CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).

The majority of the Court has taken an extraordinary step and has declared the "exceptional circumstances" clause of MCL 552.17a; MSA 25.97(1) null and void. In spite of the clear language of the statute, which authorizes circuit courts to order the payment of postmajority child support when exceptional circumstances are present, the majority has held that circuit courts do not have the jurisdiction to award extended parental support for the disabled adult children of divorced parents. The result of this decision is that the financial responsibility of providing for the care of these disabled children will fall solely on the state and on custodial parents.

I cannot agree that the decision of the majority is compelled by either an analysis of the legislative history of the child support and custody statutes or by prior decisions of this Court. Not only does the decision violate principles of statutory construction and judicial restraint, it also cannot be justified in view of the public policy considerations that support giving meaning to the clear language of the statute. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and would hold that exceptional circumstances are present when a child's mental or physical disabilities make it impossible for the child to be self-supporting.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

When the Washtenaw Circuit Court granted a judgment of divorce to Michael and Mary Carlen Smith on August 30, 1973, the judgment provided that defendant Michael Smith was to pay for the support and maintenance of the couple's minor daughter, Aimee, "until the minor child shall attain the age of eighteen years, or until further order of the court. . . ." It was later discovered that Aimee was born with genetic abnormalities. Aimee suffers from acute mental and physical handicaps, and there is, unfortunately, little hope that her condition will improve.

Plaintiff Mary Carlen Smith filed a motion for an increase in support in August of 1984 and then amended the motion to include a request that child support be continued beyond Aimee's eighteenth birthday. When plaintiff filed the amended motion in October of 1984, Aimee was fifteen years old. The defendant, who became a practicing dentist after the divorce, agreed to the increase in child support, and on November 26, 1985, the trial court granted plaintiff's request for increased support.

After reviewing the pertinent statutes and appellate court decisions, however, the trial court also ruled that it was bound to follow certain decisions in which the Court of Appeals ruled that the Age of Majority Act prevents any court from extending support payments beyond a child's eighteenth year unless the original divorce judgment contains a reservation or agreement for extended payments. The trial judge noted that this Court had not yet ruled on this important issue, and he added his personal view that "[t]he facts established in the present case are very heartrending and equities for support of the minor child of the parties are very compelling."

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to extend defendant's child support obligations beyond Aimee's eighteenth birthday and remanded the case so that the circuit court could consider whether exceptional circumstances exist. We granted leave to consider whether a court in a divorce proceeding has the authority to order a parent to pay child support for a disabled adult child.

ANALYSIS

This Court held in Johnson v Johnson, 346 Mich. 418; 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956), that an award of support was properly granted under the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a in order to enable a child to attend college. The Court also ruled, however, that because the age of majority was twenty-one years, courts had no authority to award extended parental support for education expenses under the exceptional-circumstances clause once a child reached the age of twenty-one years.

The question for this Court to resolve, then, is whether the Legislature, in reducing the age of majority to eighteen years, intended to implicitly repeal the exceptional-circumstances clause of the child support statute and preclude circuit courts from ordering extended support for the disabled adult children of divorced parents. Primarily in reliance on this Court's decision in Johnson, the majority of the Court has concluded that the exceptional-circumstances clause is a legal nullity and that support payments may not be awarded beyond the age of majority.

I disagree. In order to preserve the validity of the Johnson decision, the majority has reached a result that requires a radical departure from established rules of statutory construction, a result that is not supported by the current language of the statute, the applicable court rule promulgated by this Court, or considerations of public policy. Furthermore, although a review of the case law of other jurisdictions reveals that courts have employed a variety of rationales in order to provide for support for disabled adult children, the present majority has held null and void a statutory provision that clearly provides for such support and has shifted the burden to the Legislature to amend the statute to add more precise language.

I

The resolution of this case turns on an interpretation of § 17a of the Michigan divorce statute, which provides, in part:

The court shall have jurisdiction in making such order or judgment relative to the minor children of such parties as authorized in this chapter to award custody of each child to 1 of the parties or a third person until each child has attained the age of 18 years and may require either parent to pay such allowance as may be deemed proper for the support of each child until each child shall have attained that age and may in case of exceptional circumstances, require payment of such allowance for any child after he attains that age. [MCL 552.17a; MSA 25.97(1).]

