Summary
In Soles v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Insurance Co., 524 Pa. 280, 571 A.2d 378 (1990), affirming Soles v. Pa. National MutualInsurance Co., 372 Pa. Super. 605, 539 A.2d 1360 (1988), Chief Justice Nix in a dissenting opinion noted that the Supreme Court had previously held that the stacking of insurance benefits was prohibited under the No-Fault Insurance Act, citing Antanovich v.Allstate Insurance Co., supra.
Summary of this case from Kosor v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co.Opinion
Argued March 8, 1990.
Decided March 28, 1990.
Appeal No. 16 M.D. Appeal Dkt. 1989 from Order of Superior Court, 372 Pa. Super. 605, 539 A.2d 1360 (1988), entered April 5, 1988, at No. 246 Harrisburg 1987, Affirming Order of Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Civil Division, entered March 30, 1987, at No. 86-666.
Appeal No. 28 W.D. Appeal Dkt. 1989 from Order of Superior Court, 379 Pa. Super. 654, 545 A.2d 380 (1988), entered May 26, 1988, at No. 1245 Pittsburgh 1987, Reversing Order of Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Civil Division, entered August 18, 1987, at No. A.D. 85-6240.
Louis C. Long, Meyer Darragh Buckler Bebenek Eck Hall, Pittsburgh, for Donegal Mut. Ins. Co.
James M. Horne, State College, for Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Ins. Co.
Gary M. Lang, Feldstein, Grinberg, Stein McKee, Pittsburgh, for Raymond Benson.
Joseph P. Green, Bellefonte, for Deloris B. Soles.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.
ORDER
Orders of Superior Court affirmed.
McDERMOTT and ZAPPALA, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of these cases.
NIX, C.J., files a dissenting opinion in which FLAHERTY, J., joins.
We have previously held that the stacking of insurance benefits was prohibited under the No-fault Insurance Act, Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176, 40 P. S. § 1009.101-40 P. S. § 1009.701 (repealed 1984). Antanovich v. Allstate Insurance Co., 507 Pa. 68, 488 A.2d 571 (1985). The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701 et seq., expressly prohibits stacking. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1717. Thus, any argument that stacking is permitted during a transitional period between the two acts is completely without foundation.
Further, the insurance agreements of appellants expressly excluded coverage of persons covered by another insurance policy. Under constitutional concerns for the sanctity of contract, we ought to respect the terms of valid enforceable contracts.
I, therefore, dissent.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this opinion.