Summary
holding that a prisoner who was released, filed his complaint, was reincarcerated, was released again, and filed an amended complaint naming a new party was not a prisoner for PLRA purposes
Summary of this case from Bardes v. MageraOpinion
Civil Action No. 00-CV-5642.
June 23, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court are the Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants Joan Crowe, Louis Brandt, and James Rigney. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Motion of Defendant Rigney and deny the Motions of Defendants Crowe and Brandt.
I. Background
The factual background of this action is detailed in the Court's Memorandum and Order of March 19, 2003 and is incorporated by reference herein.
II. Legal Standard
In deciding a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the test is "whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)). "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, "there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact' . . . [where the non-moving party's] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of [its] case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
An inmate's Eighth Amendment rights are violated if a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs or to a substantial risk of serious harm. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). To set forth a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for violation of the right to adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious medical need, and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979). If denial or delay in the provision of medical attention causes "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," the medical need is a serious one within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. "[W]here prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment . . . and such denial exposes the inmate to undue suffering or the threat of tangible physical injury, deliberate indifference is manifest." Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Exhaustion of Remedies
Defendant Brandt argues that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. However, the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted applies only where the plaintiff is "a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility." 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a); Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002). Plaintiff was not a prisoner when he filed his original Complaint, which was still pending when Plaintiff was re-incarcerated in May 2001. Plaintiff was not a prisoner when he filed his Second Amended Complaint, naming Brandt as a defendant for the first time. A plaintiff who is not incarcerated is not required to exhaust administrative remedies. Ahmed, 297 F.3d at 210.
B. Dr. Rigney's Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant Rigney's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendant Rigney was partially responsible for Plaintiff's medical care from November of 1998 until May of 1999. Deposition of James Rigney, M.D. ("Rigney Deposition"), attached as Exhibit B to Defendant Rigney's Brief in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment ("Rigney Brief") at 6. Rigney saw Plaintiff on approximately seven occasions. See Rigney Brief at 4-6. During this time, his notes reflect a concern for Plaintiff's well-being and show that on a number of occasions he encouraged Plaintiff to receive additional treatment. Id. The record also demonstrates that Rigney attempted to assist Plaintiff in getting additional catheters, a cane, larger shoes, and clean socks. Rigney Brief at 5-6. Plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy of this evidence and has produced no evidence that Rigney acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Accordingly, there is no material issue of fact with respect to Rigney's treatment of Plaintiff and summary judgment must be granted in favor of Rigney.
By the time Plaintiff was re-incarcerated in December 1999, Rigney had ceased caring for prisoners at Bucks County Correctional Facility ("BCCF"). Rigney Deposition at 6.
C. Summary Judgment Motions of Defendants Brandt and Crowe
By contrast, the facts surrounding the claims against Dr. Brandt and Nurse Crowe are disputed. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Brandt and Nurse Crowe were aware that he suffered from a debilitating, painful condition that necessitated clean catheters and proper lubrication, but that they refused to provide the proper materials. Deposition of Ricky Segalow ("Segalow Deposition"), attached as Exhibit B to Defendant Crowe's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Crowe Motion") at 63-4, 184-86, 205-7, 218-233. Plaintiff further avers that Defendants denied him access to necessary medications. Segalow Deposition at 231-36, 257-259, 268. Plaintiff has produced expert testimony that the treatment allegedly given to him was "substandard . . . subhuman and barbaric." See Memorandum and Order of January 28, 2002.
Defendants Brandt and Crowe have produced evidence that the treatment that they provided was neither deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs nor posed a substantial risk of serious harm. See Report of Joseph Harryhill, attached as Exhibit J to Crowe Motion at 3; Report of Lee Harris, attached as Exhibit K to Crowe Motion at 7; Report of Jacqueline Moore, attached as Exhibit L to Crowe Motion at 4. They further deny that Plaintiff needed antibiotics and contend that the care he received for his constipation was adequate. Deposition of Louis Brandt ("Brandt Deposition"), attached as Exhibit E to Crowe Motion at 94; Report of David Kelsey, attached as Exhibit M to Crowe Motion at 2. They each claim that they did not know of the severity of Plaintiff's symptoms. Brandt Deposition 57-at 65, Crowe Deposition at 24-34. Finally, each contends that the other was the senior individual in charge of Plaintiff's medical care. Crowe Deposition at 8-9; Brandt Deposition at 10-11, 50, 73.
Whether Defendants Brandt and Crowe knew about Plaintiff's condition, whether they were deliberately indifferent to it, and whether their care risked serious harm to Plaintiff are all disputed issues of material fact. Plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable trier of fact to find in his favor. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate at this time.
IV. Conclusion
Issues of material fact remain with regard to the claims against Defendants Brandt and Crowe, but not with regard to the claims against Defendant Rigney. Accordingly, Defendant Rigney's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted and those of Defendants Brandt and Crowe will be denied.