When construing the language of a statute, this Court's primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Storey v Meijer, Inc, 431 Mich. 368, 376; 429 N.W.2d 169 (1988). When the language of a statutory provision is clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation is necessary or appropriate. Hiltz v Phil's Quality Market, 417 Mich. 335, 343; 337 N.W.2d 237 (1983). "Every word of a statute should be given meaning and no word should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory if at all possible." Baker v General Motors Corp, 409 Mich. 639, 665; 297 N.W.2d 387 (1980).

Section 17a of the support statute outlines the extent of a circuit court's jurisdiction regarding its authority to award child support and plainly authorizes the court to require payment of child support "in case of exceptional circumstances" for any child after the child reaches the age of eighteen years. In spite of the clear language of the provision, the majority of the Court has concluded that the Legislature's use of the words "minor children" in the first sentence of § 17a and the use of the word "child" five more times in the provision is an indication that the Legislature intended the word "child" to apply exclusively to minor children.

The frequent use of the word "child" in a statute governing the authority of courts to award child support is not surprising and certainly should not be considered determinative of the significant issue presently before the Court. The exceptional-circumstances clause is an exception to the general rule that child support is for the benefit of minor children. The clause provides for an extension of the court's authority to order child support when certain exceptional facts are present and pertains to "any child" of the parties after the child attains the age of eighteen. In view of this clear language, I am unpersuaded by the majority's conclusion that each and every time the word "child" is used, it is a reference only to minor children.

As the Court of Appeals stated, "[u]nless we attribute to the Legislature an intent to impliedly repeal the exceptional circumstances clause, we must assume that this provision, read in conjunction with the Age of Majority Act, contemplates the extension of support beyond the age of majority." 163 Mich. App. 427.

The Age of Majority Act provides, in part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person who is 18 years of age but less than 21 years of age when this act takes effect, and a person who attains 18 years of age thereafter, is deemed to be an adult of legal age for all purposes whatsoever and shall have the same duties, liabilities, responsibilities, rights and legal capacity as persons heretofore acquired at 21 years of age. [MCL 722.52; MSA 25.244(52).]

I find nothing in this provision to indicate that the Legislature intended to explicitly repeal the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a. Section 3 of the act, MCL 722.53; MSA 25.244(53), lists a number of provisions which the act supersedes. Although § 3 specifically states that the list is not all-inclusive, it is significant that none of the affected statutes listed concerns child support.

When construing a statute, courts "must read the language of the statute in light of the general purpose to be accomplished." Wymer v Holmes, 429 Mich. 66, 76; 412 N.W.2d 213 (1987). There is simply no indication that the Legislature's purpose in enacting the Age of Majority Act, which deals with duties, liabilities, responsibilities, and rights of individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one years, was to limit the extent of a circuit court's jurisdiction to award child support to a custodial parent. As this Court stated in Price v Price, 395 Mich. 6, 11, n 5; 232 N.W.2d 630 (1975), the "Age of Majority Act does not purport to deprive persons between the ages of 18 and 21 of any rights theretofore enjoyed by them. . . ." The act certainly does not purport to divest circuit courts of jurisdiction to order the payment of child support to custodial parents when exceptional circumstances are present.

There is also no indication that the Legislature intended to implicitly repeal the exceptional-circumstances clause. Repeals by implication are not favored. One commentator has stated:

Repeal by implication is . . . disfavored and will be applied only where there is no rational basis for harmonizing two conflicting statutes and where the statutes are so inconsistent that concurrent operation is not possible. Implied repeal will only be effected if the statute or part of it is repugnant. Normally the courts will consider and attempt to harmonize all statutes on the same subject or with the same general purpose. Further, all sections of the support statute will be read together as a whole, and courts will avoid a construction that renders part of a statute meaningless.

In Attorney General ex rel Owen v Joyce, 233 Mich. 619, 621; 207 N.W. 863 (1926), this Court stated:

When the intention of the legislature can be ascertained, it is the duty of the courts to give it force and effect.

But,

"The presumption is always against the intention to repeal where express terms are not used, and the implication, in order to be operative, must be necessary."

"Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be indulged in if there is any other reasonable construction."

"The intent to repeal must very clearly appear, and courts will not hold to a repeal if they can find reasonable ground to hold the contrary." [Citations omitted.]

There is certainly another reasonable construction of § 17a beyond that offered by the majority, and we should be reluctant to conclude that the Legislature repealed the exceptional-circumstances clause by implication. Although it would repudiate the rationale of the decision in Johnson, we should interpret the statute so as to give effect to the exceptional-circumstances provision.

