FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JEFF KAPLAN, Magistrate Judge

This case has been referred to the United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from the district court. The findings and recommendation of the magistrate judge are as follow:

I.

This is a pro se civil rights action brought by Willie Arthur Sneed, an inmate in the Hunt County Jail, against the Hunt County Medical Department and various jail officials, including Lieutenant Snead, Nurse Gail Pierce, and Sergeant Mary Brunner. On October 13, 2005, plaintiff tendered a one-page handwritten complaint to the district clerk and filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Because the information provided by plaintiff in his pauper's affidavit indicates that he lacks the funds necessary to prosecute this case, the court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and allowed the complaint to be filed. A Spears questionnaire then was sent to plaintiff in order to obtain additional information about the factual basis of his suit. Plaintiff answered the questionnaire on January 26, 2006. The court now determines that plaintiff should be permitted to prosecute his claim for lack of adequate dental care against Nurse Pierce. His other claims should be summarily dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

II.

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied dental care for a broken tooth and prescription drugs for a variety of ailments, including insomnia, anxiety, and high blood pressure, while incarcerated in the Hunt County Jail. According to plaintiff, Nurse Gail Pierce and her supervisor, Lieutenant Snead, would not let him visit the dentist to have his tooth pulled and denied him medication prescribed by an MHMR doctor prior to his incarceration. Plaintiff further alleges that a detention officer, Sergeant Mary Brunner, destroyed his legal papers in retaliation for filing a grievance. As relief, plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages totaling $60,000.

A.

A district court may summarily dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes that the action:

(1) is frivolous or malicious;

(2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or

(3) seeks money relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

B.

The court initially observes that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against two of the defendants named in his complaint. The Hunt County Medical Department is not a legal entity subject to suit. See Morgan v. Dallas County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 3-04-CV-2172-D, 2005 WL 57282 at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2005) (Kaplan, J.), rec. adopted, 2005 WL 2075796 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2005) (Fitzwater, J.) (Dallas County Jail Medical Department not a proper defendant with jural existence). Nor can plaintiff sue Lieutenant Snead. As jail administrator, Snead can be sued only if he: (1) affirmatively participated in acts that caused a constitutional deprivation; or (2) implemented unconstitutional policies that resulted in injury to plaintiff. See Mouille v. City of Live Oak, Texas, 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2443 (1993). In his interrogatory answers, plaintiff explains that Snead is liable because he has authority to approve all medical appointments. ( See Spears Quest. #5). Such an allegation is insufficient to state a claim against this defendant in his individual capacity. See Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 736, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2723, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989); Morgan, 2005 WL 57282 at *1.

C.

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied dental care for a broken tooth and prescription drugs for a variety of ailments. In order to establish a constitutional violation, plaintiff must show that jail officials acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs such as to cause the "unnecessary or wanton infliction of pain." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). This, in turn, requires proof that defendants were subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm and failed to take reasonable measures to abate that risk. Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 649 (5th Cir. 1996), citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1984, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).

With respect to his dental care claim, plaintiff admits that jail officials took him to a dentist to have his tooth pulled. However, the procedure could not be performed due to plaintiff's elevated blood pressure. ( See Spears Quest. #4; Plf. Supp. at 2). The dentist, Dr. Anthony A. Glass, promised to extract plaintiff's tooth if his blood pressure returned to normal. (Plf. Supp. at 2). Following this visit, plaintiff alleges that Nurse Gail Pierce "refused to reschedule my dental appointment regardless of my constant pain" and told plaintiff "the only way I would go to the dentist is she wanted me to change my blood pressure medication[.]" ( Spears Quest. #4). Plaintiff further contends that Pierce made several statements probative of deliberate indifference, such as "she did not care" if he was in pain. ( Id.). These allegations, though thin, are sufficient to state a claim for denial of dental care.

The court reaches a different conclusion with respect to plaintiff's claim for denial of prescription medications. Assuming plaintiff can show that jail officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to refill his prescriptions for Clonipan, Benedryl, Buproprion, and Clonidine, ( see Spears Quest. #2), this claim still fails because plaintiff suffered no physical harm. The PLRA provides that "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The injury required by this statute "must be more than de minimus [sic], but need not be significant." Alexander v. Tippah County, Mississippi, 351 F.3d 626, 630-31 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 2071 (2004). In his interrogatory answers, plaintiff states that he suffered "discomfort to mental health, lack of sleep, [and] anxiety attack[s]" as a result of not receiving his medication. This is insufficient to establish "physical injury" under the PLRA. See, e.g. Morgan, 2005 WL 57282 at *1 (allegation that plaintiff suffered "undue pain . . . on a regular basis" as a result of not receiving medication held insufficient to establish physical injury); Davis v. Bowles, No. 3-04-CV-0877-L, 2004 WL 1205182 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jun 1, 2004), rec. adopted, 2004 WL 1381045 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 18, 2004) (headaches and depression caused by failure to administer Prozac was de minimus injury).

D.

Finally, plaintiff contends that Sergeant Mary Brunner confiscated and destroyed his legal papers in retaliation for filing a grievance. Prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate for exercising his right of access to the courts or using the grievance system. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 800 (1996); Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1975 (1986). In order to prove retaliation, the inmate must: (1) allege the violation of a specific constitutional right; and (2) establish that the incident would not have occurred but for a retaliatory motive. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 313 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 559 (1997); Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166.

In support of this claim, plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Brunner led a "shakdown" of his jail cell and confiscated unspecified legal papers and documents shortly after he filed a complaint with the Texas Commission on Jail Standards. ( See Spears Quest. #6). Although plaintiff believes this was done in retaliation for filing the complaint, he offers no facts to support that conclusory assertion. Plaintiff's subjective belief that he was the victim of retaliation does not give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Phillips v. Mills, No. 3-04-CV-0991-P, 2004 WL 1402569 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 22, 2004) (Kaplan, J.) (citing cases); see also Puckdeesri v. Lopez, No. 04-10594, 110 Fed. Appx. 396 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 2004) (retaliation claim properly dismissed where prisoner failed to establish retaliatory motive for confiscation of legal documents).

RECOMMENDATION

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party may file written objections to the recommendation within 10 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). The failure to file written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).