Opinion

SCHALLER, J.

The defendant, Kenneth Porter, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a)(1), interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-167a (a), and breach of the peace in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-181 (1) and (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court violated his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, (2) the state produced insufficient evidence to establish that he had the requisite intent to breach the peace, to assault a peace officer and to interfere with a peace officer, and (3) the court violated his right to counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution by failing to canvass him adequately to determine if he was making a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel in accordance with Practice Book § 44-3. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On December 2, 2000, Richard Sutphin was driving a public utilities truck on Cooke Street in Waterbury. Sutphin was forced to stop the truck at the intersection of Cooke Street and Buckingham Street because the defendant was in the roadway, pushing a car. When the car that the defendant was pushing was driven away, the defendant approached the front of Sutphin's truck. Upon reaching the truck, the defendant began to yell, pull his hair out, and wildly strike the truck with his fists and head. The defendant continued that behavior for approximately fifteen minutes. During that time, Sutphin radioed for police assistance, left the truck and ran toward an approaching police car that was driven by Sergeant Paul Ezzo of the Waterbury police department.

At that time, the defendant, seeing an approaching vehicle driven by Andelino Vilar, turned away from the truck and jumped onto the hood of Vilar's car. The defendant began to strike the car. During the attack, the defendant reached through an open window, grabbed Vilar's sweater and attempted to pull Vilar out of the vehicle.

Ezzo approached the defendant and informed him that he was placing him under arrest. The defendant began to swing, kick and bite at Ezzo. Ezzo, Sutphin and Ted Peil, a private citizen, attempted to restrain the defendant. While wrestling the defendant to the ground, Ezzo called for additional police assistance and was repeatedly struck by the defendant. Ezzo sprayed the defendant with Mace. The Mace had little or no effect on the defendant. When additional police support arrived, it eventually took seven officers approximately thirty minutes to subdue and to place the defendant under arrest.

The defendant was charged with one count of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61, two counts of breach of the peace in violation of § 53a-181 (a)(1) and (2), one count of criminal mischief in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-117 (a)(1), two counts of assault of public safety personnel in violation of § 53a-167c (a) and two counts of interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a (a).

After a jury trial, at which the defendant represented himself with the assistance of standby counsel, the defendant was convicted of one count of assault of public safety personnel, one count of interfering with an officer and two counts of breach of the peace. The defendant now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court violated his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court improperly refused to instruct the jury that interfering with an officer is a lesser offense included in the greater offense of assault of public safety personnel in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.

The following additional facts are necessary to the resolution of this claim. The defendant was initially charged in an eight count information. On November 1, 2001, the state filed a part B information charging the defendant with being a persistent serious felony offender in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-40 (b), now (c).

On November 5, 2001, the state filed a long form substitute information. Counts five and six, respectively, accused the defendant of assault of a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a)(1) relative to acts that occurred "shortly after 2:00 in the afternoon of December 2, 2000, on or about 191 Cooke Street in the City of Waterbury, CT [where] the said Kenneth Porter did with intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable peace officer from performing his duties and while such peace officer was acting in the performance of his duties, he caused physical injury to such peace [officers]" Richard Valente and Ezzo. Counts seven and eight, respectively, accused the defendant of interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a (a) relative to acts that occurred "at a time shortly after 2:00 in the afternoon on December 2, 2000, on or about 191 Cooke Street in the City of Waterbury, CT [where] the said Kenneth Porter did obstruct, resist, hinder or endanger . . . peace [officers]" Valente and Ezzo.

The jury trial commenced on November 7, 2001. On November 13, 2001, the court dismissed counts one and four of the information, which alleged assault in the third degree and criminal mischief in the third degree, respectively. On November 14, 2001, the jury returned a guilty verdict with respect to counts two, three, six and eight. The defendant was acquitted of the charges alleged in counts five and seven.

Although the defendant admits that he raises this claim of double jeopardy, arising in the context of a single trial, for the first time on appeal, our Supreme Court has ruled that such double jeopardy claims are reviewable under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), if the four prongs of Golding are satisfied. See State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 704-705, 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254, 111 S.Ct. 2898, 115 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1991); see also State v. Denson, 67 Conn. App. 803, 807-808, 789 A.2d 1075, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 915, 797 A.2d 514 (2002).

"Double jeopardy analysis in the context of a single trial is a two-step process. First, the charges must arise out of the same act or transaction. Second, it must be determined whether the charged crimes are the same offense. Multiple punishments are forbidden only if both conditions are met. . . . The traditional test for determining whether two offenses are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes was set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). [W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. . . . In conducting this inquiry, we look only to the relevant statutes, the information, and the bill of particulars, not to the evidence presented at trial." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Denson, supra, 67 Conn. App. 808-809.

Turning to the first prong of the Blockburger test, the charged offenses in counts five through eight arose out of the same act or transaction. In those four counts of the substitute information, the state alleged that the crimes were committed at the same time and place: "2:00 in the afternoon of December 2, 2000, on or about 191 Cooke Street in the City of Waterbury, CT. . . ." With respect to the charges of interfering with an officer, the act of interfering arose directly out of the assault charges alleged in counts five and six. The first prong of the Blockburger test is, therefore, satisfied.

Turning to the second prong of the Blockburger test, "[t]he relevant inquiry then becomes whether each statutory violation requires proof of a fact which the other does not. . . . It is well established that if two offenses stand in the relationship of greater and lesser included offense, then [t]he greater offense is . . . by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Flynn, 14 Conn. App. 10, 17, 539 A.2d 1005, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891, 109 S.Ct. 226, 102 L.Ed.2d 217 (1988). We have previously determined that "a person could not commit the greater offense of assault on a peace officer without having committed the lesser offense of interfering with a peace officer." Id., 19. In other words, "[i]t is theoretically impossible to have a situation where one, with intent to prevent the performance of duties of a peace officer . . . causes physical injury to an officer . . . without at the same time obstructing, hindering, resisting or endangering that officer in the performance of his duties." Id. Because the defendant was convicted of the charges alleged in counts six and eight, for acts solely against Ezzo, we conclude that the second prong of the Blockburger test also is satisfied.

Because we have determined that the offense alleged in count eight was a lesser offense included within the greater offense alleged in count six, the defendant's double jeopardy rights were violated. See State v. Mincewicz, 64 Conn. App. 687, 693, 781 A.2d 455 (for purposes of double jeopardy, greater offense is same offense as any lesser included offense, and vice versa, and imposition of multiple punishments for both offenses violates double jeopardy prohibitions of state, federal constitutions), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 924, 783 A.2d 1028 (2001).

Having reached the conclusion that the defendant's double jeopardy rights were violated, we must next determine the proper remedy and course of action for the trial court on remand. "[T]he remedy in a case such as this is to combine the conviction on the lesser included offense with the conviction on the greater and to vacate the sentence on the lesser included offense." Id., 693-94; see also State v. Chicano, supra, 216 Conn. 721-25. Accordingly, the defendant's conviction of interfering with an officer must be combined with his conviction of assault of public safety personnel, and his sentence for interfering with an officer must be vacated.

II

The defendant claims that the state produced insufficient evidence to establish that he had acted with the requisite intent to breach the peace, to assault a peace officer and to interfere with a peace officer. We do not agree.

The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims has been stated frequently and is well established. We apply a two part test. "First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 175, 778 A.2d 955 (2001).

It is well established that the question of intent is purely a question of fact. State v. Adams, 14 Conn. App. 119, 124, 539 A.2d 1022 (1988). "Intent may be, and usually is, inferred from the defendant's verbal or physical conduct. . . . Intent may also be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. . . . The use of inferences based on circumstantial evidence is necessary because direct evidence of the accused's state of mind is rarely available. . . . Intent may be gleaned from circumstantial evidence such as the type of weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the events leading up to and immediately following the incident. . . . Furthermore, it is a permissible, albeit not a necessary or mandatory, inference that a defendant intended the natural consequences of his voluntary conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Anderson, 74 Conn. App. 633, 638, 813 A.2d 1039, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 901, ___ A.2d ___ (2003).

A

The defendant claims that the state offered insufficient evidence of an "intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof"; General Statutes § 53a-181 (a); to support his conviction of two counts of breach of the peace under § 53a-181 (a). We are not persuaded.

General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-181 (a) provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of breach of the peace when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior in a public place. . . ." (Emphasis added.) We previously have defined the term "violent," for purposes of that provision, as "characterized by extreme force and furious or vehement to the point of being improper, unjust, or illegal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Samuel, 57 Conn. App. 64, 70, 747 A.2d 21, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 909, 753 A.2d 942 (2000).

