MEMORANDUM ORDER

I. LEO GLASSER, United States District Judge.

In this action, plaintiff Kalliopi Sigala ("Sigala") seeks to recover $200,000 she allegedly loaned to defendants Kiriakos Spikouris ("Spikouris") and Sotiris Lambrou ("Lambrou"). Lambrou has counterclaimed, alleging that Sigala hired Lambrou to operate a fishing vessel owned by Sigala, and that Sigala failed to pay Lambrou wages and other sums due as a result of his operation of the vessel. In the course of discovery, the parties have raised various issues before Magistrate Judge Go, who is supervising discovery in this case. Now before the Court is Lambrou's appeal of an Order by Magistrate Judge Go limiting the number of depositions which may be taken by Lambrou. For the reasons set forth below, Magistrate Judge Go's order should be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

The facts relevant to the present appeal are as follows. Sigala commenced this action in New York Supreme Court, Queens County, on December 1, 1999. (See Harris Decl. Ex. B.) By notice of removal dated February 16, 2000, the action was removed to this Court. (See id. Ex. D.) Sigala then served her initial disclosures, as required by Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. According to Lambrou, Sigala's initial disclosures failed to identify any witnesses likely to have discoverable information regarding her claims. (See id. ¶ 4.)

In February of 2001, Sigala responded to Lambrou's first set of interrogatories. In response to an interrogatory requesting that Sigala "[i]dentify each person who may have knowledge or information . . . concerning or relating to any payments or loans mentioned in the Complaint," Sigala identified four non-parties: Peter Vigianow, Dimitrios Papaioannou, Konstantinos Giannakis, and Anastasios Papantoniou. (See id. Ex. B ¶ 2.) By affidavit dated July 30, 2001, however, Sigala supplemented her interrogatory response, and identified ten more individuals (for a total of 13 people) with knowledge of her loans to the defendants.

Lambrou then began deposing these individuals, and conducted the depositions of Sigala and "three or four" of the witnesses listed on her July 30, 2001 affidavit. (See Transcript of October 2, 2001 Stats Conference Before Hon. Marilyn D. Go, at 6-7 (a copy of which is annexed to the Harris Reply Decl. as Ex. F).) Additionally, Lambrou subpoenaed five other persons — specifically, two of Sigala's friends, Sigala's two adult children, and Rajinder Singh (who was identified on Sigala's July 30, 2001 affidavit) — to appear for depositions, but those individuals failed to appear. (See id. at 7.) In light of this fact, and because the parties had a number of other outstanding discovery issues, Magistrate Judge Go held a conference with the parties on October 2, 2001.

At that conference, Lambrou's counsel informed Magistrate Judge Go that he had conducted a number of depositions, but that he was seeking to depose at least eight more witnesses. (See id. at 8.) Magistrate Judge Go, however, indicated that the issues involved in this case did not warrant the inconvenience of so many depositions. (See, e.g., id, at 9 ("[W]hy do we need so many depositions in this case that involves essentially a couple hundred thousand dollars?").) Lambrou's counsel, however, insisted that he needed to depose all of the persons whom he previously had subpoenaed, as well as all of the remaining witnesses identified on Sigala's July 30, 2001 affidavit. According to Lambrou's counsel:

I have to depose all of them. The reason that I now have to depose all of them is because the ones that I have deposed have given me information that clearly supports my case. . . . [T]he information that I got from the nonparty witnesses that I have deposed says that the so-called loan [from Sigala to Spikouris and Lambrou] was in fact an equity infusion.

(Id. at 10.)

Magistrate Judge Go, however, was unmoved by Lambrou's counsel's explanation. Accordingly, she issued an Order limiting the number of depositions which could be conducted by Lambrou going forward. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Go restricted the persons Lambrou could depose to Singh, "the 3 other relatives of plaintiff' previously subpoenaed. and five additional persons — to be chosen by Lambrou after completing Sigala's deposition — listed on Sigala's July 30, 2001 affidavit. (See October 2, 2001 Order (a copy of which is annexed to the Harris Decl. as Ex. A).) In other words, the net result of Magistrate Judge Go's Order was that Lambrou was permitted to depose at least nine of the thirteen people identified on Sigala's July 30, 2001 affidavit: Singh; the "three or four" persons listed on the affidavit who had already been deposed by Lambrou prior to the October 2, 2001 conference; and the five additional people permitted to be deposed in accordance with Magistrate Judge Go's October 2, 2001 Order. Furthermore, in total, Lambrou was permitted to depose at least thirteen people: the nine persons described immediately above, "the other 3 relatives" of Sigala, and Sigala herself

In addition, Magistrate Judge Go's Order required Sigala to specify which persons listed on her July 30, 2001 affidavit she intended to call at trial. Although not specifically spelled-out in the Order, the purpose of identifying these individuals was to permit Lambrou to depose them, if Lambrou had not already done so. (See Transcript of October 2, 2001 Stats Conference Before Hon. Marilyn D. Go, at 21 ("If there are any other witnesses on your witness list beyond the five additional witnesses plus the four that the defendant has attempted to subpoena [that you intend to call at trial], you identify them. . . . I will give the defendant leave to depose those additional people, too.").)

