Summary
holding that where plaintiff could not show that defendant who made allegedly false statement knew it was false when it was made, or that plaintiff relied on the promise when she decided to work for defendant, the misrepresentation claim did not survive summary judgment
Summary of this case from Galloway v. Islands Mech. Contractor, Inc.Opinion
Civil No. 2002-134.
January 17, 2007
A. Jeffery Weiss, Esq. St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. For the Plaintiff. Kevin D'Amour, Esq. St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. For the Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is the motion of defendant Edward Seykota ("Seykota") requesting summary judgement against plaintiff Sydney Stern ("Stern").
I. FACTS
In June 1997, Stern and Seykota met in New Jersey. Shortly thereafter they began a romantic relationship. Stern moved in with Seykota to care for his two children and assist with housework.
In December 1997, the parties moved to Nevada. They relocated to the Virgin Islands in early 2001. Seykota purchased two condominiums at Secret Harbor Beach Resort in Estate Nazareth (the "condominiums" or the "property") and began construction on a home in Estate Peterborg.
Stern claims that Seykota promised to give her the condominiums, and he would move to his home in Estate Peterborg. In reliance on this agreement, Stern alleges that she relocated to St. Thomas, and provided house-keeping and childcare services. Stern also alleges that she managed renovations on the condominiums, in which she invested $52,000. Seykota claims he reimbursed Stern for all her expenses.
Seykota never moved to Estate Peterborg. He returned to Nevada in February 2002, and never conveyed his interest in the condominiums to Stern. Instead, Stern alleges that Seykota made "continued demands" that she leave the condominiums, and threatened to turn off electrical service. (Compl. ¶ 54). As a consequence of these actions, Stern claims to have suffered severe emotional distress. She filed this lawsuit in July 2002, alleging equitable ownership and an equitable lien on the condominiums, as well as damages for unjust enrichment, misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotion distress ("IIED").
Thereafter, Seykota filed the instant motion for summary judgment. Stern has not filed an opposition.
Seykota filed in accordance with LRCi 56.1 on December 21, 2004, including a letter to certify a lack of response. Beginning in late January of 2005, the parties disputed whether or not Stern should be permitted to file her opposition late. On February 7, 2006, the Court granted her leave to do so. Nevertheless, no opposition was ever filed with the Clerk.
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Hersh v. Allen Prod. Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1986).The movant has the initial burden of showing there are no "genuine issues of material fact," but once this burden is met the non-moving party must establish specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 1985). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In making this determination, this Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 850 (2002). The Court cannot base judgment on the mere fact that the motion is unopposed, but rather must fully consider the merits. D.H. Blair Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 110 (2d Cir. 2006); Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(e) (2006).
A. Count I: Equitable Ownership and Equitable Lien
Stern alleges that Seykota agreed to give her ownership of the condominiums in exchange for her work renovating the property, caring for his two children and assisting him with housework that her work renovating the condominiums. As a result, Stern claims she is entitled to an equitable lien on the property.
Ordinarily, a transfer of land can only be accomplished through a writing. See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 28, § 241 (2006). Notwithstanding the general rule, a transfer of property may be made orally and create an equitable ownership in the property under certain circumstances. In re Estate of Pitterson, Civ. No. at *3 1991-117, 1998 WL 91004 (V.I. Terr. Ct., December 8, 1998). In order for Stern to prevail, she must prove the following elements: (1) a clear and definite verbal agreement (2) the promisor's knowledge and intent to enter into the agreement, and (3) reliance, and detriment, by the promisee. See id. at *3-*4.
In his deposition, Seykota denies the existence of any agreement to transfer the condominiums, and asserts that he compensated Stern separately for her work. He further points to the absence of any evidence that he and Stern had a clear and definite agreement to transfer the condominiums.
Stern has not presented any evidence to refute Seykota's version of the facts. Nothing on the record shows a clear and definite agreement to transfer the property. At best, Stern has referred to a conversation she and Seykota had about real estate in which "he said that [the] condominiums would be [her] home." (Stern Dep. 146, August 27, 2002). The common understanding of "home" is a place where someone resides. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2004). Thus, at most the statement indicates that Seykota told Stern he intended for her to reside in the condominiums. It is not a clear and definite agreement to transfer his legal interest in the property. Cf. Pitterson, 1998 WL 91004 5 at *3 (requiring "clear and definite terms"). Accordingly, given the absence of any disputed material facts, the Court will grant Seykota's motion for summary judgment as to Count I.
Seykota denied saying the condominiums would be Sterns' "home" in his deposition. See Seykota Dep. 170.
B. Count II: Unjust Enrichment
Stern further alleges Seykota was unjustly enriched by her work renovating the condominiums.
Unjust enrichment is closely related to equitable ownership, but the focus is on the benefit to the defendant, rather than the detriment to the plaintiff. See Gov't Guar. Fund of Fin. v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 441, 460 (D.V.I. 1997) (describing unjust enrichment). The doctrine is applied in circumstances under which "equity and good conscience" require the defendant's payment. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff is required to establish four elements (1) a clear and definite verbal agreement (2) the defendant's knowledge and intent to enter into the agreement, and (3) a benefit conferred upon the defendant as a result of the agreement; and (4) that "equity and good conscience" require the defendant return the benefit to the plaintiff. See id.; Pourzal v. Marriott Intern'l, Inc, Civil No. 2001-140, 2006 WL 2471818 at *3 (D.V.I., August 18, 2006) (not for publication).
