DUNCAN, P.J.

Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, and Alice S. Newlin, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services. On the supplemental brief were Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.

Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General.

Before Duncan, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Judge, and Flynn, Judge.

DUNCAN, P.J.In this criminal case, defendant appeals a judgment convicting him of two counts of sexual abuse in the third degree, ORS 163.415, for conduct involving a 16–year–old girl. He challenges the trial court's denial of his motion in limine to exclude evidence of his prior conduct toward the victim. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Williams , 357 Or. 1, 346 P.3d 455 (2015), defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to balance the probative value of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice before admitting it. We conclude that defendant preserved that argument, that the trial court erred in failing to conduct balancing before admitting the evidence, and that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Defendant was charged with the crimes noted above for kissing the victim, a friend of his daughter, during a sleepover. Defendant moved in limine to exclude evidence that defendant had previously kissed the victim, snuggled with her, lain with her on the couch, talked to her on the phone, and asked her for photographs. Defendant's motion included an assertion that he was relying on OEC 403 and a quotation from State v. Mayfield , 302 Or. 631, 644, 733 P.2d 438 (1987) :

“[A] finding of logical relevance of uncharged misconduct evidence does not guarantee its admission. Evidence law demands not only logical relevance but also that the probative value of the evidence not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice as set forth in OEC 403. Evidence is prejudicial under OEC 403 if it tempts the jury to decide the case on an improper basis[.]”

At a pretrial hearing, the state argued that the evidence was admissible to show defendant's “sexual propensity toward [the] victim” under the reasoning set out in State v. McKay , 309 Or. 305, 308, 787 P.2d 479 (1990). Defendant argued that the evidence was not relevant and the court rejected that argument. Defendant did not reiterate his request for OEC 403 balancing, and the court admitted the evidence without conducting balancing. The jury convicted defendant, and this appeal followed.

After this case was argued, the Supreme Court decided Williams, in which it held that “the legislature intended OEC 404(4)^{[ ]}to supersede OEC 404(3)^{[ ]}in criminal cases, except, of course, as otherwise provided by the state or federal constitutions.” 357 Or. at 15, 346 P.3d 455. The court held that “propensity evidence is relevant in child sexual abuse cases to show that a defendant committed the charged acts.” State v. Turnidge , 359 Or. 364, 432, 374 P.3d 853 (2016) (Turnidge ) (discussing Williams ). And it decided that, “in child sexual abuse prosecutions where the state offered prior bad acts evidence to prove that the defendant had a propensity to sexually abuse children, due process ‘at least requires that, on request, trial courts determine whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.’ ” Turnidge , 359 Or. at 431 (quoting Williams , 357 Or. at 19, 346 P.3d 455 ).

As noted above, in light of Williams, defendant asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to balance the probative value of the evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice. The state responds that defendant did not preserve any request for balancing and, alternatively, that the balancing required by due process is narrower than OEC 403 balancing and would not require exclusion of the evidence at issue here. We conclude that defendant preserved his request for balancing by raising it in his motion in limine and that the trial court erred in failing to conduct the requested balancing. Under our post-Williams case law, the required balancing is OEC 403 balancing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

We begin with preservation. As the Supreme Court has explained,

“the rule of preservation ‘gives a trial court the chance to consider and rule on a contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error altogether or correcting one already made, which in turn may obviate the need for an appeal.’ Peeples v. Lampert , 345 Or. 209, 219, 191 P.3d 637 (2008). The rule also ensures fairness to opposing parties, by requiring that ‘the positions of the parties are presented clearly to the initial tribunal’ so that ‘parties are not taken by surprise, misled, or denied opportunities to meet an argument.’ Davis v. O'Brien , 320 Or. 729, 737, 891 P.2d 1307 (1995).”

State v. Walker , 350 Or. 540, 548, 258 P.3d 1228 (2011). Rather than relying on inflexible rules or any “neat verbal formula,” the Supreme Court has instructed us to evaluate preservation on a case-by-case basis, paying “attention to the purpose of the rule and the practicalities it serves.” Id. In light of those instructions, our task here is to decide whether defendant's assertion in his motion in limine that he was relying on OEC 403, coupled with his quotation from Mayfield explaining OEC 403 balancing, clearly presented his position to the trial court such that the state had the opportunity to meet the argument and the trial court had the opportunity to consider and rule on it.

