hearing under the Post-conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.)

In People v. Smith (1967), 37 Ill.2d 622, the defendant was represented at trial by an assistant public defender and later the defendant filed a pro se petition under the Act, charging trial counsel with ineffective assistance.

In Smith, a conflict of interest was found to exist where an assistant public defender alleged in a post-conviction petition that another assistant public defender had incompetently represented the defendant.

In People v. Smith, 37 Ill.2d 622, 230 N.E.2d 169 (1967), the petitioner sought post-conviction relief alleging, " inter alia, that his counsel at trial, an assistant public defender, was incompetent for various assigned reasons."

In People v. Smith, 37 Ill.2d 622, different members of the same public defender's office were appointed respectively to represent the defendant in the trial court, where he pleaded guilty, and also there in post-conviction proceedings in which he alleged, inter alia, trial counsel's incompetency.

In Smith, petitioner filed a pro se petition alleging that his counsel at trial, an assistant public defender, was incompetent for various assigned reasons.

In Smith, the alleged conflict occurred at a post-conviction hearing, but the conflict may arise at a post-trial hearing (People v. Norris (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 536, 361 N.E.2d 105), or even during trial.

In People v. Smith (1967), 37 Ill.2d 622, 230 N.E.2d 169, the defendant, who had pleaded guilty to charges of rape, robbery, and assault with intent to commit rape, filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, pars. 122-1 through 122-7), in which he alleged, inter alia, incompetence of the assistant public defender who represented him in connection with his guilty plea. Another attorney from the same public defender's office was appointed to represent the defendant in connection with his post-conviction petition.

In Smith an assistant public defender represented defendant at trial, and another assistant public defender represented him during the post-conviction proceedings where the claim was made that trial counsel was incompetent.

In People v. Smith (1967), 37 Ill.2d 622, 230 N.E.2d 169, our supreme court, in the context of a post-conviction hearing, held that where a defendant is represented by a member of the public defender's office on a petition which alleges incompetent representation by another assistant public defender from the same office, the public defender's office is clearly confronted with a conflict of interest since on the one hand it is inclined to protect its own reputation and on the other it must act as an advocate for the defendant to prove the truth of these charges.

In Smith, cited in the plurality opinion, the supreme court did nothing more than say that the trial court should have sustained the defendant's objection.

In Smith, relied upon by the defendant, the petitioner based his attack upon the validity of the previously entered guilty plea in part on an allegation of incompetent representation by trial counsel.