We were reluctant to conclude in Price v Price that the exceptional-circumstances clause had been repealed by implication. The Court of Appeals in Price reasoned that even if the Legislature had not intended to dictate that all support beyond age eighteen must cease regardless of exceptional circumstances, that was "the exact effect of the support statute when read in conjunction with the Age of Majority Act." Instead of ruling directly on the issue whether the Age of Majority Act had any effect on a circuit court's jurisdiction to award postmajority support, this Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals due to the saving clause of the act. Because the petition was pending when the act took effect, we concluded that it fell within the saving provision. Thus, the circuit court had the authority to require the defendant to pay support for his son's college education "until that son became 21 years old." 395 Mich. 11.

Although the Court in Price did not directly resolve the issue presented here, it stated that the two provisions should be read so as to avoid rendering nugatory the exceptional-circumstances provision.

While our disposition in this case rests upon the applicability of the saving provision, we are also inclined to the view that even after the effective date of the Age of Majority Act a court may enter an order or amend an order to provide for the college education of a person for whom a support order had been entered before he or she was 18. The Age of Majority Act does not purport to deprive persons between the ages of 18 and 21 of any rights theretofore enjoyed by them, but instead grants to persons of 18 the rights and legal capacities formerly withheld until they were 21. . . . Further, to interpret the two statutes otherwise would render nugatory the entire provision concerning "exceptional circumstances" in the support statute.

* * *

Special needs such as whether the individual may be handicapped mentally or physically or in need of other special training, or whether he or she is particularly gifted, are also relevant. [ Id., p 11, n 5.]

II

Upon the basis of the Legislature's actions subsequent to Price, we would not conclude that "the Legislature has acquiesced in the judicial construction given § 17a pursuant to the passage of the Age of Majority Act." Ante, p 633. Until the issuance of the opinion in this case, which is the first time this Court has considered § 17a's exceptional-circumstances clause as it applies to a disabled child over whom jurisdiction was obtained prior to the age of eighteen, this Court has not exhibited any intention to declare that the Legislature intended to implicitly overrule the clause when it adopted the Age of Majority Act.

In fact, the opposite is true, as the decision of the majority directly contradicts MCR 3.209(B)(1)(b), which states that a support order must "provide for payment for a child until the child reaches the age of majority or graduates from high school, whichever is later, or, in exceptional circumstances, until further order of the court." The lead opinion reasons that because court rules cannot take precedence over statutory language except in matters involving judicial rules of practice and procedure, the court rule is also without legal effect.

It is simply not necessary to consider whether court rules may expand a court's jurisdiction or take precedence over statutory language, since the language of § 17a, if given effect by this Court, is not in conflict with the court rule. The conflict perceived by the majority only arises when this Court declares that a portion of the statute is null and void. The existence of the court rule, however, is a further indication that the appellate courts of this state have not clearly resolved this issue, and that, therefore, the Legislature cannot be held to have acquiesced in what the appellate courts of this state have not finally resolved.

This conclusion is supported by recent decisions of the Court of Appeals, including its decision in this case, which indicate that the Court has not been entirely consistent regarding its treatment of this issue. In view of the split of authority in the Court of Appeals, the language of MCR 3.209(B)(1)(b), and the fact that this Court has never addressed the precise issue presented here, there is no settled judicial construction of § 17a in which the Legislature could have acquiesced.

Moreover, the recent authority of the Court of Appeals illustrates the danger in relying on legislative silence when construing statutory provisions which appear to be inconsistent, especially when the inconsistency arises due to prior judicial interpretations of the provisions rather than from the plain language of the statutes themselves. As Justice Rutledge explained in his concurring opinion in Cleveland v United States, 329 U.S. 14, 23-24; 67 S Ct 13; 91 L Ed 12 (1946):

The danger of imputing to Congress, as a result of its failure to take positive or affirmative action through normal legislative processes, ideas entertained by the Court concerning Congress' will, is illustrated most dramatically perhaps by the vacillating and contradictory courses pursued in the long line of decisions imputing to "the silence of Congress" varied effects in commerce clause cases. That danger may be and often is equally present in others. More often than not, the only safe assumption to make from Congress' inaction is simply that Congress does not intend to act at all. Cf. United States v American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 550 [ 60 S Ct 1059; 84 L Ed 1345 (1940)]. At best the contrary view can be only an inference, altogether lacking in the normal evidences of legislative intent and often subject to varying views of that intent. In short, although recognizing that by silence Congress at times may be taken to acquiesce and thus approve, we should be very sure that, under all the circumstances of a given situation, it has done so before we so rule and thus at once relieve ourselves from and shift to it the burden of correcting what we have done wrongly.