In general, a party does not need to reraise at trial an objection that has been litigated and ruled on pretrial. State v. Pitt , 352 Or. 566, 574, 293 P.3d 1002 (2012). Moreover, where a defendant raises an argument in a pretrial motion, “the fact that [the] defendant did not ‘reiterate’ her argument at the hearing is not dispositive.” Walker, 350 Or. at 550, 258 P.3d 1228 ; see also Maxfield v. Nooth , 278 Or.App. 684, 687, 377 P.3d 650, 2016 WL 3197410 (2016) (“As the Supreme Court has explained, for preservation purposes, a party ordinarily need not reiterate orally the arguments that it has made in writing, and also need not renew those arguments after the court has made its ruling. Rather, the question ‘is whether a party provides sufficient information to enable opposing parties to meet an objection and the trial court to avoid error.’ ” (Internal citation omitted; quoting Walker , 350 Or. at 550, 258 P.3d 1228.)).

That is true even where the court does not specifically address the unreiterated argument. For example, in Walker, the trial court did not address the argument that the defendant sought to raise on appeal, which involved the scope of a search authorized by a warrant. We held that the defendant had failed to preserve the argument, which had been briefed pretrial, in part because she “never developed or reiterated” her argument at the hearing on her motion to suppress evidence and she “never took issue with the trial court's failure to address [the] matter[ at the hearing].” State v. Walker , 234 Or.App. 596, 607, 229 P.3d 606 (2010), aff'd on other grounds , 350 Or. 540, 258 P.3d 1228 (2011).

The Supreme Court disagreed with our preservation analysis. It first explained:

“This court has never required that each and every argument that has been asserted in writing must be repeated orally in court in order for the argument to be preserved. See, e.g. , State v. Roble–Baker , 340 Or. 631, 639–40, 136 P.3d 22 (2006) (rejecting contention that, because the defendant did not repeat all contentions raised earlier, those not repeated were not preserved).”

Walker , 350 Or. at 550, 258 P.3d 1228. The court also rejected our reliance on the defendant's failure to take issue with the trial court's omission. It explained that “the fact that [the] defendant did not take issue with the trial court's failure to address her argument likewise is not controlling. Once a court has ruled, a party is generally not obligated to renew his or her contentions in order to preserve them for the purposes of appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).Thus, our consideration of whether an argument presented in a pretrial motion is preserved depends only upon whether, under all of the circumstances, the argument was presented clearly enough to serve the purposes of preservation. It does not depend, as a categorical matter, on whether the defendant reiterated the argument at a hearing or whether, if the trial court failed to address the argument, the defendant took issue with the court's failure to do so. Id. at 549–50, 258 P.3d 1228 ; see also State v. Nelson , 246 Or.App. 91, 99, 265 P.3d 8 (2011) (“The fact that [the] defendant made his OEC 412 argument in his memorandum but did not orally repeat that argument at the hearing does not demonstrate that the argument was either waived or not preserved. * * * Nor was [the] defendant required to take issue with the trial court's failure to address his argument.”); accord State v. Parnell , 278 Or.App. 260, 266–67, 373 P.3d 1252 (2016) (where the defendant raised a broad and ambiguous argument in his motion and, at the hearing, focused entirely on one possible understanding of the argument, the defendant did not preserve an alternative argument that could have been encompassed by the motion, because “a fair reading of the record shows that [the] defendant did not put the state or the trial court on notice” of the alternative argument).

The state contends that, in Purcell v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. , 153 Or.App. 415, 959 P.2d 89, adh'd to as modified , 155 Or.App. 1, 963 P.2d 729 (1998), we established a categorical rule that, where a party does not reiterate a written request for balancing under OEC 403 at the hearing, the argument that the court erred in failing to conduct OEC 403 balancing is not preserved for appeal. However, as we have explained, under the Supreme Court's decision in Walker, the preservation inquiry must take into account the totality of the circumstances and, in any event, does not rest on a categorical requirement that a party reiterate a written argument at a hearing or renew an objection after the trial court has ruled. Thus, to the extent that we established such a rule in Purcell, that holding was abrogated by Walker. The state also relies on State v. McMullin , 269 Or.App. 859, 860 n. 2, 346 P.3d 611, rev. den. , 357 Or. 640, 360 P.3d 523 (2015), in which we held that the defendant's OEC 403 argument on appeal was unpreserved. In McMullin, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence under OEC 403 ; specifically, he argued that proper OEC 403 balancing required the exclusion of the evidence at issue. Id. (noting that the defendant's argument was that OEC 403 “precluded admission” of the evidence at issue). We held that that argument was not properly before us because it did not appear that the trial court actually had conducted OEC 403 balancing. Id . (noting that the trial court “does not appear to have ruled on” whether OEC 403 precluded admission of the evidence). Thus, McMullin stands only for the proposition that we will not decide the merits of an OEC 403 balancing claim when the trial court never conducted the OEC 403 balancing in the first place. Consequently, McMullin does not apply in cases like this one, where a party is arguing that the court erred in failing to conduct OEC 403 balancing, despite a request that it do so.

