KATHLEEN M. WILLIAMS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Maricelia Soto, Coral Gables, FL, pro se.

Gregory Antonio Samms, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiff.

Ezra Saul Greenberg, Miami–Dade County Attorneys Office, Miami, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

KATHLEEN M. WILLIAMS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice (DE 130), which was filed on October 23, 2017. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants' motion (DE 131), and Defendants filed a reply (DE 132). For the reasons set out below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court will not recount the tortured litigation history of this case in the present Order, as Plaintiff's recurring practice of noncompliance is well memorialized in the Court's previous orders and the discussions on the record during the seven hearings that the Court has held in an attempt to move this case forward (DE 73; DE 76; DE 81; DE 87; DE 95; DE 98; DE 122). In addition, the details of Plaintiff's nonconformity with her legal obligations and the orders of this Court are amply set out in Defendants' renewed motion (DE 130). As such, it is sufficient to note that, in the three-and-a-half years since this litigation was initiated, Plaintiff has been unwilling or unable to cooperate in carrying out even the most basic discovery obligations, and has repeatedly ignored court orders requiring her to do so.

The motion presently before the Court is the second motion to dismiss as a sanction that has been filed by the Defendants. The first motion was filed on February 9, 2017, after Plaintiff refused to sit for her deposition or provide complete medical records despite the hearings held and court orders issued to address these and other discovery deadlines. (See, e.g., DE 51; DE 56; DE 65; DE 66; DE 73; DE 74). On August 17, 2017—after holding four additional hearings—the Court denied without prejudice Defendants' first motion to dismiss in order to give the Plaintiff one final opportunity to prosecute her case. (See, e.g., DE 81; DE 82; DE 87; DE 88; DE 95; DE 98; DE 99; DE 110; DE 115; DE 122; DE 123). In that order—and at the hearing that preceded it—the Court set the deadline for Plaintiff's deposition on October 23, 2017, and warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with all court deadlines and rulings would result in dismissal of her case. The Order went on to state that "[n]o further extensions of any deadlines set in this case will be granted for any reason," and expressly declined to accept Plaintiff's proposed medical caveat in her "Acceptance of Defendants' Proposed Discovery Schedule." (See DE 123 at 2; DE 120 at 1).

Despite this admonition, Plaintiff scheduled a medical procedure for three days before the date of her deposition. Then, on the day of her deposition—which was also the deposition deadline set by the Court—Plaintiff filed a letter with the Court at 10:23 a.m., stating, with no documentation from her physician, that it was against medical advice for her to leave the hospital, and that she would not be attending the deposition in defense counsel's offices. Plaintiff therefore was never deposed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

It is well established by precedent that "[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution," powers "which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others." United States v. Hudson , 7 Cranch 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812) ; see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper , 447 U.S. 752, 764, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980) (citing Hudson ). The Court's inherent powers permit a broad spectrum of sanctions that "include ... punishing for contempt, assessment of attorney's fees, and outright dismissal of a lawsuit." Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp. , 372 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1372–73 (S.D. Fla. 2005).

District courts also "possess[ ] the inherent power to police [their] dockets" and have a "constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions." Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-op. of Fla. , 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989) ; Pick v. Florida 17th Judicial Circuit Court , 12–62500–CIV, 2013 WL 1503156, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (quoting Procup v. Strickland , 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc)). This includes a "responsibility to prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by others" and the authority to "impose formal sanctions upon dilatory litigants." Pick , 2013 WL 1503156, at *3. Id. The sanctions available to a district court within the ambit of its management powers "range from a simple reprimand to an order dismissing the action with or without prejudice." Id., 864 F.2d at 102 ; see also Goforth v. Owens , 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir.1985) ("The court's power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce its orders and insure prompt disposition of lawsuits.").