Due to the clear language of § 17a, which grants circuit courts the jurisdiction to order postmajority child support when exceptional circumstances are present, and out of deference to established principles of statutory construction, I am unwilling to attribute to the Legislature an implied intent to repeal the exceptional-circumstances clause.

III

The decision of the majority not only runs counter to principles of statutory construction by the bold declaration that the exceptional-circumstances clause is a legal nullity, this decision also will create conflicts and inconsistencies in the child support and custody laws. It is significant that the Family Support Act, which applies when a marriage is still legally intact but one spouse is not supporting the children of the marriage, also provides for the authority of the court to order the payment of postmajority child support. Section 2 of the act states that "[i]n unusual circumstances, the court may order support for the child after the child reaches 18 years of age and until he or she reaches 21 years of age, or until the further order of the court." MCL 552.452(1); MSA 25.222(2).

Consequently, due to today's holding by the majority, circuit courts have the authority, when "unusual circumstances" are present, to order a parent who has abandoned a disabled child to pay postmajority child support, but are without authority to compel divorced parents to support their disabled adult children. This is an incongruous result which I do not believe the Legislature intended.

The age of majority was reduced from twenty-one to eighteen years of age, effective January 1, 1972. In spite of the fact that § 2 of the Family Support Act has been amended since the Age of Majority Act took effect, the Legislature has not deleted the clause providing for the extension of child support in "unusual circumstances." This is an indication of the Legislature's intention to retain, not to repeal, provisions authorizing the courts to require the payment of postmajority support in certain circumstances.

It is undoubtedly extremely difficult if not impossible for those who are severely mentally or physically disabled to support themselves. Parental support can be required for disabled adult children under Michigan's poor law, MCL 401.1 et seq.; MSA 16.121 et seq., which defines a "poor person" as one "who does not have property, exempt or otherwise, and who is unable, because of physical or mental disability or age, to earn a livelihood. . . ." Section 5 provides for the priority of liability of the relatives of the poor person. The obligation to support falls first on the person's spouse, if that person has a spouse and the spouse has the financial ability, and then on the person's parents. Thus, the poor law contains a distinct category for those who, without regard to age, are unable to provide for their own support. This provision is analogous to the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a and the unusual-circumstances clause of the Family Support Act.

It may be burdensome to make the parents of a disabled child financially responsible for the child's support, especially since the responsibility might extend for the duration of the child's life. As one commentator has observed, however, "the child must be supported by someone, and the parent, who — however blamelessly — brought the child into the world, would appear to bear a greater responsibility for his maintenance than does anyone else, including the state or deficit-ridden federal government." As Chief Justice COOLEY commented in Stilson v Gibbs, 53 Mich. 280, 282; 18 N.W. 815 (1884), "there is always a contingent liability for the support of children who are over age, in case they become a public charge."

IV

As the majority states, no final Michigan appellate decision has sustained an award of postmajority child support. The majority fails to acknowledge, however, that this Court has never directly considered or resolved the question whether mental or physical disabilities may constitute exceptional circumstances under § 17a. In addition, it is significant that the majority's review of the treatment of this issue by other jurisdictions attempts to merely categorize those cases in which postmajority support has been found permissible, but points to no case in which the final appellate court of any jurisdiction has stricken an exceptional-circumstances clause and denied support to adult handicapped children.

The majority divides the jurisdictions in which postmajority support is extended into two categories, those in which the applicable statute contains a specific authorization for extended support for handicapped children and those in which the statute does not limit support to minor children. The majority states that the Michigan statute does not fit within either category, a position it claims to be shared by a majority of jurisdictions. The majority suggests that this Court is restrained by the Michigan Constitution from reaching a contrary result, and concludes by urging the Legislature to reconsider the child support laws to expressly provide for postmajority child support.

First, even though the Michigan statute does not expressly provide for postmajority support for disabled or handicapped children, it does contain an express provision for extended support in the exceptional-circumstances clause. Second, that clause is not limited by age and confers jurisdiction upon circuit courts to order extended support for any child after the child attains the age of majority. Although a more precise statutory provision would be desirable, § 17a as presently drafted clearly provides for extended support beyond a child's majority when exceptional circumstances are present. The statute does not define what circumstances may be considered exceptional, but it is certainly within the authority of this Court to determine whether mental or physical disabilities that render a child incapable of self-support may be considered exceptional circumstances and give rise to an extended duty of parental support.

