SMITH

Jerry A. Blair, of Jerri A. Blair, P.A., Tavares, for Appellant.B. Jordan Stuart, of Wood & Stuart, P.A., Bunnell, for Appellee.
, III, C.M., Associate Judge.

Spencer Estates of Florida, LLC (“Spencer”) appeals from a lower court order that denied its motion for contempt and to enforce final judgment. The basis for the trial court's denial was a lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

In litigation regarding the agricultural classification of Spencer's property for the 2008 tax year, the trial court found that the property had received an agricultural classification from a court of competent jurisdiction as a result of litigation regarding the 2006 and 2007 tax years. The trial court further found that the property continued to be eligible to receive the agricultural classification until the use of the property changed. The trial court then required Appellee, Edward Havill, Lake County Property Appraiser (“Havill”) to “reclassify that portion of lots 3 and 4 which was classified in 2008 as ‘Vacant Lakefront’ property” and classify it as agricultural so that Spencer's entire property was classified agricultural. In 2009 and 2010, Havill again only granted the agricultural classification to a portion of the same property and denied the agricultural classification as a whole. As a result, Spencer filed a motion for contempt and to enforce the final judgment in the 2008 case. In his motion, he admitted that Havill refunded the overpaid property taxes for 2008 as ordered. The motion sought the agricultural classification for the entire property and a refund for 2009 and 2010. After conducting a hearing where arguments were heard, the trial court denied the motion finding:

The Final Judgment sought to be enforced relates to the agricultural classification for the subject property for the tax year 2008. The ruling in the Final Judgment has been complied with by [Havill]. In the subject Motion, Plaintiff seeks relief for the tax years 2009 and 2010. Each year stands on its own for ad valorem purposes. Simpson v.Merrill, 234 So.2d 350 (Fla.1970); Keith Investments v.James, 220 So.2d 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). This Court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief sought.

We agree that Spencer sought an improper remedy under the 2008 case for the 2009 and 2010 agricultural classification. Havill complied with the final judgment in the 2008 case. If there was no change in the use of Spencer's property subsequent to the trial court's judgment in the 2008 case, the proper remedy is to seek fees and costs pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statute, in the new litigation challenging the 2009 and 2010 classifications.

The trial court's judgment finding no jurisdiction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED. EVANDER, J., concurs.
BERGER, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.

BERGER, J., concurring and concurring specially.

I wholly concur with the majority opinion that the proper remedy in this case is to seek fees and costs pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes, in the new litigation challenging the 2009 and 2010 classifications. I write separately to remind Havill that, in 2008, a court of competent jurisdiction declared Spencer's land agricultural. Thus, the portion of Spencer's land subject to the court's classification was entitled to continue to receive that classification in subsequent years pursuant to section 193.461(3)(e), Florida Statutes, unless a specified change occurred. The changes warranting reclassification are outlined in section 193.461(4), Florida Statutes, which provides:

(4)(a) The property appraiser shall reclassify the following lands as nonagricultural:

1. Land diverted from an agricultural to a nonagricultural use.

2. Land no longer being utilized for agricultural purposes.

3. Land that has been zoned to a nonagricultural use at the request of the owner subsequent to the enactment of this law.

(b) The board of county commissioners may also reclassify lands classified as agricultural to nonagricultural when there is contiguous urban or metropolitan development and the board of county commissioners finds that the continued use of such lands for agricultural purposes will act as a deterrent to the timely and orderly expansion of the community.

(c) Sale of land for a purchase price which is three or more times the agricultural assessment placed on the land shall create a presumption that such land is not used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes. Upon a showing of special circumstances by the landowner demonstrating that the land is to be continued in bona fide agriculture, this presumption may be rebutted.

While Havill is entitled each year to make a new assessment concerning whether the purpose of the land has changed, he cannot do so arbitrarily. Continuing to reclassify the property year after year without proper authority is a perfect example of government run amuck, which places an unnecessary burden and expense on the property owner to re-litigate the same issue in order to obtain a refund of overpaid property taxes.