MEMORANDUM OPINION

KAREN ANGELINI, Justice.

REVERSED AND RENDERED

On January 31, 2005, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") authorized the suspension of Radika Mala Rajachar's driver's license. At the hearing, Rajachar objected to the admission of the police officer's sworn report, arguing that the report should not be admissible because the notary's stamp did not clearly show the last digit of the expiration date of the notary's commission. As such, Rajachar argued that the notary's commission could have expired before the date on which the notary notarized the report. The ALJ overruled Rajachar's objection and suspended her driver's license. Rajachar appealed to the trial court, which reversed the ALJ's decision. The Texas Department of Public Safety ("TDPS") appeals, arguing that the illegible expiration date of the notary's commission does not invalidate the notarization of the report. We agree.

We review administrative rulings on the admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Pruitt, 75 S.W.3d 634, 637 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.). A court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles or acts arbitrarily and unreasonably. See Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Mendoza, 956 S.W.2d 808, 810-11 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.).

According to the Texas Government Code, an "affidavit" is defined as "a statement in writing of a fact or facts signed by the party making it, sworn to before an officer authorized to administer oaths, and officially certified to by the officer under his seal of office." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 312.011(1) (Vernon 2005). The Government Code also provides the following:

A notary public shall provide a seal of office that clearly shows, when embossed, stamped, or printed on a document, the words "Notary Public, State of Texas" around a star of five points, the notary public's name, and the date the notary public's commission expires. The notary public shall authenticate all official acts with the seal of office.

Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 406.013 (a) (Vernon 2005). And, generally, "[a] deviation from the requirements of the statute which does not seriously hinder the legislature's purpose in imposing the requirement is in substantial compliance." Rosenblatt v. City of Houston, 31 S.W.3d 399, 404 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied). "Substantial compliance has been defined to mean performance of the essential requirements of a statute." Id. Furthermore, Rule 902 of the Texas Rules of Evidence allows admission of self-authenticated affidavits that are in substantial compliance with general requirements provided in the rule. See Tex. R. Evid. 902(b); see also Turner v. State, No. No. 05-93-01826-CR, 1996 WL 317095, at *3 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1996, pet. ref'd, untimely filed) (not designated for publication) (addressing the issue of missing or illegible seals under the authentication requirements of rule 901 and 902).

"It is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the notary public taking the acknowledgment performed his duty in compliance with law as to the use of the seal." See Mills v. Snyder, 387 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Belbaze v. Ratto, 69 Tex. 636, 7 S.W. 501 (1888). Furthermore, clerical omissions that do not obscure the meaning of the affiant's testimony do not invalidate the affidavit. See BCI Mech., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., No. 05-95-01348-CV, 1996 WL 682461, at *3 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1996, writ denied) (not designated for publication); see also Gomez v. Riddle, 334 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1960, no writ); see also Hathcox v. Shinke, No. 06-00-00067-CV, 2001 WL 650618, at *5 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).

This is not a case where the notarial seal was completely missing from the documents, rendering the affidavit invalid. See Venable v. State, 113 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. ref'd). Here, the expiration date of the notary's commission was merely partially illegible. The purpose of an affidavit is for an affiant to swear that the statements made in the affidavit are truthful; that objective was accomplished in this case. An inartfully applied notary stamp should not negate the intent of the affiant and notary public and the purpose of the affidavit. Without evidence showing the contrary, we will not invalidate a document notarized by a notary based on a partially illegible notary stamp. Here, there was no evidence that the notary's commission had in fact expired. Therefore, the police officer's sworn report was properly admitted by the ALJ.

In its second issue, TDPS argues that because the sworn report was admissible, the trial court erred in reversing the ALJ's decision to suspend Rajachar's driver's license. Courts review administrative license suspension decisions under the substantial evidence standard. Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999). A court applying the substantial evidence standard of review may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Id. The issue for the reviewing court is not whether the agency's decision was correct, but only whether the record demonstrates some reasonable basis for the agency's action. Id. Courts must affirm administrative findings in contested cases if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support them. Id. In fact, an administrative decision may be sustained even if the evidence preponderates against it. Id.

Here, because the police officer's sworn report was admissible and supported the ALJ's decision to suspend Rajachar's driver's license, the trial court erred in concluding that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We, therefore, reverse the trial court's order and render judgment reinstating the ALJ's order authorizing the suspension of Rajachar's driver's license.