In support of summary judgment, Seykota argues that there is no evidence supporting the existence of an agreement to convey the property. Seykota has also presented uncontroverted evidence that he already compensated Stern for any benefit from her labor. In his deposition, Seykota stated, "if you add up all the checks that I gave [Stern] and all the money she spent, I think it comes out I paid her more than she spent." (Seykota Dep. 175, August 25, 2002). Additionally, he has presented checks written to Stern that exceed her estimates of the renovation expenses (Def. Br. Ex. 3, 6). Stern has presented no evidence to controvert Seykota.
Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial on Count II.
C. Count III: Misrepresentation
At a hearing on September 14, 2006, the defendant moved to dismiss Count III for failure to plead with particularity pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). This motion arose quite late in the proceedings. See Seville Indus. Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that the purpose of Rule 9(b) is to initially place defendants on notice of the precise misconduct charged); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Co. 181 F. Supp.2d 1253, 1263 n. 5 (D.Kan. 2002) (dismissing a 9(b) motion because defendant had already filed for summary judgment indicating that the claim created adequate notice for a meaningful response).
However, the Court need not consider the effect of such a late motion, because dismissing Count III on summary judgment renders the motion moot.
Stern alleges that she is entitled to the condominiums, because Seykota intentionally misrepresented his intent to transfer ownership of the property to her.
A misrepresentation claim requires four separate elements: (1) a knowing misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) intent by the defendant that the plaintiff would rely on the false statement; (3) actual reliance; and (4) detriment as a result of the reliance. In re Tutu Water Wells Contamination Litig., 32 F. Supp.2d 800, 805 (D.V.I. 1998).
In support of summary judgment, Seykota offers his deposition flatly denying that he ever said he would transfer ownership of the condominiums. Stern has only made an ambiguous statement that Seykota told her the condominiums would be her "home." (Stern Dep. 146, August 27, 2006). That is far short of a promise to let her live at his property indefinitely, or to transfer legal title. Indeed, such a statement could merely reflect Seykota's current intent to have Stern be part of the Seykota household. Nothing on the record indicates that Seykota knew it was false at the time he allegedly made the statement. Similarly, nothing on the record shows that Stern relied on the promise of the condominiums when she decided to work for Seykota in the Virgin Islands. Finally, it is not clear that Stern incurred any detriment while working for Seykota. He presents evidence he fully reimbursed Stern for her expenses, and paid for her labor, and Stern has not offered the Court any evidence to refute these facts. ( See Seykota Dep. 183-84, August 25, 2002).
D. Count IV: Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress ("IIED")
Stern alleges that she suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Seykota's demands she leave the condominiums after he returned to Nevada, and his threats to turn of electrical services if she did not leave.
The tort of IIED requires "extreme and outrageous conduct [that] intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another. . . ." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 (1966). Courts have divided this requirement into four separate inquiries: "(a) deliberate or reckless infliction of mental suffering, (b) outrageous conduct, (c) the conduct must have caused the emotional distress; and (d) the distress must be severe." Watson v. Bally Mfg. Corp, 844 F. Supp 1533, 1536 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (following the Restatement in accordance with Florida law).
Seykota admits that he and Stern had a strained relationship after he returned to Nevada, that he told her she needed to vacate the condominiums, and that he accused Stern of squatting in his apartment. He denies that this conduct is "outrageous." The Restatement defines outrageous conduct as "so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 cmt. d, 1965; see also Heywood v. Cruzan Motors, Inc., 762 F.2d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 1986) (When there is no physical injury, "the conduct is expected to be sufficiently extreme . . . to guarantee a claim is genuine") (internal quotations omitted). In defining actionable conduct, other courts have noted that mere threats of eviction are not outrageous as a matter of law. See e.g., Botka v. S.C. Noyes Co., 834 A.2d 947 (Me. 2003) (Granting summary judgment because threats of eviction were not "outrageous" even when accompanied by frequent verbal berating and physical confrontation).
In his deposition, Seykota states "I'd call her up and say, you are squatting at my apartment and she would hang up. And I don't know there wasn't a lot of communication . . . [eventually] What she told me she was going to do was tidy up everything in the [condominiums], send [my belongings] back, clean it all up and turn the key over to [the property manager], so I could sell it." (Seykota Dep. 199, August 25, 2002).
The parties have not presented any evidence relating to the allegation that Seykota threatened to turn off the electrical service. However, such a statement would fall into the more general category of telling Stern to vacate the property. It is not independently significant.
Repeatedly asking Stern to leave the condominiums was arguably an annoyance, possibly even an insult, but nothing close to conduct that a civilized community cannot tolerate. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts at § 46 cmt. d. Seykota has shown there is no genuine issue of material fact involving his allegedly outrageous conduct, and Stern has failed to produce any material facts that present an issue for trial. Accordingly, Seykota is entitled to summary judgment on Count III.
III. CONCLUSION
Seykota has demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Counts I, II, III and IV. Stern has failed to present any genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, and because Seykota is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court will grant Seykota's motion for summary judgment. An appropriate order follows.