MAHAN, J.

James Clifford Higgins appeals from his judgment and sentence entered upon bench trial verdicts finding him guilty of one count each of ongoing criminal conduct and theft in the second degree and three counts of theft in the first degree. On appeal Higgins contends (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because his right to speedy trial under Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b) was violated; and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file a notice of the defense of entrapment. We affirm the convictions and reject Higgins's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Speedy Trial. Review of a statutory speedy trial claim is for correction of errors at law. State v. Finn, 469 N.W.2d 692, 693 (Iowa 1991). A district court has limited discretion in ruling on a motion to dismiss under 2.33(2)(b). State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001). We thus review the district court's ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1999). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b) provides:

If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived his or her right to a speedy trial he or she must be brought to trial within ninety days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown.

The burden is on the State to demonstrate compliance with speedy trial principles. State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983). However, dismissal is not compelled where the State proves (1) defendant's waiver of speedy trial, (2) delay attributable to the defendant, or (3) "good cause" for the delay. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d at 600.

In this case, the trial information was filed on April 5, 2001. At the pretrial conference on May 10, 2001, the court ordered the case set for trial on June 27, 2001. At the same time, the State offered Higgins a plea agreement, which was to expire on May 24, 2001. Some time after that date, Higgins's counsel advised the State he had decided to plead guilty. On June 6, 2001, the district court entered an order setting a plea proceeding for June 25, 2001. However, at the June 25 proceeding, Higgins refused to enter a guilty plea and instead insisted on being tried on June 27. At that time, the State requested additional time because it had earlier released its witnesses from their subpoenas. In extending the trial deadline, the court found good cause because the State reasonably had relied on Higgins's representation that he would plead guilty on June 25.

Upon a careful review of the record, we find the district court correctly found good cause to extend the speedy trial deadline. The delay in this case was caused solely because Higgins indicated he would plead guilty. We have previously stated the consequences of offering to enter a guilty plea:

Once a defendant indicates the choice to forego trial by entering a guilty plea or advising the State that a plea of guilty is forthcoming, the case is removed from the trial calendar and the State discontinues trial preparations. There is little, if any, need for either the State or the defendant to prepare for trial.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Higgins claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file a notice of the defense of entrapment. We review such claims de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). We will resolve ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal when the record is adequate to decide the issue. State v. Arne, 579 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Iowa 1998). We conclude the record does provide a sufficient basis for determining this issue.

To prevail on his claim, Higgins must show (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); State v. Bugely, 562 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Iowa 1997). The reviewing court may first consider either prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Iowa 2000). We have considered the prejudice prong first and conclude Higgins has failed to establish any prejudice under this record. Defendant waived his right to jury trial, stipulated to the minutes of testimony, and requested the district court to make findings and conclusions based upon these minutes. The minutes do not contain any credible evidence to support an entrapment defense. In addition, Higgins did not testify or present any "minimal showing from which this court can assess the potential viability of his claim." State v. Wagner, 410 N.W.2d 207, 215 (Iowa 1997). A "minimal showing" would not only demonstrate some need for further development of the record, but should also give the court some indication of what prejudice is likely to have resulted. Higgins's "bald assertion" that "entrapment was the only plausible defense" is insufficient to preserve the question for postconviction proceedings. Id. Higgins's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.

AFFIRMED.