In light of the facts presented at trial, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the defendant acted with the requisite intent. See State v. Anderson, supra, 74 Conn. App. 638. First, the defendant caused inconvenience and annoyance when he stopped traffic, damaged vehicles, attempted to drag people from cars and wrestled with the police. Sutphin, the driver of the utility truck, testified that the defendant's actions caused him to abandon his truck in the middle of the roadway. Ezzo testified that citizens reported to the police that the defendant was creating a disturbance in the roadway. Police Officer Steven Pedbereznak testified that he was dispatched to the scene on information that there was a disturbance. Pedbereznak also testified that when he arrived on scene, he observed the defendant struggling with police officers in the middle of the corner of Cooke Street and Buckingham Street.

Second, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was fighting and acting in a violent manner because extensive force was required, as evidenced by the use of seven officers and Mace, to place him under arrest.

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and considering reasonable inferences from the facts, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have determined that the cumulative force of the evidence established that the defendant acted with the requisite intent to breach the peace.

B

The defendant claims that the state offered insufficient evidence of an "intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable peace officer . . . from performing his or her duties"; General Statutes § 53a-167c (a); to support his conviction of one count of assaulting public safety personnel under § 53a-167c (a)(1). We are not persuaded.

To consider the defendant's claim, we must determine whether Ezzo was a "peace officer" within the meaning of General Statutes §§ 53a-3 (9) and 53a-167c, and whether Ezzo was acting in the performance of his duties. See State v. Casanova, 255 Conn. 581, 592, 767 A.2d 1189 (2001). The term "peace officer" is defined in relevant part as "a member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety or an organized local police department. . . ." General Statutes § 53a-3 (9). Ezzo, as a member of the Waterbury police department, is a peace officer within the meaning of that definition.

"[A] police officer has the duty to enforce the laws and to preserve the peace. Whether he is acting in the performance of his duty . . . must be determined in the light of that purpose and duty. If he is acting under a good faith belief that he is carrying out that duty, and if his actions are reasonably designed to that end, he is acting in the performance of his duties. . . . [His] official duties may cover many functions which have nothing whatever to do with making arrests. . . . The phrase in the performance of his official duties means that the police officer is simply acting within the scope of what [he] is employed to do. The test is whether the [police officer] is acting within that compass or is engaging in a personal frolic of his own. . . . These are factual questions for the jury to determine on the basis of all the circumstances of the case and under appropriate instructions from the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Casanova, supra, 255 Conn. 592-93.

Again, the jury could infer intent from the defendant's conduct. See State v. Anderson, supra, 74 Conn. App. 638. At trial, Ezzo, a member of the Waterbury police department, a peace officer, testified that while he was on patrol, he received notice from a passing motorist that the defendant was in the middle of the street blocking traffic. Ezzo arrived at the scene in a clearly marked police patrol vehicle and in full police uniform. When Ezzo attempted to place the defendant under arrest, the defendant began to struggle with Ezzo. During the struggle, the defendant punched and struck Ezzo's face and shoulder.

On the basis of that testimony, construing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction, and because the issue of intent is a question of fact, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established that the defendant had formed the requisite intent to assault a peace officer.

C

The defendant claims that the state offered insufficient evidence for a finding of intent to support his conviction of interfering with an officer under § 53a-167a.

"This court has stated that General Statutes § 53a-167a . . . defines interfering to include obstruction, resistance, hindrance or endangerment. . . . By using those words it is apparent that the legislature intended to prohibit any act which would amount to meddling in or hampering the activities of the police in the performance of their duties. . . . In enacting [that section], the legislature sought to prohibit behavior that hampers the activities of the police in the performance of their duties. . . . The statute's purpose is to ensure orderly compliance with the police during the performance of their duties; any act intended to thwart this purpose violates the statute." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hampton, 66 Conn. App. 357, 375, 784 A.2d 444, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 901, 789 A.2d 992 (2001). Although the statute does not contain a specific intent element, we previously have construed the requisite mental state to include an intent "to interfere with an officer by resisting arrest." Id., 376.

Again, the jury could infer intent from the defendant's conduct. See State v. Anderson, supra, 74 Conn. App. 638. At trial, Ezzo testified that when he informed the defendant that he was being placed under arrest, the defendant began to resist. The defendant's efforts at resisting arrest ultimately resulted in Ezzo wrestling the defendant to the ground. Moreover, it ultimately required seven police officers and thirty minutes to subdue the defendant. The jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant intended his activity, resisting arrest, to interfere with the police officer's duties. Consequently, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a jury finding of intent to interfere with a peace officer.