In addition to the Court's inherent powers, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe certain remedies for noncompliance with Court orders, a party's discovery obligations, or the Federal Rules, generally. First, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) states that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) ... operates as an adjudication on the merits." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Under that rule, the "legal standard to be applied ... is whether there is a ‘clear record of delay or willful contempt and a finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.’ " Goforth v. Owens , 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985). It bears noting, however, that dismissal for failure to prosecute may be particularly warranted "if the plaintiff seems culpable in some significant respect," which "might be suggested by the fact that he or she previously had been warned by the court that he or she must act with greater diligence, has failed to obey the mandates of the Federal Rules or the local rules of the court in which the action is pending or the terms of the district judge's orders in the case, has presented no legitimate excuse for the delay, or if there are other factors aggravating the offending party's inaction, particularly when it has resulted in prejudice to the defendant." Wright & Miller, 9 Federal Practice and Procedure; Civ. § 2370 (3d ed.).

Second, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) states that "[i]f a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery ... the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders. They may include ... dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). The Rule goes on to require that, "[i]nstead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). " Rule 37 sanctions are intended to prevent unfair prejudice to the litigants and insure the integrity of the discovery process." Gratton v. Great Am. Commc'ns , 178 F.3d 1373, 1374–75 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Aztec Steel Co. v. Florida Steel Corp. , 691 F.2d 480, 482 (11th Cir. 1982) ).

III. DISCUSSION

As explained above, Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to comply with this Court's orders, her discovery obligations, and her responsibilities as a litigant under the local and federal rules. Plaintiff chose to bring this case over three years ago, and it is Plaintiff's responsibility to actively and appropriately pursue her claims. The Court has held hearing after hearing, and issued numerous orders, affording Plaintiff repeated opportunities to remedy her noncompliance and proceed with prosecuting her case. Each time, Plaintiff has failed to do so. As a result, in the fifteen months since the dismissal of Defendants' appeal—and more than three-and-a-half years since this case was filed and seven-and-a-half years since the events at issue took place—this litigation has stagnated. The Court has issued repeated warnings to Plaintiff regarding her conduct to no avail.

Plaintiff's response to Defendants' motion states that she has been unable to meet the demands of this litigation because of her medical conditions, and that she has otherwise attempted to comply with the orders of this Court. Though the Court is sympathetic to the medical needs of litigants and has endeavored to accommodate Plaintiff as best as possible in light of her medical conditions, Plaintiff's contention that the stresses of this litigation will imperil her physical well-being indefinitely is an inadequate basis for issuing continued extensions and stays in these proceedings. More to the point, nothing about Plaintiff's medical conditions can be read to excuse Plaintiff's flagrant noncompliance with nearly every Court order that has been issued. In the meantime, the fees and costs accrued by Defendants—and the collateral consequences of this drawn-out litigation—continue to increase.

In light of the foregoing, and on the record before it, the Court must conclude that its attempts at imposing lesser sanctions have been and will continue to be unsuccessful at effectuating Plaintiff's compliance with the orders of this Court and the rules governing litigation in federal court. It is also clear that the repeated delays and failures by the Plaintiff are of her own making, and are not the fault of her former counsel or any other lawyer assisting her at this juncture. As such, under any of the standards articulated in Section II, above, Plaintiff's conduct is sanctionable, and while the Courts have held that "dismissal is an extraordinary remedy," they have gone on to make clear that "dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion." Moon v. Newsome , 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing State Exchange Bank v. Hartline , 693 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982) ; Anthony v. Marion County General Hospital , 617 F.2d 1164, 1169 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1980) ). Therefore, upon a thorough review of the record in this case and the pattern of conduct it reveals, the Court finds that dismissal of this action is appropriate, both under its inherent powers and under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and by the Court on the record it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants' second motion to dismiss is GRANTED . Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (DE 14) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE . On or before January 5, 2018 , Defendants may file a motion for costs, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(1)(5) and 37(b)(2)(C). All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT . The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers in Miami, Florida, this 18th day of December, 2017.