OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DAVID M. LAWSON, United States District Judge

The plaintiff, Jerry M. Stone, II, was convicted in the Michigan courts of resisting and obstructing a police officer in the performance of his duties and sentenced to a term of confinement at the Cheboygan County Jail. He was an inmate there from approximately March 22 through December 23, 2000. During that time, Stone had been prescribed several medications by his personal physicians, mostly for psychiatric conditions. He claims that jail personnel failed to administer each of the doses of some of the medications and also failed to transport him to all of his medical appointments.

Stone filed a complaint on October 18, 2000 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that his constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to be subjected only to those punishments provided by law were violated. He named as defendants the County of Cheboygan, the County Sheriff, the Jail Administrator, and several unidentified deputy sheriffs. He sought both injunctive relief and damages. On November 15, 2000, this Court entered a temporary injunctive order by consent directing the jail administrator to administer to the plaintiff all dosages of medication as prescribed, and to present plaintiff at all of his scheduled medical appointments.

The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for an order to show cause seeking a contempt finding against the defendants for violating the temporary injunction. The Court held a hearing on that motion on February 1, 2001, a which time plaintiffs counsel appeared with no witnesses and without the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed to establish any violation of the injunctive order. Through medication logs, the defendants demonstrated that all of the plaintiffs prescribed medications had been administered. The Court entered an order on February 2, 2001 denying the motion and vacating the temporary injunctive order.

The matter is now before the Court on the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, claiming that the undisputed facts do not establish a violation of the plaintiffs rights under the Eighth Amendment. This Court agrees, and will therefore dismiss the complaint with prejudice.

I.

Stone is a resident of Cheboygan County. He was arrested on March 22, 2000 for resisting and obstructing a police officer and sentenced to a term of nine months in the Cheboygan County Jail. He was incarcerated on October 18, 2000, the date the complaint in this case was filed, but he was released from custody on December 28, 2000. Stone previously had been incarcerated in the Cheboygan County Jail in 1992, 1996, and 1999. It is unclear as to the number of days he served during these years.

Mr. Stone is a certified nursing assistant. He received training and earned an EMT license in 1995. In 1992, he attended the South Career Institute and received a professional paralegal program diploma.

The plaintiff claims to suffer from back pain, endocrine disorders, and mental and emotional problems. In 1996, he was diagnosed with dissociative identity disorder, and he states in his complaint that his problems require "regular and consistent" administration of medication. He has been prescribed methadone, Paxil, Klonopin, Toprol, Depokote, and monthly testosterone shots.

When Stone came to the Cheboygan County Jail to begin serving his nine-month sentence, he had an amount of Klonopin that he brought with him. However, he states that his prescription was not promptly refilled and alleges that he was deprived of medication for the first eleven days of his incarceration. Thereafter, he missed occasional doses of some of the medication. On a medical care form Stone filled out in April 2000, he stated that he had high blood pressure (158/128) and that the condition existed for six months. However, Stone admitted at his deposition that he never had blood pressure problems and that he represented otherwise on the form in an effort to get treatment. In fact, Stone never took blood pressure medication before his jail sentence began. Further, during his period of incarceration, Stone stated that he never went more than a week without blood pressure medication.

Stone also testified as to other occasions that he missed medication doses. He described missing morning medication on July 3, 2000, once on August 9, 2000, twice on September 12, 2000, and twice on November 10, 2000.

He also contends that he was given an administration of the wrong medication on August 11, 2000, and that he missed two scheduled appointments at the Northern Michigan Pain Management Center.

The plaintiffs treating physician, Dr. Mark Drogowski, testified that the effects of withdrawing from some of the medication that plaintiff had been prescribed included an increase in anxiety, fluctuation on blood pressure, exacerbation of underlying psychiatric symptoms, and headaches. In certain cases and with individuals with underlying medical conditions, such as cardiac conditions, the withdrawal of some of the medication could produce more severe symptoms. The plaintiff did not experience those conditions or those symptoms, however. Dr. Drogowski concluded:

If Mr. Stone's medications were missed, his most common withdrawal problems would be increased agitation, anxiety, nervousness, some thought disturbances. He certainly had those during his time of incarceration. To surmise whether those were from missed dosages of medication or exacerbation of his underlying condition is impossible.

Drogowski Dep., at 19. Dr. Drogowski also stated that if exacerbations of underlying conditions occurred, they would have been temporary and would have subsided once normal dosages of medication were given and normal or therapeutic blood levels of the medications were restored. Id. at 29. In fact, Dr. Drogowski commented during his deposition that the plaintiff was frequently noncompliant with medication orders before he was incarcerated, and that the trend continued after Stone had completed serving his sentence.

As noted above, Stone's lawsuit filed midway through his sentence of incarceration sought injunctive relief in addition to damages. His release from confinement rendered the injunction moot, but Stone persists in his claim money damages and opposes the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

II. A.

A motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 presumes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (internal quotes omitted).