In short, the statute already provides the authority for extended support that the majority of the Court now urges the Legislature to restore. The fact remains that the majority has employed a dubious analysis of legislative intent to reach a harsh result that is clearly contrary to express statutory language and considerations of public policy. It then attempts to reduce its responsibility for this result by stating that the result reflects the will of the Legislature and that to hold otherwise would be a usurpation of legislative power. I find this analysis wholly unpersuasive. Notwithstanding the majority's attempt to persuade to the contrary, it is not the language of the statute or the intent of the Legislature that leads to this harsh result, but this Court's refusal to consider the validity of the decision in Johnson.

Furthermore, I take issue with the majority's statement that Michigan remains in the majority of states that do not provide postmajority child support for disabled children absent an express statutory provision or a statute that does not refer to "minor children." The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Brewington, 445 So.2d 294 (Ala, 1983), rejected prior decisions in that jurisdiction which held that absent a statute or agreement, no common-law authority existed to impose upon a non-custodial parent the obligation to support an adult child. The court stated that "the majority trend is to recognize an exception to this rule when the adult child is so mentally and/or physically disabled as to be unable to support himself." Id., p 296.

The Brewington court repudiated a prior decision which held that the term "children" as used in the Alabama child support statute was meant to apply only to minor children. The court explained that the statute did not express such a limitation, and it found such a narrow interpretation unacceptable.

[W]e believe the legislature intended that support be provided for dependent children, regardless of whether that dependency results from minority, or from physical and/or mental disabilities that continue to render them incapable of self-support beyond minority. [ Id.]

The exceptional-circumstances clause in the Michigan statute also does not refer to minor children, but expressly provides for support for any child beyond the age of eighteen upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. As did the court in Brewington, I find unacceptable the present majority's narrow interpretation of § 17a.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also recently held that the common law imposes a duty on the part of a parent to support a child after the child reaches majority if the child is physically or mentally disabled. Nelson v Nelson, 548 A.2d 109 (DC App, 1988). In reaching that decision, the court commented that "it is clear that the great majority of jurisdictions have accepted the existence of a continuing duty on the part of parents to support disabled children beyond the age of majority, if not by virtue of statute enacted by the legislature, then by rule of law adopted by the courts." Id., p 114. The court referred to a trend among courts "to recognize the parental duty of support for the adult disabled child as a natural extension of the common-law obligation of support for minor children." Id., p 116.

The Supreme Court of Colorado has employed the concept of delayed emancipation. In Koltay v Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Colo, 1983), the court explained that the attainment of the age of twenty-one only creates a presumption of emancipation.

If, by reason of some serious physical or mental disability, the child is incapable of self-support, the child is not "emancipated." A different interpretation would be wholly inconsistent with the independence that the word "emancipation" connotes. If a child is physically or mentally incapable of self-support when he attains the age of majority, emancipation does not occur, and the duty of parental support continues for the duration of the child's disability.

The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from a review of the case law of other jurisdictions is that when the question has been presented, the vast majority of jurisdictions have concluded that non-custodial parents may be ordered to support their disabled children beyond their minority. Although the result has been reached in a variety of ways, either through statutory interpretation or by an extension of the common law, courts have almost uniformly held that postmajority support for physically or mentally handicapped children is both permissible and desirable. The majority does not point to a single case, and my research reveals no case, in which a final appellate court has stricken a clause that provides for such support. The fact remains that the majority of this Court has reached its conclusion in spite of language in the Michigan statute that permits postmajority support, the weight of authority from other jurisdictions that suggests the desirability of that result, and public policy considerations which compel a determination that extended support for disabled children is permissible in this jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

Unlike the lead opinion suggests, this is not a case in which there is "voluminous" case law supporting the decision of the majority and merely a footnote that infers to the contrary. There is, after all, the plain language of the statute and a court rule promulgated by this Court. In addition, established principles of statutory construction and considerations of public policy, considerations which have led a majority of jurisdictions to hold to the contrary, weigh against the decision of the majority.

I would hold that because the Legislature reduced the age of majority to eighteen years but retained the exceptional-circumstances clause in the support statute, it had no intention to implicitly repeal the provision for extended parental support. It is the rationale of the decision in Johnson, not the statutory provision itself, which is no longer valid.

