EISENHAUER, J.

Tyrone Edward Pierce appeals from his convictions and sentences for criminal mischief and attempting to elude. He contends there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. He also contends the district court erred in ordering him to pay restitution to one of the victim's for time and money spent to find a comparable vehicle.

On May 1, 2002, Pierce was driving a Dodge 4-by-4 truck when he struck Lonny Goodwin, who was driving a 1990 Honda Accord. Goodwin noticed Pierce's vehicle approaching him quickly. Pierce pulled his truck alongside Goodwin and drove in a manner suggesting he wanted to race. When the lanes merged, Pierce cut in front of Goodwin's vehicle, forcing the Honda into a median. Both vehicles momentarily came to a stop. As Goodwin tried to dislodge his vehicle from the median, Pierce backed his truck into Goodwin's Honda. Pierce then fled the scene.

Later that night, Pierce rear ended a car driven by Sally Beronich. As Pierce sped away, Beronich recorded three digits of the license plate number. She saw the truck turn into a trailer court.

Police officers received information that Pierce's vehicle had proceeded into the Grand View Mobile Home Park. Two officers approached the vehicle on foot and ordered Pierce to place his hands outside the vehicle. Pierce complied with this request. When ordered to use one hand to open the door, Pierce initially complied, but then sped off at a high rate of speed. A pursuit ensued for three or four blocks before Pierce swerved and struck a parked vehicle. One officer estimated Pierce's speed at between fifty and sixty miles per hour in the fifteen-mile-per-hour zone.

On May 9, 2002, Pierce was charged with criminal mischief, attempting to elude, and interference with official acts. Following a bench trial, Pierce was convicted of second-degree criminal mischief, first-degree attempting to elude, and interference with official acts.

Pierce first contends the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for criminal mischief and attempting to elude. He claims both are specific intent crimes, and the evidence presented at trial shows he could not form the necessary intent because he was suffering from cocaine induced paranoid delusion. We review claims of insufficient evidence for errors at law. State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000). We will uphold a finding of guilt if substantial evidence supports the verdict. Id. "Substantial evidence is evidence upon which a rational finder of fact could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.

We first note the crime of attempting to elude does not require specific intent.

When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a further consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence; the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.

Veverka v. Cash, 318 N.W.2d 447, 449-50 (Iowa 1982) (citations omitted). The crime of attempting to elude occurs when:

. . . the driver willfully fails to bring the motor vehicle to a stop or otherwise eludes or attempts to elude a marked official law enforcement vehicle driven by a uniformed peace officer after being given a visual and audible signal to stop.

Iowa Code § 321.279 (2001). The definition of attempting to elude does not require intent to do some further act. It simply requires an intent to elude and is therefore a general intent crime. Accordingly, we reject Pierce's argument that he was unable to form the specific intent to commit the act of attempting to elude.

The crime of criminal mischief is a specific intent crime because it requires an intent to damage, deface, alter, or destroy property, rather than an intent to do the act which damaged the property. State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998). Accordingly, evidence of Pierce's voluntary intoxication may negate the specific intent required. See Steinkuehler v. State, 507 N.W.2d 716, 722 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). The district court found, however, that although Pierce may have been in a rage, or suffering from cocaine intoxication, he was in full command of his truck and not delusional. We conclude substantial evidence supports the district court's assessment. Pierce did not merely collide with the Honda and drive away. As the court noted, Pierce maneuvered his truck around obstacles in order to position himself to ram Goodwin's vehicle after it was forced into the median. His actions are evidence of his specific intent to damage the car. Under such facts, we conclude Pierce's conviction for criminal mischief in the second degree is supported by substantial evidence.

Pierce next contends his counsel was ineffective (1) in failing to investigate and present evidence on the issue of the legally enforceable speed limit at the mobile home park, (2) in failing to obtain an expert witness in regard to the significance of the failure of the airbag to deploy, and (3) in failing to file a motion for new trial. To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a defendant must show (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted therefrom. Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1999). We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. McBride, 625 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001).

Iowa Code section 321.279(3) (2001) provides a defendant is guilty of a class "D" felony when attempting to elude only if the defendant exceeded the speed limit by twenty-five miles per hour. The district court found the speed limit in the mobile home court was fifteen miles per hour, and that Pierce's speed while fleeing the officers was at least forty miles per hour. Pierce's ineffective assistance claims regarding the speed limit in the mobile home park and the failure of the airbag to deploy relate to whether he was exceeding the speed limit by at least twenty-five miles per hour. Because the record is not fully developed as to these matters, we preserve these claims for postconviction relief. See Berryhill v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1999) (holding ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be preserved where the record is inadequate to resolve the claims on direct appeal).

As to Pierce's claim his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion for new trial, we conclude no prejudice has been shown. It is not likely the district court, having acted as the trier of fact, would have found Pierce's convictions were against the weight of the evidence.

Finally, Pierce contends the district court erred in ordering him to pay $200 in restitution to Goodwin for "time and money spent to find a comparable vehicle." Decisions regarding restitution are reviewed for errors at law and are only reversed for abuse of discretion. State v. Bradley, 637 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001). Restitution may be ordered to compensate a victim "to the extent not paid by an insurer, which a victim could recover against the offender in a civil action . . . except punitive damages and damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium." Iowa Code § 910.1(3). An award of restitution can stand as long as the figure has a reasonable basis and is not speculative or imaginary. State v. Watts, 587 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Iowa 1998).

It is not evident how Goodwin determined the $200 figure for time and money spent finding a comparable vehicle. He simply listed it as a loss on his victim impact statement. He may have taken time off work to find a new vehicle. He may have required the use of public transportation, taxi cabs, or a rental vehicle while searching for a new car, or he may have simply valued his own time. Because the basis for this figure is uncertain, we conclude the court abused its discretion in awarding the $200.

AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REVERSED IN PART.