A fact is "material" if its resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit. Lenning v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2001). "Materiality" is determined by the substantive law claim. Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2000). An issue is "genuine" if a "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Henson v. Nat'l Aeronautics Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Irrelevant or unnecessary factual disputes do not create genuine issues of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; St. Francis Health Care Centre v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2000). When the "record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party," there is no genuine issue of material fact. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 951 (6th Cir. 2000). Thus a factual dispute which "is merely colorable or is not significantly probative" will not defeat a motion for summary judgment which is properly supported. Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 1999).

The party opposing the motion may not "rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact" but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). The party opposing the motion must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. If the non-moving party, after sufficient opportunity for discovery, is unable to meet his or her burden of proof, summary judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

The party who bears the burden of proof must demonstrate that there is a factual question on which reasonable minds might differ as to each element of the claim. Davis v. McCourt, 226 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2000). Failure to prove an essential element of a claim renders all other facts immaterial for summary judgment purposes. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 1991).

B.

When a prisoner challenges the conditions of his confinement under the Eighth Amendment, he must show that he was subjected to "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). "[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain', . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Thus, to establish an Eighth Amendment claim stemming from conditions of confinement, the plaintiff must establish objectively that the deprivation is "sufficiently serious," and that the prison official is possessed of a culpable state of mind. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 352 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1991)). See also Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000).

In order to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim involving the delay or denial of medical treatment, an inmate "must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay" such that the conditions of confinement pose a "substantial risk of serious harm." Napier v. Madison County, 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994)). The subjective component of the claim requires proof that "the [jail] official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety. . . . [T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." LeMarbe v. Wisneski, 266 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

The plaintiff in this case has failed to make a sufficient showing establishing a triable issue on both elements of his Eighth Amendment claim. The evidence in the record does not demonstrate a complete deprivation of prescribed medication or even a systematic failure to administer critical doses. Rather, the testimony, including the plaintiffs own testimony, and the medication logs show that the plaintiff encountered occasional missed dosage administration caused primarily by the need to obtain refills.

Dr. Drogowski, the plaintiffs treating physician, testified about the effect that missing doses of prescribed medications would have on the plaintiff. He noted that the plaintiff had been prescribed Klonopin, Paxil, methadone, Toprol (extended release), Depokote, and monthly testosterone injections. He noted that with Klonopin, agitation, anxiety and nervousness were the most common withdrawal side effects. With Paxil, the same symptoms may emerge along with some thought process changing, depression does not result for several weeks and only if the medication is not restored. Dr. Drogowski did not provide any evidence concerning the effects of withdrawal from methadone. Toprol withdrawals can cause an elevation of blood pressure, according to Dr. Drogowski, and also angina in people with underlying heart disease. Missing single doses of Depokote might produce "minimal" exacerbation of the plaintiffs underlying psychiatric problems. Dr. Drogowski stated that missing a monthly dosage of testosterone could cause increased fatigue and decreased energy and libido.

The effects described by Dr. Drogowski, of course, result from withdrawal of the medication and, as confirmed by the physician, they are mild, transitory and disappear when the medications are restored to therapeutic levels. An occasional missed dose, and missed scheduled, non-emergency medical appointments, do not pose a "substantial risk of serious harm." The plaintiff, therefore, has failed to establish a jury-submissible issue on the objective element of his Eighth Amendment claim.

The subjective component of the claim requires an examination of the state of mind of the separate defendants. The plaintiff has named the county sheriff as a defendant but has offered no evidence that this defendant was cognizant of the plaintiffs need for medication or the risks to the plaintiffs health if medication were withheld. Defendant Richard Charboneau, the Jail Administrator, testified that the jail administration had a policy in place which called for monitoring prescriptions by means of daily inspections of pill vials to determine when refills were required, and prescription reorder sheets that were checked twice weekly by physician assistants. This Court has not been presented with any evidence that Officer Charboneau deliberately disregarded serious risks to the plaintiffs health regarding administration of his medications. To the contrary, Dr. Drogowski's office notes indicate that Officer Charboneau would contact the doctor's office to follow up on prescription refills and was cooperative in attempting to procure medical care for the plaintiff

The plaintiff also sued several unnamed Cheboygan County deputy sheriffs. Despite the fact that he has had ample opportunity through discovery to identify these individuals, he has chosen not to do so nor to seek an amendment of his complaint. The plaintiff has offered no evidence of any unconstitutional conduct on the part of other jail personnel, named or unnamed.

Finally, to recover against Cheboygan County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must show that his civil rights were violated as a direct consequence of an official policy, practice or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). "The burden in this regard requires a showing that the unconstitutional policy or custom existed, that the policy or custom was connected to the county, and that the policy or custom caused his constitutional violation." Napier, 238 F.3d at 743 (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)). Stone cannot establish a constitutional violation. Nor can he trace his treatment during confinement to any official or deliberate policy or custom. Consequently, his claim against Cheboygan County fails as well.

III.

The plaintiff has failed to establish that the jail personnel at Cheboygan County were deliberately different to his medical needs. To the contrary, the evidence shows that they responded in due course to the demands of a difficult inmate who brought with him a complex medical and psychological regiment which he himself did not faithfully follow with precision both before and after his confinement. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment [dkt. #25] is GRANTED.

The plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.