SACKETT, C.J.

Defendant-appellant, Steven Jay Thomas, Jr., was convicted after a trial of possession with intent to deliver a schedule II controlled substance, in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(1)(c)(3), 124.206(2)(d), 703.1, and 703.2 (2003); possession with intent to deliver a schedule I controlled substance, in violation of sections 124.401(1)(d), 124.206(4)(m), 703.1, and 703.2; carrying weapons, in violation of sections 724.4(1), 703.1, and 703.2; possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of sections 724.26 and 703.1; and criminal trespass, in violation of sections 716.7(2)(a) and 716.8(1). Defendant appeals the convictions, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel and the district court should have granted his motion for a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain testimony and failing to object to alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.

Defendant was arrested after police responded to a call regarding a fight. As police approached the scene, an officer saw defendant and another man running away. The men did not halt after the officer yelled, "Stop police." The two men split up when they reached an alley. Police gave chase and found the other man that they had initially seen with defendant. As police continued to search for defendant they were approached by a ten-year-old boy who informed them that there was a man in his family's apartment. The boy led the officers to the rear entrance of his apartment, where they found the boy's mother and sister. The officer testified that the women said nothing, but were "wide-eyed" and pointed to the front door. Following a search of the apartment, the police found defendant hiding in a hallway. Defendant was arrested.

After both men were in custody, police returned to the apartment and conducted a search. In a balled-up rug, in the hallway where defendant was found, police discovered a gun, a knife, and eleven individually-wrapped bags of marijuana. Defendant's person was searched at the police station, where police found a bag with five rocks of crack cocaine, a cell phone, and $461 in cash.

Following receipt of Miranda warnings, defendant admitted to police that the rocks of crack cocaine were his and that he purchased them for use with his father. Defendant claimed the money was earned from babysitting. Defendant did not admit to ownership of the gun, the knife, or the marijuana.

After a trial on September 8, 2003, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver a schedule II controlled substance, in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(1)(c)(3), 124.206(2)(d), 703.1, and 703.2 (2003); possession with intent to deliver a schedule I controlled substance, in violation of sections 124.401(1)(d), 124.206(4)(m), 703.1, and 703.2; carrying weapons, in violation of sections 724.4(1), 703.1, and 703.2; possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of sections 724.26 and 703.1; and criminal trespass, in violation of sections 716.7(2)(a) and 716.8(1).

II. ANALYSIS.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Because a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel implicates constitutional rights, our review is de novo. State v. Carter, 602 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1999).

To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice. Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1999); State v. Miles, 344 N.W.2d 231, 233-34 (Iowa 1984).

Ineffective assistance claims are generally preserved for postconviction relief actions; however, we will resolve them on a direct appeal of the criminal conviction in two situations:

If the record on appeal shows . . . that the defendant cannot prevail on such a claim as a matter of law, we will affirm the defendant's conviction without preserving the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Conversely, if the record on appeal establishes both elements of an ineffective-assistance claim and an evidentiary hearing would not alter this conclusion, we will reverse the defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial.

State v. Martinez, 679 N.W.2d 620, 625-26 (Iowa 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness so that counsel failed to fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Sixth Amendment envisions. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). A strong presumption exists that counsel's performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 814. The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence both elements of a claim of ineffective assistance. State v. Shumpert, 554 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Iowa 1996); Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Iowa 1989).

Defendant first alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the police officer's testimony regarding the statement made to him by the ten-year-old boy and the nonverbal communication of the sister and mother. Defendant first claims this was inadmissible hearsay because the State did not make a sufficient showing of unavailability of these potential witnesses. However, the record before us does indicate that these potential witnesses were unavailable. The State was unable to successfully serve subpoenas on these potential witnesses for depositions or for trial. Furthermore, a relative of these potential witnesses indicated to the State that the family had moved out of state due to threats they had incurred in connection with this case. Therefore, the record indicates the potential witnesses were unavailable pursuant to Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.804( a)(5). Defendant's claim that an objection should have been made is without merit and counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue. State v. Scalise, 660 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Iowa 2003) (citing State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Iowa 1999)).