III

The defendant claims that the court violated his right to counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution by failing to canvass him adequately to determine if he was making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel in accordance with Practice Book § 44-3. Specifically, the defendant argues that during the canvass, the court (1) failed to state the proper charges against him and (2) inaccurately explained the defendant's maximum permissible punishment. See Practice Book § 44-3(3). We disagree.

Because the defendant concedes that his claim is unpreserved, he asks for review pursuant to State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40. The first two steps in the Golding analysis address the reviewability of the claim, and the last two steps involve the merits of the claim. State v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 305, 746 A.2d 150, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 855, 121 S.Ct. 136, 148 L.Ed.2d 89 (2000). With regard to the first two prongs of Golding, we conclude that the record is adequate for review and that the defendant's right to counsel clearly is of constitutional magnitude. The defendant's claim fails to satisfy Golding's third prong, however, because we conclude that the court's canvass was adequate for the court to conclude that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.

The following additional facts are necessary to our resolution of the defendant's claim. On July 19, 2001, the defendant appeared at a hearing on his motion to dismiss his counsel. The defendant sought to dismiss his attorney, claiming that the attorney never sought to have a charge of failure to appear vacated. The court dismissed the failure to appear charge and denied the motion because, in the court's opinion, the attorney-client relationship had not broken down. The court indicated that the defendant could "resurface the motion" if he desired to do so in the future.

Prior to the commencement of trial, on October 11, 2001, the defendant again sought to have the court consider his motion to dismiss his counsel. The court questioned the defendant about his age, education, prior trial experiences, understanding of the charges against him, knowledge of legal procedure and laws, and personal views regarding his ability to represent himself. Finding the defendant competent, the court granted the defendant's motion and appointed his attorney as standby counsel.

"Although it may be settled law that a criminal defendant has an absolute right to self-representation, that right is not self-executing. A trial court in this state must satisfy itself that several criteria have been met before a criminal defendant properly may be allowed to waive counsel and proceed pro se. . . . Those criteria include a determination by the court (1) that the defendant is competent to waive counsel, and (2) that his waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary. . . .

"A defendant is deemed competent to waive counsel when it is shown that he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. . . . After a determination by the court that a criminal defendant is competent, its next task is to determine whether his decision to waive the right to counsel is knowing, intelligent and voluntary. . . . A defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel if the trial judge finds that he (1) [h]as been clearly advised of the right to the assistance of counsel, including the right to the assignment of counsel when so entitled; (2) [p]ossesses the intelligence and capacity to appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent oneself; (3) [c]omprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case; and (4) [h]as been made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rose, 73 Conn. App. 702, 707-708, 809 A.2d 534, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 927, 814 A.2d 382 (2002); see also Practice Book § 44-3.

While "[a] defendant . . . does not possess a constitutional right to a specifically formulated canvass . . . [h]is constitutional right is not violated as long as the court's canvass, whatever its form, is sufficient to establish [in the court's opinion] that the defendant's waiver was voluntary and knowing. . . . In other words, the court may accept a waiver of the right to counsel without specifically questioning a defendant on each of the factors listed in Practice Book § 961 [now § 44-3] if the record is sufficient to establish that the waiver is voluntary and knowing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taylor, 63 Conn. App. 386, 402, 776 A.2d 1154, cert. denied, 257 Conn. 907, 777 A.2d 687, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 978, 122 S.Ct. 406, 151 L.Ed.2d 308 (2001). "[A] record that affirmatively shows that [the defendant] was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will sufficiently supports a waiver." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oliphant, 47 Conn. App. 271, 277-78, 702 A.2d 1206 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 904, 714 A.2d 3 (1998).

A

The defendant first argues that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent because the court failed to inform him properly of the charges against him. In particular, the defendant states that the court (1) failed to cite the specific statutes contained in the information, (2) failed to explain the essential elements of each crime charged and (3) improperly referred to the term "medical personnel" as opposed to "public safety personnel" when referencing § 53a-167c. We are not persuaded.