Lambrou now appeals Magistrate Judge Go's Order. According to Lambrou, "the Order appears to limit Lambrou' s ability to depose all of plaintiffs witnesses, thereby forcing Lambrou to proceed to trial without deposing all of the witnesses whom the plaintiff will be able to call at trial. Lambrou objects to the Order to the extent that it fails to provide that he may depose all witnesses listed on plaintiffs witness list." (Harris Decl. ¶ 9.) Lambrou therefore requests that the Court permit Lambrou to depose all persons listed on Sigala's July 30, 2001 affidavit. (See id. ¶ 11.)

DISCUSSION

With respect to a ruling of a magistrate judge on a pre-trial non-dispositive matter. a district court shall "modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate's order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) ("A judge of the court may reconsider any [nondispositive] pretrial matter . . . where it has been shown that the magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law."). Matters involving pretrial discovery generally are considered nondispositive of the litigation and are subject to the "clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard." Thomas B. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court has stated that a finding is "clearly erroneous" when, "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394 (1948) (quoted in Derthick v. Bassett-Walker Inc., Nos. 90 Civ. 5427, 90 Civ. 7479, 90 Civ. 3845, 1992 WL 249951, at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1992)). "[A] party seeking to overturn a discovery ruling [therefore] generally bears a heavy burden."Com-Tech Assocs. v. Computer Assocs. Intl. Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1078, 1099 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). "Pursuant to this highly deferential standard of review, magistrates are afforded broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes and reversal is appropriate only if their discretion is abused."Lanzo v. City of N.Y., No. 96-CV-3242, 1999 WL 1007346, at 2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 1999) (quoting Derthick, 1992 WL 249951, at 8).

II. Magistrate Judge Go's Order Should Be Affirmed

At the outset, it should be noted that it is difficult to review the parties' papers without having a visceral reaction. The parties' submissions are effused with accusations of obstructionist conduct, replete with complaints concerning the veracity of opposing counsel, and generally overloaded with what can only be fairly described as mud-slinging. Indeed, the animosity with which this case has been litigated has not gone unnoticed by Magistrate Judge Go (see Transcript of October 2, 2001 Status Conference Before Hon. Marilyn D. Go, at 4 (describing case as full of "nastiness and innuendos and distortions of facts")), and counsel's apparent failure to abide by Magistrate Judge Go's directive that they act civilly and courteously is troubling.

In any event, when Lambrou's appeal is stripped of its rhetoric, his argument boils down to a complaint that Magistrate Judge Go's Order "fails to provide that [Lambrou] may depose all witnesses listed on plaintiffs witness list." (Hats Decl. ¶ 9.) In essence, Labrou argues that a defendant should be entitled to depose all of the witnesses that a plaintiff indicates might have knowledge relevant to the subject matter of a lawsuit. This argument must be rejected, because it finds no support in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Federal Rules presumptively limit the number of depositions that each side may conduct to ten. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(a)(2)(A) ("A party must obtain leave of court, which shall be granted to the extent consistent with the principles stated in Rule 26(b)(2), if . . . a proposed deposition would result in more than ten depositions being taken. . . ."); accord Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 104 F. Supp.2d 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Landry v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd., No. Civ. A 99-1438, 2000 WL 1741886, at 2 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 2000). The purpose of Rule 30(a)(2)(A) is to "enable courts to maintain a `tighter rein' on the extent of discovery and to minimize the potential cost of `[w]ide-ranging discovery'. . . ." Whittingham v. Amherst Coll., 163 F.R.D. 170, 171-72 (D. Mass. 1995) (citation omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he mere fact that many individuals may have discoverable information does not necessarily entitle a party to depose each such individual."Dixon v. Certainteed Corp., 164 F.R.D. 685, 692 (D. Kan. 1996).

As noted above, however, a party may request leave to conduct more than ten depositions, and the Court should grant such a request if it is "consistent with the principles stated in Rule 26(b)(2)." Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(a)(2). Rule 26(b)(2) states, in pertinent part:

The frequency or extent of [the] use of [depositions] . . . shall be limited by the court if it determines that (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.

In essence, what has occurred in this case is that Lambrou, at the October 2, 2001 conference, requested leave to take more than ten depositions, and Magistrate Judge Go granted him leave to depose, at a minimum, thirteen people. Lambrou, however, contends that Magistrate Judge Go's Order improperly restricts the number of depositions he can take. This contention is wholly without merit. Indeed, the transcript of the October 2, 2001 conference makes it abundantly clear that Magistrate Judge Go considered the criteria spelled-out in Rule 26(b)(2) — including "the needs of the case," "the amount in controversy," "the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation," and "the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues" — before deciding that thirteen depositions, which exceeds the ten deposition limit in Rule 30(a)(2)(A), was more than enough. (See Transcript of October 2, 2001 Stats Conference Before Hon. Marilyn D. Go, at 8-16.) Furthermore, Lambrou failed to come forward with any evidence beyond pure speculation that the additional persons he sought to depose would provide any evidence that was not cumulative of that he could obtain (or had obtained) from persons he was permitted to depose. Finally, Magistrate Judge Go's Order in no way prejudiced Lambrou, as he will be permitted to depose any additional persons Sigala intends to call at trial. Accordingly, there simply was no abuse of discretion by Magistrate Judge Go in issuing an Order limiting the number of depositions to be taken by Lambrou.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Go's October 2, 2001 Order is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.