Defendant also claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make an objection to the police officer's testimony regarding the statement made to him by the ten-year-old boy and the nonverbal communication of the sister and mother pursuant to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant relies on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), for authority that the introduction of the hearsay statements be the State violated his Confrontation Clause rights. However, Crawford was decided on March 8, 2004, six months after defendant's trial. Our supreme court has recently held that Crawford "cannot apply retroactively to support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 29 (Iowa 2005). Prior to Crawford, the hearsay statements of this case were admissible under well-settled law. Under Ohio v. Roberts, hearsay statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause if (1) the declarant was unavailable to testify at trial and (2) the statement "b[ore] adequate indicia of reliability," which it did if the statement fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S. Ct. 1354, 1374, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608 (1980). We previously concluded that the record reveals the declarants were unavailable to testify. The record also reveals that the statements were within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, as excited utterances. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742-43, 116 L.Ed. 2d 848, 859-860 (1992); see State v. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d 435, 445 (Iowa 2001). Therefore, defendant's trial counsel did not breach an essential duty by failing to object based on the Confrontation Clause.

Defendant next claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony by the police officers in which the word "gang" was used in various contexts. The two police officers that testified at trial spoke of their affiliation with the police department's "gang unit" a number of times. The testimony in question referred to the officers' "gang car" (an unmarked Ford Crown Victoria), the officers' "gang attire" (jeans, full-duty belt, and a t-shirt with "police" written on the front and "gang unit" on the back) and the "gang unit" (the division in which the officers worked).

Our supreme court has held that "evidence of gang membership and activity is inherently prejudicial. It appeals to the jury's instinct to punish gang members." State v. Nance, 533 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Iowa 1995). However, the present case is distinguishable Nance. In Nance the State provided evidence that gang notes were found in the defendant's apartment, clearly insinuating that the defendant was a gang member. In the present case, the testimony cited by this defendant did not insinuate that this defendant was a gang member. The word "gang" was used only in reference to the police officers that responded. The State presented no evidence that defendant was actually a gang member or involved in gang activity. Neither did the use of the word "gang" in the testimony necessarily insinuate that defendant was a gang member or involved in gang activity. In this case, use of the word "gang" was not prejudicial to defendant. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to use of the word.

Defendant next claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony relating to the effects of crack cocaine as prior bad acts evidence that was inadmissible pursuant to Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.405. Defendant cites no specific evidence in the record to support his position, as is required by Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.14(1)( c). Due to this failure we need not consider this issue on appeal. Humphrey v. Happy , 169 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Iowa 1969). However, it appears that defendant is claiming the police officer's testimony that defendant did not demonstrate the common characteristics of drug addict were objectionable. This argument is without merit as a matter of law.

Defendant was charged with the crime of possession with intent to deliver crack cocaine. Defendant had asserted to the police that he did not have the intent to sell drugs, as he was simply going to smoke the drugs with his father. Testimony that defendant did not have the characteristics of an addict was appropriate to demonstrate that defendant did have the requisite intent to be convicted of the charged crime. See State v. Sullivan , 679 N.W.2d 19 (Iowa 2004); see also State v. Bell, 223 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Iowa 1974). Thus, defendant's claim that an objection should have been made is without merit and counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue. Scalise, 660 N.W.2d at 62.

Defendant next contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to two instances of prosecutorial misconduct that allegedly violated his due process rights. The first incident involved the prosecutor's use of the personal pronoun "I" in her closing argument. "Prosecutorial misconduct warrants a new trial when it is so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of fair trial. To establish the claim, defendant must show both misconduct and prejudice." State v. Escobedo, 573 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). A prosecutor may properly draw conclusions and argue all permissible inferences which may reasonably flow from the evidence during closing argument. Id. at 278 (citing State v. Phillips, 226 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Iowa 1975)). However, the prosecutor may not create evidence by argument or interject personal beliefs. Id. Therefore, the prosecutor may not personally vouch for a defendant's guilt or a witness's credibility in closing argument. Id. (citing State v. Williams, 334 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 1983)).