In general, "a trial court may appropriately presume that defense counsel has explained the nature of the offense in sufficient detail." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 430, 680 A.2d 147 (1996). The defendant need not "be specifically informed of the particular elements of the crimes charged before being permitted to waive counsel and proceed pro se. In fact . . . perfect comprehension of each element of a criminal charge does not appear to be necessary to a finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver. . . . A discussion of the elements of the charged crimes would be helpful, and may be one of the factors involved in the ultimate determination of whether the defendant understands the nature of the charges against him. A description of the elements of the crime is not, however, a sine qua non of the defendant's constitutional rights in this context. Indeed, in our cases we have approved of a defendant's assertion of the right to proceed pro se where the record did not affirmatively disclose that the trial court explained the specific elements of the crimes charged to the defendant as long as the defendant understood the nature of the crimes charged. . . . In each of those cases, we concluded that the defendant had validly waived his right to counsel, although none of those decisions indicated that the defendant had been expressly apprised of the elements of the crimes charged." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wolff, 237 Conn. 633, 655-57, 678 A.2d 1369 (1996).

On October 11, 2001, the court encountered, by all appearances, a competent and knowledgeable defendant. The court knew that the defendant had had the chance to confer with court-appointed counsel before directing the dismissal of that counsel. The court engaged in a thorough discussion with the defendant to convince itself that the defendant was competent and that his waiver was valid. The court inquired about the defendant's understanding of the charges and the defendant stated that he "[a]bsolutely" understood. Despite the defendant's claimed understanding, the court proceeded to describe the charges and the elements associated with each crime. The defendant also acknowledged the fact that his attorney had discussed the elements of the charges.

Although the defendant is correct that the court substituted "medical personnel" for "public safety personnel" when referring to the assault charge, the defendant was put on notice of the substance of the crime by the court, his former counsel and the charging instrument. We do not believe that this precluded the defendant from understanding the "nature of the charges" against him. The information put the defendant on notice of the crimes charges because it used the proper term, "public safety personnel," cited to § 53a-167c and repeatedly used the term "peace officer." Because General Statutes § 53a-167c is entitled "[a]ssault of public safety or emergency medical personnel," the defendant was on notice that he was accused of assaulting a member of at least one of those two classes of personnel. During the canvass, the court informed the defendant that "assault on medical personnel, you hit, cause pain to a medical [person] who's identifiable in his performing his or her duty." Regardless of the victim's title, medical personnel or safety personnel, the defendant knew that he was being charged with violating § 53a-167c (a)(1), and the substance of the crime charged is the same regardless of whether public safety or emergency medical personnel are involved; that is, it is still a class C felony. See General Statutes § 53a-167c (b).

Additionally, the defendant does not dispute the fact that the part B information was filed because he previously had served a sentence for the same crime, assault of a peace officer, further emphasizing to the court his understanding of the nature of the charges against him. On the basis of that fact, during the July 19, 2001 hearing before the court, Damiani, J., on the defendant's original motion to dismiss his counsel, the defendant stated that he had "just finished doing an extensive period of time for basically the same thing, actually the same thing." By his own admission, the defendant was aware that he was charged with assaulting public safety personnel in the present case. Three months later, before the same court, Damiani, J., it was appropriate for the court to rely on the defendant's previous admission and to take it into consideration during the court's canvass to satisfy the court that the defendant was aware of the nature of the charges against him.

We conclude, in light of the totality of the canvass, that the court properly canvassed the defendant and did not, by an inaccurate statement during its canvass, render his waiver unknowing or unintelligent.

B

Finally, the defendant argues that the canvass was improper because the court did not accurately explain to him the maximum permissible punishment. More specifically, the defendant argues that although the court informed him that he was exposed to twenty-three years incarceration, the defendant actually was exposed to twenty-four years and nine months. Therefore, the defendant argues, the canvass was not adequate. We are not persuaded.

The defendant's argument implies that although he was aware of an exposure period of twenty-three years, the additional twenty-one month difference precluded him from having a broad understanding of the charges against him and invalidated his waiver. Pursuant to the rules of practice, the court is required to satisfy itself, not the defendant, that the defendant "[c]omprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 44-3(3).

The rules of practice do not, as the defendant suggests, require the court to satisfy itself that the defendant has a precise understanding of the maximum sentence. In light of the defendant's uncontested understanding of an exposure of twenty-three years, we conclude that the additional twenty-one month period did not preclude the court from believing that he had a broad understanding of the charges against him.