If the support statute is given effect as it is written, as long as a court obtains jurisdiction over a child when the child is a minor, the court has the authority to award postmajority support upon a showing of exceptional circumstances until those circumstances no longer exist. I would also hold that mental or physical disabilities may constitute exceptional circumstances under § 17a and would remand this case to the circuit court to determine whether exceptional circumstances are present.

BRICKLEY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.

LEVIN, J. (dissenting).

I would hold that, although the Legislature, in the Age of Majority Act, reduced the age of majority to eighteen, the circuit court continues to be empowered, under § 17a of the divorce statute, in "exceptional circumstances" to require child support until the child attains twenty-one. I agree with the majority that the case has not been made for a construction of the statutes that would empower the circuit court to require support beyond twenty-one.

In 1939, the Legislature added § 17a and thereby empowered the circuit court to require a husband to pay for the support of "minor children" until they attain seventeen and "in its discretion in case of exceptional circumstances" to require "payment of such allowance for any such child after he attains that age."

This Court construed § 17a as empowering the circuit court in exceptional circumstances "to grant support until arrival at majority — majority being 21 years old." Johnson v Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 426; 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956); Titus v Titus, 311 Mich. 434, 437; 18 N.W.2d 883 (1945).

In 1971, the Legislature reduced the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen, and provided that a person who had attained or thereafter attains eighteen would be deemed to be an adult of legal age "for all purposes whatsoever and shall have the same duties, liabilities, responsibilities, rights and legal capacity as persons heretofore acquired at 21 years of age." The Age of Majority Act provides that it "supersedes all provisions of law prescribing duties, liabilities, responsibilities, rights and legal capacity of persons 18 years of age through 20 years of age different from persons 21 years of age including but not limited to the following enumerated public acts." Section 17a was not so enumerated.

The majority concludes that since this Court had construed § 17a as empowering the circuit court to award child support in exceptional circumstances only until a "minor child" attained the age of "majority," when the Legislature reduced the age of majority to eighteen the power of the circuit court to award child support beyond eighteen perforce came to an end.

Section 17a provides that "payment of such allowance for any such child after he attains that age," eighteen, may be awarded in exceptional circumstances, thereby clearly indicating that the 1939 Legislature intended that a "minor child" is nevertheless a "child" for the purposes of the exceptional-circumstances clause beyond eighteen until twenty-one when, at the time § 17a was enacted, he would cease to be a "minor child."

It is not suggested that the 1939 Legislature, when enacting § 17a, contemplated the possible subsequent enactment of legislation raising or lowering the age of majority and intended that whatever the age of majority might be from time to time would be the age beyond which child support could not be awarded. In Johnson and Titus, this Court concluded that the 1939 Legislature, in enacting in § 17a that child support might be continued in exceptional circumstances until arrival at majority, intended that support might in such a case be continued until the age, twenty-one, then the age of majority. By construction, there was thus read into § 17a the concept, expressed in Johnson and Titus, that child support could be awarded in exceptional circumstances beyond eighteen until, but not beyond, twenty-one.

It is contended that, in reducing the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen, the 1971 Legislature repealed by implication the authority conferred in § 17a to award child support in exceptional circumstances until twenty-one. Clearly, child support is not a "dut[y], liabilit[y], responsibilit[y]," or "legal capacity" of the child within the meaning of the Age of Majority Act. While child support might be a "right" of the child, the Age of Majority Act provides generally that rights theretofore acquired at twenty-one henceforth would be acquired at eighteen.

The language employed does not appear to reduce the rights of a person who is eighteen but who has not yet reached twenty-one. The Age of Majority Act does not appear to concern, or have as its purpose reducing, rights acquired at or before birth, but rather accelerating the age of acquisition of rights theretofore not acquired until twenty-one. Nor has our attention been directed to anything in the history of the enactment of the Age of Majority Act that justifies the majority's conclusion that the 1971 Legislature intended that the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a — not concerning a right theretofore acquired at twenty-one nor enumerated in the list of acts "superseded" — be repealed by implication.

There are two other straws in the wind. The Child Custody Act was amended in 1980 by deleting the "exceptional-circumstances" clause from § 7(1) of the act. The Family Support Act continues to provide, however, that in "unusual circumstances, the court may order support for the child after the child reaches 18 years of age and until he or she reaches 21 years of age, or until the further order of the court." The failure to amend the Family Support Act in the manner in which the Child Custody Act was amended dissuades me from deducing legislative intent, operative in the construction of § 17a, on the basis of the amendment of the Child Support Act.