In this case, defendant's motion in limine raised OEC 403 sufficiently “to enable opposing parties to meet [the] objection and the trial court to avoid error.” Walker , 350 Or. at 550, 258 P.3d 1228. Although defendant's statement of his position was relatively basic, his citation to OEC 403, paired with his citation to Mayfield and the quotation explaining the OEC 403 balancing process, raised OEC 403 clearly enough that it would have been apparent to the state and the trial court that defendant sought to have the court balance the probative value of the prior bad acts evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice that would result from its admission. See Walker , 350 Or. at 550, 258 P.3d 1228 (“Particularly in criminal cases, in which there is a premium on considerations of cost and speed, the realities of trial practice may be such that fairly abbreviated short-hand references suffice to put all on notice about the nature of a party's arguments.”); see also id. (“The fact that the level of detail or thoroughness with which a party articulates a position may leave something to be desired does not mean that it was insufficient to serve the rule of preservation's pragmatic purposes.”). Thus, defendant preserved his request for OEC 403 balancing.

As noted above, in Williams, the Supreme Court held that, in child sexual abuse prosecutions, where the state offered prior bad acts evidence to prove that the defendant had a propensity to sexually abuse children, due process “ ‘at least requires that, on request, trial courts determine whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.’ ” Turnidge , 359 Or. at 431 (quoting Williams , 357 Or. at 19, 346 P.3d 455 ). After Williams, we concluded that the required balancing is OEC 403 balancing. State v. Brumbach , 273 Or.App. 552, 563, 359 P.3d 490 (2015), rev. den. , 359 Or. 525 (2016). Subsequently, in Turnidge, the Supreme Court held that, “if a trial court determines that prior bad acts evidence is relevant to a nonpropensity purpose under OEC 404(3), the court, on a proper motion, must weigh the probative value of the evidence against its potential to unduly prejudice the defendant, per OEC 403, before admitting the evidence.” 359 Or. at 442. Thus, when a trial court admits prior bad acts evidence in a child sexual abuse case, either for a propensity purpose or a nonpropensity purpose, OEC 403 balancing is required, on a proper motion. See State v. Altabef , 279 Or.App. 268, 273, 379 P.3d 755 (2016) (noting that “we need not resolve whether [prior bad acts] evidence was relevant [in a prosecution for child sexual abuse] under either (or both) OEC 404(3) or OEC 404(4) because, regardless of the theory of relevance, the court was required to balance in this case”).

Here, defendant requested that the trial court conduct OEC 403 balancing, but the court did not do so. That was error. Williams , 357 Or. at 19, 346 P.3d 455 ; see also Altabef , 279 Or.App. at 272 (when a defendant in a child sexual abuse case raises an OEC 403 challenge, “a trial court's failure to properly engage in balancing under OEC 403 is reversible error”); State v. Baughman , 276 Or.App. 754, 764, 369 P.3d 423, rev allowed , ––– Or. –––– (2016) (“[B]efore admitting prior bad acts evidence in a child sex abuse case, the trial court must engage in OEC 403 balancing.”); Brumbach , 273 Or.App. at 560, 359 P.3d 490 (“[I]n light of Williams, the trial court erred because it did not subject the other acts evidence to OEC 403 balancing.”).

“Under Williams, a failure to perform the requisite balancing test is a violation of a defendant's due process rights under the United States Constitution.” Brumbach , 273 Or.App. at 564, 359 P.3d 490 (citing Williams , 357 Or. at 18, 346 P.3d 455 ). Thus, we must reverse and remand for a new trial unless we can confidently say, “ ‘on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. at 564, 359 P.3d 490 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) ). Here, the trial court could conclude that “the evidence is so unfairly prejudicial as to be inadmissible under OEC 403.” Brumbach , 273 Or.App. at 565, 359 P.3d 490. And, with that evidence excluded, the outcome of the trial could have been different. Accordingly, we cannot say that the error in admitting the evidence at issue—that defendant had been intimate with the victim prior to the charged acts of kissing the victim—without first conducting balancing would not have affected the jury's determination of whether defendant kissed the victim as charged. See id. at 565, 359 P.3d 490. Thus, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Convictions for third-degree sexual abuse reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed.