DEW, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court reversing and remanding an award of the Industrial Commission of Missouri in respect only to an application for an additional allowance of attorney's fees.

From the meager transcript and from the facts stated and not denied in the respective briefs of the parties, we understand the salient, undisputed facts to be as related below.

The respondent Cosgrove is an attorney at law and as such represented the appellant in her claim before the Industrial Commission of Missouri, for an award growing out of the death of Charles Laird Sanderson. The appellant is the widow of the deceased employee, and guardian of his minor daughter. The claim, as filed before the commission, was duly assigned to its referee who, after hearing and considering the same, awarded to the claimant $12,645, payable $15 a week to the widow for 609.2 weeks, and to the guardian $5 a week until the death or remarriage of the widow, in which event the daughter to receive the allowances as her interest may appear. In that award respondent Cosgrove was allowed a 25 percent attorney's fee, the same to be a lien on the award. The award was exclusive of medical and burial expenses. Thereupon the employer and insurer appealed to the full Industrial Commission, whereupon respondent Cosgrove appeared and represented the claimant, and the appeal resulted in a reversal of the referee's finding and award. Thereafter, appellant perfected an appeal to the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, in behalf of claimant and that court reversed and set aside the finding and final award of the Industrial Commission, found the facts to be undisputed, and entered a judgment in favor of the claimant, awarding $12,645 in certain installments. From that decision and award of the Circuit Court the employer and insurer prosecuted their appeal to the Supreme Court, wherein respondent Cosgrove continued to represent the claimant. The case contained some unusual features, was thoroughly briefed and presented by both parties. In due time the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court, 360 Mo. 571, 229 S.W.2d 563.

Upon the receipt of the mandate from the Supreme Court by the Industrial Commission, John J. Cosgrove filed an application before the Commission for additional attorney's fees, alleging the previous allowance of 25 percent by the referee, and setting forth the character of his services thereafter rendered before the full commission, the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court, the unusual points involved and the skillful opposition met with in the litigation. On July 14, 1950, the commission denied the application for an increase in attorney's fees and proceeded to enter its final award for medical expenses and for compensation "in accordance with the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, as affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri." The entry provided for medical allowances, weekly payments of compensation according to the Circuit Court judgment, and included the words "and (the award) is also subject to a lien in favor of John J. Cosgrove, attorney, in an amount of equal to 25 percent of the money award payable hereunder (exclusive of medical and burial expenses) for necessary legal services rendered. The application of said attorney for an increase of attorney's fees is hereby denied." From that award of July 14, 1950, John J. Cosgrove appealed to the Circuit Court from that part of the award denying his application for an increase of attorney's fees. The Circuit Court, on such appeal, found "that there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award", and found from the evidence, as a matter of law, that the judgment therein is subject to a lien in favor of John J. Cosgrove, attorney therein. The judgment of the Circuit Court was that the finding and award of the commission be set aside as to the attorney's lien and that the cause be remanded to the commission for hearing as to attorney's lien only, on the application for an increase of attorney's fees theretofore filed by John J. Cosgrove. From this judgment of the Circuit Court the present appeal was taken by the claimant Helen Sanderson.

We think that a misunderstanding of the facts on the part of both parties here changes the complexion of this case, and in a respect to which we must take notice. In stating the facts as they existed prior to the application for an increase of attorney's fees filed before the commission after mandate from the Supreme Court, appellant says in her brief that in the Supreme Court "an award of the referee in favor of the defendants was upheld", citing the decision. Respondent Cosgrove in his brief states that the Circuit Court "reinstated the award of the referee", and that the "Supreme Court sustained the Circuit Court and affirmed the judgment of that court". Upon reference to the opinion of the Supreme Court, 229 S.W.2d 563, we find it there stated that "the Circuit Court reversed and set aside the finding and final award of the Industrial Commission and entered a judgment for claimant, awarding $12,645." (Italics supplied.) The judgment of the Circuit Court on that appeal and so affirmed, is not shown in the record before us in the present proceeding. Upon our own motion we have ordered up a certified copy of the judgment of the Circuit Court, affirmed by the Supreme Court. Supreme Court Rule 1.03. From the transcript of that judgment we find that the Circuit Court on that review of award of the commission, after finding the facts to be undisputed, found the award of the commission not supported by the facts found by it nor warranted by sufficient competent evidence; that as a matter of law the deceased died from accidental injuries on January 14, 1948, arising out of and in the course of his employment, whereupon the Circuit Court entered its own judgment setting aside the award of the commission, and awarding the claimant certain installment payments in a total sum of $12,645. That judgment made no provision for any attorney's fees nor for any lien therefor. It is that judgment that was affirmed by the Supreme Court and which became the final award to be entered and which was entered by the commission and, thereupon, the award of the referee, which allowed attorney's fees, passed out of the case.

Upon appeal to the Circuit Court in such cases, and where the facts are not in dispute, the question of what the award shall be becomes one of law, and the Circuit Court may enter its own award in the light of such undisputed facts. Kristanik v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 335 Mo. 60, 70 S.W.2d 890, 894; Gantner v. Fayette Brick Tile Co., Mo.App., 236 S.W.2d 415, 418. Its right to do so in the instant case cannot now be disputed, since it was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Thus upon the receipt of the mandate from the Supreme Court by the commission, the final award in the case contained no provisions whatever for attorney's fees. Assuming that the commission considered the application for an increase of attorney's fees to serve the purpose of an ordinary application for attorney's fees, the fact remains that the commission, then fully advised of all of the services rendered by John J. Cosgrove throughout the litigation, expressly overruled his application for an increase of fees, but provided in its entry of the final award, that the award was subject to a lien in favor of John J. Cosgrove, attorney, of 25 percent of the money award, exclusive of medical and burial expenses, for necessary legal services rendered the defendants. Respondent Cosgrove says in his own brief: "In other words, the commission knew, was advised and is legally bound to take judicial notice of the fact that valuable, additional legal services had been rendered by Mr. Cosgrove since the rendition of the original finding by the referee at which time he was allowed a lien of 25 percent for attorney's fees." Thus the grounds assigned for the reversal by the trial court in the present proceedings are nonexistent, since the commission had allowed to John J. Cosgrove attorney's fees and a lien therefor; had already passed on his application for additional fees and denied the same, and had so acted upon full knowledge of the services rendered. Under Section 3711, R.S.Mo., 1939, Section 287.260, R.S.Mo. 1949, the authority and discretion is lodged in the commission to determine, allow and to regulate attorney's fees in matters pending before it and the action in that connection should not be disturbed unless it can be said, as a matter of law, that the allowance made was so inadequate and so unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of the discretion of the commission. Under the record, it is our opinion that we cannot, nor could the Circuit Court, declare that an allowance of attorney's fees of 25 percent in the final award was, as a matter of law, so unreasonable or inadequate as to amount to an abuse of the commission's discretion. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed.

All concur.