GERSTEN, Judge.

I respectfully dissent.

Appellee, Curtis Brown (Brown), was arrested and charged with burglary, theft, and criminal mischief. Prior to any police questioning, Brown was advised of his Miranda rights. Brown invoked his right to counsel, and thereafter all police questioning ceased.

Before placing Brown in a holding cell, the arresting officer explained the nature of the charges to Brown. About an hour later, Brown was moved to a booking room.

When he arrived at the booking room, Brown told the officer that he wanted to tell him "the truth." The officer explained that he could not take Brown's statement because Brown had invoked his right to counsel. Brown then agreed to waive his previously asserted right. Brown was again advised of his rights and signed a written Miranda waiver. Brown then wrote his confession, admitting the crimes.

Before trial, Brown moved to suppress the confession. At the suppression hearing, the court, making findings of fact, rejected Brown's assertion that he had been coerced into giving the confession. The trial court stated:

I really don't believe anything he says. This is not going to make any difference in my decision in the case. I think he is an absolute liar . . . I don't really care what he says. That's not going to be what decides this case . . . I don't care what this guy says. He wasn't coerced in anyway [sic]. He wasn't afraid in anyway [sic].

On a motion to suppress, it is the trial court: (1) who is the trier of both fact and law; (2) who determines the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence; (3) whose determinations concerning questions of fact must be accepted by appellate courts; and (4) whose resolution of conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. Gonzalez v. State, 578 So.2d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); State v. Belcher, 520 So.2d 303 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 529 So.2d 695 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 912, 109 S.Ct. 270, 102 L.Ed.2d 258 (1988); Harvey v. State, 502 So.2d 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Dooley v. State, 501 So.2d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); State v. Guerra, 455 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 461 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1985); State v. Garcia, 431 So.2d 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); State v. Favaloro, 424 So.2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); State v. Melendez, 392 So.2d 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Battleman, 374 So.2d 636 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Ponder v. State, 323 So.2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); State v. Thomas, 212 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968); Cameron v. State, 112 So.2d 864 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959); see also Stone v. State, 378 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986, 101 S.Ct. 407, 66 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980).

Here the trial court determined the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and resolved conflicting evidence by finding that the defendant was lying and the officer was truthful. The trial court stated:

[N]ow when an appellate court looks at it, the appellate court is going to know the basis of my ruling, and it has nothing to do with what the Defendant said, but it was only on what the detective said . . . I find the testimony of the officer was credible and I believe what the officer said to me.

Nevertheless, relying on Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), the trial court suppressed Brown's confession, finding that the officer's discussion of the case with Brown was the functional equivalent of police questioning. The trial court stated:

Let's say there is no more questioning. But he is not allowed to then say to him like they did in the Christian burial speech on the way back to Arizona, whatever it was I think about the poor people and it's Christmas time and you should give them a Christian burial. I am not going to ask you to say a word. Don't say a word but just think about it.

Accordingly, the sole issue on the question of suppression is a matter of law — whether the officer's comments rise to the level of police questioning or its functional equivalent.

The officer testified that his only contact with Brown, after Brown invoked his rights and before he offered to make a statement, was as follows:

At that time, I explained to him briefly the purposes of his being arrested, that I was assigned an investigation that [the victim] had made indicating that he had in fact been listed in the original report as a possible suspect in the case.

I also explained to him the fact that I spoke with his girlfriend . . . who provided me a written statement in the presence of her mother because she was a juvenile.

I explained his arrest was based on the circumstances contingent to those facts prior to his arrest and basically he was placed in our interrogation room for safe keeping.

Neither the cases relied on by the trial court, nor the cases cited by the majority, support the conclusion that Brown's confession must be suppressed. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 387, 97 S.Ct. at 1232, a police detective transporting a defendant after he had invoked his Miranda rights attempted to elicit a response concerning the location of the murdered girl's body by appealing to the defendant's highly religious sentiments.

In Brewer, unlike here, the State conceded that the officer's "Christian burial speech" constituted police interrogation. In finding that the defendant's statements should have been suppressed in Brewer, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Despite [the defendant's] express and implicit assertions of his right to counsel, [the detective] proceeded to elicit incriminating statements from [the defendant]. [The detective] did not preface this effort by telling [the defendant] that he had a right to the presence of a lawyer and made no effort at all to ascertain whether [the defendant] wished to relinquish that right. The circumstances of record in this case thus provides no reasonable basis for finding that [the defendant] waived his right to the assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeal did not hold, nor do we, that under the circumstances of this case [the defendant] could not, without notice to counsel, have waived his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. It only held, as do we, that he did not.

In this case, the police were not attempting to elicit incriminating statements from Brown. Further, Brown was again fully advised of his rights and waived them in writing. Accordingly, the suppression in Brewer is inapplicable to these facts.

Similarly, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 291, 100 S.Ct. at 1682, does not mandate suppression of Brown's confession:

[S]ince, the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

The comments made by the officer do not fall within the purview of interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, and nothing in the police comments invited, or elicited a response. Accordingly, it is clear that, as in Rhode Island v. Innis, "it cannot be fairly concluded that the respondent was subjected to the `functional equivalent' of questioning." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302, 100 S.Ct. at 1690.

Not one of the cases cited by the majority requires suppression of Brown's confession. Minnick v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990); and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), address the resumption of police interrogation after the invocation of Miranda rights. Based on the previous analysis, they are inapplicable to these facts.

Jones v. State, 497 So.2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 506 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823, 108 S.Ct. 87, 98 L.Ed.2d 48 (1987), involved the functional equivalent of interrogation as defined in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 291, 100 S.Ct. at 1682, and therefore does not apply to the instant facts.

Finally, Colquitt v. State, 396 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), is not relevant to this case. Colquitt states:

This is not a case where the interrogation was terminated after a suspect requested counsel and was later resumed only under circumstances where it was apparent the defendant had changed his mind and desired to make a statement. Here, the defendant continuously indicated his desire for an attorney and consequently the state completely failed to show that the defendant thereafter exercised a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent.

In this case the officer's comments merely advised Brown of the charges and circumstances concerning his arrest. The comments were not intended to elicit any response. Therefore, because the officer's comments did not constitute an interrogation, or its equivalent, I would reverse the suppression of the statement.