MILLER, Chief Justice:

In this original mandamus action the petitioner, George David Smith, through his parents as next friends, seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the in loco parentis doctrine generally embodied in W. Va. Code, 18A-5-1. He also contends that one of the respondents, the West Virginia State Board of Education, has failed under W. Va. Code, 18-2-5, to promulgate regulations in regard to administering corporal punishment to school children.

The petitioner's constitutional claims are predicated on Section 5 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment and the substantive due process provision in Section 10 of Article III.

On September 15, 1981, Petitioner George David Smith, who was age 11 at the time and a student at Clover Elementary School, along with fellow student, James Greathouse, were "severely struck" with a wooden paddle by Respondent Jack Sharp, a teacher and the principal. As a result of the striking, Petitioner George David Smith's legs received large bruises which required medical treatment at a local hospital. Allegedly the petitioner subsequently developed a negative attitude toward school.

The respondents admit to the use of corporal punishment by Sharp who has stated that he "gave each boy three moderate licks with a wooden paddle on their buttocks." He further states that he told the boys that this punishment was for their disobeyance of school rules regarding fighting. The boys were caught fighting in the bathroom. Sharp further stated that another student, Mark Nichols, was also paddled.

I.

The respondents initially make the procedural point that a writ of mandamus is not an appropriate remedy in this case. They recite our traditional rule found in Syllabus Point 2 of State ex rel. Kucera v. City of Wheeling, 153 W. Va. 538, 170 S.E.2d 367 (1969):

"A writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist — (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of respondent to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel; and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy."

See also State ex rel. Cabell County Deputy Sheriff's Association v. Dunfee, 163 W. Va. 539, 258 S.E.2d 117 (1979); McGrady v. Callighan, 163 W. Va. 539, 244 S.E.2d 793 (1978); State ex rel. Damron v. Ferrell, 149 W. Va. 773, 143 S.E.2d 469 (1965). Our rule regarding utilization of a writ of mandamus must be read against the back drop of Judge Haymond's statement in Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 897, 54 S.E.2d 747, 757 (1949):

"The tendency in this jurisdiction is to enlarge and advance the scope of the remedy of mandamus, rather than to restrict and limit it, in order to afford the relief a party is entitled to when there is no other adequate and complete legal remedy."

The clear legal right to the relief sought is generally a question of standing. Thus, where the individual has a special interest in the sense that he is part of the class that is being affected by the action then he ordinarily is found to have a clear legal right. Walls v. Miller, 162 W. Va. 563, 251 S.E.2d 491 (1978). Moreover, where the right sought to be enforced is a public one in the sense that it is based upon a general statute or affects the public at large the mandamus proceeding can be brought by any citizen, taxpayer, or voter. State ex rel. Brotherton v. Moore, 159 W. Va. 934, 230 S.E.2d 638 (1976); State ex rel. West Virginia Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Charleston, 133 W. Va. 420, 56 S.E.2d 763 (1949); Prichard v. DeVan, 114 W. Va. 509, 172 S.E. 711 (1934); State ex rel. Matheny v. County Court of Wyoming County, 47 W. Va. 672, 35 S.E. 959 (1900).

Here the petitioner is a member of the class directly affected by corporal punishment. The clear legal right of the petitioner to bring a writ of mandamus besides involving a standing issue is also entwined in the legal duty which the respondent is required to perform. This is the second element of our traditional test for the appropriateness of a writ of mandamus. There is a certain amount of legal sophistry in this area because if there were such a clear legal right on behalf of the petitioner to the relief sought and the countervailing legal duty on the respondent, the matter would be resolved without court intervention. In the usual case the matter at issue may be somewhat opaque until the court pronounces the clear legal right and duty. Typical of this category of mandamus cases is where the respondent refuses to act because he relies on an ordinance which the petitioner claims is invalid or unconstitutional. E.g., Marra v. Zink, 163 W. Va. 400, 256 S.E.2d 581 (1979); State ex rel. Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee, 160 W. Va. 329, 233 S.E.2d 419 (1977); State ex rel. Sheldon v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 691, 122 S.E.2d 427 (1961); Carter v. City of Bluefield, supra. Cf. State ex rel. McCamic v. McCoy, 166 W. Va. 572, 276 S.E.2d 534 (1981). Much the same utilization of the writ of mandamus has been made in regard to the validity of statutes. E.g., State ex rel. Kanawha County Building Commission v. Paterno, 160 W. Va. 195, 233 S.E.2d 332 (1977); State ex rel. West Virginia Housing Development Fund v. Copenhaver, 153 W. Va. 636, 171 S.E.2d 545 (1969); State ex rel. Smith v. Kelly, 149 W. Va. 381, 141 S.E.2d 142 (1965); State ex rel. Wheeling Downs Racing Commission v. Perry, 148 W. Va. 68, 132 S.E.2d 922 (1963).