After reviewing the transcript of the closing argument we determine the prosecutor in this case did not create evidence, interject personal beliefs, vouch for defendant's guilt, or vouch for a witness's credibility. We agree with the State that the prosecutor's use of personal pronouns were simply instances of the prosecutor clarifying her statements, organizing her thoughts, using common expressions, employing rhetorical crutches, or responding to personal attacks leveled by defense counsel. Furthermore, we conclude that the prosecutor correctly recited the evidence in the record, did not express a basis of knowledge gained outside of the trial, and did not prejudice the defendant with any inappropriate uses of personal pronouns. Defendant's claim that an objection should have been made is without merit and counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue. Scalise, 660 N.W.2d at 62.

Defendant also alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct when, in response to defense counsel's closing argument, the prosecutor said, "Quite honestly what counsel is telling you is a bill of goods and it is not credible." We agree that use of the phrase "bill of goods" conveys the idea that opposing counsel was engaged in deception and that this was misconduct. See State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 874 (Iowa 2003). Additionally, it was clearly misconduct for the prosecutor to assert that opposing counsel was "not credible." See id.

However, our inquiry does not end there. We must also conclude the misconduct resulted in prejudice to such an extent that the defendant was denied a fair trial. Id. at 870. "[I]t is the prejudice resulting from misconduct, not the misconduct itself, that entitles a defendant to a new trial." State v. Wilkins , 693 N.W.2d 348, 352 (Iowa 2005); (citing State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 913 (Iowa 2003)). We consider (1) the severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct, (2) the significance of the misconduct to the central issues in the case, (3) the strength of the State's evidence, (4) the use of cautionary instructions or other curative measures, and (5) the extent to which the defense invited the misconduct. Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 877. In weighing these factors, we conclude the misconduct was not prejudicial. In the present case, the misconduct was one isolated statement during closing arguments. The State's case against defendant was strong. Defendant was found trespassing. Crack cocaine was found on defendant's person. Marijuana, a gun, and a knife were found in close proximity to the location where defendant was found hiding. We conclude the misconduct was not prejudicial and defendant's due process rights were not violated. Having determined there was no prejudice caused by the misconduct, we also conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object to the misconduct.

B. Defendant's Trial Motion for a Mistrial.

After the prosecution rested its case, without calling the three family members who lived in the apartment where defendant was found hiding, the defendant moved for a mistrial. Defendant alleged the prosecutor, in her opening statement, stated that the family members would be testifying, even though she knew they were unavailable to testify because they had moved out of state and could not be located. Defendant alleged this was prosecutorial misconduct, as the prosecutor elicited improper hearsay testimony knowing that the parties were unavailable to testify.

The State first argues that error was not preserved on this issue. There was no record made of opening arguments. Case law indicates there are two requirements to obtain relief on the basis of misconduct in opening statements. First, the defendant must make a timely and proper objection to the offending statement. See State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 552 (Iowa 1996) (regarding a closing argument); see also State v. Horsey, 180 N.W.2d 459, 460 (Iowa 1970). Unless objection is made at the time of the statement, the defendant has waived his right to complain. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d at 552. Second, there must be some record of the statement so the appellate court has something to review. Id.; Horsey, 180 N.W.2d at 460. Defendant did make a proper objection; however, there is no record of the opening statement. Iowa procedural rules provide the means create a record in cases such as this. See Iowa R. of Crim. P. 2.25; see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1001. Apparently, defendant's trial counsel did not make use of these procedures to create such a record. Without a record made for appeal, error was not preserved as to this issue.

Defendant asks that if we find error was not preserved, we proceed on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Review of a trial court's denial of motion for a mistrial is for abuse of discretion. State v. Anderson, 448 N.W.2d 32, 33 (Iowa 1989). To determine whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a record to preserve this issue, we must determine whether there is any merit to the underlying issue. We determine the record on appeal is insufficient to rule on the merits of the underlying issue and, thus, we preserve this claim for possible postconviction relief proceedings.

AFFIRMED.