The petitioner in this case seeks to challenge the constitutionality of W. Va. Code, 18A-5-1, insofar as it permits through the in loco parentis doctrine corporal punishment of school children. In addition he seeks to have the respondent, the State Board of Education, promulgate proper regulations in regard to corporal punishment under its rule making authority contained in W. Va. Code, 18-2-5. We have in the past permitted the writ of mandamus to be brought against public officials who have some positive duty to act and who fail to do so. In State ex rel. Brotherton v. Moore, supra, we required the governor to fill a vacancy in a public office. We have permitted writs of mandamus to be brought against the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner for failure to properly classify an employer's account and to correct an overcharge. State ex rel. Red Jacket Coal Corp. v. Stokes, 142 W. Va. 126, 94 S.E.2d 634 (1956); Puritan Coal Corporation v. Davis, 130 W. Va. 20, 42 S.E.2d 807 (1947). More recently we have sanctioned a mandamus against the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to enter some award for permanent partial disability. Wilson v. Lewis, 166 W. Va. 273, 273 S.E.2d 96 (1980). These decisions are predicated on the finding that the respondent had a statutory duty to act and had failed to do so or had acted improperly. Similarly in our recent case of United Mine Workers of America v. Miller, 170 W. Va. 177, 291 S.E.2d 673 (1982), we found that the respondent had a statutory duty to prescribe enforcement procedures and had failed to act and as a consequence a writ of mandamus would lie to compel him to act.

Finally, as to the third element, the lack of another adequate remedy, we have stated in Syllabus Point 2 of Stowers v. Blackburn, 141 W. Va. 328, 90 S.E.2d 277 (1955):

"Mandamus will not be denied because there is another remedy, unless such other remedy is equally beneficial, convenient and effective."

In State ex rel. Board of Education of the County of Kanawha v. Dyer, 154 W. Va. 840, 179 S.E.2d 577 (1971), which involved a mandamus proceeding by the Board to compel the issuance of a license to operate a school of beauty culture, we held that an administrative appeal to the circuit court and to this Court was not an equally beneficial remedy as an original writ of mandamus. There is a premise, perhaps not specifically articulated, in our mandamus cases that where the legal issue is of a substantial public policy nature, we will accept an original writ of mandamus rather than force the petitioner to try the issue through administrative proceedings or in a lower court. E.g., Walls v. Miller, supra; State ex rel. Board of Education of the County of Kanawha v. Dyer, supra; Stowers v. Blackburn, supra; Carter v. City of Bluefield, supra.

In the present case, we believe that petitioner's initial constitutional challenge to the in loco parentis concept embodied in W. Va. Code, 18A-5-1, when coupled with the failure of the West Virginia State Board of Education to make a rule relative to corporal punishment under W. Va. Code, 18-2-5, are sufficient predicates to warrant our accepting the petition for writ of mandamus. These are issues of substantive public importance bearing upon the welfare and conduct of pupils and teachers throughout this State.

II.

We decline to address the petitioner's constitutional claims as we believe that the in loco parentis doctrine contained in W. Va. Code, 18A-5-1, is merely an embodiment of the common law concept which the courts have historically shaped and the issue in this case can be resolved under this doctrine. We have not had occasion to consider the scope of the common law doctrine of in loco parentis as it relates to school children. Its general embodiment in W. Va. Code, 18A-5-1, leads us to conclude that our Legislature intended to import the common law contours of this doctrine into the statute. One of the axioms of statutory construction is that a statute will be read in context with the common law unless it clearly appears from the statute that the purpose of the statute was to change the common law. E.g., Wicks v. City of Charlottesville, 215 Va. 274, 208 S.E.2d 752 (1974); cf. Coal Coke Ry. Co. v. Conley, 67 W. Va. 129, 67 S.E. 613 (1910); 2A Sands, Sutterland Statutory Construction, 268 et seq. (1973 ed.).

The doctrine of in loco parentis originated in the English common law and recognizes that a parent delegates part of his parental authority to school personnel while the child is in their custody and for purposes consonant to the school setting. Some commentators question the rationality of the parental delegation in view of compulsory school attendance laws. Although the origin of the doctrine may have been rooted in a voluntary school system, the doctrine has been followed in this country even though there is compulsory school attendance. E.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa. 1971); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889 (E.D.Ill. 1970); Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So.2d 49, 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371, 31 A.2d 414 (1943); Laucher v. Simpson, 28 Ohio App.2d 195, 57 Ohio Op.2d 303, 276 N.E.2d 261 (1971); 79 C.J.S. School and School Districts § 493 (1952 ed.).

Even though the in loco parentis doctrine covers more than the discipline of school children, it is not without constitutional limitations. For example, in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), the United States Supreme Court determined that students could not be expelled without some procedural due process. And in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), recognition was given to the First Amendment right of free speech to school students who wore black arm bands to protest the Vietnam war.

Several states have by statute prohibited the use of corporal punishment in schools. Other states by statute have proscribed the use of corporal punishment by requiring prior parental approval, notification, by expressly providing that it must be reasonable or by limiting its use only after other methods of punishment have been attempted.

In those states that have no particular statute controlling the use of corporal punishment, the courts have generally held that under the doctrine of in loco parentis reasonable corporal punishment may be used but if it is excessive the teacher may be liable for damages. E.g., Tinkham v. Kole, 252 Iowa 1303, 110 N.W.2d 258 (1961); Carr v. Wright, 423 S.W.2d 521 (Ky. 1968); McKinney v. Green, 379 So.2d 69 (La.App. 1979).

In one of our earlier cases, and the only one that appears to have touched upon the question of corporal punishment of a child, we recognized in State v. McDonie, 89 W. Va. 185, 197, 109 S.E. 710, 715 (1921), that the right to punish is not absolute:

"A parent, or one standing in loco parentis, has the authority to administer chastisement or correction to his child. . . ., but it has never been recognized that this chastisement or correction could go beyond what the child's reasonable welfare demands. It has never been recognized that a parent has the right or power to maim or disfigure or disable a child simply because he might be stubborn and not respond to correction in the manner the parent might think proper."

In McDonie a stepfather had been criminally prosecuted for physically abusing his wife's child.

It cannot be doubted that in recent years society has become increasingly aware of the plight of children subject to parental abuse. Our Legislature has responded by enacting statutes which curtail the right of parents to abuse or neglect their children and enable the State to intervene and remove the child from the custody of its parents. This enlightened Legislative response suggests to us that the ancient doctrine of in loco parentis has been legislatively curtailed.

Moreover in a related area, under the doctrine of parens patriae, which historically applies to those individuals who become wards of the state because of being under age or mentally disabled, we have held the state's authority is not absolute. In State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974), we concluded that the doctrine of parens patriae could not be extended to avoid certain procedural due process steps in the involuntary committment of the mentally ill. Much the same reasoning was applied against the parens patriae doctrine in State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 160 W. Va. 172, 233 S.E.2d 318 (1977), where we spoke on the constitutional perimeters surrounding the incarceration of juvenile status offenders.

We believe the doctrine of in loco parentis as contained in W. Va. Code, 18A-5-1, in light of the present day standards and legislative enactments in the child abuse area cannot be interpreted as permitting corporal punishment of public school children by means of a paddle, whip, stick or other mechanical devices. In the vast majority of cases where the question of excessive force has arisen in suits against teachers, they have involved the use of such mechanical contrivances. To sanction this type of physical punishment in a school context under the doctrine of in loco parentis is to ignore those cases that have held such practices are impermissible when applied to persons incarcerated in the penal system. E.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3183, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (use of wooden paddles on incarcerated juveniles); Wiltie v. California Department of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1969) (beating of a prisoner); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (whipping adult prisoners with leather strap); Johnson v. Al Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.Mo. 1973) (striking of a prisoner by the warden); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D.Tex. 1973) (beating, slapping and kicking prisoners); Harrah v. Leverette, 165 W. Va. 665, 271 S.E.2d 322 (1980) (dispensing tear gas on prisoners); State ex rel. K. W. v. Werner, 161 W. Va. 192, 242 S.E.2d 907 (1978) (punitive practices); cf. State ex rel. Pingley v. Coiner, 155 W. Va. 591, 186 S.E.2d 220 (1972). These cases dealt with cruel and unusual punishment and civil rights concepts but we see no reason why we cannot draw on them by way of analogy in considering the scope of the common law doctrine of in loco parentis as it relates to corporal punishment by way of paddles or related devices.

The limiting force of our opinion is directed at the use of whips, paddles or other contrivances to administer corporal punishment. The very nature of these devices is such that their use often leads to excessive force and injury. We believe that the doctrine of in loco parentis cannot be interpreted in light of current attitudes, particularly as reflected in our child abuse statutes, as permitting corporal punishment by mechanical devices. Our decision does not prohibit the spanking by hand, the physical seizure and removal of unruly students from the classroom nor the use of physical force to restrain students from fighting or engaging in destructive or illegal acts.

Although we have declined to address the petitioner's constitutional arguments relative to cruel and unusual punishment and substantive due process claims, we do believe that some minimal procedural due process must be afforded before manual corporal punishment can be utilized as a disciplinary measure. In North v. Board of Regents, 160 W. Va. 248, 233 S.E.2d 411 (1977), we discussed procedural due process standards under Section 10 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution. We also recognized the concepts of "liberty" and "property" interests which have generally been held to trigger a procedural due process inquiry and cited Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

In North, we relied on Goss v. Lopez, supra, which held that some procedural due process must attend the expulsion of students from public school. In Waite v. Civil Service Commission, 161 W. Va. 154, 241 S.E.2d 164 (1977), we further developed the concepts of liberty and property under the due process clause, Section 10 of Article III of our Constitution. We have no difficulty in holding that a liberty interest is implicated not only when the State makes a charge against an individual that might seriously damage his standing and association in his community but also when the state attempts to undertake disciplinary measures involving manual corporal punishment of school children. In Syllabus Point 5 of Waite, we stated the following test to determine the extent of procedural due process:

"The extent of due process protection affordable for a property [or liberty] interest requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a property interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."

Here the private interest that is affected by the official action is being subjected to corporal punishment. We have previously limited the use of this type of punishment and even though manual corporal punishment is permissible, it must still be moderate. We cannot say that this private interest is so minimal that no due process should be afforded. When we turn to the second consideration, the risk of an erroneous application of corporal punishment and whether there is any present safeguards to diminish this problem, we find no present procedural safeguards since the state has not promulgated any. We also find that there are in regard to the third factor, valid reasons not to impose substantial procedural due process safeguards. Certainly if disciplinary measures must be taken, they should be permitted to occur rather promptly following the disturbance. Moreover the intrusion on the person's privacy is not severe and under North's standard, procedural protection is accorded based on the severity of the rights deprived.

We conclude that the following minimal due process procedures should be utilized. First, the student should be given an opportunity to explain his version of the disruptive event as such an explanation may convince a fair minded person that corporal punishment is not warranted. Second, in the absence of some extraordinary factor the administration of corporal punishment should be done in the presence of another adult. This latter requirement is designed to protect both the student and the person administering corporal punishment by providing a neutral observer.

We, therefore, conclude that a writ of mandamus should be issued directing the State Board of Education to promulgate corporal punishment regulations not inconsistent with the standards set out herein.

Writ Issued.